



# ब्रह्मसूत्रम्

भाष्यव्यास-नाम-संस्कृत-टीकया तथा  
वचनविद्या-समन्वितेन राजमानन्द-निबद्धेन भाष्येन

उपनिषद्-गीता-सम्पादकेन

श्रीसीतानाथ-तत्त्वभूषणेन व्याख्यातं सम्पादितञ्च

मुम्बई टीकाव्यास राजमानन्दप्रवादी व्याख्याया तथा एम् ए इन्दुपाधिशारिण्या

श्रीसतीशचन्द्र चक्रवर्तिना कृतं

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श्रीदेवेन्द्रनाथशास्त्रिण मुद्रितं प्रकाशितञ्च

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# THE BRAHMA SÚTRAS

EDITED WITH SHORT AND EASY SANSKRIT ANNOTATIONS  
AND AN ENGLISH COMMENTARY GIVING AN EXPOSITORY  
AND CRITICAL SUMMARY OF THE CONCEPTS

By  
SÍTÁNÁTH TATTVABHÚSHAN  
Editor of the twelve principal *Upanishads* and  
the *Bhagavadgītā*

The *sūtras* and the annotations translated into English  
by the Editor and  
SATISHCHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI M.A.

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पृष्ठाङ्कः.

Rāmmohann Bhāshya

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## PREFACE

The *Brahma Sūtras* called also the *Vedānta Sūtras* the *Sārākra Mīmāṃsā*, the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, and by several other names, are a body of aphorisms expounding and systematising the teachings of the *Upanishads* and refuting doctrines opposed to them. They are the earliest known work on the subject and are ascribed to Bādarāyana the supposed compiler of the Vedas. As such they are held in high esteem by all the chief schools of Hindu religious thought. As one of the three *prasthānas* or institutes of Vedic Theism revivalists of the national creed have, ever since the days of Sankarāchārya appealed to them and written commentaries on them. We thus possess, besides the commentary of Sankara, those of the Śivites of Southern India and the Vaishnava *bhāshyas* of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka Ballabha and Baladeva Rājā Rāmmohan Rāy, the last great reviver of Indian Theism, also followed his predecessors in the line by writing Bengali commentaries on the *Prasthanatraya*. His commentary on five of the principal *Upanishads* and that on the *Sūtras* are included in his published works, while that on the *Bhagavadgīta* is lost. As a humble worker in the same field and a follower of the Rājā, it has been a part of my life's aim and object to publish the twelve principal *Upanishads*, the *Gīta* and the *Sūtras* with annotations and translation. With the publication of this work that arduous task is completed by the

grace of God inspite of numerous obstacles and difficulties. The annotations were completed as early as 1907. This was done at the earnest request of my esteemed friend, Babu Pratulchandra Sora, the present editor of the *Indian Messenger*, who was at that time carrying on a publishing business. He had already published my *Uddet* and my Devanagar and English edition of ten of the principal *Upanishads* and now proposed that the contemplated edition of the *Sūtras* should be prepared and published even before those of the two remaining *Upanishads* and the *Gītā*. But this it seems was not the will of God. Through unforeseen causes my friend's business languished and failed and the incomplete manuscript of the *Sūtras* lay in my desk for nearly a quarter of a century. But God, in his own good time, raised helpers in his inscrutable way. After the Sanskrit and Bengali editions of the *Chhândogya* and the *Bṛhadâraṇyaka*, and the Devanagar and English edition of the *Gītā* had come out, my esteemed brother, Sir R. Venkata Ratnam, who must be too well-known to readers of my works to need any introduction, proposed that the *Sūtra* manuscript should be completed and published\*. As in the case of the *Gītā*, an unexpected helper came forward to sustain my old and enfeebled hand. My translation of the text and the annotations

By the Brâhma Mission Board of Cocanada founded through the pious munificence of the Maharaja of Pithapuram.

had proceeded only up to the tenth *sūtra* of *pāda* I chapter II, that is a little more than five of the sixteen sections of the book. The remaining and major portion of the work was now undertaken and ably done by my dear and esteemed friend, Āchārya Satīschandra Chakravartī M. A., Missionary Sādhāran Brāhma Samāḥ. It has been carefully revised by me. The long-completed annotations also have undergone a thorough revision. They are written, like my annotations on the *Ten Upanishads* with the help of Sankara's great commentary. I have freely quoted from him words, phrases and sentences required to explain the verbal meaning of the *Sūtras*, often re writing his sentences in a diffuse and more intelligible form where they seemed too compact and so unintelligible to the general reader. But I have not followed him in his philosophical interpretation of the *sūtras*. That interpretation based on his doctrine of illusion, seems to me often forced and biassed. I have tried to find out by an independent study of the aphorisms, helped indeed by Sankara's literal exposition of them, what the real philosophy of the *Sūtrakāra* is, and to expound it in the English *bhāṣya* forming the introduction to this book. Neither in my annotations nor in my introduction, however, have I given my own views of Sankara's philosophy. Such as they are, these views are set forth in my other works, specially in my *Vedānta and its Relation to Modern Thought* and my account of his teachings in Natesan's *Srī Sankar-āchārya*. My *bhāṣya*, as the reader will see, is a

summary, expository and critical, of all the sixteen pádas of the *Sútras*. A clear idea of the entire *Sútra* teaching will, it is hoped, be got from it even without going through the annotations and their translation.

As to the date and authorship of the aphorisms, the historical research of Indologists has, up to the present time, failed to come to a satisfactory conclusion. That Bádaráyana or Kṛṣṇa Dvaipáyana, the reputed compiler of the Vedas, is the author of the aphorisms, is a mere tradition. Bádaráyana is indeed often referred to in them as one of several early exponents of the *Upanishads*, but there is nothing in these references to prove that he was the author of the *sútras*. About the compilation of the Vedas, it is tentatively concluded from a statement in an old astronomical work, that the task was concluded about 1181 B C. But the *Brahma Sútras* cannot really be so old. The schools of thought mentioned in them, specially such doctrines as Buddhism, Jainism and the Bhágvata-Pancharátra cult, belong to much later times. Panini's *Sútras*, which probably belong to the end of the fourth century before Christ, mention (in iv 3 110) a *Bhikshu Sútra* and ascribe it to Párasarya, that is Kṛṣṇa Dvaipáyana, the son of Parásara. If this means our *Sútras*, they must have existed at least a century before Panini to have merited his attention and reference. But if they at all existed then, they must have done so in a much briefer form than what has come down to us and cannot have contained the elaborate discussions of opposed doctrines we find in them, for even if these doctrines had at all been taught

in those days, they must have been then in a more or less incipient form. However, our concern is with the book itself, its intrinsic worth and usefulness, and not its age and authorship. Whoever may have written it, and in whatever period of our history it may have appeared, it has largely and profoundly influenced the religious and philosophical thought of our people through ages and given rise to a vast literature. As such, it deserves our attentive, reverent and at the same time critical study. If the present edition of the work helps in such a study, my labours, in this evening of my life, will not have been in vain.

210 3 2 Cornwallis Street }  
Calcutta, July 25, 1932. }

EDITOR





# Ramamohana Bhashya\* on the Brahmasutras

## CHAPTER I

### Pada I

The sources of knowledge recognised by the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy may be divided though bearing various names and forms, into three classes,—*Pratyaksha*, perception, *Anumana*, inference and *Sabda*, revelation. The unity of these is only ultimately and then also not explicitly recognised. The author of the *Sutras* depends primarily on the third of these sources of knowledge and only secondarily on the second for the conclusions arrived at by him. His work therefore is more exegetical than philosophical in character. This distinction of exegesis and philosophy however is not clearly recognised in this country. Revelation being commonly recognised as an independent source of knowledge, the interpretation of scripture is accepted as a philosophical process equally with inference or reasoning. This needs to be remembered in entering upon the study of these aphorisms. The reader who begins his study with the expectation of

\* So named out of reverence for Raja Rammohan Ray of whom the author is a humble follower. The Raja's own bhashya, included in his collected Bengali works, is given in Dr Guruprasad Mitra's edition of the *Sutras*.

going through a process of pure reasoning as he is made to do by a philosophical work in the western sense, is likely to be greatly disappointed. Revelation, that is the Vedas recognised as a distinct source of knowledge, being a common ground between our author and his orthodox opponents, a large part of his work is devoted to showing by means of interpretation that words and phrases in the Upanishads and other parts of the Vedas which his opponents take as meaning nature or the individual self, really mean God, the Universal Self. To him such appeals to scripture is final, establishing to his own satisfaction the creed he holds,—the Upanishadic system of Brahmanvāda, Absolutistic Theism. It is only incidentally that he appeals to reason in elucidation of Theism and that mostly in refutation of opposed systems. His appeal to scripture, however, will be found to be ultimately nothing more than an appeal to the direct spiritual vision of every purified soul, but he adopts no method likely to be satisfactory to modern thinkers by which such direct knowledge of [things super-sensuous can be distinguished] from superstition and acquired beliefs. As the present writer has often said in his former works on the Vedānta, the composers of the Upanishads, the makers of the scriptures appealed to in these aphorisms, were perfect free-thinkers, recognising no external authority and appealing only to the introspection and understanding of their readers. Their thoughts do not constitute a regular system. The *Brahmasūtras*, though entitled the *Nyāya-māsthāna* or logical form of Hindu Theism, realises only partially the idea of

a system Its idea of scripture as a revelation to be dogmatically accepted whether one directly sees its truth or not, restrains its free course of thought and prevents it from growing into a truly philosophical system However with this short introduction as to their true character we proceed to give in our own words the purport of these aphorisms They seem to represent, in their studiously condensed form calculated to aid the memory, the essence of long discourses on the subject-matter of the Upanishads The lecturer or some advanced and thoroughly reliable pupil must have embodied the substance of the discourses in the form which has come down to us The aphorisms must have been used by successive lecturers as texts of their discourses and thus given rise to the commentaries which now help us to understand them

In the first chapter the opponents criticised seem to be chiefly the Sāṅkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas the followers respectively of Kapila and Jaimini They give to Prakṛti and Puruṣa, nature and the individual self what belongs properly to Brahman the Universal Self the Absolute Our author by his true interpretation of some texts of the Upanishads misinterpreted by his opponents tries to bring them to Theism The first sūtra merely proposes the general subject of the whole treatise,—inquiring into Brahman The phrase *athāta* seems only a conventional form of beginning a sūtra treatise and may not really mean all that Sankara attributes to it. But we have followed

him and his commentator, Govindānanda, in their exposition of the phrase because the doctrine here propounded by them, namely (1) that the four disciplines, *sādhana-chatushtaya*, must precede a serious inquiry into the Absolute and (2) that liberation is impossible without a real knowledge of God, are integral parts of Vedantic teaching whether they are symbolised or not by the *sūtra* words '*atha*' and '*atah*'. However, the second aphorism necessarily follows the first. Inquiring into Brahman being proposed, the next question is 'What is Brahman?' The word may mean the Vedas, the Brāhmana order or caste, the created universe conceived as an embodied being and called '*Hiranyagarbha*', and even nature conceived as the whole or the material cause of the sensuous world. All these meanings are set aside by the definition given in the *sūtra*, namely that the Brahman whose nature is about to be inquired into is the cause of the origin, continuance and disappearance of the world, and one of the most oft-quoted scriptural texts, *Taittirīya* III 1, is referred to in its support. But how can we be sure that the cause of the world is an intelligent being and not an unconscious or indefinable substance or power? The third aphorism answers this question. Among the things created by Brahman are the scriptures, the Vedas, a store-house of vast wisdom. This is stated in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II 4 10. Now, how can the scriptures, such as they are, be the product of any other than an intelligent cause? If there were no wisdom in the cause, there could not be any wisdom

in the effect. But 'Sastrayoni' may also mean a reality whose evidence is in the scriptures. If so the same conclusion follows. The scriptures everywhere speak of the cause of the world as an intelligent being. So the wisdom of God follows from the scriptural proof of his existence. But an objector may contend that the scriptures do not everywhere teach an intelligent cause of the world—that there are passages in them speaking of causes other than intelligent. The answer to this objection is given in detail in the fourth and the following seven sūtras. In the fourth it is generally stated that the only true and self-consistent interpretation of the scriptures is that which shows that Brahman the omniscient cause of the world is the final purport or object of all scriptural teaching. The next seven aphorisms show how, on the authority of the scriptures, the Sāṅkhya doctrine that Prakṛti or Pradhāna, an unintelligent power is the cause of the world, is untenable. The fifth sūtra points out that in the *Chhāndogya* description of creation (vi. 2) *Sat* the primal reality before he manifests himself as the world, thought, 'May I be many may I grow forth'. How can one who thinks be the unintelligent cause spoken of by the Sāṅkhya philosophy? But may it not be, an objector may say that thinking is attributed to the first cause only in a secondary or figurative sense? The sixth sūtra answers this objection by pointing out that in the very scriptural passage referred to the primal reality is spoken of as 'self'. *Sat* is made to say, "Let me now enter these three divinities (*tejas*,

ap and anna) in the form of this living self' The use of the term 'self', which can never mean an unintelligent reality, with reference to the cause of the world in the passage clearly shows that thinking is attributed to it in its primary and not in a secondary or figurative sense. But may it not be, the objector continues, that by 'self' the scripture means nothing but Prakṛiti? This objection is answered by the seventh aphorism *Śrīśāstratara* II 15 says that it is only by seeing Brahman through the knowledge of the self that one is liberated. If 'self' means the unconscious Pradhāna, it follows that liberation is attainable by devotion to an unconscious object which is absurd. Another reason why the scriptural *sat* described as the self cannot be the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna is this. Liberation implies both a negative and a positive process. It is attainable by setting aside the unreal and holding fast to the real. The Sāṅkhya system itself teaches that to attain knowledge the Pradhāna should be set aside, not being a part of the real nature of Puruṣa, and the latter in its unalloyed form held fast to. Now if the 'self' in the scriptural passages referred to really meant the Pradhāna, the scriptures should have spoken of the self as something to be set aside (*heya*). As they do not say so, they cannot mean by it the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna. A further reason why the unconscious Pradhāna cannot be meant by the scriptural *sat* and self is stated in the next sūtra, the 9th. Here and there in the Upanishads it is taught that in dreamless sleep the individual self gets united with, is merged in, the *sat*

It is then said to go to its real self. One of the clearest of such passages is *Chhândogya* vi 8 1. Now, if the *sat* and the self really meant the unconscious Prakriti, then it would seem that in sleep the conscious merges in the unconscious as in its true nature. This view is absurd and does not form a part either of the Vedānta or the Sāṅkhya philosophy. The 10th sūtra merely emphasises the fact that the Upanishads everywhere teach an intelligent cause of the world. The 11th aphorism instances a clear expression of the truth in scripture namely *Svetāśvatara* vi 9 where in speaking of the all knowing Lord, it clearly says "He is the cause."

In the next eight sūtras, from the 12th to the 19th the discussion centres round the second chapter of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* called the "Brahmānanda Valli." This chapter is very important and constitutes the scriptural basis of the Vedāntic doctrine of *Panchakoṣha* the five sheaths of the self. It speaks of the five manifestations of Brahman as matter, life, sensibility, understanding and bliss. The last *Ānandamaya* being the fullest and highest manifestation the author of the sūtras identifies it with the Absolute and would not allow it to be regarded as anything relative. His first reason, given in the 12th aphorism for his contention is that in the chapter in question and elsewhere too the term *Ānandamaya* is repeatedly applied to Brahman. But his opponent objects—the suffix *mayat* is used in the sense of modification, *anandamaya* therefore means something modified or changed into the form of bliss, something therefore which is subject to change.



and so cannot refer to the Absolute, which is above change or modification. This objection is answered in the 13th sūtra. The answer is that the suffix *mayat* is not exclusively used in the sense of modification, it means also abundance, for example in '*annamaya yajna*', which means a sacrifice in connection with which there is an abundant provision for food. Here, in '*ānandamaya*', the suffix is clearly used in that sense. Brahman as abounding in bliss is called '*Ānandamaya*'. This conclusion is confirmed, says the 14th sūtra, by the seventh verse of this chapter, which speaks of Brahman as the only source of bliss. That '*Ānandamaya*' in the passage in question means the Supreme Self, is further proved, says the 14th aphorism, by the fact that the same Brahman who is spoken of in the *Taittiriya* mantra, '*Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*' (II 6 5) is also mentioned in the *Ānandamaya* section referred to. The 15th sūtra points out that having spoken of the *Ānandamaya* the passage referred to says (in the 6th verse), "He created all this whatever there is". Now, this proves that the '*Ānandamaya*' means the Supreme Self, and not any inferior self, for it is impossible for any but the former to create all things. That the *Ānandamaya* cannot be any created self, is further proved, says the 17th sūtra, by the fact that in the passages under discussion the Creator and the created are spoken as different from each other, the latter as gaining the former and thus becoming happy. As the gainer cannot be the gained, the *Ānandamaya* cannot be any created self. This sūtra is significant

as one of those in this body of aphorisms which clearly admits the difference between the universal and the individual self. However the 18th sūtra adduces one more reason for setting aside the supposition that the unconscious Pradhāna is meant by Ānandamaya. In the passage in question the Ānandamaya is represented as wishing before creation to be manifested in the form of the variegated universe (ii 0). How could the unconscious Pradhāna wish? Hence there is no reason for the above supposition. The last argument against a non theistic interpretation of the ānandamaya passage is set forth in the 19th sūtra, and it is this — In its seventh verse the passage teaches that the created self obtains fearlessness, that is *mokṣha* liberation through union with the Ānandamaya. How could liberation be attained through union with an unconscious object or a finite self?

The next two sūtras, the 20th and the 21st, refer to the *Chhândogya* passage i 0 6 and to another passage *Bṛihadâraṇyaka* iii. 7 0, which seems to support the interpretation put by the author of the aphorisms upon the former passage. The *Chhândogya* speaks of an effulgent person in the solar regions who is free from sin. The description given is that of an embodied being, and hence the *prima facie* interpretation of the passage is that it refers to a finite being, a deity, but not the Supreme Deity. It may be the individual self of the sun,—the self who regards the sun as his body. Every important object is regarded by the author and other followers of the Upanishads as having an *abhimānini devatā*, a deity who thinks,—‘I am this

object, this is my body" But no finite being even though a deity, can be sinless, perfect, by nature though one can attain to perfection by *sādhana*, spiritual endeavour. Now, the person referred to in the passage in question is said to be transcending all sin. The conclusion which necessarily follows is therefore this, that the person of whom the passage speaks is the Supreme Self and not any finite self who has attained to excellence through a course of spiritual culture. A good deal of discussion arises out of this conclusion into which we will not enter. We shall only briefly indicate the progress of Vedic thought as regards the sun. At first it was only one of the thirty-three gods of the Vedic pantheon. It was then raised to the place of the Supreme Deity, at which stage the *Gāyatrī mantra* was composed. The rise of Upanishadic Absolutism again reduced the sun to his former place as only one god among many gods. But as all finite selves, whether human or divine, must have the Infinite, the Perfect, in them, so the sun-god was regarded as containing the sinless in him. His 'beard', 'hair', 'nails' and 'eyes' may be taken as only metaphorical, specially as '*huanmaya*' means consisting of consciousness, that is spiritual, in many Upanishadic passages, or they may be a relic of the old anthropomorphic way of thinking which some of the composers of the Upanishads could not quite shake off. It may be stated here that the person spoken of in this passage is mentioned also in verses 15 and 16 of the *Īsopanishad* and v 15. 1 of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, where his nature is called

*lalyánatama*, perfectly good, another divine attribute inapplicable to a finite being

However let us now come to the next sūtra the 21st. The passage referred to in it occurs in a remarkable passage of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*,—the *Antarvīmi Brāhmaṇa* of its third chapter, and embodies the substance of Yājñavalkya's speech in reply to a question put to him by his *guru*, Uddālaka Āraṇi in Janaka's great assembly. To see the full significance of the passage the reader must go through the whole *Brāhmaṇa* or section. The use which the author of the sūtras makes of it is this. In it the distinction of the Supreme Self from the individual self of the sun is distinctly acknowledged. In the other parts of the same discourse its distinction from the *abhimānint deśatas* embodied in the other important objects of the world is brought out in the same manner. This confirms the conclusion arrived at in the 20th aphorism that the golden person in the sun is the Supreme Being and not the particular self of the solar regions or any other finite person. We now come to the 22nd sūtra. It refers to *Chhāndogya* i 9 and viii 14 where occurs the word *ākāśa* which usually means elemental ether but here as our author shows, means the Infinite Cause of all phenomena. *Chhāndogya* i 8 and 9 record a conversation on the *udgītha* that is the syllable *Om* and the Absolute which it indicates between two Brāhmaṇas and Pravāhana Jaibali a king. In their search after the Absolute one of the Brāhmaṇas stopped at heaven and the other at the earth. King Jaibali having heard both showed that both of them

were wrong, for the real Absolute, that from which all phenomena arise and to which they all return, is *Ākāśa*, which is the true Infinite. The same thing is said more explicitly in the other passages in which the terms 'Brahman' and 'Ātma' are clearly applied to *ākāśa*. Our author's argument for the interpretation he puts upon the word '*ākāśa*' is that the attributes ascribed to *ākāśa* in the passages referred to, namely that it is the origin (*gati*) of this world and that it is "the revealer of names and forms" are those of Brahman and cannot belong to any person or thing other than he.

In the 23rd sūtra the term '*prāna*,' which may mean, as it usually does, 'breath,' which is only a form of air, is interpreted as meaning Brahman, and for the same reason as in the preceding sūtra, namely because in the passage referred to attributes which can belong only to God are ascribed to *prāna*. The reference is to the interesting story of Ushasti Chákráyana, which the reader will find in the tenth and eleventh sections of the first chapter of the *Chhándogya*. In reply to the question of the singer of a particular hymn as to who the deity of that hymn was, Ushasti said, '*Prāna*,' and added, "All these creatures merge into *Prāna* alone and from *Prāna* alone do they rise." Now, this can be said of Brahman alone and of nothing else.

The four succeeding sūtras, 24th-27th, discuss the meaning of the word '*jyoti*, light, used in *Chhándogya* in 13.7. They interpret it as meaning Brahman and nothing else, and answer the objections that may be raised against this interpretation. The passage referred

to is connected with the previous section *Chh. lil. 12*, which in the course of a meditation on Brahman identifies him with the *Gayatri mantra* composed in the *Gāyatri* metre which has four pādas (feet) : 4 parts. It may seem that the word *jyotiḥ* in the first *Chhândogyâ* passage means either natural light or points to the *Gāyatri* metre. But our author says in his 24th aphorism that the word means Brahman because in the meditation contained in the second passage the same reality that is indicated by *jyotiḥ* in the first passage is said to have four feet : that is four aspects or forms of manifestation. Now this attribute that of having four feet or forms of manifestation belongs to Brahman and not to natural light. But if *jyotiḥ* does not mean Brahman may it not mean the *Gāyatri mantra* or metre which in *Chhândogyâ lil. 12* is said to have four feet? This objection is mentioned and answered in sūtra 25. It points out, what we have already said in effect above, that the *Gayatri* is used in the passage referred to only as a help to the fixing of the mind in Brahman. This way of realising the presence of God with the help of some phenomenal object is mentioned the sūtra adds in other scriptural texts also for instance in the *Āitareya Aranyaka* which mentions the *Uktha* hymn fire and the *Mahābrata* ceremony as so used by the followers of the *Rik*, the *Yajur* and the *Saman* respectively. Moreover though the *Gāyatri* metre has 4 feet in a sense, the text in *Chh. lil. 12. 1*, "One foot of it constitutes all beings three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven" at once settles the doubt whether *jyotiḥ* means the *Gāyatri* or Brahman, because without reference to Brahman the

mere Gáyatrí metre cannot be said to have all beings as one of its feet This is the purport of the 26th sūtra It may be mentioned here that the text speaking of all beings as a foot of Brahman is taken from the celebrated Purusha Sūkta of the *Rigveda* (x 90 30) But the objector is not satisfied, and raises a verbal difficulty He says, 'In the first passage (*Chh* iii 12 6) *du*, heaven, has the seventh case-ending and means a place, whereas in the second, *Chh* iii 13 7, the same word bears the fifth case-ending and means a limit Now, this change of termination having broken the unity of the subject-matter, the word cannot mean the same object in both the texts Our author answers this objection in his 27th sūtra by saying that this change of form in the word '*div*' does not constitute any real change in the teaching In spite of the difference in the case-ending of *div*, the object dealt with in the two texts is recognised as the same

In the next four sūtras, forming the last *adhikāraṇa* or topic of the pāda, a very important subject is discussed, a discussion which has an important bearing on our later religious literature In the *Bhagavadgītā* and such other books an individual identifies himself with the Supreme Being and speaks in his name In the third chapter of the *Kaushītaki* Upanishad, Indra, a Vedic god, does the same The author of the *Sūtras* thinks that the sage Vāmadeva does the same thing in *Rigveda* iv 26 1 The present discussion shows in what sense such an identification of the individual and the Universal is possible and defensible The Śāstras, by which the Vedas are meant,—and here their Upanishad

portions are specially meant,—teach that the individual self is really one with the Universal, though spiritually unenlightened people do not feel this unity. Those who know and feel it are entitled to speak in the name of God. This is the philosophical basis of the doctrine of incarnation so prominent in Puranic literature. The whole subject is somewhat fully discussed with the necessary quotations in the second lecture of the present writer's *'Krishna and the Gita*. Here in the 29th sūtra, the word *'Prāṇa* in *Au* iii. 2 is interpreted as Brahman because the very connotation of the words in the sentence wherein the term occurs clearly shows this. But the objection may arise that in the passage in question *Indra* an individual god, speaks of himself and so *'Prāṇa* cannot mean Brahman. This objection is stated and answered in the 20th sūtra. The answer is that as in the chapter where the passage occurs there are numerous references to the Inner Self of all selves *Indra*, in speaking of himself as *Prāṇa*, means his Inner Self and not his individuality. But why does he speak of himself at all? This question is put and answered in the oft-quoted 30th sūtra, the most important aphorism of the group. The answer is that *Indra* does so by looking upon his own self in the light of scriptural teaching,—the teaching which shows the fundamental unity of the individual and the universal self. In sūtra 31 another objection is raised and answered. *Prāṇa* in the passage in question cannot mean Brahman, it may be said, for the characteristics of the individual self and those of the vital breath are mentioned in the passage and so either one or both



of them are meant by '*Prána*' The answer is this If it were so, then we should have to admit that in the same passage three distinct meditations,—those on Brahman, the individual self and the vital breath, are prescribed, which is improbable. As '*Prána*' is used for Brahman with his characteristics in other passages of the Upanishads, for instance in *Prasna* iii, and in *Mundaka* iii 14 &c, it is reasonable to suppose that here also Brahman alone is meant In that case the three forms of meditation may be taken as a meditation on the same Being, the Supreme, under three forms, the phenomenal forms of the individual self and the vital breath, and Brahman's own transcendent form of nature In the well-known Sándilya Vidyá (*Chh* iii 14 2) Brahman is meditated upon in several phenomenal forms

## Pada 2

The Sândilya Vidya in *Chhândogya* lil. 14 is one of the most important and oft-quoted passages in the Upanishads. It is also one of the best of the *vidyâs* or *upasanâs* (devout meditations) prescribed in them. In a few sentences it sets forth the gist of Upanishadic teaching—the immanent and transcendent nature of the Deity and the goal and destiny of man which is union with God. There can be no doubt that the subject matter of the *vidyâ* is the Supreme Being, but there will be objectors even about the plainest matters. And so our author is at pains to show that it is God and no inferior being to whom the great affirmations of the *vidyâ* refer. Sûtras 1-4 form a group giving a true interpretation of the scriptural passage referred to and answering objections. In the first sūtra the author's contention that the Sândilya Vidya speaks of Brahman and not of any other reality remains implied and only the argument in its support is given. The argument is a general one—as all Vedanta texts teach Brahman, so this particular text must also be supposed to teach him. The second sūtra is more definite. It says that the attributes mentioned in the passage for instance whose thoughts are true can belong only to the Supreme Being. The third sūtra points out that as these attributes cannot belong to the embodied self, it cannot be the subject matter of the meditation. The fourth sūtra supports the contention of the third by pointing to the fact that he to whom the mentioned attributes belong is

set up in the passage as the object of meditation and the embodied self as its subject. The fifth sūtra finds a further support of the same contention in the fact that in the *Satapatha* passage treating of the same subject there is an actual difference of case-ending in the words meaning respectively the finite and the infinite self. Whereas the former has the seventh case-ending, the latter has the first, clearly proving that the two words indicate different objects. This difference of the finite and the Infinite is recognised, says the 6th sūtra, in the *Smṛiti* also (the *Bhagavadgītā* xviii 61) and in the same way, that is by difference of case-endings in the words indicating them. But is not the subject-matter of the *Sāṅkhya* *Vidyā* said to be *anfyān*, small, an attribute which can belong only to the individual self? No, says the seventh sūtra, for the Lord is so described only with reference to the lotus-like cavity of the heart where he is to be thought of as manifested, and not because he is actually small. Space, though infinite, is said to be small when it is thought of as existing in the eye of a needle and such other things. But if the Lord really exists in the heart of the individual, is he not subject to the pleasures and pains of the world? No, says the 8th sūtra, for the finite and the infinite self being different from each other, only the former is subject to pleasure and pain, and not the latter.

We now come to the second group consisting of two sūtras, the 9th and 10th. The first of these contends that he who is said in *Katha* 1 2 25 to eat up, that is absorb or take back into himself, the *Brāhmanas*

and the *kshatriyas* is no other than the Supreme Self, for such taking in of all things moving and unmoving as is spoken of in the passage is possible only of the Supreme Being. The second sūtra adds one more reason for the contention and that is, that the section in which the eating up is mentioned namely verses 18-25 of *Katha* 1-2, has for its subject matter none but the Supreme Being.

Sūtras 11th and 12th form the next group. In the first of these reference is made to *Katha* 1-3-1, where two objects are said to exist in the heart of man. Some suppose them to be the individual self and the understanding. But our author says they are the universal and the individual self. His reason for this interpretation of the text is that in various other texts both in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*, it is the Universal Self and not the understanding that is spoken of as existing in the heart. The second aphorism adds the further argument for the interpretation that in the texts referred to the Universal and the individual are distinguished as the goal and the goer, the object thought of and the thinker and so on.

The next group of aphorisms, consisting of the 18th and the following four discusses the text *Chhândogya* iv-15 repeated in the same Upanishad viii-7-4. It shows against all objections that "the person seen within the eye" spoken of in the text is none but the Supreme Being. This Person is characterised as immortal and fearless. These attributes are possible only of the Supreme Being. So much for the first sūtra of the group. The next answers an objection,—How can God, who is

all-pervading, be spoken of as existing within the eye ? The answer is,—Particular spaces and things are mentioned not as limitations of the Absolute, but only as helps to his realisation. In the ‘Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa’ of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* as well as in other scriptural passages, many things are mentioned as such helps. The fifteenth sūtra points out that in *Chh* iv 10 4 the ‘person within the eye’ is said to be endowed with bliss, which can be said of the Supreme Being only. The 16th aphorism adds another reason for the same conclusion. In various scriptural passages such as *Chh* iv 15 5 and *Pras* 1 10 the Devayāna Patha, the way of the gods, leading to the divine regions, is assigned to the knower of Brahman. In the present text the same path is assigned to the knower of ‘the person within the eye’. Hence none but Brahman can be meant by the ‘person within the eye’. The 17th aphorism sets aside a different interpretation of the passage, namely that the person in question means either the reflection of the seer in the eye, the seer himself or the self of some deity. The answer is that none of these can have any permanent existence in the eye and that the attributes of ‘the person within the eye’ enumerated in the passage, namely immortality &c, are impossible in their case.

Sutras 18-20 form the next group. They refer to the ‘Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa’ of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, a very important section of the book, which Āchārya Rāmānuja regards as the scriptural authority for his doctrine of Qualified Monism. The question dis-

cussed is whether the term 'antaryāmi', inner ruler used in every verse of the chapter, means the Supreme Being or the Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti, or the individual Self. The 18th sūtra says that it clearly indicates the Supreme Being, for divine attributes like ruling and the like are ascribed to the antaryāmin throughout the section. The next sūtra points out that attributes like seeing, hearing &c mentioned in the section with reference to the 'inner ruler' are opposed to the nature of the unconscious Prakṛiti and therefore cannot refer to it. In the last sūtra, the 20th it is shown that as in both the rescensions of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* the Kāṇva and the Mādhyandina the universal and the individual selves are spoken of as different from each other—the former as the ruler and the latter as the ruled—the term antaryāmin cannot mean the individual self. The difference between the readings of the two rescensions is only this that while the Kāṇva speaks of the embodied self as 'the understanding', the Mādhyandina mentions it as 'the self'.

What the last group does with the term 'antaryāmin' the next group sūtras 21-23, does with 'bhūtayoni' used in *Mundaka* I 1 0, and by similar arguments. Bhūtayoni 'the source of things', may be identified with the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna or the Subjective Idealist's individual self. But that would be improper for the qualities ascribed to it in the text are all divine, those of God, and the 'Bhūtayoni' is clearly distinguished from the individual self, the lower Brahman and the undecaying principle underlying created things. Further, in another part of the same section, II 1 4, the world, with its

various parts, is spoken of as the Lord's 'form'. Such a description would be quite inappropriate in the case of a not-self like Prakṛiti and a finite reality like the individual self

The last group of the pāda, sūtras 24-32, discusses the meaning of the word '*Vaisvānara*' used in sections 11-18 of the 5th chapter of the *Chhândogya*. These sections contain a remarkable story, one of several similar stories told in the prose Upanishads, where we find eminent Brāhmanas approaching Kshatriya teachers for religious instruction. In the present case six Brāhmanas, including Rishi Uddālaka Āruṇi as their leader, pay a visit to Asvapati Kaikeya, a king, and receive instruction from him on the Vaisvānara Ātman. The same story is told with some variations in the *Satapatha Brāhmana*. Before studying the sūtras under discussion the reader will do well to read carefully the *Chhândogya* sections referred to with the translator's remarks appended to them. He will note that Asvapati's Brāhmana pupils all make the mistake of identifying a particular deity, one conceived as presiding over a limited part of the world, with the Vaisvānara, the Universal Self, whereas the truth is that he is the Whole, the all-comprehensive Infinite, of whom natural objects and individual selves are parts. The Whole is indeed in every part, but an exclusive emphasis on a part or parts is liable to obstruct the vision of the Whole. This is the mistake of *deva*-worshippers everywhere and in every period of human history. The priestly class, absorbed in ceremonial religion, is specially liable to the mistake, while those un-

trammelled by convention and tradition like the ancient *rajarsis*, royal sages, discover this error more easily than others. However, coming to the arguments by which the Sutrakāra shows that the Vaisvānara Ātmā spoken of in the *Chhândogya* passage is none but the Universal Self, we find that in sūtra 24 he says that though Vaisvānara has a general sense meaning in differently the gastric juice, the elemental fire and the god of fire and though 'Ātmā may mean either the individual or the universal self both the terms are here used in a special sense and mean the Supreme Being for the attributes mentioned in the passage are such as point to God alone. In the next sūtra our author points out that the description of God's visvarupa or world form in such smṛiti passages as the eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgita*,—a description based on the *Chhândogya* passage under discussion,—helps us to infer that the Vaisvānara of the latter passage can be no other than the Supreme Lord. But the objector is not satisfied. He says (1) that as the terms Vaisvānara and 'agni usually mean other things than the Supreme Being they should mean those things here and (2) that as the text speaks of Vaisvānara as existing *within us*, the term should mean the gastric juice. The Sutrakāra replies (1) that by speaking of the Vaisvānara as existing within us the scriptural passage really teaches us to realise the presence of the Lord in the gastric juice, (2) that the attributes of Vaisvānara enumerated are impossible in any other object than the Supreme Being, and (3) that the *Satapatha* version of the story distinctly speaks of the



Vaisvânara as a Person For the reasons already mentioned the 27th aphorism states that the Vaisvânara of the *Chhândogya* passage cannot be either the god of fire or elemental fire The 28th sūtra states Jaimini's view that there would be no inconsistency in taking the Vaisvânara passage as a direct meditation on the Supreme Being without reference to the gastric juice Sūtra 29 refers to Āshmarathya's view that as v 18 1 of the passage teaches the meditation of Vaisvânara as 'prādesamātra', that is the heart, which is conceived as of the measure of a span and wherein the Supreme Being is specially manifested, 'Vaisvânara' really refers to him Sūtra 30 adds Bādari's comment on the term 'prādesamātra' The Lord is described as 'of the measure of a span' because he is meditated upon by the mind situated, as he thinks, in the heart, which is of the measure of a span The 31st aphorism says that according to Jaimini the *prādesamātra* text is intended to teach *sāmpatti* or *sampadupāsanā*, that is the realisation of the non-separation of God from objects of sense A similar passage, it is added, namely *Sathapatha* x 6 1, teaches the same form of meditation The 32nd sūtra, the last of the pāda, adds another reason for the use of the phrase 'prādesamātra' with reference to the Lord The Jābālas speak of him in their Upanishad as dwelling 'in that place' i e in the span-measured space between the head and the chin

### Pada 3

Sutras 1—7 of this páda discuss a few passages of the *Mundaka Upanishad*, specially II. 2. 5 and show that the Support of heaven, earth &c., spoken of in the latter, is God, and neither the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna nor the individual self. The first aphorism argues that the word 'self' used in the passage referred to which properly means Brahman, makes it clear that it is he whom the text speaks of. The second aphorism refers to III. 2. 5 of the same Upanishad in which the same Being who is mentioned in the first text is spoken of as one to whom the liberated go as to as their true Self. Such a Being cannot be anything but God. The third aphorism points out that in the first text there is no word meaning the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna. The fourth sūtra says that the individual embodied self cannot be the support of heaven, earth, &c. and so cannot be meant in the text. The fifth sūtra points out that in the text under discussion the individual self is exhorted to know the support of heaven, earth &c. thus distinguishing the latter as the object of knowledge from the former as its subject. The sixth sūtra adds another argument in favour of the author's contention, namely that the section in which the text occurs has the Supreme Being as its subject matter and not anything else. The seventh sūtra refers to *Mundaka* III. 1. 1 which is really an extract from the *Rigveda*. Of the two 'birds' spoken of in this passage the one is said to be eating—enjoying the fruits of its actions,—and the

other as not eating,—remaining indifferent or inactive. From these two marks distinguishing the individual and dependent self from the universal and independent, it is evident that the latter, and not the former, is the Support of heaven, earth &c

Sútras 8 and 9 form the second group of the páda. They refer to the 7th chapter of the *Chhándogya* Upanishad, which is a dialogue between Nárada, a divine sage, and Sanatkumára, the general of the divine army, here represented as a philosopher. It leads the inquirer gradually from the lowest category, *náman* (name), through various intermediate categories to the highest and most comprehensive, *Bhúman* or the Infinite, beyond which there can be nothing. It thus reminds the student of western philosophy of Hegel's *Logic* and its gradual progress from Being to the Absolute Idea, but there is nothing in it of the Dialectical Method of Hegel. There is, however, some method in it, however imperfect, and a better definition of the Infinite than the one given by Sanatkumára has not been given, as Prof Maxmuller truly says in his Gifford Lectures on Psychological Religion, by any modern philosopher. The Sútrakára's reference to the subject is, however, short and superficial. The 'Bhúmá' in the texts referred to means, he says, the Highest Self, and not *prána* the vital breath, for the Bhúmá is spoken of in the text as higher than *prána*. In 'the state of great bliss' experienced in dreamless sleep, *prána*, it is said, awakes. It is *prána*, therefore, which is meant by this state of bliss. But Bhúmá is spoken of as higher than *prána*, he is therefore the Supreme Self different from

the vital breath Further, the attributes of Bhuman mentioned in the dialogue, namely blissfulness immortality, all pervasiveness, establishment in his own glory, his being the self of all, and his being such that when he is seen and heard nothing else can be seen and heard—all these are possible only of the Supremo Self

The next group sūtras 10-12, deals with the meaning of 'Akshara' occurring in Yājñavalkya's second discourse in reply to Gārgī in the great assembly held on the occasion of king Janaka's sacrifice In his first discourse he had spoken of *ākāśa*, ether or space, as the container of all phenomenal things In his second he speaks of Akshara, the unchangeable One as the support of space itself The sūtras show that the Rishi's 'Akshara' cannot be a letter, in fact nothing else than the Supremo Self, for it is only the latter that can support all phenomena, including space The texts speak of Akshara as guiding the action of the sun, the moon &c, by his command, and a command can proceed only from an intelligent being and not any inanimate object. Besides, inanimate objects like letters &c. are clearly distinguished from the Akshara in the text and so they cannot be meant by the term

Sūtra 13 forms an *adhikarana* or section by itself It shows that the syllable *Om* in the fifth *prasna* of the *Prasnopanishad* means the Supremo Self, and nothing else, for the reality indicated by the syllable is spoken of in the 5th verse as the object of spiritual realisation

The next *adhikarana*, sūtras 14-18, discusses the meaning of the word '*dahara*' in the *Daharavidyā* dealt

with in the 1st and more or less in some of the following sections of the 8th chapter of the *Chhândogya*. The Rishi's teachings show his insight into the truth that the Whole, the Absolute, is present in everyone of its parts, however absurd this may seem to the thoughtless and the superficial. But the Sûtrakâra does not enter into the metaphysics of the subject. He is concerned only to show that the *dahara âkāsa*, small space, of which the Rishi speaks, is not really the space in the heart where the self is usually located by the ancients or the merely individual self which distinguishes one person from another, but is really the Supreme Universal Self which is common to all of us. As a proof of his assertion he cites the third verse of the section where the attributes of this *dahara âkāsa* are enumerated, attributes which can belong only to God. In the next sūtra the text viii. 3. 2 is cited to show that all creatures daily go in dreamless sleep to Brahmaloka indicated by '*dahara*', though they are not aware of it. This 'going' and the word 'Brahmaloka' distinctly meaning God are further proofs of the correctness of the Sûtrakâra's interpretation of '*dahara*'. The same distinction of goers and the goal and the fact that the goal is Brahman, are found in another scriptural text, namely *Chh* vi 8. 1. The 16th sūtra points out that in viii 4. 1 *Dahara* is said to support the world, proving that it is the Supreme Self who is meant by the word. This supporting power in him is also seen in another scriptural text, namely *Bṛ* iii 8. 9. Further, says sūtra 17, the use of '*ākāsa*' in the sense of the Infinite is well-known and is found

in such texts as *Chh* viii. 14 10 and the same i 9 1. But does not the mention of the individual self at the end of the section (*Chh* viii 1 1) prove that *dahara* means that? The 18th sūtra says No because attributes like sinlessness &c, enumerated there are impossible in the case of the individual self.

The next group sūtras 10 21 may be regarded as a continuation of the last, though it refers to other scriptural passages than those already discussed. The conclusion of the last group may be doubted on reading *Chh* 12-3, in which the individual self is clearly spoken of. But the doubt is removed when it is considered that the individual self is there conceived not in its individuality but with its unity with the Universal manifested. Besides the reference to the individual in the last part of the *dahara* section already discussed has another meaning, or object. Its object is the 20th aphorism says to set forth the real nature of God. Further, if any one doubts our interpretation because the *dahara śloka* is said to be *alpa* small, then we have only to remind him that we have already met the objection in the seventh sūtra of pada 2.

Sūtras 22 and 23, which constitute the next group interpret the All revealing one spoken of in *Mund.* ii 2 10. They say it is the Supreme Self who is meant here and not any elemental light, for all elemental lights like the sun and the moon are said therein to reflect the light of the shining One. His in All this shines by his light indicates God. This interpretation is confirmed by verses 9 and 12 of the 15th chapter of the *Bhagavadgīta*.

The next adhikarana, sūtras 24 and 25, interprets verses 12 and 13 of *Kāth* II 12 and 13. They speak of a person who is apparently 'pramitah', measured or finite, for he is said to be "of the size of the thumb". But from the words spoken of him, namely that he is the regulator of the past and the present and that he who knows him ceases to hate, &c., it is evident that this Person is really the Supreme Self and not the individual. But why is he then said to be of the size of the thumb? The answer is that as the Supreme Self is manifested in the heart of man, which is (as the ancient doctrine is) of the size of the thumb, and as the Vedic knowledge of God is the exclusive sphere of man, God is poetically represented as of the size of the thumb. A controversy somewhat irrelevant to the subject of the pāda, but very interesting, arises out of the doctrine broached in the 25th sūtra, namely that the sāstric knowledge of God is the exclusive sphere of man. Are then the *devas* and such other ethereal beings shut out from Vedic knowledge? The *prima facie* reply to this is,—Surely they are shut out, because how can they, having no gross bodies like ours, study the Vedas? But suppose we grant, as Bādarayana does in sūtra 26, that they have bodies and are therefore entitled to study the Vedas, would not this corporeality on their part conflict with their connection with Vedic rites? How can a god with one body be present at different sacrifices offered simultaneously? The answer, as given in sūtra 27, is,—Scripture speaks of the same god assuming many forms. But does not the idea of the gods having forms conflict with 'the Word',

the eternal words constituting the Vedas from which as *Śruti* and *Smṛiti* both say, the world, including the gods, has originated? Bodies are ephemeral things subject to decay and death. How could they originate from Vedic words which are admitted to be eternal? Words and their meanings causes and their effects, are eternally related. It is this eternal relation on which according to Jaimini, the authoritativeness of the Vedas rests. To him the gods are identical with Vedic words and are, as such eternal and formless. The popular view of them as embodied beings—a view which finds support from *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*,—conflicts with Jaimini's view of the nature and authority of the Vedas. However *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, though upholding the popular idea of the gods, does not think that the authoritativeness of the Vedas is affected thereby. In his view as expounded by the commentator it is only *vyaktayaḥ* particulars and not *ākṛstayaḥ*, universal forms that are originated and it is with the latter that Vedic words are eternally connected. This connection and the authoritativeness of the Vedas founded on it remain unaffected, says he in *sūtras* 28-30, by the origination of non eternal things like the bodies of the gods from the eternal words of the Vedas. He seems to think of the Vedic texts as archetypal ideas in the divine mind of which earthly things and their qualities are transient ectypes. As such they are not transient. Both *Śruti* and *Smṛiti*—the *Rik* and the *Gitā* are quoted—tell us that in each cycle the same things are created, i e., manifested after their disappearance during *pralaya*, the state of universal submergence. So there is no contradiction



between the eternality of the Vedas and the apparent transiency of the world proceeding from them. But Jaimini is not silenced by this reasoning. Even admitting for a moment the personality or corporeality of the gods, he says, as stated in sūtra 31, that they are clearly not entitled to the study of the Madhu-vidvā in *Chhândogya* III, for it treats of their own worship. Debarred from one or more such vidyās, they are, he thinks, debarred from all Vedic vidyās. But the real cause of Jaimini's opposition to the gods comes out most clearly only at the end. He thinks, as we see in sūtra 30, that words like 'īditya' &c. meaning the gods, are applied only metaphorically to luminous bodies which are '*mudādīvat achetanā eva*'—really inanimate like mud and such other things. How can such things have any title to the study of the Vedas? Bādarāyana meets his scepticism in sūtra 33 by re-affirming the statements of Sruti and Smṛiti, already given, about the gods as real embodied persons. Jaimini indeed is aware of these affirmations. But his method of interpreting them is very different, as we have already said, from Bādarāyana's. It remains a curious fact in the history of our ancient literature that the author, real or supposed, of the *Pūruṣa-mīmāṃsā*, which deals chiefly with the worship of the gods, is an unbeliever in their existence as personal beings, whereas Bādarāyana, or whoever else may be the author of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, which treats almost exclusively of the worship of the Supreme Being and has little to do with the gods, is a staunch upholder of their reality.

The next group, consisting of sūtras 34-38, discusses

the title of the Sūtras to the Vedic vidyās. About the time the *Brahmasūtras* were composed perhaps long before that time, the opinion seems to have been established that the Sūtras were not entitled to the study of the Vedas and therefore to at least a direct acquisition of Vedic knowledge. But there seem to have been thinkers who questioned this disqualification as appears from the discussion we are entering into. A supposed questioner refers to the story of king Jānasruti Pantrāyana and his receiving the Sambarga Vidyā from the sage Raikva in sections 1-3 of the fourth chapter of the *Chhândogya*. This king says the questioner, was evidently a Sūdra, for in 2. 4 and 5 Raikva addresses him as such. Now, Sūtra 84 answers the objector by saying that the word Sūdra in the text does not mean caste. It means *suk* the sadness which Jānasruti felt and with which he had gone to see the sage, caused by the rather disrespectful manner in which the Flemingo in the story had spoken of him. The word therefore does not prove that the king was a Sūdra by caste. In the next sūtra the kshatriyahood of Jānasruti is proved by the fact that he is mentioned in the same section along with a Kshatriya named Abbipratāri, a descendant of Chitraratha. The next sūtra refers to purificatory rites like *upanayana* mentioned in the sūtras in the case of the higher castes but prohibited in that of the Sūtras thus proving their non title to Vedic study. Sūtra 87 refers to the remarkable story of Satyakama Jābāla in *Chhândogya* iv 4, where his teacher Haridrumata Gautama does not undertake to initiate him until he is satisfied that the

boy is not a Súdra. As to the real import of the story the reader is referred to the observations in our edition of the *Chhándogya*. Súra 38 refers to specific Smṛiti passages prohibiting the hearing of the Vedas and following their meaning by Súdras. Now, a good deal might be said on this subject both on grounds of reason and sastric teaching. But we confine ourselves to referring to the teaching ascribed to God in the *Gítá*,—‘*Cháturvarnyam mayá sṛṣṭam guna-karma-vibhāgasah*’ (iv 12) “The fourfold order of castes has been created by me according to the division of qualities and duties.” If there is any natural distinction of castes at all, it is based on the division of qualities or aptitudes and the life and occupations they lead to. Judged by this criterion, many so-called twice-born people should be called Súdras, and many so-called Súdras should be classed as *dvijas*. But the Sútrakāra and those who follow him implicitly seem to think of caste as depending on birth and not on *guna* and *karma*.

The next three aphorisms, 39, 40 and 41 are each a distinct adhikarana. They discuss the meaning of ‘*prāna*’ in *Katha* II 3 2, ‘*jyotiḥ*’ in *Chh* viii 12 and ‘*ākāśa*’ in *Chh* viii 14. 1 respectively. With arguments already familiar to the reader, namely that the actions and qualities ascribed to the objects denoted by the words are possible only of the Supreme Being, it is shown that the terms mean God and no phenomenal objects. In the case of *ākāśa* it is moreover shown that the scriptural passage differentiates *nāma-rupa*, phenomena, from the *Ākāśa* of which it speaks. None

but the Absolute can thus be differentiated from phenomena.

Sātras 42 and 43 form the last group of the pāda. They discuss the meaning of 'self' in *Bṛ. iv 3 7*. The sections are most important. In fact no other portion of Upanishadic literature is more important. But the Sūtrakāra's treatment is very brief. It only shows that the 'Self' spoken of in the scriptural passages is the supreme and non transmigrating Self and not the individual and transmigrating, as if their difference could be conceived apart from their unity. But Yājñavalkya speaks of both the aspects of the self. The Sūtrakāra's treatment thus does not do justice to the gravity and difficulty of the subject. We shall discuss it later on. Our author's arguments here are (1) that in the state of dreamless sleep and the self's departure from the body, the Universal and the individual are clearly distinguished, and (2) that in the 2nd of the two texts referred to the Universal is called 'the Lord of all' 'the King of all &c., thus differentiating him from the individual.

#### Pada 4

The first adhikarana of the páda, sūtras 1-7, discusses the meaning of the term 'avyakta' in *Katha* 1 3 10, 11, and cites another adjacent passage, 1 3 15 in support of the given interpretation. Some Sāṅkhyas seem to have claimed that 'avyakta' means their Pradhāna or Prakṛti. The Sūtrakāra says it cannot do so, for from the metaphorical description, given at the beginning of the *Katha* section, of the body as a chariot, it is clear that it is the body that is meant by the term. But it is not the gross but the subtle body that is meant, for the term suits it alone. The subtle body is said to be superior to the individual self, for the bondage and liberation of the latter are dependent on the former, just as the functions of the senses are dependent on objects. It will be noticed by the careful reader that this interpretation of the *Katha* text is different from ours as given in our Devanagar and English edition of the *Ten Upanishads* and extracted in the English translation of our sūtra text and annotations. However, the 4th sūtra points out that if 'avyakta' meant the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna, it would have been mentioned as something to be known. The Sāṅkhyas emphasise the knowledge of their Pradhāna as distinct from Puruṣa as a means of attaining *kaivalya*. Again, if the Sāṅkhyas claim that the other text beginning with '*Asaṁdam aspaṁsam*' speaks of their Pradhāna, the Sūtrakāra says he must say 'No', for it really speaks of the Supreme Intelligent Self, as the section in which the passage occurs belongs

to him Besides, in the dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas with which the section deals, and in the course of which the former grants boons to the latter only three things are spoken of,—fire, the individual self and the Supreme Self Anything else like the Pradhāna is out of the question and cannot be mentioned Lastly, it should be noticed that as the Sāṅkhya use the term *mahat* in the sense of the first substance generated from Prakṛiti and not in the Vedic sense of the individual self so they use the term 'avyakta' not in the Vedic sense of the subtle body but in the sense of the Pradhāna But this un Vedic application of the term can be no reason for the identification of the Vedic Avyakta and the Sāṅkhya Pradhāna.

The next group also which consists of sūtras 8-10, corrects a Sāṅkhya misinterpretation of a Vedic word 'Ajá', the unborn, or she-goat, in *Svetāsvatara* i 5 5 is claimed to be the Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti But 'the unborn may mean other things also just as 'a cup with its mouth below and its bottom above means all spoons indifferently and not a particular kind of spoon Ajá in the text really means the substance of the elements *tejas* &c, spoken of in *Chh.* vi 4 There is nothing unreasonable in the Śrūti metaphorically speaking of the primal substance as a she goat Such metaphorical descriptions are numerous in scripture, for instance in *Chh.* iii the sun is called 'honey' though really it is not honey

Sūtras 11-13 interpret the phrase 'pancha panch janāh' in *Bṛ.* iv 4. 13 'Panchajanāh' as is evident from the next verse means breath, the eye, hearing, food

Brahman from whom it and the world come out in the state of waking

Sutras 19-22 discuss the well known 'Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa in *Bṛi* ii 4 and iv 5. Is 'the self to be seen, heard &c.' spoken of there the individual or the universal self? Considered from beginning to end the passage, says the Sūtrakāra, is seen in all its parts to refer to the Supreme Self? But is not the Supreme Self also taught as identical with the individual? Yes. But why? Are not they also different? Yes, but their unity is emphasised in order that the promise may be fulfilled which is made at the beginning that when the self is seen all things are seen. The fulfilment of the promise depends upon the identity of the two selves. This seems to be the view of the ancient teacher Āśmarathya referred to in sūtra 20. The view of another ancient śchārya, Audulomi, is given in sūtra 21. He thinks that the identity of the Universal and the individual taught here is really that state which the latter finally attains when released from its body and other adjuncts. Sūtra 22 adds the view of still another ancient teacher, Kāśakṛitana, about the identity spoken of. The individual, he says, is the form in which the Universal exists in man, and so their identity is taught.

The next group sutras 23-27 shows that Brahman is not only the efficient but also the material cause of the world—the substance of which the things of the world are forms or appearances. The arguments, rational and scriptural, are the following —(1) *Chh.* vi. 1 promises that there is one thing (that is God) which, being known, all things are known, and instances clay

## CHAPTER II

### Pada 1

The whole of the first páda of chapter II is devoted to meeting Sāṅkhya objections to the Vedāntic theory of the creation of the world by God and otherwise defending the latter. An idea of the Sāṅkhya doctrine in a few words should therefore precede an exposition of the various topics of discussion. For a detailed account based on Īśvarakṛishṇa's *Sāṅkhya Lārīka* and the *Sāṅkhya pravāchana* with Vijnānabhikṣu's commentary thereon, the reader is referred to our *Kṛishṇa and the Gīta*. The Sāṅkhya postulates two eternal principles, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛiti* from a combination of which the world as we perceive it, has arisen. *Puruṣa* or rather *Puruṣas*, co eternal and mutually independent, are conscious but inactive beings. *Prakṛiti* is unconscious, but active but she can act only when she is in nearness *samudhya* to some *puruṣa*. From their union come out (1) *buddhi* or *mahat* a form of consciousness undifferentiated into the ideas of subject and object, (2) *aḥankāra*, egoity or self-consciousness (3-7) *pañchatanmātra*, the subtle essence of the five gross elements, (8) *manas* or the sensorium, (9-18) the five *jñānendriyāṇi* or organs of knowledge and the five *kārmendriyāṇi* or organs of action and (19-28) the five gross elements,—earth, water &c. A knowledge and direct realisation of *Puruṣa*'s distinction from *Prakṛiti* leads to the former's



release from the latter's bondage and the attainment of *kavalya*, aloofness, the goal of Sāṅkhya *sādhana*. The system leaves no room for a Creator, but what is called the *Sesvara* or theistic school of Sāṅkhya postulates an eternally perfect Being under the name of *Īsvara*, who, though not the Creator of either Prakṛiti or the Puruṣas, helps all human endeavours after *kavalya*.

We now come to the various topics into which the section is subdivided. In the first two sūtras the Sāṅkhya objector says to the Vedantist,—You reject the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *Piadhāna* on the authority of the *Sruti*. But the *Smṛiti*,—the class of religious and philosophical books other than the *Sruti* and ascribed to great teachers,—also deserves honour. Such are the works embodying the teachings of the Sāṅkhya āchāryas. In rejecting the Sāṅkhya doctrine you deny the authority of the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti*. The Sūtrakāra's reply to this objection is, There are also *Smṛitis* teaching the Vedantic doctrine. In rejecting this doctrine you deny their authority. You commit the same offence that you charge us with. The fact is that the *Smṛiti* is to be accepted only so far as it agrees with the *Sruti*. Where it opposes the latter, one is at liberty to reject its teachings. Besides, the Sāṅkhya teaching on *mahat* and other derivatives from *Prakṛiti* are not taught in the *Sruti*, neither are they recognised by common sense, hence they must be rejected. For the same reason the third sūtra rejects the Yoga philosophy, otherwise called the theistic Sāṅkhya. The Yoga accepts the Sāṅkhya metaphysics *in toto*. It supplements the latter, as we have already seen, by

recognising an uncreative *Īvara*, and teaching a system of mental and semi physical discipline

In Sūtras 4 11 the Sāṅkhya raises more serious objections against the theism of the Vedānta, and the Sūtrakāra tries to answer them. The Sāṅkhya doctrine is based on the common sense distinction of subject and object, mind and matter. The Sāṅkhyas point out that this distinction is accepted by the Vedānta also though it recognises presiding deities in various departments of nature. If then mind and matter are really distinct, how can mind, the Divine Mind, account for the existence of matter? The disparity of their nature goes against the creation of the one by the other. The answer which the Sūtrakāra gives to this objection is rather unsatisfactory and inconsistent with his final and serious opinion. He says the disparity of nature between mind and matter does not prevent a relation of cause and effect between them. Material things like hair and nails come out of living beings and living beings like scorpions come out of cow-dung. The objector is not satisfied and again urges—In that case, in the case of mind producing matter and matter producing mind, the effect must be regarded as non-existent. The Sūtrakāra does not accept this view. He says, just as on its emergence from the cause the effect exists in the cause so before its emergence too it exists therein. The Sāṅkhya does not press the question which naturally arises here,—how such disparate things as mind and matter can exist in each other,—but raises a very different question, namely, that Brahman being the Cause both of the creation and re-absorption of the

world, does it not follow that he is tainted by the imperfections of the world absorbed in him ? The Sūtrakāra's answer is again unsatisfactory and rather tentative. He says, when things made of clay or gold, with their various qualities, are absorbed in their material causes, they do not communicate their qualities to the latter. So the imperfections of the world do not taint its Supreme Cause. Further, you, Sāṅkhyas, have no right to charge us with inconsistencies of which you are yourselves guilty. Your Pradhāna is devoid of sound and various such other qualities which you say, it produces. And in the final absorption, when cause and effect become one, is it not tainted by these qualities ? The fact is, adds the Sūtrakāra in the last aphorism of the adhikarana, arguments based only on individual opinions and not on the scriptures cannot afford a firm standing ground. If you try to argue better, your better argument will be refuted by a still better one. So in matters religious and philosophical the only stable basis is the direct knowledge of the rishis. But in indirectly accepting the direct knowledge of the rishis, do we not reason ? And if we directly gain the same experience as the rishis did, have we not still to argue in satisfying ourselves and those about us that what we call our experience is not either superstition or an inherited belief ? The Sūtrakāra does not raise these questions.

In the 12th sūtra our author says that by appealing to the Vedas, whose authority his opponents also accept, but with which their conclusions do not tally, he has refuted all those other systems also,—systems

other than the Sankhya. Nevertheless he will take them up in the next *pada*

In sūtra 18 another objection to the Vedāntic theory of creation is answered. As we have already seen, this doctrine does away with the distinction of subject and object, mind and matter. The Sūtrākara says he accepts this identification, which does no harm to his doctrine. The sea, though one has in it the varieties of froth, ripples, waves, bubbles &c. The one undivided space seems divided by limiting adjuncts like pots and walls. So the distinction of subject and object is not unreasonable in the one Brahman who includes all. What we have to say is that these metaphors do not go into the root of the matter. The mutual relations of objects do not represent but rather misrepresent the relation between subject and object. This relation, which involves difference as well as unity, has yet to be examined and the real meaning of both the unity and the difference explained.

In the next *adhikarana*, which consists of sūtras 14-20, our author does not take up any such analysis as we have suggested, but he shows by the sort of analogical argument he is fond of and by referring to two scriptural texts that the effect is one with the cause and before its emergence from the latter really exists therein. If the effect did not so exist in the cause, anything would come out of anything else. Curd would come out of clay and a pot would be made out of milk instead of clay. But this does not occur, showing that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. The two scriptural texts referred to are *Chh* vi. 1-4.

and *Ītī* 11 7 The objector points out that in these texts the world is clearly said to be non-existent and its Cause as the only thing existent The Sūtrakāra replies that the non-existence mentioned is not absolute non-existence, but non-existence in the sense of non-manifestation as *nāma-rūpa*, name and form The objector might still say, but does not say, that to the All-knowing One there can be no distinction of manifest and non-manifest,—everything being ever-manifest to him Manifestation as a change implies the existence of a limited intelligence which passes from ignorance to knowledge

In the next group, sūtras 21-23, another objection to Vedantic Brahmanāda is answered In this doctrine, says the objector, the Universal and individual selves are identified It follows therefrom that the Universal becomes liable to the charge of bringing upon himself evils like birth, bondage and death The Sūtrakāra replies that texts like *Bṛ* 11 4 5 declare the distinction of the Knowable and the knowing and the Universal and the individual and thus show that the former is greater than the latter He also shows, by the analogy of different kinds of precious stones and the production of leaves, fruits, flowers &c., from seeds that it is possible for different kinds of effects *and such differences as individual selves and the Supreme Self to be in the same Brahman* The italics correct a misprint in the translation (P 101)

But we find in the world potters and other mechanics depending upon clay and other substances and their various instruments for making the objects made by

them. How then can Brahman be thought of as creating the world without any pre-existing substance and any instruments? This objection is answered by the Sūtrakāra in aphorisms 24 and 25. He instances the change of milk into curd as a case of creation without extraneous help forgetting atmospheric action and the addition of leaven as necessary causes in producing curd. He also takes for granted the alleged power of the gods and the rishis to produce things by the mere power of their meditation,—a power which according to him, exemplifies the divine power of creation.

Sūtras 20-22 answer the objection to the Vedantic theory of creation arising from Brahman's incorporeal-ity. The sūtras characterise Brahman as incorporeal. The incorporeal must be indivisible. When the indivisible turns into the world, as scripture says he does, he must do so as a whole and not in part, and thus cease to be Brahman. The Sūtrakāra cannot answer this objection in any better way than by appealing to the sastras. The sastras, as we see in *Isā* 5 and *Latha* ii. 2. 9 teach that in becoming the world Brahman nevertheless remains beyond it. We must accept both his immanence and transcendence on the authority of the scriptures. We think that his immanence and transcendence, which are only two sides of the same fact, can be shown on grounds of reason also but the Sūtrakāra does not appeal to reason here. He only refers to the state of dreaming mentioned in *Bṛi* iv 3. 9 in which the same self is seen to create various objects without extraneous help and without losing its identity and indivisibility. But after all, the objections

urged against the Vedantic theory of creation are fully applicable to the Sāṅkhya theory. Pradhana is also taught to be incorporeal and devoid of the various qualities it creates. It either cannot create these or in creating them it ceases to be incorporeal.

In sūtras 30 and 31 several scriptural texts are referred to which declare God's possession of various powers and attributes and his capability of knowing and acting without organs.

But how can God act, the objector continues, when he is without any want, and has therefore no motive for action? The Sūtrakāra answers in aphorisms 32 and 33 that as a king having no wants still acts as a matter of sport or pleasure, so may God be conceived as acting though without any want or motive. The answer must be pronounced very unsatisfactory. The king takes to sport out of inanity, his vast resources failing to satisfy him. This cannot be said of God. The fact is that there is no satisfactory answer to the objection from the standpoint of Unqualified Monism, the doctrine of a solitary God.

The Sūtrakāra evidently sees this and so tries to get out of the *impasse* brought about by the theory of creation he has thus far been defending. The world contains numberless pleasures and pains and their apparent or real causes in the form of partialities and cruelties. Are not these causes attributable to the one only cause of all effects,—God? A consistent Monist should say 'yes', but our author does not do so. In the next *adbhikarāṇa*, which consists of sūtras 34-36, he says that partiality and cruelty cannot be attributed

to God, for differences in men's lot are due to their own actions in their past incarnations. But creation proceeds, the objector says, from a condition in which there are no actions and so no distinctions. The Sutra LĀMA says creation has no beginning a tenet which is proved by both reason and scripture. No reason however is adduced and no reference made either to any Sruti or Smṛiti text. Reason indeed finds no beginning in creation the very idea of time being that of an Indefinite ever-beginning never ending as we have tried to show in the second chapter of *Brahmajyotiḥ*. But we find no definite statement about the matter in Sruti or Smṛiti except the occasional mention in the latter of recurring *kalpas* or cycles. However the idea of time as having no beginning or end does not solve the problem of the relation of the many and the one and that of change and the changeless. It seems evident that one and many and change and the changeless being correlative ideas, implying one another, the many cannot be derived from the one and change from the changeless, as the Sruti texts on creation seem to attempt. The proper task of philosophy is not to explain creation,—God becoming something other than himself—but to analyse experience and reality and find out their final synthesis,—the necessary relation of their constituent elements. Such an analysis discloses the fact that subject and object and the Absolute which both makes and overlaps their distinction, are necessary moments of an indivisible reality—that God creates man and the world not in the sense of bringing existence out of non-existence or of differen





## Pada 2

This pada, usually called the Tarkapada, is very important. It attempts to refute on grounds of reason the chief of what the Sūtrakāra regards as un Vedic systems of philosophy. These systems are (1) the Sāṅkhya, (2) the Kāṇḍa, (3) the Realistic Bauddha (4) the Sensationalistic and Nihilistic Bauddha, (5) the Jaina (6) the Naiyāyika and (7) the Bhāgavata. This is done in forty five sūtras divided into eight adhikaraṇas.

The first adhikaraṇa, consisting of sūtras 1-10 refutes the Sāṅkhya doctrine. The arguments are the following —

(1) The world is not a chaos. Its parts are so ordered that they serve certain ends — the life happiness and propagation of living beings and the spiritual progress of rational beings. Such a world cannot be the effect of an unconscious cause like the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti. Activity itself is impossible in an unconscious object. Even if the possibility of unconscious activity be granted, it cannot account for the various ends served by the world-order referred to for they imply purpose or motive which Prakṛti admittedly does not possess.

(2) But milk, though unconscious nurses the calf, and unconscious water assuages thirst and sustains life. Cannot the unconscious Prakṛti be supposed in the same manner to serve our ends? So argues the Sāṅkhya. The reply is that in the cases referred to the effects justify the inference of an intelligence — guiding the unconscious causes.

(3) It must not be said that as grass, leaves, water &c., taken by a cow, turn into milk &c. from Prakṛiti come its various modifications, *māhāt* &c. It is only in living bodies like the cow, and not else where, that grass &c. become milk showing the presence of intelligence in them

(4) The Sāṅkhya Prakṛiti is an independent reality, not dependent on Puruṣa or anything else. And the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa is inactive. Yet the Sāṅkhyas ascribe Prakṛiti's activity to her nearness to Puruṣa. A naturally inactive reality influencing another reality to act is an absurd idea. As Prakṛiti's activity, like its existence, is independent, it cannot be explained why it sometimes changes into the forms of *māhāt* &c. and sometimes does not so change.

(5) Sāṅkhya thinkers often explain the relation of their Puruṣa and Prakṛiti by the analogy of a blind man conveying a lame man on his shoulders and being guided in his movements by the latter's directions. But the analogy breaks down at every point. The blind man is not naturally inactive as Prakṛiti is supposed by the Sāṅkhyas, nor is the lame man inactive like the Sāṅkhya Puruṣa for he is able to direct the blind man by his words. The analogy therefore fails to make the Sāṅkhya theory reasonable.

(6) The Sāṅkhya doctrine is inconsistent with itself. Its adherents differ widely among themselves as to the number of the *tattvas*, the order of their production from Prakṛiti and their mutual relations as causes and effects.

The above arguments, though valid, are not suffi-

cient They do not go into the root of the matter—the Sāṅkhya dualism of knowing and acting and knowing and being The Sūtrakāra indeed thinks that action cannot be unconscious and unmotived but he does not show this by analysing action and tracing our very idea of activity to our conscious volitions He even concedes to his opponent if only for a moment that action can be unconscious and unmotived and rests his argument for theism on the impossibility of *ordered things*,—things related as *means* and *ends*—proceeding from unmotived action His opponent might therefore contend as he practically does that where we cannot trace order we may recognise the reign of mere matter independent of intelligence As to mere existence the existence of things independent of any intelligent puruṣa, the Sūtrakāra stands on the same ground as his opponent and therefore fails to refute him fully To show the error of Dualism either Sāṅkhya or otherwise knowledge must be analysed and it must be shown that subject and object, knowing and being,—and even the finite and the Infinite to which the distinction ultimately resolves itself—though distinguishable, are not divisible that unity and difference are not opposed but complementary ideas or facts

The 11th sūtra answers an objection from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint to the Vedantic doctrine of creation and sūtras 12-17 refute the Vaiśeṣika system This system is ascribed to Kanāda or Kanabhuk, meaning the eater of particles apparently a nickname derived from the nature of the system It is an Atomic

system representing the material world as a combination of subtle indivisible particles called *paramāṇus*. That all gross objects can be divided into more or less small particles, is indeed evident, but that this division ends or must end at some point is a mere dictum. The very idea of extension or space involves infinite divisibility. The Sūtiakāra does not mention this point. He confines himself to showing (1) that his own doctrine of the creation of the material world by an immaterial or intelligent cause is at least as reasonable as Kanāda's theory of the growth of this world from atoms, and (2) that atoms by themselves without an extraneous power to move them cannot combine themselves into a world. The Atomic theory conceives the original single atoms as spherical and minute and thinks that from their combination arise binary atoms which are minute and short, and from the latter again come ternary compounds which are big and long, not minute and short. The point of the Sūtrakāra's self-defence is that if effects so different from the causes can come out of the latter, why cannot an unintelligent world come out of an intelligent cause? The Atomist might rejoin that his effects are different from his cause only in form, not in substance, whereas the material world is substantially different from the non-material intelligent cause from whom the Vedantist derives it. If God is to be shown as both the material and efficient cause of the world, it must, we think, be shown as through and through mental or spiritual. In fact this is the position of the Upanishadic rishis, as appears from the descriptions of creation given by

them though it cannot be said that they consistently keep up this position everywhere. It seems to us that the Sātrākara in recognising a duality of substances the one conscious and the other unconscious really plays into the hands of his opponents and weakens the theism he would establish. However, his criticism of Atomism proceeds as already stated on his showing that the original atoms as incapable of movement, cannot combine and form a world. To this it may be said that it is *adrishta* an unseen power possibly the effect of the past actions of selves which moves the atoms. But this unseen principle as an unintelligent entity, is incapable of producing motion. The next supposition is *Samarāya* a relation which binds together atoms and produces combinations. Now as distinct from the atoms themselves, it is inexplicable how this *samarāya* comes to help them. Something else seems necessary to connect it with the atoms. But if this is allowed it will lead to an infinite regress and no stable conclusion will be arrived at. The supposition of a *samarāya* therefore does not help the Atomist. But let us waive this objection and allow the activity of the atoms through *adrishta*. Will that help the Atomist? The constant proximity of *adrishta* would make their activity permanent and the state of *pralaya* or end of creation impossible as their inactivity has been already shown to make creation impossible. Moreover the Vaiśeṣhikas assume the atoms to have the qualities of colour, taste &c found in the gross objects which result from their combination. In fact atoms are classified according to the four classes of objects they give

rise to,—earth, water, fire and air, and are conceived as possessing the varying qualities of the latter. But this makes them gross objects and affects their minuteness and permanency and thus makes them unfit for being causes of this gross and impermanent world. If, to avoid this difficulty, we suppose the atoms to have only one quality each, or all to have all the four qualities, the variety of objects with their various qualities would remain unexplained. On the ground of these discrepancies and lastly owing to the fact that the system has not been accepted by authorities on the Vedas, Atomism, says our author, must be rejected. We may remark in passing that the Atomic theory, which once reigned supreme among the votaries of science in the west, is now a practically exploded theory there owing chiefly to the progress of philosophical speculation during the last half a century or more. Atoms and the force they were once conceived to be moved by are now recognised by a large and growing class of scientific thinkers to be metaphysical noumenal ideas having no place in science proper, which deals with phenomena or appearances on grounds of positive experience. Our perceptions, so it seems agreed to by thoughtful scientific men, are confined to sensuous events and our belief in the world as a whole is the result of a systematic association of the ideas left by these sensuous events. To ascribe our sensations to atoms, forces or an intelligent mind or minds is to go beyond experience. Thus from solid entities atoms came to be (1) centres of force, then (2) centres of mere motion and are now regarded as (3) mere centres

of radiation and called electrons and protons. What the latter mean will be somewhat clear from the following extract from an article on 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell' contributed by us to *Advance* and the *Indian Messenger* nearly two years back. Mr (now Lord) Russell is the chief British representative of New Realism, which has succeeded the old Materialism. In his '*Outlines of Philosophy*' he says — "Until 1925 theories of the structure of the atom were based upon the old conception of matter as indestructible substance, although this was already regarded as no more than a convenience. Now, owing chiefly to two German physicists, Heisenberg and Schrodinger the last vestiges of the old solid atom have melted away and matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritual science (P 104). Again Every atom is a structure consisting of electrons and protons" (P 106). All protons carry a certain amount of positive electricity and all electrons carry an equal amount of negative electricity" (P 106). "The aim is to confine the theory to what is empirically verifiable, namely radiations as to what there is where the radiations come from we cannot tell and it is scientifically unnecessary to speculate" (P 112). The reader will thus see how far thought has travelled since the days of our old Atomists,—travelled in the very lines followed by them not to speak of other lines. However, we now come to speak of our ancient Buddhists whose advanced sections greatly anticipated modern thought on Idealistic or rather Sensationalistic lines.

Buddhist philosophy is examined in *adtras* 18-32



The philosophers are broadly divided into three classes,—(1) the Realists, (2) the Idealists or Sensationalists and (3) the Nihilists. The third class, though mentioned, is not dealt with by the Sūtrakāra. The Realists are Dualists, holding matter and mind to be different. Their theory of matter is atomistic, and the Sūtrakāra's refutation of it resembles his criticism of the Atomic theory. Their theory of mind may also be said to be a species of mental Atomism. Transient mental events are said to form themselves into five *skandhas* or groups,—form, perception, feeling, concept and idea,—and constitute the basis of personal experience. As the Buddhists do not recognise any permanent self, individual or universal, the Sūtrakāra argues that their attempts to show the formation of these aggregates are quite futile. As the mental events are distinct and perish as soon as they arise, they cannot be related as causes and effects of one another. Even if their causality be admitted for a moment, so that an antecedent event be regarded as giving rise to its consequent, it cannot be explained how several events form an aggregate. There are two modes of escape from this difficulty,—either to deny the principle of causality altogether or to say that the antecedent lasts just long enough to give rise to the consequent. The first case brings a perfect chaos into our experience. In the absence of a law of causation, anything at any time and place must be supposed to produce anything else. In the second case the very basal principle of *Kṣhanabhaṅgavádā*, that all impressions are momentary, is rejected. This principle of momentariness, however, which necessarily leads to

the denial of a permanent self is negatived by the fact of remembrance. Remembrance implies the recognition by the same person of a past and a present impression as his own. He must know— I who *had* the past impression *have* the present also. This proves the permanence of the percipient and also of the past perception. Buddhist Idealism or Sensationalism is specially examined in sutras 27-34. The Sutrakara's arguments against the doctrine are the following —

(1) You say there are no external things and only mental things exist but we do perceive external things. Why go against patent experience? The Mentalist might however ask what the Sutrakara means by external. External to what,—body or mind? The Mentalist does not deny the existence of things external to the body. Some percepts are really related externally to one another that is are in different spaces. What the Mentalist denies is the externality of percepts to perception. Percepts divorced from perception are meaningless.

(2) The Idealists urge that as things perceived in our dreams are admittedly not caused by things beyond the mind, things seen in the waking state need not be ascribed to non mental causes. The two classes of things are exactly alike. Why ascribe them to different causes? The Sutrakara says they are not alike for things seen in a dream are proved to be unreal on the termination of the dream while those perceived in the waking state remain permanent. Our author here does not see the point of the Idealists argument. The similarity of the waking and the dreaming state lies

in the fact that in both cases the objects are percepts, necessarily related to the percipient mind and explicable only by reference to it. The permanency of the objects of the waking state does not take away this similarity. And the permanency is only relative, if real at all. Our waking perceptions go and come,—they are in a constant flux. As perceptions of individual minds, subject to oblivion and remembrance, they are not permanent. Their identity in this flux may prove the existence of a higher self in us which never forgets anything, but it does not prove any extra-mental reality. As to the similarity of the waking and the dreaming state and the creative power of the self, Yājñavalkya's views in *Bṛ* iv 3 tally, at least partly, with those of the Vijnānavādins and seem opposed to those of the Sūtrakāra. But, as we shall see later on, our author sets forth another and a maturer view elsewhere.

(2) The Idealists think that mental impressions can be caused by *vāsanās*, preceding impressions, and that no extra-mental causes need be postulated. But *vāsanās* are modifications and imply a substratum, the existence of which the Idealists deny. We might ask the Sūtrakāra whether he thinks of material or mental substrata. Mental substrata might be allowed for mental phenomena, but material, that is, unconscious substrata for mental or conscious phenomena are not only uncalled for, but meaningless. However, the variety of mental impressions demand, so argues the Sūtrakāra, various kinds of external things as their causes. But, apart from the unreasonableness of explaining conscious effects by unconscious causes, are not various pur-

poses a better explanation of them? If the same self can be the subject of various mental conditions such as we experience daily and hourly and such as the Sūtrakāra himself has spoken of elsewhere what prevents various mental impressions from being the effects of the same conscious cause with various purposes?

(4) The Sensationalists substitute what they call *Ālayavijñāna* a sum total of sensations for a permanent self. But as we have already briefly said in (1) momentary sensations cannot be summed up without a permanent ego that retains sensations as fixed ideas. A self that persists while events pass away retains the knowledge of the past and relates it to the present, and also anticipates the future can alone combine *viñānas* ideas which, as necessarily related to the self have an element of permanence in them. Space with its relations of *here* and *there* *far* and *near* time with its *now* and *then*, causality with its union of the *permanent* and the *transient* are all impossible and meaningless without a self which, while making space time and causality possible, yet transcends their limitations. However the student of recent British philosophy will see that the refutation of Sensationalism aphorised by the Sūtrakāra and amplified by Sankara, which we have sketched above, is a remarkable anticipation of T. H. Green's refutation of Hume in the introduction to his edition of Hume's works reproduced in the first volume of his own works.

The Jaina philosophy is considered in the next *adhikarana*, *sūtras* 33-36. The Jainas recognise only two fundamental categories or classes of objects, *jīva*

and *ajīva*, self and not-self But these include various other subordinate categories, as the reader will find on reference to our annotations and their translation They have also got a method of reasoning which they call *saptabhaṅginaya*, according to which any object, considered from seven distinct standpoints, appears to have different contradictory qualities The method seems to have a distant resemblance to Hegel's doctrine of the identity of contraries Both the *Sūtrakāra* and the *Bhāsyakāra* are very brief on the subject and nothing definite can be said about it without a direct study of Jaina philosophy However, the *Sūtrakāra* shows the erroneousness of this method by the simple statement that contradictory qualities cannot inhere in the same object at the same time He then examines the Jaina doctrine of the self from the standpoint of the Vedantic view of it as eternal and unchangeable According to the Jainas the self assumes various sizes corresponding to the bodies it occupies in its successive transmigrations But in the final stage of liberation it is, they say, unalterable The *Sūtrakāra* characterises this theory as inconsistent He thinks that to be unchangeable in the state of liberation, the self, regarded either as *vibhu* or *anu*, minute or pervasive, must always be unchangeable

In the next group of *sūtras*, 37-41, the doctrine of the theistic or rather deistic *Sāṅkhyas*, the *Saivas*, the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas*, which says that God is distinct from both matter and the individual self and is only their Ruler and not their Creator, is examined and refuted Our author's arguments are the following —

(1) God as Ruler has ordained for different beings unequal positions, high low and middling. He is therefore subject to love and hate and therefore no real *īśvara* or Ruler.

(2) Being distinct from and therefore unconnected with matter and the selves how can such a God rule them?

(3) A potter can control his clay because it is an object of his perception. *Prakṛiti* is devoid of form and other qualities and not an object of perception. Hence *īśvara*'s control over her is unthinkable.

(4) It may be said that *īśvara*'s control over *Prakṛiti* is like that of the soul over its senses. But its senses make the soul subject to pleasure and pain. The analogy would therefore make the Deity subject to pleasure and pain and so take away his divinity.

(5) According to the *Sāṅkhya*, *Prakṛiti* is unlimited and so are the *Puruṣas*. Now, one may ask if *īśvara* knows their and his own measure. If he knows it, he is limited. If he does not know it, he is not omniscient.

The last *adhikāraṇa* of the *pāda*, *sūtras* 42-45, examines the *Bhāgavata Pancharātra* doctrine. The ancient works of the school seem to have been lost. The present *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* is evidently a modern book and though teaching the peculiarly *Bhāgavata* tenets, is—at any rate tries to be—in harmony with Vedantic teachings. The current *Nārada Pancharātra* and the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa*, which are more distinctly *Bhāgavata* in spirit, seem even later than the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. But they do sound a note of opposition to the *Vedas* and the *Vedānta*, which is mentioned

in sutra 45 They can thus be taken as the modern representatives of the ancient Bhāgavata-Pancharātra system According to this system Bhagavān, the Supreme Being, though one, manifests himself in four distinct *vyūhas*, forms or aspects, namely Vāsudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha Vāsudeva is the Infinite One in his fulness Sankarshana is his manifestation as the individual self Pradyumna is *manas*, the sensorium, which unites the five senses and the five organs of action Aniruddha is *ahankāra*, egoity, each person's consciousness of himself as distinct from other selves The Sutrakāta's criticism of the system turns upon its dual procedure of representing the subsequent *vyūhas* as at once one with Vāsudeva and so infinite and eternal, and as proceeding from him and so non-eternal and finite If Sankarshana, the individual self, proceeds from Vāsudeva, the Absolute Self, then the former becomes transient and finite and cannot be said to be one with the latter The cause, to be a real cause, must have some *atīśaya*, superiority, over the effect, or else causation is impossible. As to the third and fourth *vyūhas* the doctrine is even more inconsistent *Manas* is an organ or instrument (such as a hatchet) of the individual self and *ahankāra* the same of *manas* Now, we never see an instrument proceeding from an agent But the Bhāgavatas derive their Pradyumna from Sankarshana and then Aniruddha from Pradyumna Such a theory is opposed to common experience and has no support from the scriptures The Bhāgavatas also contradict one another as regards attributes and

the beings possessing them,—representing the former sometimes as mere qualities and sometimes as selves as holy Vāsudevas. And they are opposed, at least partly, to the Vedas. They say Sāṅdilya failed to get the highest good in the Vedas and found it in their sāstra.

The ancient Bhāgavata Pancharātra cult has gradually developed into what is now called Vaiṣṇavism with its four chief schools and their many divisions and sub-divisions. The four divine *vyūhas* have given rise to an elaborate story of love and war in which Vāsudeva has become Krishna, the son of a Kshatriya named Vasudeva, and Sankarshana has become Balarāma, Krishna's half brother. Pradyumna is Krishna's son and Aniruddha his grandson. The present writer has given a sketch of the rise and development of Vaiṣṇavism in a small volume of twenty essays named *Krishna and the Puranas* in which, besides other things, the earlier form of the cult, which is in harmony with the Vedānta, and the later form which practically rejects it are clearly distinguished. As to the Sūtrakara's criticism of the Bhāgavata doctrine of *Chaturvyūha* could it not be said from the Bhāgavata standpoint so far as it accepts Vedāntic teachings that the distinction of cause and effect, and even of agent and organ can be regarded both from the eternal and the temporal point of view. Considered from the latter the Sūtrakara's criticism is valid. The individual self as proceeding from the Universal *in time* is not the Universal. And the same thing can be said of egoity as proceeding from the sensorium. But looked at from a standpoint



beyond the time-process, these very effects, though distinguishable from their causes, are not separable from them and are in that sense one with them. Such an explanation is suggested by, if not clearly set forth in, the higher Vaishnava puranas like the *Vishnu* and the *Bhágavata*.

### Pada 3

The first adhikarana of the pāda, sūtras 17, discusses the origin of ākāśa space. The pūrvapakṣa holds that space is eternal not a created object. The arguments in favour of this position are (1) that the scriptures do not speak of the origin of space or if they do speak of it, as in *Tait* if they do so in a figurative sense and (2) that space has not that composite and changing nature which all created objects have. The Sūtrakāra meets these arguments by saying (1) that the scriptural statement of the creation of space is not figurative (2) that the scriptural promise of knowing all things by knowing God can be fulfilled only by accepting all things including space as one with God which he interprets as meaning that all things are caused or created by God, and (3) that, as observed in this world, there is division or distinction only in effects, not in causes. Space being distinguishable from earth and other things, it must be an effect or created object. As to the last argument, is it not evident that earth as extended as in space, can not be distinguished from it? However, the whole discussion can hardly be called philosophical. Neither party undertakes to analyse experience and show like the English Empiricists that space is derived from sensations, or like Kant that it is an *a priori* form or condition of perception. The pūrvapakṣa seems to have a glimpse of the latter view, but does not elaborate it. In substance we side with Kant and regard

space and time as undervived *forms* of perception But it would be going out of the way to attempt here an exposition of this view We refer the reader for a somewhat detailed treatment of the subject to the first chapter of our *Brahmajñásá* either in its English or Bengali version Space is not derived from perception, for it is an *a priori* condition, mode or form of perception But perception itself is a human form of knowledge, which is essentially above the limitations of space and time Knowing or the knowing self, inasmuch as it is aware of limitations, transcends limitation He who knows *here* and *there*, *now* and *then*, *far* and *near*, really comprehends all these and is above their divisions Man, though his actual perceptions are in space and time, has the unspatial and the timeless, the Infinite and the Eternal, in him and is in that sense one with the latter If the comprehension of space in God makes it a created thing, and if this is what the Sūtrakāra means by calling it so, he is right And in this sense, the creation of space is continuous, "ever beginning, never-ending" Every time the transcendent knowledge of God is manifested as human knowledge or the knowledge of some superhuman finite being, space is created

Sūtra 8 merely states that by a procedure similar to that adopted in the case of space, air also may be shown to be created by God.

In sūtra 9 the childish question "who made God?" sometimes asked even by people who are not children, is discussed In explaining one thing by another we really explain, says the Sūtrakāra, the particular by the

general When the most general i. e., the Universal, is reached, namely *Sat*, Being the causal question ends. The Universal requires no explanation *Sat* cannot be derived from *asat* non being because it is non-existent and therefore cannot be a cause That the Upanishadic *Sat*, Being, is not a mere empty conception but is the same as knowing, which cannot be derived from any thing else for all other things imply it as their condition, is clear from *Chh* vi 2 and such other passages

Sūtras 10 11 and 12 treat respectively of the origin of fire, water and earth In the last of these sūtras it is shown that '*anna*' in *Chh* vi. 2 and 4 means earth and not food, such as rice or barley

In sūtra 13 it is shown that the elements mentioned do not of themselves produce the other elements, but that the Lord, abiding in them as their selves, produces effects by his creative thought.

The 14th aphorism teaches the doctrine by illustrations from observed facts that the order of creation *c. g.*, water from fire and earth from water is reversed in dissolution or retraction into Brahman.

Sūtra 15 answers an objection to the order of creation given in scripture arising from the intervention of *buddhi* and *manas* between the Creator and the elements We merely mention it, as it is of no importance and pass on to the next topic, which is really important.

Sūtras 16, 17 and 18 are regarded as different topics, but they, in fact the remaining whole of the pāda, may be taken as one topic, the nature of the self However, we shall take up 16-18 first They teach the indestructibility of the self As it manifests itself with the birth

of the body, and disappears with its death, it seems to be born and to die, but its birth and death are *bhāta*, apparent and not real. It is really eternal and indestructible. The proof adduced by our author is purely scriptural. He does not attempt any rational proof. As in speaking of space, so here, he does not analyse the idea of time and show, as he might do, that there can be no time without the timeless,—the knowing self in us which, seen in the fulness of its nature, is seen to be also the Self of the universe. For a detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to the second chapter, *Nityāntyaviveka*, of our *Brahmajñāsā*.

The next topic, comprising sūtras 19-32, is the size, minute or pervasive, of the self. The pūrvapaksha defends its minuteness, the Sūtrakāra its pervasiveness. The pūrvapaksha argument extends up to the 28th aphorism. There is much in this long discussion which does not call for or indeed deserve exposition or abbreviation. Its strong point is the scriptural doctrine of transmigration. A self that migrates from body to body, from one world to another, cannot be *viśva*, pervasive, it must be *anu*, minute. The pūrvapaksha also cites scriptural texts in support of his view. The Sūtrakāra's answer turns upon his view of the conjunction of the self with *buddhi*, the understanding, with its expressions,—desire and aversion, pleasure and pain &c. as long as its individuality lasts. It is this limiting or differentiating adjunct that makes the self appear as minute, and scriptural statements of its minuteness have all a reference to the self's conjunction with it. In its essence, that is as free from this adjunct, the self

is not minute, but pervasive. Our author finds a support of this view in such scriptural passages as *Bri* iv 3.7. This passage which we have explained in the light of Sankara's commentary, may admit of another interpretation at any rate some words in it, for instance *samāna*. But its general trend undoubtedly supports the Sutrakāra's view. '*Dhyayati it i lalayati ita*' really means that thinking and moving do not belong to the self's real nature. But this view of the self is not shared by all the rishis of the Upanishads, as we shall see by and by. However the Sutrakāra's idea of the self is as already mentioned above in substance that its minuteness its special perceptions its pleasures pains and movements in short its individuality are all due to its connection with *buddhi* apparently an extraneous substance and that this connection ceases in the state of liberation. But does not this connection cease even before liberation? In *sushupti* dreamless sleep which represents *pralaya* submergence of the world in Brahman all expressions of individuality cease and the self is united to Brahman. This view is set forth in *Chh* vi 8.1. *Bri* iv 8.22 and several other passages in the Upanishads. The Sutrakāra's reply to this given in sūtra 31 is that in dreamless sleep *buddhi* remains in a potential condition and is re-manifested in the waking state, like the moustaches and the virile seed in the child, manifesting themselves in youth. Our author tries to strengthen his position in sūtra 32 by saying that in the absence of a limiting adjunct like *buddhi* there would be either perpetual non-perception or constant perception, neither of which is actually the

case But even in the presence of *buddhi* there is change from perception to non-perception and the reverse This is explained by the contact or non-contact of *buddhi* with external objects and its attention or inattention to them The *Sūtrakāra* cannot think of the self in its real nature, without contact with a not-self, as capable of producing the changes of our conscious life How far this view is consistent with his avowed Monism, we shall see later on

In the next two *adhikaranas*, *sūtras* 33-39 and 40, our author shows, on the authority of many a scriptural text, that the self, with the understanding as its organ, is an agent in matters both temporal and spiritual But it can also cease to act, by not using its instrument, as a carpenter does by laying aside his adze

In *sūtras* 41 and 42 our author tries to solve, too briefly it would seem, the problem of man's dependence upon God and his freedom as a moral agent Man's activity, he says, is dependent on God But if so, he suffers the evil consequences of actions which, as dependent on God, are not properly human This, says the *pūrvapaksha*, is not compatible with God's justice and goodness But, says our author, God in awarding the consequences of human actions has regard to men's moral efforts,—their choice of virtue and vice The various moral injunctions in the *sāstras* prove this They would be meaningless if man had no free choice Our author stops here He does not seem to see that the idea of man's free choice and that of the dependence of his actions on God are

naturally contradictory, at any rate they seem to be so. The problem recurs in another form and is discussed at length in the next adhikarana.

Sūtras 43-53, the last adhikarana of the pāda discuss the question of Monism and Pluralism,—whether what we call finite selves are one with God or really distinct selves independent of God and independent of one another. As we have already seen, our author accepts the former view, but he qualifies his Monism by teaching that individual selves are parts of God and not God in his totality. He thinks that by this qualification he solves many a problem which unqualified Monism and Pluralism cannot solve. Besides the many sastric declarations of man's distinction from God already referred to by him (in sūtras 43-45) he adds here a few more. On the other hand the Atharvans go so far as to identify even fishermen, slaves and gamblers with Brahman. Our author thinks these opposite views of unity and difference can be reconciled by his own view that the individual is a part of the Universal. The objection (in sūtra 46) that on his view God would be affected by human afflictions, he meets in a way already familiar to us, namely by his theory of *buddhi* as a limiting adjunct of the self. As light, space and the sun seem bent, moving and trembling respectively though not really so, owing to such adjuncts as fingers, jars and water, so God is not affected by the pain to which his part, the individual limited by *buddhi*, is subject. This view is again supported (in sūtra 47) by texts from Śruti and Smṛiti. Sūtras



18-53 answer some objections to our author's Non-dualism urged by Pluralists and show that their system is not free from inconsistency. If there is only one Self, they ask, what can be the meaning of the sastre injunctions and prohibitions? Do they not imply a plurality of selves? Our author answers this question by admitting the one self's connection with many bodies and drawing his illustrations from the material world, thus practically giving up his Advaitavādi Fire, he says is really one, yet fire in contact with a dead body is untouchable. Earth is one, yet of the two things, a diamond and a corpse, both (as he thinks) made of earth the one is worthy of acceptance, the other of rejection. The second objection (urged in sūtra 19) is this - You admit only one self and therefore only one agent. But there are many actions attributed to many agent. If there were only one agent, the fruits of actions would get mixed. Evil-doers would be happy and virtuous people miserable. The Sūtrakāra answers - (1) Buddha keeps agents distinct from one another and prevents the confusion you speak of. (2) The individual self is after all (as says sūtra 50) a reflection of the Supreme Self, not a reality different from the latter, yet not quite (sākshāt) identical with it. In sūtra 51 the Sūtrakāra turns the tables against the Pluralists. Your *adrishta*, he says, the invisible fruit of actions, inheres in an unintelligent object open to all selves, so there being nothing to confine any particular *adrishta* to any particular self, the possibility of confusion you ascribe to my theory really belongs to

your. The Pluralist rejoins (in sūtra 52) that the particular resolutions of particular selves to secure this end and avoid that, is sufficient to avoid the supposed confusion and bring to each the result of his own action. Our author replies that there is nothing to prevent the confusion for the particular resolutions of particular selves are taken in conjunction with the *manas* (a form or expression of buddhi and ultimately of Prakṛiti) which is open to all selves. There is nothing to regulate these resolutions and confine their results to particular selves. But the Pluralist is not yet silenced. In sūtra 53, the last of the pāda he says—As the conjunction of the selves with *manas* takes place in their respective bodies, the distinction of their resolutions and the result of these resolutions are secured by the locality in which the conjunction takes place. The Sūtrakāra replies that as the selves are *ubhu* pervasive and as the body originates in proximity to all selves, the latter are in all bodies and there are no particular bodies belonging to particular selves. The conjunction of the *manas* with the selves cannot therefore be assigned to any particular locality. The possibility of confusion therefore remains on the Pluralist theory and the Monistic view is proved to be the only one which solves all difficulties.



have effects all over the body. If they were pervasive, there would be no meaning in their passing out of the body at death. The mukhya prāna is sometimes called pervasive, but its pervasiveness pertains only to its universal aspect, as Hiranyagarbha. Some thinkers would not call the mukhya prāna an organ for it does not reveal any object as sight or hearing does. But as it sustains the body and the organs of knowledge and action, it is surely an organ of the self.

So far we have given the substance of the first nineteen sūtras of the pāda. The 20th sūtra seems abruptly to introduce another subject already sufficiently discussed in the foregoing parts of the book, namely the creation of name and form, that is the world in space and time. In answer to a supposed purvapakṣa asserting that the speaker in *Chh* vi 8 2 and 3 is the individual and not the universal self the Sūtrakāra shows that it cannot be so. The 'living self' is mentioned only as the form which the Universal assumed in entering the three elements which he had already created and subsequently made tripartite. The 21st sūtra refers to the rise of some of the minor elements from the chief elements made tripartite. The process is described in *Chh* vi. The 22nd affirms that though all things are now of a mixed nature fire, water and earth retain their distinctive names owing to the pre dominance of the original elements in them. Thus what we now call fire contains one-half of the original fire and one-fourth of each of the other two elements.

## CHAPTER III

### Pada 1

This páda treats of the destiny of those who follow the *karmakánda*, the ceremonial portion, of the Vedas, that is, who practise the threefold religion of *ista*, *púrta* and *datta*, sacrifices, digging tanks and such other philanthropic work, and giving alms and presents to deserving persons. We fear that to modern readers, to those who have been taught to think in all matters, including religion, according to the established methods of science, namely observation, experiment, deduction and induction, much of what is said in this section will seem extremely crude and even meaningless, even though they may be believers in the immortality and transmigration of the soul. Our summary of the section will therefore be very brief, indicating only the broad lines of our author's thought and leaving the details to be gathered from the text and our annotations and translation by those who feel interested in them.

The first adhikarana, occupying sūtras 1-7, affirms that the individual self, when it passes out of the body at death, goes enveloped by subtle parts of the elements, *i e*, in an etherial body composed of these parts. The authority referred to is the "Panchágni-vidya," meditation on the five fires, in the *Chhándogya* Upanishad, v 3-10, which is set forth in the course of a conversation between the Bráhmāna sage Uddálaka Áruni and the royal sage Praváhana Jaivali. It is one of those

stories already referred to in this *bhāṣya*, in which a Brāhmana takes instruction on religious subjects from a Kshatriya. The peculiarity of this particular story is that Jaivali tells Aruni that the latter is the first Brāhmana to learn the vidyā, which was up to that time confined to the Kshatriyas. This seems an extreme assertion if it means that the whole subject of the soul's immortality and transmigration was unknown to the Brāhmanas till the time Aruni learnt it from Jaivali. But it may mean only that the priestly class as a whole, owing to their absorption in ceremonial religion, did not attend to matters pertaining to the future life and had only vague notions about it. It may also mean that the form in which Jaivali expounded the Panchāgni vidyā was hitherto unknown to Brāhmanas. However, the same story is told with some variations in *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* vi. 2. The first chapter of the *Kaushītaki* tells the same story with important omissions and elaborations and the name of the king changed into Chitra.

In the second adhikarana, sutras 8-11 and the third 12-21, it is stated that the followers of the karmakāṇḍa go to the lunar regions through a path called the pitṛyāna, the way of ancestors, which consists of or are symbolised by smoke, mist &c., and having experienced the results of their actions there, return with a residue of karmic effects to the earth in an order which is the reverse of what they followed in going. After return they are re-born in forms varying according to their merits. Those who do not follow the karmakāṇḍa, but live lives of unrestrained sin, go to the abode of Yama.

and having suffered punishment there, return to the earth and are re-born

In the 22nd and 23rd aphorisms, it is stated on sástric authority that the self, both in its ascent to and descent from the moon, takes the form of, that is becomes similar to, certain objects such as ether, smoke, rice and barley. Release from the latter kind of objects during the descent is delayed

In the last adhikarana, sūtras 24-27, it is further explained that entering into or taking the form of rice, bailey &c, means only coming into contact with these objects. In such contact the selves enter human bodies. It is only when they enter a womb that they are re-born

In reading the sūtras and our annotations on them it will be found that in more than one instance statements made on the passage of the individual self to and from the lunar regions are interpreted metaphorically. Did it not occur to our author, we have often asked ourselves, that the whole description, as given in the Upanishads, may be metaphorical? Perhaps the Sūtrakāra, as he lived in an age when the freedom and originality of the Vedic rishis had given place to an uncritical acceptance of their utterances, did not think so. But the careful reading of Chittrā's description, referred to above, of the Devayānapatha and the Brahmaloṇa to which it leads, leaves us in no doubt that to him at least and those who thought with him, the two paths, Pitriyāna and Devayāna, and the lunar and solar regions to which they lead, are only two methods of religious culture and two spiritual conditions which result from them. These two methods

and conditions are not indeed confined to our life *here* but also extend to *hereafter* but they do not indicate two spatial passages and two regions in space. The Pitriyāna is really the blind following of rites and customs promulgated by our ancestors and the Devayāna the method of *sādhana* discovered by the direct experience of *devas*, enlightened souls—an experience to be repeated in every *sādhana*. The uncritical blindness characterising the former path is compared to smoke, mist, the dark fortnight &c., and even the goal it leads to is nothing better than the borrowed and dim light of the moon. Such a method of *sādhana* cannot lead to any stable spiritual gain. The unstability attached to it is typified by repeated transmigrations to high or low forms of life. The Devayāna is symbolised by fire, the solar rays, the bright fortnight &c., and it leads to the solar regions, the very source of light. The goal achieved is lasting, from which there is no descent. However we shall return to the subject when we have occasion to speak in detail of Brahmaloka, the divine regions, and the way which leads to it.



## Pada 2

In his dealing with the Buddhist Idealists we have found the Sūtrakāra to be a Dualist, believing in things external to the mind as the cause of its sensations. Here, in this páda, which discusses the relations of the individual and the universal self, we find him still holding to the same Dualism and establishing on its basis the doctrine of a lonely Self whose self-consciousness, inasmuch as he is untouched by the material world, is not broken by the idea of anything distinguishable from him. In the latter part of the section our author indeed tries to get rid of his Dualism by appealing to well-known Upanishadic texts proclaiming the sole reality of Brahman, but he gives us no rational grounds on which the material world can be rejected,—a world which, according to him, supplies us with both our sensations and the ‘adjunct’ consisting of *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahankāra*, the medium of our contact with matter and the ultimate cause of our bondage. The proof of our author’s doctrine of an absolutely *niṣguna* Brahman is furnished by a philosophical discussion of the three states of the self, *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti*, waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. Such a discussion is to be found in several parts of the Upanishads, chiefly in *Chh* viii 7-12, *Bṛ* iv 3-4, *Pṛas* iv and *Mund* 1-7. But there is a fourth, a ‘*chaturtha*’ or *túrīya* state, variously described in the first and last passages referred to, which our author ignores. A thorough discussion of that would have,

as we shall see by and by either deepened his *nirguna* *rāda* and made it more consistent, or led him to reject it altogether at any rate in the exclusive form in which he holds it. However, to enter into the discussion which leads to such important issues, what does our waking life teach us as to the relation of the individual self to any not self that may exist and to the Universal Self? Our author as we have already seen, takes the common sense view of which the Sāṅkhya view is a philosophical form, that our waking perceptions are caused by the contact of our *upādhis* adjuncts with objects external to the self. As the reader has already seen, our *upādhis* also according to our author are composed of unconscious elements. We have briefly shown in our summary of the Tarkapāda, the unreasonableness of this view and referred to our *Brahmajyñāsā* for a detailed discussion of the subject. The error of this way of thinking lies in taking abstractions for concrete realities. Sensations, perceptions, *viñānas* even minds or selves without objects of which they are aware, are abstractions and not concrete realities. The mind or self is supposed to be like a lump of clay or wax susceptible of taking impressions from a stamp and actually taking such impressions when the stamp is pressed against it. Sensations and ideas are thought of as such impressions made on the mind or self by things external to it. But the self, and knowledge which forms its very essence, have nothing even remotely similar to wax, clay or the impressions made on them. In knowledge, of whatever kind or degree, the knower and the known are undivided and indivisible. They

may be distinguished, but the distinction is not a difference without unity, but a difference in unity or a unity in difference. Knowledge or the self is the real infinite beyond which nothing is seen, heard or thought of,—‘*Yatra nānyat paśyati, nānyat śrīnoti nānyat vijānāti*’ (*Chh* vii 24 1.)—In which nothing but itself is seen, heard or thought of. In it the self knows itself and nothing but itself. In it there is no external difference between the self and any not-self. But there are in it undemable internal differences some of which may be briefly pointed out. There is for instance the difference of *here* and *there* (space) *now* and *then* (time), and good and evil (morality). In knowing something *here* I distinguish it from what is *there*, but nevertheless I know that what is there, though not before my senses, yet exists. In knowing this I know that my self, which makes this distinction of here and there, overlaps or transcends the limitation implied in it. So in knowing the book before me *now*, I distinguish the *now* from the *then* when the object was not and shall not be before my senses. Nevertheless I know that it existed and will exist beyond my senses, and in knowing this I recognise that my self, though there are for it these distinctions of present, past and future, transcends the limitations of time. In the same manner, though I sometimes choose the evil, my higher self soon reveals the good to me, makes me feel penitent for my sin and thus makes itself known as the Perfect. All knowledge, therefore,—perceptual and conceptual, theoretic and practical, turns out to be the self-revelation of the Infinite to the finite, of the Perfect to the imperfect.

The true cause or explanation of our waking life is not the contact of the self with a not self,—a bondage to be got rid of,—but a necessary and inalienable relation of God and man.

Before taking up the discussion of *śvapna* and *sushupti* it should be seen that in what we call our waking life we are not fully awake. Most part of the knowledge we have acquired remains in the background of our consciousness and what comes to the light of consciousness is in a constant flux. As creatures we are subject to oblivion and are constantly forgetting things. But the Creator who forgets nothing is in us as our true Self, and it is this which explains our passing from oblivion to remembrance. The Lord says in the *Gītā* —

*Sarvasya chaham hridi sannivishṭo*

*Mattah smṛtirjñānam apohamāncha.*

That is, 'I abide in the hearts of all. Memory and knowledge, as well as their disappearance, are from me' (xv 15). Our passage from oblivion to recollection, if truly understood, will convince even an ordinary unphilosophical thinker that we, individual selves, are not independent realities, but are dependent for our conscious life on an ever-knowing never forgetting Being who, though so different from us, exists in us as our truest Self. People think that things forgotten by us somehow continue to exist in us, forgetful beings and start up into consciousness again, perhaps through the instrumentality of the brain cells. They do not see that such an idea involves a self-contradiction,—knowledge remaining unknown and becoming known again.

Knowledge, in all its forms,—perception, conception, memory, imagination etc —can exist only as knowledge, as the property of a knowing being. It cannot become unknown and come back as knowledge. So, when we, as individuals, lose our knowledge, it still exists in the Universal, our true Self, and comes back to us through his activity. The brain-cells, as parts of the Supreme Reality, have indeed something to do with the revival, even with the acquisition, of knowledge, but conceived as unconscious objects, they explain neither the one nor the other. Knowledge can exist, come from, and go back to only a knowing being. The individual, inasmuch as it acquires, loses and gets back knowledge, is not sufficient for itself, cannot explain itself. It has its true cause, explanation and permanent abode in a Being in whom knowledge is original, eternal and perfect. Our waking life then, seen in its fullness, in relation to its Cause and Support, already, without any consideration of our dreams and dreamless sleep, bears testimony to an ever-waking, all-knowing Being who never forgets anything, who therefore never dreams or sleeps. Dreaming and sleeping are only forms of oblivion, and cannot be ascribed to the self in its fullness. And as is clear from what we have said above of the nature of *our* waking, which is never full and perfect, even waking in this sense cannot be ascribed to him. He is above the three states of *jāgrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti*. To him knowledge is not a process, as it is to us, but an unchanging eternal possession. His is the fourth or *tūīya* state. Prajāpati in *Chh* viii 12 truly interprets it, while Māndūkya, at any rate his interpreters, Sankara

and Gourapáda, misunderstand and misinterpret it. The Sūtrakāra, as we have already said, ignores it altogether, but his trend of thought, as we shall see, resembles Mandūkya's more than Prajāpati's.

Sūtras 1-6 of the pāda under discussion treat of *raṇa*. We need not touch upon all that the Sūtrakāra says about this state. Much of what he says has nothing to do with philosophy. The point to be specially noted is the contrast he draws between the waking and the dreaming state. As the latter does not represent reality—reality as it appears in the waking state in all its aspects it is according to him a state of illusion. He misses the real point of Īśnavalkya's contrast of the two states though he quotes it,—“There are no chariots in that state (dreaming) no horses no roads. He himself creates chariots, horses, roads” (*Bṛi* iv 3. 9 and 10). Īśnavalkya suggests, though he does not here say so explicitly, that as the self can create in dreams things which seem to be external to it but are actually not so things perceived in the waking state are also its own creation. Elsewhere for instance in *Bṛi* iv 3. 23-32, he says so explicitly. What the Sūtrakāra emphasises is that the self in *raṇa* is still in bondage, for it still sees a plurality of things while reality is absolutely one. However coming to *sushupti* in sūtras 7 and 8 he says on the authority of many a text of the Upanishads, that in this state the individual reaches its true Self—becomes one with it and has no feeling of difference. In sūtra 9 he shows the identity of the sleeping and the re-awakened individual. This identity depends upon the union of past with present

experience As we have shown in our prefatory remarks, this implies that the individual's experience, with all the differences of which it is composed, remains in tact in the Universal during the former's *sushupti* and that the Universal is not the abstract unity without difference which the *Sūtrakāṇa* would make it The fourth *adhikarāṇa*, *sūtra* 10, deals with the state of swoon and need not detain us In the fifth *adhikarāṇa*, *sūtra* 11-21, scriptural texts are quoted to show that God's immanence, his unity with objects in time and space, which makes him *saguna*, qualified, is only apparent, and that his transcendence, his *nirguna* or unqualified nature, is alone real Scripture indeed often describes him as *saguna*, but that is because he appears one with the objects in which he is present, as the rays of the sun or the moon seem straight or curved in conjunction with such an object, or as the reflection of the sun seems multiform in water though the sun itself is one An objector showing the inappropriateness of the analogy is answered by the statement that the cases compared have some points of similarity Our author also shows that the immanental attributes of God mentioned in the scriptures are often negated by them and a decided prominence is given to his transcendental attributes That immanence and transcendence, the *saguna* and *nirguna* natures, are only two aspects of the same truth, and so equally real, the one being meaningless without the other, our author does not see However, the next *adhikarāṇa*, *sūtras* 22-31, contains the same subject with some variations The chief point in it is that though God as transcendent is

unmanifested that is not an object of sense, he is realised in worship by the purified soul. In the next adhikarana sūtras 32-39 arguments urged in favour of the existence of other realities than Brahman on the authority of some scriptural analogies are answered in a way already indicated above and the sole reality of God affirmed on the authority of the sastras. The last adhikarana, sūtras 39-43 discusses the same subject,—God as the true source of the results of *Larma*,—which we have seen already discussed in sūtras 41 and 42 of the third pāda of the second chapter.



### Pada 3

This section, which deals with *Upāsana*, worship or meditation, and might be expected to be helpful to devotional exercises, is on the contrary highly technical and textual. It indeed speaks of the scriptural passages, variously named *vidyās*, *upāsanās* and *pratyayas*, which set forth the attributes of God and thereby help the aspirant to meditate upon and worship him. But instead of affording any aids to devotion our author occupies himself mostly with such questions as (1) whether the *vidyās*, because of their variations in minor matters, should be recognised as different or in regard to their common object, helping the mind's concentration in God, should all be accepted as fundamentally one, (2) whether some of them do not belong to ceremonial religion though apparently *upāsanās*, (3) whether attributes found to be enumerated in some *vidyās*, but absent in others, should or should not be taken over and joined to the latter in the actual practice of meditation, and so on. Readers interested in the details of this discussion are referred to our annotations and translation. The monotony of this scholastic dissertation, extending over sixty-six aphorisms divided into forty topics, is broken only once or twice. In sūtra 53 a digression, an admitted one, is made. The Chārvāka objection to the separate existence and immortality of the self is mentioned and in the next sūtra it is answered. The self with its properties of perception &c, appears only so long as the body

lasts disappearing on the dissolution of the body. There are therefore the Materialists conclude one and there is no future life — any life in view of which your elaborate rites and meditations are prescribed. The Sutrakara answers — If the self were one with the body the properties of the self perception &c. would be manifested in the dead body but they are not manifest therein thus showing the distinction you ignore. You admit the existence of perception which we regard as the very essence of the self. On this very ground you should admit the difference of self and body for perception means you should admit, perception of matter and things material, implying a difference of reality of subject and object. Objects of perception change but the perceiving self persists and remains identical during the change. That prove that it cannot die even on the dissolution of the body. The other break rather slight, is seen in *sūtra* 1 wherein our author gives the aspirant the option of choosing any one or more of the many scriptural meditations as helps to his devotion. The common object of them all is he says to enable us to have a direct vision of the Lord. To realise this object it is not necessary to use all the meditations. If only one chosen out of them and steadily followed in our devotion gives us success a second is not necessary. This indeed does not exclude the possibility that the others if devoutly studied, may have a cumulative effect on the mind. However it may help the reader if we mention below all the scriptural references given by the Sutrakara, so far as we could verify them. We exclude only his references to

those meditations which he rejects as merely ceremonial

Prána-vidyá,—*Bṛ* vi 1 1 *Chh* v 1 1 *Kau* ii 9

Panchágni-vidyá,—*Bṛ* vi 2 *Chh* v 10

Vaisvánara-vidyá,—*Chh* v 11-18

Sándilya-vidyá,—*Chh* iii 14

Udgitha-vidyá,—*Bṛ* i 3 7 *Chh* i 2 7

Parovarīya-udgitha-vidyá,—*Chh* i 9 1, 2, i 6 6-8

*Kath* i 9 10, 11, i 3 12 *Ait* i 1 2 *Chh* v 2 2

*Bṛ* vi 1 14 *Satapath Br* xc 6 3 2 *Bṛ* vi 6 1

*Mund* iii 1 1 *Svet* iv 6 *Kath* i 3 1. *Bṛ* iii 4 1,

iii 5 1 *Svet* vi 11.

*Ait Ar* ii 2 4 6 *Bṛ* v 4 1 v 5 2 *Chh* viii 1 1,

viii 7 1 *Bṛ* iv 4 2'

#### Pada 4

This section, which treats of the relation of knowledge and work, has fifty two sutras divided into eighteen *adhikaranas*. The division is immaterial and not quite logical. The whole *pada* may be taken as a single dissertation on the main subject mentioned with incidental digressions to ceremonial matter such as the permissibility of taking forbidden food in critical conditions of life and whether a *naisthika brahmachari* one who has taken the vow of perpetual celibacy can ever be purified by *prayaschitta* an expiatory rite. The chief controversy is that between the *Samuchchaya* *vidin* the advocate of the constant union of knowledge and action in the same life and the *Sannyasin*, the advocate of mere knowledge without any obligation to work. The first position is taken by Jaimini as he is represented in the *Puramimansa* the second by Bādarāyana, as referred to by the *Sutrakāra*. The gist of the controversy is given in the first two *adhikaranas* *sūtras* 1-20, though some of the succeeding aphorisms also touch upon it. We will not enter into the details of the controversy but leave the reader to gather them from the text and our annotations and translation. Both the parties appeal exclusively to scriptural authority. None of them descend to reasoning,—to any analysis of experience which may show either the indissoluble union of knowledge and action or their independence of each other. Our judgment is that as exponents of the scriptures both of them are right, be

cause the rishis, the composers of the Vedas, are not of the same opinion on the matter. Some of them are advocates of *samuchchaya* and some of *sannyása*. But none of them are extremists like some of the later Vedantists, according to whom *moksha*, liberation, is impossible without *sannyása*. Neither is the *Sútrakárin* an extremist. He only contends that *sannyása* is an *áśrama*, a condition of life, as much recognised in the scriptures as *gárhasthya*, the life of the householder. He knows, and any close student of the Upanishads may see, that almost all the most eminent of the sages mentioned in them were life-long house-holders, and several of them kings. However, the *Sútrakáras* predilection for *sannyása* is not without significance. We have already seen that his idea of Brahman as really transcendent and only apparently immanent makes his God practically an inactive Being. *Moksha* being *Brahmabháva*, partaking of the nature of God, it must be a state of pure knowledge without activity. There are Upanishadic rishis who hold this view, and there are also those who are opposed to it. We shall see this more clearly in our summary of the next chapter of the *Sútras*. Our view of the nature of the Absolute has already been briefly set forth and will be more completely expounded as we proceed. In ultimate analysis knowledge and action are found to be inseparable. The Absolute is not only an all-knowing but also an ever-active Being imparting his perfection more and more to imperfect beings dependent on him. His perfection consists not in mere knowledge, but in the fullness of knowledge, love and activity. For man to

partake of his nature is not to gain a static condition of wisdom but to share in his incessant activity in perfecting his creation. God as God is indeed perfect, there is nothing which he does not possess, which he has to gain — *niravapim ariparyam* nevertheless he says *Ista eva cha karmani*—yet I am working (*Gita* iii 22). Even for him there is an obligation to work. We shall find a confirmation of these views in some of the eminent *risis* of the Upanishads.

## CHAPTER IV

### Pada 1

This pāda treats of the attainment of liberation even while still living in the body, through the worship of God. The form of *sādhana* chiefly recommended is the one which Yājñavalkya teaches his wife Maitreyī in the 'Maitreyī Brāhmana' of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad. It consists of *darsana*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nīdīdhyāsaṇa*. Of these *darsana*, seeing or realising God, Śāṅkara explains, is the end, and the other three are the means to the attainment of the end. *Śravaṇa*, hearing, is taking instruction from competent teachers and good books on the nature of God. *Manana*, thinking, is trying to grasp the meaning and be convinced of the truth of such instruction by reasoning, '*taṭkātāh*'. *Nīdīdhyāsaṇa* is deep and prolonged meditation ending in *darsana*. This *sādhana*, our author says, is to be practised again and again, for it is only by such constant practice that it comes to fruition. But what is the nature of the *darsana* which is the end of the process? In seeing God do we see anything else but what we call our own self? Our author answers this question in the negative. God-vision, according to him, is really self-vision. In seeing God we see our own true Self as devoid of all limiting adjuncts. This is said in numerous Upanishadic texts. But has not our author, in several previous occasions, told us that in the act of worship the subject and object of worship are

distinguished as the finite and the Infinite? He has, but here he does not speak of the distinction, though it is undeniable. As we have shown in our comments on pada 2 chapter III, in all acts of knowledge direct or indirect, gross or subtle, this distinction is a necessary condition. In seeing God the aspirant indeed sees the Infinite as his true Self but he cannot do so without realising his own finitude. He sees the Infinite in the finite, that is as the supporter of the finite, and the finite in the Infinite that is as dependant on the Infinite. To deny this relation, in which both unity and difference are implied, is to make God vision meaningless. Self knowledge as divine,—God's knowledge of himself and of man—is eternal and does not imply any process. But man's knowledge of himself and of God passes through a long process of *sādhana* in coming to fruition, and even when it comes to fruition, it is distinguishable from the divine knowledge. A world of mischief has been caused and is still being caused by ignorantly denying or wilfully ignoring this distinction,—a distinction which must be emphasised in the interest of both philosophy and practical religion. However we shall return to the subject in dealing with the subject of *Moksha*, liberation. From *ahangraha upāsana*, the worship of God as our Self which we have just briefly discussed, our author comes to *pratika upasana*, the worship of God with the help of such symbols as the sun, lightning, the sensorium &c. Such worship is proscribed in many a passage of the Upanishads. In the age when they were composed images of gods and goddesses,



now so largely used in popular worship, seem not to have come into vogue. In his 4th sūtra our author forbids the worship of symbols as the Self, for the worshipper does not really think of symbols as one with the Self, knowing them to be finite objects while the Self is infinite. Where the finite is sharply distinguished, that is conceived as separate, from the Infinite, so-called symbolic worship, either in the ancient Vedic or modern popular form, cannot be called divine worship. But what if and when the finite has been seen in its true relation to the Infinite? The Sūtrakāra draws a fine distinction even in such a case, a distinction which he does not make quite clear. According to him the symbols are to be meditated upon as God, but God is not to be meditated upon as the symbols. Perhaps he means, as he suggests in his 5th sūtra, that in the former case the finite is taken up into a reality higher than it, whereas in the latter the infinitude of the Infinite is practically forgotten. This forgetting comes out most clearly when worship takes the form of offering food, drink and other creature comforts to the object of worship.

We pass over, with only a bare mention, the aphorisms in which our author says that worship should be gone through in a sitting posture, that it is irrespective of any particular time, place or direction, and that the practice should continue till the time of death. We come to the far more important question, discussed in sūtras 13-15, whether virtue and vice, good and evil, do or do not stick to man when he has been blessed with the knowledge of God. The Sūtrakāra's view is that

the truly wiseman is freed from both virtue and vice and their fruits except in the case of *prārabdha karma*, i. e. actions whose fruits, for instance the body, the fruit of pre natal *karma*, have commenced and cannot cease except by *bhoga* experience. He supports his view by quotations from the scriptures but does not reason it out. But we can guess his reason from his *metaphysical views*. From the standpoint of unqualified Monism, the doctrine of a solitary Absolute unrelated to finite beings, the distinction of virtue and vice, good and evil, is indeed groundless. It is due to *avidyā* nescience, which is an illusory and vanishing entity, a mere appearance without reality. Ethical relations imply persons distinct from though related to one another. We have seen that even the relation of subject and object in knowledge imply distinction of persons. Now, judged by this standard, our author's wiseman who is *jīvan mukta* liberated though still in the body, and waits for complete release at its dissolution, is not really 'wise' inasmuch as he still believes in the theoretic distinction of body and soul, whereas there is no such distinction, God being all in all, and in the ethical distinction of bondage and liberation, the former of which is an evil the supreme evil, and the latter the supreme good, not to speak of the numberless evils and goods he has wrestled with before reaching the condition he has gained. The doctrine of an abstract undifferentiated Unity cannot be held without being guilty at every step of such inconsistencies. A life of true wisdom, purity and spirituality also cannot be lived with the idea, haunting one at

every step of life, that distinctions are all apparent, none real.

However, in the concluding aphorisms of the páda, 16-19, our author again takes up the subject, already discussed in III 4, of the relation of *harma*, chiefly ritual, to *gnána*. We need not recur to it. Whether the daily *agnihotra*, the performance of which by the *gnámin* is here insisted upon as purificatory,—though its end, the propitiation of the gods, has ceased for him and even the objects of these rites as distinct personalities have disappeared from his mental vision,—still continues to purify the heart and help the fruition of wisdom, the reader will judge for himself.

## Paṇa 2

This section speaks of the passing of the embodied self at death, out of the body and of its starting on the Devayāna Patha already mentioned in III 1. The very mooted of the subject raises the question, Is the self whether it be gross or subtle an extended object, something enclosed in the body like a bird in a cage that it should pass out of it and travel from one region to another? Is not such a conception opposed to the Vedantic idea of the self, at any rate the truly philosophical idea of it as something which is the very presupposition of time, space, motion and individuality, and therefore transcending the limitations implied in these? The self indeed has, as we have seen in III 2 a finite moment or aspect, but the finite and the Infinite are not divisible or separable they are co-existent and inseparable. What then can be the meaning of the *jīva* or finite self passing out of the body and following a route to meet the Infinite? To answer these questions we must have a clear idea of the Vedantic theory specially the Sūtrakāra's theory of the individual self, its relation to the body and the nature of the body it assumes at birth and gives up, either at once or gradually, after death. As we have already seen in III. 2, our author though avowedly a Monist, is only dogmatically so, believing on the authority of the scriptures that the Supreme Self is all in-all, but unable, by any process of reasoning, to reconcile the common sense Dualism of matter and spirit with his dogmatic Non dualism.

This becomes more clear than elsewhere in these concluding sections of his book. His interpretation of the Upanishadic narration of creation, for instance that given in *Chh* vi, is that the things originally created, *tejas*, *ap* and *anna*, and then various combinations in the shape of things earthly and heavenly,—do not represent the Creator's real nature, and that the individual self which arose from God's entrance into these things also misrepresents his true character. The fact is, according to this theory, that creation,—the material world and the individuated self, is not real. Our bondage consists in thinking it to be real and our liberation in knowing it to be unreal. As we have already seen in the last section, liberation, for the truly wise-man, is delayed only so long as his body, the result of actions done under the influence of *avidyá*, is not dissolved. This point is taken up again, in some detail, in the present section. The body is threefold, gross, subtle and causal. All these three kinds of body must perish before liberation can be secured. The gross (*sthúla*) body need not be defined, being known to all. The subtle (*linga* or *sūkshma*) body consists of sixteen elements, the five vital airs, the five organs of knowledge conceived as powers, the five organs of action similarly conceived, and *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahankāra* regarded as a single principle. The causal (*kāraṇa*) body is the *avidyá* which has caused our embodiment and all its consequences. All these three bodies perish in the case of the fully awakened man, so that he is released as soon as he dies. He obtains what is called '*sadyo muktir*', immediate liberation. In this condition he becomes in-

divisible from God. The Sūtralāra calls this condition *avibhīca* (10th sūtra). But from the texts speaking of it it seems to be indistinguishability. When the powers of knowing and acting—principles which distinguish finite selves from one another and from the Infinite—perish, how can any distinction remain? And in the absence of any distinction how can it be said that the individual exists in a liberated condition? Would it not be more appropriate to say that with the destruction of its distinguishing characteristics it is itself destroyed? However, from *sadyo mulā* we now come to *brahma mulā* liberation by successive grades. This kind of liberation is obtained by those who though they have acquired some knowledge of God have not been able to fully burn their nescience (sūtra 7). The first grade of their progress is the *merging* of the functions of their organs of knowledge and action in the sensorium of the sensorium in the vital principle of the vital principle in the individual self and the individual self in *ijās* and other original elements constituting its individuality and these elements themselves in the Highest Self. This merging is not the final absorption which can take place only in the state of liberation. As we have shown in III 2, the idea of this merging is taken from the state of dreamless sleep. However in this merged state, but with a momentary lighting of the heart which shows its way out the individual self helped by the Universal Self abiding in its heart comes out of the body through the 10th artery and joins the solar rays which lead to the divine regions (sūtras 17 and 18). These rays are in constant connection with the artery,

a connection which is not severed either at night or during the southern solstice. In works on *yoga* like the *Bhagavadgītā* it is said that a man dying at night or during the *lakṣhṇāyana* cannot reach the divine regions. Our author says that this restriction may apply to those who follow the *Smṛiti*, but it has no application to followers of the *Sruti*.

We hope that the summary we have given will make the reading of the section easy. We have not followed the order of the *adhikāraṇas*, as it does not seem quite logical to us, though we have sometimes referred to some of the *sūtras*. As to *sadyo mukti*, so summarily dealt with by our author, we shall return to it in dealing with the next two sections. His radical mistake lies in his idea of the subtle body as composed of material elements subject to change and destruction, or pseudo-material illusory entities vanishing on the dawning of true knowledge. The powers of knowing and acting which belong to spirit and are inseparable from it have nothing unconscious or evanescent in them and cannot be destroyed with the dissolution of the body or vanish with the advent of knowledge. And, after all, what are our bodies and the elements they are composed of but different modes of the divine existence. As an integral part of God, what we call the material world partakes of the divine eternality and though ever changing its form, can never perish.

### Padā 3

As we have already said in III.1 when speaking of the *Pitṛyāna Patha* and the lunar regions which it leads to, the two paths and the two goals are really metaphorical descriptions of two ways of life and two spiritual conditions, here and hereafter attained through them. As we have also said the *Sātrakāra* sees the metaphorical character of the description only partly. On the whole he takes both the paths as spatial routes and the goals reached as regions in space. He does not speak in detail of the different stages of the *Devayāna Patha* as described in the *Upanishads*. After speaking of only a few,—light, the year *Vāyu*, lightning and *Varuna*,—he proceeds to speak of what he considers the real nature of these stages. For a full description the reader must consult *Chh.* v 10 13, *Bṛi* vi 2 15, and *Kau* i 3. As to the real nature of these stages our author says that they are not either landmarks or places of enjoyment, but super human beings who conduct the selves to their destination. As already said, the selves remain unconscious throughout the route and the objects and regions named as stages are also unconscious. How could then the selves move on unless they were conducted by the intelligent divinities presiding over the latter? And the first two scriptural passages referred to actually mention such a super-human guide in the regions of lightning. It may therefore be concluded that there are guides at all the other stages also.



However, we have now proceeded up to the 6th aphorism. In 7-14 our author discusses a more important question. It is whether the Brahmaloka reached by the way of the gods is the world of the Higher Causal Brahman or that of the Lower Effect Brahman. The distinction must by this time be quite familiar to the reader. It is the same as that of the unqualified and the qualified Brahman. In the language of western philosophy it is that of God conceived as transcendent and as immanent. To us, with whom transcendence and immanence are related and inseparable aspects of the same Being, the distinction exists indeed, but is of no practical importance. To those, however, for whom the distinction is practically a division, making Para-Brahman an infinite and eternal Being, and Apara-Brahman, Brahmá or Hīranyagarbha, a created, finite, though indefinitely great being, appearing at the beginning of a cycle and disappearing at its end, the question raised is of spiritual importance. If the goal reached is the world of the Lower Brahman, that is union with him, then a higher world or spiritual stage has yet to be reached. The liberation secured is only relative and not absolute. If the Higher Brahman has been reached, the liberation is absolute and no higher stage is possible.

In dealing with this question the Sūtrakāra adopts a method very different from what he has hitherto been following. His usual method is to state a *pūrvapakṣa*, the objector's view, and then meet the objection by his own view, the *siddhānta-pakṣa*. In the present case he states Bādarī's view as the *pūrvapakṣa*, and meets

it by an *uttarapakṣha*, the view of Jaimini without identifying himself with the latter. It may be that he accepts Jaimini's view, but he does not expressly tell us so. Bādari's view is that it is the Lower Brahman who is reached by the Devayāna Patha, whereas Jaimini thinks it is the Highest Brahman who is thus reached. Bādari argues that as the Highest Brahman is all pervasive and the Inner Self of all beings there is no meaning in reaching him by a route. This is possible only in the case of the Lower Brahman who is confined to a particular locality. The misconception on which this argument is based is obvious. The Higher Brahman though all pervasive and the Inner Self of all has yet to be known and realised by a long course of *sādhana*. On the other hand, the Lower Brahman as the Cosmic Self, the *Viśvātman* or *Viśvarūpin*, is also all pervasive. He seems confined to a particular locality only in the popular imagination which takes him as an ordinary *deha* occupying a more or less small body. However Bādari thinks that when the time comes for the Effect Brahman to merge in the Causal, the selves united to the former also merge in the latter. Scriptural authority is appealed to for this doctrine but no text is quoted in the *bhāṣya* to this effect. *Prasna* v 5 however seems to point to it. A *smṛiti* passage clearly stating Bādari's view is given, but we have not been able to trace its source. However, coming to Jaimini, we find him arguing thus — (1) 'Brahman primarily means Para Brahman and only secondarily Apra Brahman. There is no reason why the secondary meaning should be accepted here. (2) The scriptural passage (*Pras vi*



#### Pada 4

The self has now reached the *Brahmaloka*,—the world of Brahman, that is union with him. As we have seen it is associated in the mind of the *Sūtrakāra* with a particular region in space. All the same he must enumerate the characteristics of the liberated self, and this he now proceeds to do. We are glad to see that in this task he has taken the lead of just the class of rishis with whom we agree most,—*Prajāpati*, *Indra* and *Chitra*. But as we shall see in the course of his exposition he comes into an inevitable collision with those others under whose influence he has mostly been up to this point and has said much that we have not been able to accept. However, to begin with, he says on the authority of a passage in the *Chhandogya* that in the state in question the self, possessed of the highest light, manifests itself in its own form that is in its form as a pure self without any extrinsic quality derived from its real or fancied association with a not-self. The text occurs in a most important portion of the *Chhandogya*, in the course of *Prajāpati*'s colloquy with *Indra*. As we have shown in our *Pancharshi*, *Prajāpati*'s exposition of the state of liberation seems to be a refutation of *Yājñavalkya*'s, given in the latter's conversation with *Maitreyi* and *Janaka*. At any rate the two expositions are irreconcilably opposed, and the *Sūtrakāra*, though he does not say so seems to feel it. However, to proceed with our author's description of the individual *Brahmabhāva*, he reminds us of the second *sūtra*, which

says that the state described is unquestionably the liberated state, for in the colloquy referred to Prajapati promises to speak of a condition of the self in which it is freed from the imperfections pertaining to the states of *jágrat*, *svapna* and *sushupti* and is untouched by worldly pleasure and pain. As the description proceeds, the self is spoken of as sinless and one with the Highest Person. 'The highest light', we are again reminded in sūtra 3, is the self, and not any physical light. And on the authority of well-known texts it is said in sūtra 4 that the liberated self is inseparable from Brahman. We shall see as we proceed that this inseparability is not indistinguishability. In the 5th sūtra Jaimini says on the authority of *Chh* viii 7 that the liberated self is endowed with Bráhmīc, that is God-like, qualities. But the scriptures include 'true desires' &c, in such qualities. Āchārya Audulomi, in sūtra 6, thinks that this latter class of qualities, as they depend on "limiting adjuncts", cannot inhere in a pure intelligence like the liberated self. In the next sūtra Bādarāyana thinks these other qualities are not incompatible with pure intelligence. But do not desires and their fulfilment imply bodily organs? The answer in sūtra 8 on the authority of *Chh* viii 2 1. is that the liberated self's desires are fulfilled by its mere will. The reading of the passage referred to will show how much of what is regarded as 'worldly' is deemed compatible by the scriptures with the liberated state. However, having such a powerful will, the liberated self must be considered, as is done by sūtra 9, as having no over-lord,—no over-lord, it would seem, among other individual selves. The over-lordship

of God is everywhere recognised Bādarī says on scriptural authority in sūtra 10 that the liberated self has no body and sense-organs. Jaimini in sūtra 11 on the same authority affirms their existence Bādarāyaṇa reconciles the two positions by affirming in sūtra 12 that assuming or not assuming a body depends on the liberated self's own option Sūtras 13 and 14 liken perceptions in the disembodied and embodied states to dreams and the waking state respectively Sūtra 15 compares the liberated self's power of entering several bodies described in *Chh. vii 20 2*, to a flame's self multiplication.

But now comes an abrupt halt. Our author seems to feel that what he has been saying about the liberated state in the aphorisms so far summarised conflicts with what he has said on *sadyo mukti* in the 2nd pāda of the present chapter The state he has there described is one of undifferentiated unity and absolute inactivity But the liberation he now speaks of is one which, in spite of the individual's affirmed non-division from God, admits of several differences and also a good deal of activity on the part of the released self Before proceeding further therefore he disposes of this apparent conflict by practically denying that the former state—that of undifferentiated unity with God and of inactivity,—is a state of liberation He calls it here, in sūtra 16 *śrāpyaya*, dreamless sleep or *sampatti*, union with God But union with God, as also dreamless sleep, which according to several scriptural texts symbolises that union, is nothing but liberation. All the texts referred to here and elsewhere as descriptions of *sampatti* are

descriptions of liberation as well according to the rishis who have uttered them. The Sūtrakāra also has all along taken them as such before arriving at this point. But now he is in a real difficulty. The two ideas of liberation held by the two classes of rishis are, it is clear, mutually conflicting. But how can our author, with his idea of the Vedic sages as infallible authorities, say or even think so? They are not mere *āchāryas* like Bādari and Jaimini that he would pit them against one another. He therefore tries to get out of the difficulty by calling the former description of liberation one of *sampatti* and the latter that of *mukti*. But really they are both descriptions of liberation, the one given by Yājñavalkya, the teacher of undifferentenced unity and the other by Prajāpati, who teaches unity-in-difference. The later systems of unqualified and qualified Non-dualism rose out of emphasising these two views by their respective advocates.

However, with this rather unpleasant interruption, our author continues his characterisation of the state of liberation. In sūtra 17 he says that inspite of the many lordly powers acquired by the liberated self, such as that of making itself indefinitely large or small, it never acquires that of creating the world, to which that of preserving and destroying it may be added. Creation &c, are mentioned in the scriptures only in sections speaking of the Supreme Lord and not those dealing with the finite self. And the latter is not proximate to, but very far removed from, creation, having appeared long after it. Hence the power of creation can never belong to it. But does not scripture

sometimes speak plainly, e g In *Taitt* i 0, of the individuals attaining *svárājya*, lordship? Yes, says the author in *sūtra* 18, but such lordship primarily belongs to the Supreme Lord abiding in the solar regions for discharging certain specified functions and it is from him that finite selves derive such powers. However, the Lord should not be conceived as only qualified as he really is in the solar regions. He has got, says our author in *sūtra* 10 also an unqualified transcendent form as is clear from *Rik* x. 90 8 *Chh.* iii. 12 0 and several other similar texts. *Sūtra* 20 refers to other scriptural texts and to the *Gītā* in support of this position. If however the Universal and the Individual are so dissimilar where lies their *sāmā*, sameness, which is so often spoken of in the *sāstras*? Their sameness lies only, says our author in *sūtra* 21 in enjoyment. The individual inherits all the bliss and honour which belong to God. Texts from the *Kaushītaki* and the *Bṛihadāranyaka* are quoted in support of this proposition. *Sūtra* 22, the last aphorism of the chapter and of the whole body of *Brahmasūtras*, affirms on the authority of *Chh.* viii. 15 1 the permanent abiding of the individual self in *Brahmaloka*. It does not return to the world, that is, as we understand, to worldly life, but lives in unending union with God. Nothing is said of its attaining any 'higher destiny' in the form of mergence in an undifferentenced Unity of which the reader has heard not a little in this exposition of the *Sūtras* and of which he hears much more in works on Advaita Vedānta.

We are afraid however, that notwithstanding much



that is comforting and re-assuring which the aspirant after the divine life has heard in this chapter and in this treatise as a whole, the reading of it will leave him cold. This is due mainly to the aphoristic form of the work, but partly also, it would seem, to the fact that what may be called emotional elements in the Upanishads have not been brought into prominence by our author. Such elements are indeed rare in them, but such as they are, our *Bhakti Sástras* have utilised them to the utmost. Both the classes of rishis mentioned by us have spoken of love, the love of the Infinite Self for the finite. Yájnavalkya, inspite of his unqualified Non-dualism, has said some of the finest things ever spoken on love. The other school too has not been silent on the subject. But it would be going out of the way on our part to speak of it at any length. However, it may not be inappropriate to close this section on Liberation by transcribing below Rájārshi Chitra's description of the Brahmaloka and Brahmadhāma in the first chapter of the *Kaushītaki* as expounded by us in our pamphlet on *Pancharshi* already mentioned more than once in the course of these comments. We begin from the point where Chitra speaks of the finite self's starting on the Devayāna Patha —

“Chitra begins by saying that having reached the Devayāna path, which evidently means spiritual religion as contrasted with the merely ceremonial or traditional (the Pitriyāna), the soul reaches successively the regions of Agni, Vāyu, Aditya, Varuna, Indra, Prajāpati and Brahman. The first six seem to mean Heno-theistic

forms of religion,—the identification of the Supreme Being with one or another of the Vedic gods until a pure idea of God freed from anthropomorphism is reached in the seventh stage. However, even when the divine regions are reached that is a pure form of Theism is embraced, there is yet a long way to traverse before one reaches the divine city. At the very beginning of this journey Brahman calls five hundred of his *apsaras* divine nymphs commands them to meet the pilgrim soul with various divine equipments and to bring him to the divine city with honours due to himself (*mama yasasā*). These nymphs are of two classes, *ambāh* and *ambāyabāh*, the former being divine texts like *Satyam jñanam anantam* which lead us to God and the latter the mental powers which enable us to conceive and apprehend the Divine Reality. The nymphs carry powder clothes, fruits, anointments and garlands for the pilgrim. The spiritual nature of these things is evident from the statement that when the messengers meet the pilgrim soul they adorn him with divine ornaments,—*Tam Brahmāṅkarendāṅkurantī*. Thus equipped for his arduous journey, the worshipper of God ( *Brahmajña* ) reaches a lake named *Aro Hradah*,—the lake of *Ara* or evil passions. These must be subdued before any progress along the route is possible. Already sufficiently strengthened for the bold feat, the worshipper crosses the lake with his will power—*'Manasā atyeti*. Those lacking the necessary equipment sink into the lake. The next stage is represented by *Yeshitā muhurtāh*—the harmful moments,—the injurious way of spending life in fruitless pursuits.

which is seen even in many an otherwise good man. Before our pilgrim, thus gifted with self-control and a grim determination, such moments, such wasteful modes of life,—‘*apadhravanti*’, fly away. The third stage of the journey is a river name *Vyará*, free from senility, which, when crossed, gives one perpetual youth, entire freedom from indolence and despondency. ‘*Tám manasá atyeti*’,—the pilgrim crosses the river by dint of his will-power. He is then said to be freed from both his merits and demerits,—merits which make egotistic men proud of their achievements, and demerits which weigh them down with the thought of unrelieved and unmixed evils. The pilgrim’s dear ones are said to take possession of the former and his enemies the latter. The fourth and final land-mark of the route is ‘*ulyo brikshah*’, a tree named the ‘earthly’. Even when in a comparatively advanced stage of the spiritual life, one feels he is not fully spiritual. An idea that the world is earthly, material, that there are things in it which have no spiritual end or purpose, still haunts him. We cannot reach the divine city until this practical materialism is entirely got rid of and the world is seen to be spiritual, divine, through and through. As soon as the pilgrim-soul attains to this view of the world, ‘*Iam Brahmagandah pransati*’,—the odour of God enters into him. He does not yet directly see God and his abode, but he feels that they are very near. Spiritual endeavours lose the weariness with which the unspiritual go through them. They become attractive and lead the aspirant with the promise of a rich and yet unseen enjoyment. The divine city is now very

near the next march takes him directly before it. "[ The Goal ] The divine city is called the *sálayya samsthānam* 'Samsthānam means a city. The commentator explains *sálayya*' thus,—having reservoirs of water with banks as high as bowstrings equal to *sāla* trees, that is, as we understand, very deep tanks such as may not be dried up even in the hottest seasons. A true city of God must indeed have such reservoirs with an inexhaustible supply of drink for thirsty souls. However, as the worshipper enters the holy city *Tam Brahmarasah pravṛṣati*,—the flavour of Brahman enters into him. He directly tastes the presence and loveliness of God. His foretaste of the sweets of true worship is turned into direct experience. Henceforth everything pertaining to God is delightful to him. Grace takes the place of Law. But there are degrees in directness also. The divine city is entered but not yet the divine abode, the holy of holies. Before that all forms of mediation must be got rid of. Even in what seem very deep and sweet devotions, the thought of human teachers and leaders,—those who have helped men to draw near to God,—is mixed up with the experience of the divine sweetness,—showing that the truest directness is not yet reached, and the danger of lapsing into man worship or *deva* worship is not yet fully escaped. This fact the Upanishadic sage expresses by saying that at the gate of *Aparājitam Āyatanam*, the impregnable abode of God there stand Indra and Prajāpati, the highest of *devas*, as *dvaragopau*, gate-keepers. On the approach of the true worshipper, *Tau asmād apadravataḥ*,—they withdraw from him

The implication is that less true worshippers, those who mix up their worship of the Infinite with that of 'incarnations', 'great men' and 'centres',—are held back. However, as soon as the pilgrim-soul enters the Aparájitam Áyatatanam, '*Tam Brahmatejah pravisati*' *Tejah* is both light and heat, both wisdom and power. Henceforth there is no more groping in darkness, but more and more light day after day, and no more compromise with untruth and wilful ignorance. Henceforth also there is no parley with and no yielding to weakness and impious indolence and sluggishness. The true worshipper of God is known above all by the *power* which his words and actions express and radiate. However, our pilgrim is now in the *sabhá sthánam*, council chamber, of God, called *Vibhu* (all-pervading). As the immediate effect of this entrance,—'*Tam Brahmayasah pravisati*,—the glory of God enters into him. His thoughts, purposes and actions being now wholly attuned to God's, God himself is glorified in all that he says and does. He takes praise and blame indifferently, for he knows he is but the servant of God and it is God who acts through him. There are indeed egotistic pietists who sometimes ascribe their selfish actions to God. But the distinction between such men and the truly selfless servants of God is so transparent that it does not require much insight to see it. However, the *rishi* now describes Brahman's throne named *Vichakshaná*, which is *Prayná*, Reason, and his 'coach of infinite brightness,' *Amitayagam Paryankam*, which is *Prána*, Life. The description is indeed allegorical, but couched in scriptural language. It need not detain us

We rather hurry to the dialogue which follows that between the finite and the Infinite Spirit. The wisdom of the former is tested by the latter with many a question the details of which need not detain us. The most important part of it is the affirmation made by the finite of its relation of unity in difference with the Infinite. In reply to the question *Kosi?*—Who art thou,—the worshipper says, *Tram átmási, yastram asi so hamasmi*—Thou art the Self what thou art, that I am. There is unity of essence or substance and yet a difference of personality indicated by the distinction of thou and 'I'. There is nothing in what follows,—and there is little that follows—which may imply that this distinction is obliterated in any higher stage of progress. On the contrary the divine city is said to be watered by rivers called *ambayah* which the commentator explains as '*upásanárupinyah*' of the form of worship, leading to insight into the divine nature. A city where acts of devotion form the necessary medium of communication cannot represent the monist's heaven of undifferentiated unity. And we have seen that the *devas* are there not as objects of worship, but as worshippers. And we are introduced into a world of real and not illusory creation for we are told how Brahman's consort ('*príya*') that is his creative power, and her reflection ('*pratirupa cha chákshushí*') the individual self, in whose knowledge the world is reproduced, 'weave the creatures like flowers ('*pushpányárayatau vai jagáni*')'. The divine promise to the worshipper is 'This world of mine, consisting of water (the chief element as symbolising all elements) is thine. Can the father keep any

thing from his son ? So the *ṛish* ends with the words, 'He who knows all this obtains whatever glory and power belong to God' And what are these glory and power ? Evidently they are wisdom, love, holiness, peace, joy, beauty and sweetness, all of which form the very essence of the divine nature and are beyond time and destruction, stored eternally in God and ever ready to be communicated to his children "

# ब्रह्मसूत्रे

समन्वय नाम प्रथमाध्याये

प्रथम पादः,—स्रष्ट ब्रह्मबोधक-श्रुतिवाक्याणां समन्वय

## १। अथातो ब्रह्मनिष्ठासा ।

१। अथ अतएव साधनचतुष्टय-प्राप्त्यनन्तरम् अतः अस्यात् ब्रह्मविद्यानाम् एव परब्रह्मबोध-निष्पत्तिं तस्यात् 'ब्रह्म ज्ञानमा ब्रह्म ज्ञेयमा ज्ञानम् इत्यादि' इति वाक्यमिव । साधनचतुष्टयम्—निश्चयनिश्चयचतुर्विधम्—इत्यामुक्तमभोगविद्या-समाधि-साधनमुच्यते मुमुक्षुषः च । समदमादि साधनमुच्यते—समदमीप-ति-तितिया समाधानं यथाः । 'लोहित-च-रागात् मयस' उप-ति. 'मम' । वाक्यकरणात् उप-मी 'इमः । आत्मादे विहित नित्यादि अन्तर्भाव उपरति । श्रीतीर्थादि-चतुष्टय 'तितिया । निद्राभय-प्रसक्त-व्याधिना मयसः स्थिति' समाधानम् । मुख्यं निष्ठासा 'ब्रह्म' इति एवमावादी गीतिनामस्य ।

1 Then therefore (should begin or should be made) inquiry into Brahman

Atha means then or after that is, after adopting the



fourfold system of spiritual culture 'Atah' means as it is from knowing Brahman that man's highest object is fulfilled, therefore 'Brahmajijnāśā, means inquiry into or wishing to know Brahman 'The fourfold system of spiritual culture' comprises (1) the discrimination of things eternal and temporal, (2) indifference to enjoying the fruits of actions here or hereafter, (3) the spiritual acquisitions 'sama' &c, and (4) desire for liberation 'Sama' is drawing away the mind from earthly things 'Dama' is restraining the external senses 'Uparati' is giving up, for the sake of the higher knowledge, the prescribed duties called *niṭya* (habitual) and others 'Titikshā' is enduring the correlatives of heat, cold &c 'Samādhi' is the steadiness of the mind arising from giving up sleepiness, laziness and inattention 'Sraddhā' is trustful respect for all higher things

## २ । जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।

२ । 'अस्य' जगत 'जन्मादि' जन्मस्थितिभङ्ग 'यत' यस्मात् सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्ते कारणात् भवति, तत् ब्रह्म इति वाक्यशेष । श्रुतिप्रमाणम्,—“यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत् प्रथन्यसिसविश्रन्ति, तद् विजिज्ञासस्व, तद् ब्रह्म” ( तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि ३।१ ) इत्यादि ।

2 From which the origin &c, (that is, origin, subsistence and dissolution) of this world proceed, [that is Brahman] Scriptural proof, “From which these creatures are born, through which they, being born, live, and into which they return and enter, seek to know that well. That is Brahman” (Taittirīya Upanishad, III 1) and similar other passages.

## ३। आत्मयोगित्वात् ।

३। आत्मस्य स्ववेदादि 'योगि' कारणं ब्रह्म । ब्रह्मस्य आत्मयोगित्वम् आत्मकारणत्वात् तस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वशक्तिस्य च सिद्धम् इति शेषः । (३३२।१०० ३।३।३।१) यदेषां ब्रह्मस्य योगि प्रमाणम् यत् ब्रह्मस्य सर्वपात्रिणि आत्मा एव प्रमाणम् जगति ब्रह्मकारिणोऽप्येव चरितव्यत इति भाष्यम् । ब्रह्मस्य आत्मयोगित्वम् आत्मप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् यत् सर्वशक्त्याऽपि सिद्धम् इति शेषः ।

3 *Brahman being the source of scripture (Bṛihad ranyaka II 4 10) [his omniscience and omnipotence are established.] An alternative explanation is this Scripture is the source of the knowledge of Brahman's nature. The purport is that it is from scriptural proof that Brahman the Cause of the origin &c. of the world is known. As Brahman is taught by scripture his omniscience &c. are established*

## ४। तदुपपत्त्ययात् ।

४। न पुनरपि कार्यं 'तत्' ब्रह्म आत्मप्रमाणम् एव । 'अथ ब्रह्म आत्मप्रमाणकत्वं ?' इति पूर्वोपपत्तिः । तदुत्तरम्—समन्वयात् । समन्वयात् सम्यक्त्वमन्वयात् विद्वान्ब्रह्मस्य ब्रह्मणि एव तात्पर्यावधारणम् । तानि एतत् सर्वस्य प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन समनुपपत्तिः । न हि ब्रह्म अपरिणामकत्वेना युक्तम् ।

4 *But that (i e that Brahman is established by the scriptures) is true on account of (the r) correct interpretation only when taken as speaking of him*

Tu but, is used to set aside the *pūrvapakṣa* (the objector's view) The objector's contention is not established by scripture *Tat* i e. Brahman is really

established by scripture 'How do you know that Brahman is established by scripture?' is the objector's question The answer is—'On account of correct interpretation,' that is, because Brahman is the final purport or object of the Vedānta texts They are rightly interpreted only when they are taken as establishing this truth It is not possible to imagine another interpretation

### ५ । ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ।

५ । 'अशब्दम्' शब्दाप्रतिपाद्य, श्रुतिभिः अकथित साध्यपरिकल्पितम् अचेतनं प्रधानं न जगतः कारणम् । कथम् ?—'ईक्षते', वेदान्तेषु जगत्कारणस्य ईक्षितत्वस्य ब्राह्मण्यस्य कथनात् । तथाहि छान्दोग्योपनिषदि "तदैक्षत बहु स्या प्रजाययेति" ( ६।२ ) ।

5 *On account of seeing (being predicated of the cause of the world) that which is not spoken of in the Word (that is, Prakṛti, Nature, spoken of by the Sāṅkhyas) is not (the real cause)*

'Asabdam,' that which is not established by the Word, that is, scripture, the unconscious *Pradhāna* imagined by the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is not the cause of the world Why not? 'On account of seeing,' because the Vedāntas speak of the Cause of the world as seeing or knowing For example, in *Chhandogya*, vi 2, "It thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'"

### ६ । गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ।

६ । 'चेन्' यदि उच्यते सञ्छब्दवाच्ये प्रधाने 'ईक्षित'-शब्द 'गौण' औपचारिक इति, तत् 'न' न उपपद्यते । कस्मात् ?—'आत्मशब्दात्' जगत् कारणे 'आत्म'शब्द-

५ । एतं जगत्कारणं सृष्टिमि 'आत्मैश्वर्यं' इत्यतः । यदा चान्दा वी ( ६।१ ) —  
 "सिद्धं द्विजा पितृणां इत्ययम् इमांस्त्रिधा द्विजा अभिन जीविनाः कृतात्मविमं नामकपि  
 व्याख्यासि इति । 'आत्मैश्वर्यं' जगत्कारणं न मुच्यते ईश्वरत्वम् उपपन्नम्  
 न तु शीघ्रम् ।

6 *If r note no, on account of the word self* If it is said that to the *Pradhāna* indicated by the term *Sat* Being the term *Ikshatri* thinker is *gauna* remotely or metaphorically applied then this contention is not proved Why ?—*Ātmasabdāt* because the word *self* is applied by scripture to the Cause of the world For instance in *Chhāndogya* vi 2 'The Divinity thought Let me now enter these three divinities as the living self and evolve names and forms. By the word *self* it is established that the Cause of the world is a thinker in a direct and not a metaphorical sense

### ७ । तद्विषय मोक्षोपदेगात् ।

७ । न प्रकृतम् अक्षितम् आत्ममन्त्रत्वेन भवितुम् अर्हति । कुतः ?—  
 तद्विषय आत्मनिष्ठम् 'मोक्षोपदेगात्' यतः शास्त्रं मोक्षम् उपदिशति । यदा

५ । अतस्तेन तु प्रकृतत्वं

दीक्षीयमिति युक्तं प्रपञ्चेत् ।

यत्र सर्वं प्रकृतत्वं विद्यते

आत्मा हि न मुच्यते नान्यथा ॥ ( वेतावर्त १।१५ )

न अक्षितनिष्ठा मोक्षोपायी भवितुम् अर्हति ।

7 *As liberation is promised to those devoted to it* The unconscious *Pradhāna* cannot be meant by the word

'self' Why not? *Mokshopadeshāt*, as liberation is promised in the scriptures, *taumslithasya*, to him who is devoted to him For instance, "When one practising *yoga* truly sees Brahman by seeing his self, as one sees objects by a lamp, when he knows the unchangeable God unsullied by any object, he is freed from all bonds". (*Svetāsvatara* II 15)

### ८। हेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

८। यदि प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् उपदिष्टं स्यात्, तदा श्रुति आत्मन 'हेयत्वं' व्याज्यतां ब्रूयात्, न च एवम् अवीचत्। अस्मात् हेतुत्वात् च,—'हेयत्वस्य' 'अवचनात्' अवकथनात् च । प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् ।

8 *And as the scriptures do not say that the self should be set aside*

If the *Pradhāna* were taught by scripture as 'Being', then scripture would speak of the self as something to be set aside,—would say, "It is not the real self" But it does not say so For this additional reason also,—'*Heyatva abachanāt*', because the necessity of its being set aside is not said,—it is not the *Pradhāna* that is spoken of as 'Being'

### ९। स्वाप्ययात् ।

९। कुतश्च न प्रधान सच्छब्दवाच्यम् ?—'स्वाप्ययात्', 'स्वप्निन्' 'मप्यय' ज्ञेयत्वात्। सपुत्रावभ्यासात् उपाविहृत-विग्न्यामावात् पुरुष स्वात्मनि प्रलीन इव भवति, इत्युच्यते इत्यादिग्राह्यं। न तु चैतन आत्मा अचैतन प्रधान स्वरूपत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते ।

प्रादम् । ॥५॥ १ सुतिमामाचम् — 'उद्दालकादीनां च जेतकेतु दुश्चमसाच ॥५॥  
 मि कोऽपि विज्ञासीति यत्तत् पुनश्च न विदितं नाम सदा भवेत् तदा कदाचि भवति  
 भवतीति भवति तच्चादित्वा विदितोपायघटनं च प्रतीयता भवति । ( दाम्नीये ॥५॥ )

9 *As the individual soul merges in the Self* From what other ground is it to be asserted that the *Pradhāna* is not spoken of as Being ?—*Sūṭhyayāt*? On account of merging in the Self In the *Chhāndogya* and elsewhere, it is said that in dreamless sleep on account of the absence of differentiation due to limiting adjuncts, the individual soul merges, as it were in its own Self But the conscious soul cannot merge in the unconscious *Pradhāna* as in its true nature. Therefore it is not the *Pradhāna* but the Conscious, spoken of as Being which is the Cause of the world. The passage specially referred to is *Chhāndogya* vi 8. 1 — Uddālaka Āruni said to his son Svetaketu Learn from me my dear the truth about sleep. When a man is said to sleep, then my dear he is united with Being is gone to his Self Hence people say he sleeps because he goes to his Self

१० । गतिमामान्यात् ।

१ । सदा एव हि सर्वेषु विद्वान्बु विदितव्यान्वावहति । यतः तेषां 'गति  
 मामान्यात् तात्पर्येण न सर्वेषु ब्रह्म एव ब्रह्मन् कालचम् ।

10 *As the scriptures uniformly point (to a conscious Cause)* In all the Vedāntas there is a uniform teaching of a conscious cause of the world So because of this uniformity of teaching the omniscient Brahman alone is the Cause of the world

## ११ । श्रुतत्वाच्च ।

११ । सर्वज्ञम् ईश्वरं प्रकृत्य 'स कारणम्' ( श्रुतिश्रुतरे ६।८ ) इत्यादि स्वतः 'श्रुतत्वात्' श्रुत्या कथितत्वात् सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म एव जगत् कारणम्, न अचेतनं प्रधानम्, अन्यत् वा इति सिद्धम् ।

11 As it is directly stated in scripture, for instance in *Svetâsvatara* vi 9 Having spoken of the omniscient Lord, the text clearly says, "He is the Cause" Therefore it is established that the all-knowing Brahman is the Cause of the world, and not the unconscious Pradhâna or anything else

## १२ । आनन्दमयोऽस्यासात् ।

१२ । तैत्तिरीयश्रुत्युक्तं 'आनन्दमय' पर एव आत्मा भवितुम् अर्हति । कुत, 'अम्यास्यात्' पुन पुन प्रयोगात् । परस्मिन् एव हि आत्मनि 'आनन्द'-शब्द बहुकालं अभ्यस्यते । तथाहि तैत्तिरीये ( २।५ )—"तस्मात् वा एतस्मात् विज्ञानमयात् अन्योऽन्त आत्मानन्दमय" इत्याद्या ।

12 'Anandamaya' is the Brahman, as the term is applied again and again 'Ānandamaya', the Blissful, spoken of in the *Taittirīya Upanishad*, can only be the Supreme Self On what ground? 'Abhyāsāt', because of its repetition, because it is to the Supreme Self that the word 'bliss' is applied again and again The texts referred to are "Verily there is an Inner Self consisting of bliss different from this Self consisting of the understanding" and the following texts (*Taittirīya*, ii. 5 &c)

१३। विष्वाग्मन्नेति चेन्न भावुर्थात् ।

१३। विष्वाग्मन्त् सयत्प्रत्ययस्य विष्वापदत्तात् अममयादि मन्बत् विष्वा विषय एव आनन्दमय इति न आनन्दमय प भाषा इति किं यदि उच्यते तत् न न उपपद्यते । भावुर्थात् भावुर्थेति चेत् सयत् प्रतीयते । यदा अममय एव इति अममय उच्यते, एवम् आनन्दमय इति आनन्दमय उच्यते ।

13 *If it is said that Anandamaya cannot mean Brahman because mayat means a modification then the answer is No because it may mean abundance*

If it be objected that because the suffix *mayat* in *Anandamaya* means a modification therefore the term *Anandamaya* refers to something which is subject to modification like the term *Annamaya* and such other terms then the reply is, No the objection is not valid *prachuryat* because *mayat* is used also in the sense of abundance. As *annamaya jajnah* means a sacrifice in which there is an abundant provision for food so the Brahman which abounds in bliss is called *Anandamaya*

१४। तदेतुष्यपदेगाच्च ।

१४। इतश्चावुर्थात् सयत्, यथात् इति आनन्दमयस्य अपरिचयि तदपयति कृति । यथा, "एव चोपनिषत् (तैत्तिरीय १३) तस्यात् भावुर्थात् सयत् अममयात् आनन्दमय एव एव वाक्ता ।

14 *And because Brahman is spoken of as the source of bliss* On this ground also it may be said that *mayat* is used in the sense of abundance, because scripture speaks of Brahman as the source of bliss, as



for instance the *Taittirīya*, II 7 says, "For he alone causes bliss" Therefore, as 'mayat' may be used in the sense of abundance, 'Ānandamaya' is really the Supreme Self.

### १५ । सान्त्ववर्णिकमेव च गीयते ।

१५ । इतश्च आनन्दमय पर एव आत्मा यस्मात् "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म" ( तैत्तिरीये २।१ ) अभिन् सन्ने यत् ब्रह्म कथितं तत् 'सान्त्ववर्णिकम्' सन्ताप्सरे कथितम् ब्रह्म 'एव' इह आनन्दमयाधिकारे 'गीयते' उच्यते ।

15 *And the Brahman spoken of in the mantra is here referred to* On this ground also is the *Anandamaya* the Supreme Self, namely that the same Brahman that is spoken of in the Vedic verse *Taittirīya* II 1) is referred to in the *Ānandamaya* passages

### १६ । नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

१६ । इतश्च आनन्दमय पर एव आत्मा, 'नेतर' न ईश्वरात् अन्य सञ्चारी जीव, 'अनुपपत्ते' यत् जीवस्य सृष्टिकर्तृत्वं न उपपद्यते । आनन्दमयं हि प्रकृत्य श्रूयते, "स सर्वमसृजत् यदिदं किञ्च" ( तैत्तिरीये २।६ ) इति । न सर्वविकारसृष्टिं परस्मात् आत्मन अन्यत्र उपपद्यते ।

16 *Not any other, for it is not possible* On this ground also is the *Anandamaya* the Supreme Self, and not any creature subject to birth and death, and distinct from God, namely, that creatorship is not possible for a creature. For, having mentioned the *Ānandamayā*, scripture (*Taittirīya* II 6) says "He created all this, whatever there is" Now, it is not possible for any but the Supreme Self to create all phenomena

१०। मीदयदेगाय ।

१०। इतए च नन्वय न संयागी दद्यात् आनन्दमयदधिकारं जीवन्मयो  
मईन एवदिति श्रुति — “आ न मः एते एव यं नन्वात्मनो भवति ( तत्तिलीय १।०)  
इति । न हि नया एव नमया भवति ।

17 Also because they are spoken of as different On this ground also is the *Ānandamaya* not a creature that in this passage treating of it it and the creature are spoken of as different Thus Verily he is joy for it is by gaining that joy that this (creature) becomes happy (*Taittiriya* II 7) Now the recipient cannot be the thing to be received

१८। यामाय मागुमानापिद्या ।

१८। तदा, “आकाशमयं बहु वा प्रवदिति ( तत्तिलीय १।६ ) यमेव  
२। —मयम आनन्दवस्तुनिर्देशात् न आगुमानिकं संप्रपत्तिक्रियतम् अपितम जगत्  
आनन्दन अपेक्षितम् बाधनीयम् ।

18 As wish is mentioned the *Pradhāna* inferred or imagined by the *Sāṅkhya* cannot be regarded (as cause) *Ānandamaya* is spoken of as having wished in the text Let me be many let me be born (*Taittiriya* ii 6) How could then the unconscious *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhya* be the cause of the world ?

१९। अक्षिन्नस्य च तद्वयीमं नास्ति ।

१९। इतए प्रथमं जीव वा आनन्दमयस्य न प्रगुणं दद्यात् ‘अक्षिन्

आनन्दमये विषये प्रतिबुद्धस्य 'अस्य' जीवस्य 'तदर्थयोग' तदभावापत्तिं सोऽस्य 'शान्ति' उपदिशति शास्त्रम्,—“यदाह्निवैष पतन्निद्रदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तंऽनिलयनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठा विन्दते अथ सोऽस्य गती भवति ( तैत्तिरीये २।७ ) इत्यादिना ।

19 *And scripture speaks of the union with it (the Anandamaya) of the soul which has acquired knowledge about it* On this ground also the term 'Ānandamaya' cannot be applied either to the Pradhāna or the individual soul, namely that scripture speaks of the union with it, acquiring its nature, which is liberation,—of this, the individual self, when it has acquired knowledge about it Thus, “It is only when the creature gains an immovable footing on this invisible, incorporeal, inscrutable, and self-supported One, that he becomes fearless ” (*Taittiriya* II 7)

## २० । अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ।

२० । 'अन्त'—“अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यस्य पुरुष दृश्यते हिरण्यरसञ्च हिरण्यकेश आम्रण्घ्रात् सर्व एव सुवर्ण, तस्य यथा कप्यास पुण्डरीकमेवमग्निणी तस्योदिति नाम, स एव सर्वेभ्य पाप्मभ्य उदित, उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्य पाप्मभ्यो य एव वेद” इति छान्दोग्ये ( १।६।६,७ ) श्रूयमाण परमेश्वर एव, न कश्चित् प्राप्तुम्कर्तुं सक्षारी । कुत ?—‘तद्धर्मोपदेशात्’ तस्य हि परमेश्वरस्य ‘धर्म’ अपापविह्वलादय लक्षणा इह उपदिष्टा ।

20 ‘Antah’ (within) is God, for his nature is spoken of “Now, the golden person who is seen in the sun, the Person with golden beard and golden hair, all golden up to the tips of the nails, his eyes like the lotus of the colour of a monkey’s lower part, his name is *ut*, above, transcending all sin Verily he rises above all sin

who knows this (*Chhandogya* i vi 6 7) The Person spoken of in this passage is really the Supreme Lord and not any exalted individual self Why ?—Because in this passage the nature freedom from sin &c of the Supreme Lord is mentioned

## २१ । मीदध्यपदेत्यायान्य ।

११ । सुमन्त्रे च "य चास्मि तिस्रन्वादितादन्तरी दमन्त्रि न ईद दमन्त्रि  
इतीर्य चास्मिन्तरी दमन्त्रि एव त आत्मा नर्पायत ( बृहदारण्यक ३।७।१ )  
चास्मिन्तीतिमन्त्रि ओम्वा ईद मीदध्यपदेत्यात् मीदध्यपदेत्यात् म ओम्वा 'यम् ।

21 *And God is distinct as scripture speaks of distinction* And as in another text namely He who dwells in the sun is distinct from the sun whom the sun does not know whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun within he is thy Self the Inner Ruler the Immortal (*Brihadāranyaka* iii 7 9) God is spoken of as distinct from the individual self who thinks of the sun as his body therefore God is distinct from individual selves

## २२ । आकाशमसिद्धात् ।

११ । "अथ नाकस्य का मतिरित्याकाश इति ईशाव [ प्रवाचको कश्चि ]  
( काशी वे १।८ ) आकाशो वै नामरूपयानिबद्धता ( ब्रह्मसूत्र २।१४ ) इत्यायासु  
सुतिरु अथ आकाशमस्य परब्रह्मवाचक । कुत ?—तस्मिन्नात् तस तस तस्मिन्  
अथनात् परस ब्रह्मस एव नामरूपयानिबद्धतादिविशेष्यत्वमनात् ।

22. *Ether means Brahman because his attributes are spoken of* In texts like the following What is the

origin of the world' ? 'Ether', he (Pravāhana Jaivali) replied" (*Chhândogya*, i 9) "Ether is the revealer of names and forms" (*Ibid*, viii 14) the term 'ether' means the Supreme Brahman and not elemental ether Why ? 'Because of his attributes,' because in those passages his attributes, that of being the revealer of names and forms and such others belonging to the Supreme Brahman are spoken of

### २३ । अतएव प्राणः ।

२३ । 'अत' ब्रह्मलिङ्गकथनात् 'एव' "कतमा सा देवतेति प्राण इति शीवाच [ उपस्ति चाक्रायथ ]" ( ऋन्दीग्ये १।१।४, ५ ) इति श्रुत्वा 'प्राण' ब्रह्मवाचक, न वायुविकार-विषय ।

23 For the same reason, 'Breath' means Brahman For the same reason, that is, because Brahman's attributes are mentioned in the passage, "'Which is that deity ? he [Ushasti Chákráyana] said, 'Breath' " (*Chhândogya*, i 11 4, 5) the term 'Prāṇā' (breath) means Brahman

### २४ । ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ।

२४ । "अथ यदत परी दिवी ज्योतिर्दीप्यते" ( ऋन्दीग्ये ३।१।३ ) इति, श्रुत्वा ज्योति ब्रह्मवाचकम्, न तत् प्रकृतं सूच्यते । कुत ?—'चरणाभिधानात्', यत पूर्वस्मिन् वाक्ये ( ऋन्दीग्ये ३।१।६ ) "पादोऽस्य सर्वामृतानि विपादस्याहव दिवि" इति ज्योति-लक्षितस्य ब्रह्मण पादत्वेन चराचराणि कथितानि । पादत्वम् ब्रह्मलिङ्गमेव ।

24 *Light means Brahman because of the mention of feet* The term light in the passage, 'Now that light which shines above this earth (*Chhândogya* iii (13 7) means Brahman and not natural light. Why?—Because of the mention of feet—because a preceding passage namely 'One foot of it constitutes all beings three feet of it are the immortal in heaven' (*Chhândogya* iii 12. 6) speaks of the feet i.e. four aspects or manifestations of the same Brahman that is indicated by the term light? Now having feet (or various manifestations) is an attribute of Brahman alone.

२३ । अन्तोऽभिधानावेति चेन्न तथा चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात्-  
याहि दर्शनम् ।

२३ । अन्तोऽभिधानम् पूर्वञ्चिन् वाक्ये ( आन्तोऽन्ते ३।१।१ ) वाच्यत्वात्सम्बन्धस्य अभिव्यक्तिवत्त्वात् 'न' न ब्रह्म अभिव्यक्तिम् अस्ति 'इति' चेत् यदि एवं श्रव्यसि 'न' न एवं श्रव्यत्वम् ।—कुतः ?—तथा वाच्यत्वात्सम्बन्धस्य अन्तोऽर्पणनिगदात् श्रव्यसि विप्रधानात्-उपपत्त्यात् । वाच्यत्वो वा इदं सर्वं मूर्तं यदिदं चिच्छेत् अनेन वाक्येन ब्रह्मसि विप्रधानात् निवर्तते । तथाहि दर्शनम् यत् विचारवद्विषयं चक्षुष्यं यदि ब्रह्म उपलब्ध इत्यस्ति यथा, "एवं श्रेयस्वान् वा मङ्गलान् सौभाग्यं एतन्मन्त्रावध्यायं एवं मन्त्रवत् अन्तोऽन्ते इति" ( उत्तरार्धे अन्ते ३।१।१।१ ) ।

25 If it be said No for the Gâyatri metre is spoken of there" then we say No, for the fixing of the mind is thereby taught. For it is seen If it be objected that in the preceding passage (*Chhândogya* iii 12. 1) the Gâyatri metre is spoken of and therefore Brahman is not spoken of then the reply is that this objection is not valid. Why?

For thereby, that is by the metre called the *Gáyatrí*, the fixing of the mind in Brahman is taught. The sentence, “*Gáyatrí* is all this, whatever exists,” teaches us to fix our minds in Brahman. ‘For it is seen’, that is in other passages also, the meditation of Brahman by means of a phenomenon is found, for instance in the *Āitareya Āraṇyaka* III 2 3 12 “For the Bahvrīchas (the followers of the *Rigveda*) think of him in the great *Uktha* hymn, the Adhvaryus (the followers of the *Yajurveda*) in fire, the Chhandogas (the followers of the *Sāmaveda*) in the Mahāvratā ceremony”

## २६ । भूतादिभ्योपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र कारणात् ‘एवम्’ पूर्वमिन् वाक्ये ब्रह्म एव कथितम् इति सिद्धम्, यत् तस्मिन् वाक्ये भूतादीन् पादान् ‘व्यपदिशति’ कथयति श्रुतिः । नहि ब्रह्म-अनात्म्यस्यैव केवलस्य कृत्स्नं भूतादयः पादा उपपद्यन्ते ।

26 And so also because thus alone can natural objects be called ‘the feet’ On this ground also is it so, that is, the conclusion is right that Brahman is spoken of in the preceding passage, namely, that in that passage natural objects are spoken of as ‘the feet’ Of the mere metre, without reference to Brahman, natural objects cannot be spoken of as ‘the feet’

## २७ । उपदेशमेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ।

२७ । यत् अपि एतत् उक्तं पूर्वम्, “विपादस्यामृतं दिवि” (छान्दोग्ये ३।१।६) इति सप्तम्या दौर्गाधारत्वेन उपदिष्टा, इह पुन “यदतः परी दिव” (छान्दोग्ये ३।१।७) इति पञ्चम्या सैर्वादात्वेन, तस्मात् ‘उपदेशमेदात्’ ‘न’ न तस्य इह प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् अस्ति





In the story of Indra and Pratardana in the *Kaushîtaki* Brâhmana-Upanishad it is said, "I (Indra) am the vital breath I am the conscious self Worship me as Life, as Breath" (vi 2) '*Prâna*' here means Brahman and not an individual god. How? Because of such understanding, because the connection of the words is understood as pointing to Brahman. If the sentence is considered from the beginning to the end, it is found that the connection of the words is intended to mean Brahman

२९ । न वक्तुरात्मीपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ।

२९ । 'वक्तुः' इन्द्रस्य 'आत्मीपदेशात्' आत्मविषयकथनात् 'न' न प्राणशब्द-  
ब्रह्मविषय, देवतात्मविषय एव, 'इति चेत्' आशङ्क्येत, तत् न युक्तम् । 'हि'  
यत् 'अस्मिन्' अत्र अध्याये, 'अध्यात्मसम्बन्ध' प्रत्यगात्मसम्बन्ध तस्य 'भूमा'  
बाहुल्यम् उपलभ्यते । तस्मात्, अध्यात्मसम्बन्ध-बाहुल्यात् ब्रह्मीपदेश एव अयं, न  
देवतात्मीपदेश ।

29 If it be objected that this is not so, because Indra speaks of himself, then the reply is that this chapter contains many references to the Inner Self

If it be objected that as the speaker, Indra, speaks of himself, the word '*Prâna*' does not mean Brahman, but an individual god, the objection is not valid For here, in this chapter, we find a multitude of references to the Inner Self So, because of a multitude of references to the Inner Self, the passage relates to Brahman, and not to an individual god

३० । शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ।

३ । कथं तदि वक्तुं आसीदसि ?—शास्त्रदृष्ट्या 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' इति आर्षेण दृष्टमित्यवस्थाम् 'तु' उपदेशः इत्यस्य आत्मत्वमम् । वामदेववत् यथा अयं वामदेवः प्रतिदेशे "अहं सन्तुष्टमहं सूर्यवेति ( अथर्ववेद ३।१६।१ ) वक्तव्यम् ।

30 That reference to self by Indra is in accordance with the śāstric vision like that of Vāmadeva

Why then does the speaker refer to his own self?—According to śāstric vision Indra speaks of himself in accordance with the scriptures by realising like the Rishis, the truth I am Brahman just as Vāmadeva realised the truth I was Manu and Surya." (Rigveda iv 26.1)

३१ । जीव मुख्यप्राणं लिङ्गावेति चोपासनाद्वैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिव तद्व्ययोगात् ।

३१ । 'जीव मुख्यप्राणं लिङ्गात्' अस्मिन् वाक्ये ( आदीये ३।११ ) जीवलिङ्गस्य मुख्यप्राण-लिङ्गस्य च व्यवहारात्, न इति चेत् इह जीवमुख्यप्राणवती अन्यतएव, उभौ वा प्रतीयेतातः, न ब्रह्म, इति यदि आशङ्क्यते तदा 'न न एतत् एवम् आशङ्कनीयम् । कुत ?—उपासनाविध्यात् एवं सति विविचम् उपासनम् प्रसज्येत—जीवोपासनं मुख्यप्राणीपासनं ब्रह्मोपासनं च इति । न च एतत् एतद्विन् वाक्ये अभ्युपगन्तुं शक्यम् तत्र अर्थेकत्वम् एव शक्यम् आपन्नितम् । आश्रितत्वात् अन्यत्रापि ब्रह्मलिङ्गवत्त्वात् 'प्राणेशश्च ब्रह्म' इति इह अत्रापि तद्विधीयात् ब्रह्मलिङ्गविधीयात् ब्रह्मीपदेशः एव अस्य इति स्यात् ।

अथवा, जीवोपासनाविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिव तद्व्ययोगात् इति, अत्र अस्य अर्थः—ब्रह्मवाक्ये अपि जीव-मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गं न विवक्ष्यते । कथं ?—उपासनाविध्यात् । विविचम् इह ब्रह्मणः उपासनं विवक्षितम्—(१) प्राणवर्त्येण, (२) प्रयाणवर्त्येण,

(३) स्वधर्मेण च । अन्यत्र अपि “मनोमय, प्राणशरीर ” ( छान्दोग्ये ३।१४।२ ) इत्यादौ उपाधिबन्धेन ब्रह्मण उपासनम् आश्रितम् । इहापि तत् युज्यते । तस्मात् ब्रह्मवाक्यम् एतत्, इति सिद्धम् ।

31 *If it be said, 'No, for the marks of the individual self and those of the chief vital air are mentioned', then we say, 'No, for in that case there would be three forms of devout meditation, and because the word 'Prāna' being used in other passages for the Brahman, here also it is so used, as the same characteristics are mentioned'*

If the *pūrvapakṣa* says that as the marks of the individual self and those of the chief vital air are mentioned in this passage, either the individual self or the chief vital air or both are meant here, and not Brahman, then we say 'No, it is not so, for in that case there would be three distinct forms of devout meditation prescribed in the same passage, namely that on the individual self, that on the chief vital air, and that on Brahman. But it is not reasonable to suppose that in the same passage three distinct forms are prescribed, it is rather reasonable to think that the passage has the same purport. As also, in another passage the word 'Prāna' is used for Brahman, because Brahman's characteristics are mentioned there, therefore here also, the characteristics of Brahman being mentioned, it must be understood that it is Brahman alone that is spoken of'.

Or, the portion of the aphorism beginning with '*noṇāsā*' &c may be explained otherwise, Thus Even in a passage speaking of Brahman, the characteristic marks of the individual self and the chief vital air are not conflicting elements. Why? Because of the three forms of devout

meditation Three forms of devout meditation on Brahman are intended to be taught here (1) that through characteristics of *Prāṇa* (2) through those of *Prajñā* (the individual self) and (3) through those of Brahman himself Elsewhere too, for example in such passages as He who consists of *manas* whose body is *Prajñā* &c." (*Chhāṇ* in 14 2) devout meditation on Brahman is taught with reference to his attributive adjuncts. This applies to the present case also. Therefore it is settled that the passage speaks of Brahman

## समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः—उपास्य-ब्रह्मबोधकास्यष्ट-श्रुतिवाक्यानां समन्वयः.

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### १ । सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।

१ । छान्दोग्योपनिषदि शण्डिल्यविद्यायाम् परम् एव ब्रह्म उपदिष्टम् । कुत ?—  
यत 'सर्वत्र' सर्वेषु वेदान्तेषु 'प्रसिद्धम्' ब्रह्म एव 'उपदिश्यते' । शण्डिल्यविद्या,  
“सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तन्नलानिति शल्ल उपसीत । अथ खलु कतुमयः पुरुषः । यथा-  
कतुर्बलिहीनो पुरुषो भवति तथैतं प्रेत्य भवति । स कतुः कुर्वति । मनोमयं प्राण-  
मरीचं भावः सत्यसङ्गः आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मो सर्वकामः सर्वगन्तः सर्वरसः सर्व-  
निदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादः । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदयेऽणीयान् ग्रीहेवा यवावा सर्वपावा  
श्यामाकावा श्यामाकतण्डुवावा । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदये ज्ञायान् पृथिव्या ज्ञायान्  
अन्तरीचात् ज्ञायान् दिवी ज्ञायान् एभ्यो लोकेभ्यः । सर्वकर्मो सर्वकामः सर्वगन्तः  
सर्वरसः सर्वनिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादः । एष स आत्माऽन्तर्हृदये एतद् ब्रह्मेतमितं  
प्रेत्याभिसम्भविताभीतिः । अयं स्यादज्ञा न विचिकित्साऽस्तीति ह आऽन शण्डिल्य  
शण्डिल्यः ।” ( छा ३।१।४।१-४ ) ।

1. *Because the well-known Brahman is taught everywhere*

In the 'Sândilya-vidyâ' of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad, it is the Supreme Brahman that is taught Why ? For everywhere, in all the Vedântas, it is the well-known Brahman that is taught The Sândilya Vidyâ is as follows  
“All this is Brahman, for all this originates, disappears

and continues in him. Meditate on him calmly. Man consists of will. As his will is in this world so will he be when he has departed from here. He should will accordingly. He who consists of mind (*i.e.* intelligence) whose body is life whose form is light whose thoughts are true who is (boundless) like space to whom belong all deeds, all desires, all odours and all tastes, who pervades all this, who is without speech and without partiality — this (Person) is my Self existing in the heart. He is smaller than a grain of wheat or barley than a mustard or canary seed than even the kernel of a canary seed. This Self within my heart is greater than the earth greater than the mid regions (those between earth and heaven) greater than heaven greater than these worlds. He to whom belong all deeds all desires, all odours and all tastes who pervades all this who is without speech and without partiality — this is my Self in the heart this is Brahman. I shall reach him after departing from this world. He who has this faith has no uncertainty that is, he is sure to reach Brahman. Thus said Sândilya, thus said Sândilya. (*Chh* iii 14 14)

## २। विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेयः ।

२। इदम् वा चत्वाराम् यदा विवक्षिता गुणा उपपत्त्यानाम् उपपत्तिर्न उपदिष्टा  
अपहृत्युपपत्त्यं लभ्यते परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि एव उपपद्यते ।

2 And because the attributes intended to be expressed are possible only in Brahman. This is another reason for the above conclusion — because the attributes

intended to be expressed, the attributes of having true thoughts and others, are possible only in the Supreme Brahman.

३ । अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः ।

३ । तेषा गुणाना शारीर जीवे अनुपपत्ते तु न शारीर जीव शङ्खित्यविद्यायाम् उपास्य ।

3 *Because they are not possible in the embodied self, therefore the embodied self is not taught* Because those attributes are not possible in the embodied self, therefore the embodied self is not to be meditated upon in the *Sāṅdilya Vidyā*

४ । कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ।

४ । इतश्च न शारीर मनोमयत्वादियुग्य यस्मात् श्रुति मनोमयत्वादियुग्यम् उपास्यम् 'कर्मत्वेन' उपासकस्य प्राप्यत्वेन, तथा शारीरम् उपासकम् 'कर्तृत्वेन' प्रापकत्वेन 'व्यपदिशति' ।

4 *And because there is a reference as to object and subject* And for this reason also is the embodied self not that which has the attribute of 'consisting of *manas*' and such other qualities, because scripture speaks of that which is to be meditated on and which has the attributes of 'consisting of *manas*' and such other qualities as an object, as what is to be attained by the meditator, and of the embodied self, the meditator, as the subject or agent.

## ३। शब्दविशेषात् ।

३। इत्यत्र शरीरात् एव महीश्वरमित्यादौ द्रष्टव्यं तदर्थं तत्र शरीरात्  
 महीश्वर इत्येव विदितं विमर्शितं भवति महीश्वर इति श्रुत्या दत्ता इत्यर्थः  
 ( १।६।१।२ ) “एवम् एवम् च शब्दात् ( २०।३।१ विमर्शितं प २। १ ) श्रुत्या  
 विदितं इति शरीरात् इत्येव तत्र महीश्वर इत्येव विदितं महीश्वर इत्येव  
 द्रष्टव्यं इति ।

5 *Because of the difference of words* And for this reason also is that which consists of *manas* and such other attributes different from the embodied self because in another scriptural passage treating of the same subject there is a difference of words, that is a difference in case ending between two words referring respectively to the Lord and the individual. In the *Satapatha Brahmana* (x 6. 3 2.) it is said “Thus that golden person is in the self” Here the term referring to the embodied self has the seventh case-ending, and the term person different from it and having the first case-ending refers to Brahman.

## ४। स्मृतिषु ।

४। विदितं तत्र च शब्दात् एव—एतत् “महीश्वर महीश्वरानां उद्दिष्टं त्रुत्तं  
 विदितं ( मय १८।६१ ) इत्याद्या अति शरीर परमात्मन मितं द्रष्टव्यं ।

6. *And because of the Smriti* Another reason for the conclusion is given. Because a *Smriti* passage like “O Arjuna, the Lord is seated in the heart of all creatures” (*Bhagavadgita* xviii 61) shows the difference between the embodied and the Supreme Self.



७। अर्मकौकारूपात्तद्वपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं  
व्योमवच्च ।

७। 'अर्मकम्' अल्पम्, 'ओकाः' स्थान यस्य स अर्मकौका, तस्य भाव अर्म-  
कौकस्त्वम्, तस्मात्, 'अर्मकौकस्वात्' अण्वीयस्त्वादियुक्तात्, 'तद्वपदेशात् च' तस्य  
शाण्डिल्यविद्याविषयस्य अण्वीयस्त्वकथनात् च, 'न' न स परमात्मा, परन्तु शरीर एव, 'इति  
चेत्, न' । कुत ?—'निचाय्यत्वात् एवम्' यतः स एवम् अण्वीयस्त्वादियुक्तीपेत ईश्वरः  
हृदयपुच्छरीके निचाय्य द्रष्टव्य इति उपदिश्यते । 'व्योमवत् च' एतत् द्रष्टव्यम् । यथा  
सर्वगतम् अपि सत् व्योम सूचीपाशाद्यपेक्षया अण्वीय व्यपदिश्यते, एव ब्रह्मण अपि  
हृदयेष्वपि अण्वीयस्त्वम् ।

7 If it be said 'No, because of the smallness of the space, and because of its being mentioned', then the reply is 'No, because Brahman has thus to be realised, and because of the similarity to ether.' If it be said that because of the smallness of space, that is because such attributes as minuteness are mentioned in the passage, and because the attribute of minuteness as belonging to the subject-matter of the *Sāṅdilya Vidyā* is expressly mentioned, therefore that is not the Supreme Self, but rather the embodied self, then we say 'No' And why ? Because it is taught that the Lord, as possessing such attributes as minuteness has to be realised in the lotus of the heart And he has to be considered as similar to ether As ether, though pervading all things, is spoken of as small when considered in relation to the eye of a needle or a die &c, so is Brahman said to be minute in relation to the heart

८ । सम्भोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वेद्येयात् ।

८ । ब्रह्मणः सर्वप्राप्तिं वदन्त्येवमन्त्यात् संसारः 'सम्भोगप्राप्ति' इति चेत् 'न । स तस्य सम्भोगप्रसङ्गः । वदन्त्यात् इति शरीरप्राप्तिरपी विविध भवति । एतन्त्यात् चक्षुरी विवेचनान् एवमेव एव भोगः न इत्यर्थः ।

8. *If it be objected that from this the subjection of Brahman to pleasure and pain follows then the reply is No on account of the difference* If it be objected that on the supposition of Brahman being related to the hearts of all creatures it would follow that he is subject to the pleasures and pains of the world then we reply "No it would not follow that he is subject to pleasure and pain for there is a difference between the Creator and the creature. As the two are different only the latter is subject to pleasure and pain not the former

९ । अतो पराचरयद्व्यात् ।

९ । "यस्य ब्रह्म च चक्षुरसि भवत आदयम् । सत्युपनिषत्परीक्ष्य च इत्यादिदं ब्रह्म सः ॥ ( ऋठ १।१।१३ ) यस्य चक्षुःशरीरे 'अतो ब्रह्मचक्षुरी' भवत्य परमात्मा एव न इत्यर्थः । कुतः ?—पराचरयद्व्यात् इति पराचरयद्व्यस्य व्यापकब्रह्मस्य व्यापकत्वेन उपपत्तिः परमात्मनो चक्षुरसि न भवति ।

9 *The eater means Brahman for he is mentioned as taking in the moving and the unmoving* In the *Kathopanishad* verse, He of whom both Brahmanas and Kshatriyas are food and death is the sustaining material who can say as to where he is,—it is so and so (1 2. 25)

the *Atmā*, the 'eater' of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas and others, is the Supreme Self, and no one else. How? For the taking in, the final absorption, of the moving and the unmoving, of the whole world, is possible only of the Supreme Self, not of any other thing or being.

### १० । प्रकरणाच्च ।

१० । इतश्च परमात्मा एव इह 'अजा' भवितुम् अर्हति यत्कारणं प्रकरणम् इदं परमात्मनः,—“न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्” ( कठ १।२।१८ ) इत्यादि ।

10 *This follows also from the section* For this reason also it is possible only for the Supreme Self to be the 'eater', that this section, the one beginning with "The knowing Self neither is born nor dies" (*Katha*, 1 2 18) deals with the Supreme Self

### ११ । गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् ।

११ । कठवल्लीषु एव पठ्यते,

ऋतं पिवन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके

गुह्याभ्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।

छायातपो ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति

पञ्चाग्रयो ये च दिशाचिकेता ॥ ( १।१।१ )

अत्र 'गुहा प्रविष्टौ' 'आत्मानौ' विज्ञानात्म-परमात्मानौ एव गृह्येते, न बुद्धिचेवज्ञौ ।  
अत्र हेतुः,—“हि तद्दर्शनात्” यतः गुहाहितत्वं श्रुतिधृतिषु अभसत् परमात्मनः एव दृश्यते,  
—“गुहाहितं गङ्गरेष्टं पुराणम्” ( कठ १।२।१२ ), “यो वेदं निहितं गुहाया परमे व्योमन्”  
तैत्ति १।१ ), “आत्मानमन्विष्य गुह्याभ्रविष्टम्” इत्याद्यासु ।

11 *The two who have entered into the cavity of the heart are the individual and universal selves [and not the understanding and the individual self] for it is seen* It is said in the *Kathopanishad* In this world in the highest place of Brahman the two who have entered into the cavity of the heart are enjoying the fruits of their work Those who know Brahman describe them as light and shade also those who feed the five fires (the house holders) and those who feed the fire thrice (१ ३ १) In the phrase "the two who have entered into the cavity of the heart" the individual and the universal selves are mentioned, and not the understanding and the individual self (as some suppose) The reason is this,— It is seen "That is, in the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti* the Supreme Self alone is frequently spoken of as existing in the heart as for instance "Who is in the heart who lives in inaccessible places, and who is ancient (*Katha* i 2. 12) "Who knows (him) as hidden in the heart the highest heaven" (*Taittī* ii 1) Seek the Self who has entered into the cavity of the heart" &c.

## १२ । विशेषणम् ।

११ । सुपुत्रम् विमदन्तम् कीदृशं मिदम् — दण्डनाम् भग्नमनायादि मिदं च यन्मन्त्रं पूर्वादि विद्वान् बुद्धम् एव ।

12. *And on account of the distinction* The above conclusion is right also on account of the distinction mentioned in the *Śruti* between God and the individual self, namely the distinction of the goal and the goer the object thought of and the thinker and so on

## १३। अन्तर उपपत्तेः ।

१३। “य एषोऽचिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति श्रोवाचतदन्तममयमेतद् ब्रह्मेति” (छान्दोग्ये ८।३।४) । अथ ‘अन्तर’ अक्षय्यन्तर पुरुष, परमेश्वर एव । ‘उपपत्तेः’ यत अथ उपदिश्यमान गुणज्ञात परमेश्वरे एव उपपद्यते ।

13. *The Person “within” is Brahman on account of attributes* “He said, this Person who is seen within the eye, that is the Self. This is the Immortal, the Fearless, this is Brahman” (*Chh* viii 74) Here “The Person within the eye” is the Supreme Lord, for the qualities mentioned here are attributable only to him.

## १४। स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ।

१४। कथं पुन आकाशवत् सर्वगतस्य ब्रह्मण्य षट्सम्पत्स्थानम् उपपद्यते ? अथ उच्यते,—ब्रह्मण्य उपलब्धार्थं स्थानादिनामरूप-व्यपदेश [ “य पृथिव्या तिष्ठन्” “यश्चक्षुषि तिष्ठन्” ( ऋह० ३।७ ) इत्यादिषु ] श्रुत्यन्तरेषु अपि दृश्यते ।

14 *And on account of the mention of place and other things* But how can the location of a small space like the eye be attributable to Brahman, who is all-pervading as ether? To this objection it is replied here, In other scriptural texts also, for instance, “Who, residing in the earth”, “Who, residing in the eye” (*Br* iii 7) names and forms like space and other things are mentioned as helps to the realisation of Brahman

## १५ । सुखमिगितामिधानादेव ।

१५ । इतए अचिदुक्व वाभिर एव एता अचिद् वाव ताव सुखमिगता  
वदितम् । "अथा ब्रह्म ब्रह्म ते ब्रह्मेति ( ता ३।१ । ४ ) । ब्रह्म सुखायै  
चरन् आनामवाये । इति तदर्थमिति ब्रह्म इत्येव सुखायै ब्रह्म गमयन् ।

15 And also because the Person in the eye is mentioned as endowed with bliss For this reason also is the Person within the eye none but the Supreme Lord that in this text he is spoken of as endowed with bliss  
Breath is Brahman Ka is Brahman Kha is Brahman" (Chh iv 10 4) Ka means bliss and Kha ether Qualifying each other they indicate the blissful Brahman

## १६ । श्रुतीपनिषत्कृत्यमिधानाच्च ।

१६ । इतए अचिदुक्व वाभिर एव एता अचिद् वाव ताव सुखमिगता  
वदितम् । "अथा ब्रह्म ब्रह्म ते ब्रह्मेति ( ता ३।१ । ४ ) । ब्रह्म सुखायै  
चरन् आनामवाये । इति तदर्थमिति ब्रह्म इत्येव सुखायै ब्रह्म गमयन् ।

16 And because the path of him who has heard the Upanishads is mentioned For this reason also is the Person within the eye none but the Supreme Lord that the path named the Devayana, which is assigned by the Sruti to him who has heard the secret science—the knower of Brahman—is here, in this text, mentioned as the path of him who knows the Person in the eye (Prasna i. 10 Chh iv 15 5)

## १७ । अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ।

१७ । यत् पुनरुक्तं कायात्मा विज्ञानात्मा देवतात्मा वा स्यात् अचिस्थान इति अव उच्यते,—‘न’ कायात्मादि ‘इतर’ इह ग्रहणम् अर्हति । कायात् ?—‘अनवस्थिते, न तावत् कायात्मन चक्षुषि गित्वावस्थान’ सम्भवति । ‘सम्भवात्’ यत् अस्तत्वादीना गुणानां न कायात्मनि सम्भव ।

17 Not others, on account of impermanency and impossibility And then as to the contention that the person within the eye is the reflected self, the cognitional self (the individual soul) or the self of some deity, it is said here, the reflected and other selves cannot be accepted here Why not? On account of impermanency the reflected and other selves cannot permanently exist in the eye And on account of impossibility the qualities of immortality &c cannot exist in the reflected and other selves

## १८ । अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ।

१८ । बृहदारण्यके ( तृतीयाध्यायस्य सप्तमब्राह्मणे ) इतिव्यादिषु ‘अधिदैवादिषु’ य ‘अन्तर्यामी’ श्रूयते स परमात्मा एव स्यात्, न अन्य इति । ‘तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्’ यतः तस्य परमात्मन धर्मा यमयितादय इह निर्दिश्यमाना दृश्यन्ते ।

18 The ‘Inner Ruler’ of the presiding deities of the devas &c is the Supreme Self, as his attributes are mentioned The “Inner Ruler” spoken of in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (Chap III Brahmana 7) as ruling over the earth and other presiding deities among the *devas*, is the Supreme

Self and none other for in this passage the attributes of the Supreme Self—ruling and such others,—are found mentioned in this section

### १८ । न च आर्त्तमतवर्त्तामिच्छापातः ।

१८। 'न च आर्त्ते' मांश्वशृपृश प्रशानम् पश्यानिमन्दरायं भवितुम् अहति ।  
नतवर्त्तामिच्छापात् यतः अवितत प्रशान विवक्षयसा द्रष्टव्यश्च अश्यामिनः समितयिता  
भवितुः । "अदृष्टी द्रष्टव्युत आताडमती मन्ताडविभाती विभाता ( इष ३।१।२३ )  
इति हि वाक्यमर्थे भवति ।

19 The Inner Ruler is not that spoken of in the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti for attributes not its own are spoken of The Inner Ruler cannot be the Pradhāna spoken of in the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti for seeing and other attributes opposed to the nature of the unconscious Pradhāna are mentioned with reference to the Inner Ruler About the end of the passage (Br lil. 7 23) it is said of him 'He is the unseen seer the unheard hearer the unthought of thinker the unknown knower

### २० । शारीर्योभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैवमधीयते ।

२ । शारीर्य कीवात्मा 'च' न चत्पञ्चासी छात् यतः 'उभये अपि अस्मिन्  
आत्मा' नाभ्यन्दिता च चत्पञ्चासिन् 'भेदेन' निषण्ण निषणादिभेदेन 'एत' शारीरम्  
परीक्षते पठन्ति । 'यो विद्यानि तिष्ठन्' इति आत्माः । अत्र विद्याल त्रयेण शारीर्य  
उच्यते । 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इति नाभ्यन्दिताः । अत्र आत्मतत्त्व शारीर्येण वाचकः ।

20 The Inner Ruler is not the embodied self for



*both the schools speak of it as different* The 'Inner Self' is not the embodied self, for both the schools,—the Kanvas and the Mādhyandīnas (in their different readings of the section) speak of it (the embodied self) as different from the Inner Ruler,—the former as the ruled, and the latter as the ruler The *Kānvās* read, "Who, dwelling in the understanding" Here 'the understanding' means the embodied self The Mādhyandīnas read, "Who, dwelling in the self" Here 'the self' indicates the embodied self

## २१ । अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तिः ।

२१ । सुष्ठुकोपनिषदि श्रुयते "यत्तदद्रेक्ष्यमग्राह्यमगीतमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्र तदपाणि-  
पादं नित्यम् । विमुक्तं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं तदभूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः" (१।१।६) ।  
अथ य 'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको' भूतयोनिं प्रोक्तं स परमेश्वर एव, न अन्य । 'धर्मोक्तिः'  
यत तस्य एव धर्मा अत्र उक्ता ।

21 *He who is spoken as having the qualities of being unseen &c is the Supreme Lord, for his attributes are mentioned* In the *Mundaka Upanishad* it is said, "That source of things which the wise see, is invisible, intangible, uncaused, uncoloured, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, eternal, omnipresent, all-pervading, extremely subtle and undecaying" (I 1 6) The source of all things spoken of here as 'having the qualities of being unseen &c) is the Supreme Lord, and none other, as it is his attributes which are mentioned here

## २२ । विशेषण-भेदव्यपदेशाभ्याञ्च नेतरौ ।

२२ । इतश्च परमेश्वर एव भूतयोनिः, 'न' 'इतरौ' शरीर प्रधानं वा, यतः श्रुति

एवम् भूतमिति शरीरान् एव तान् च विवेकिन विवदन्त्यन, भूतम् च 'अदिति' वदन्ति । तदिति

निष्ठा इमून् पुरम् न वदन्त्येताः ।

२५ वा इमन्तः त्रीणि ददन्त्युपमाया ॥ ( सु. १।१।३ )

22. *The Supreme Lord is the source of all things and not the other two because of his being given specific attributes and his being spoken of as different. For this reason also it is the Supreme Lord and not the other two,—the embodied self and the Pradhāna—which is the Source of all things, that Scripture gives specific attributes to the Source of all things that it speaks of and differentiates him from both of them. For instance it is said (ii. 1. 2) 'That Divine Person is incorporeal, he is within and without, unborn, without breath, without a sensorium, pure and higher than the high, undecaying (person or principle meaning either the Lower Brahman or the eternal creative power of God)'*

२३ । इतोपस्थासाध ।

२४ । तत्र एव नृपते,—

अधिमर्हं चक्षुषी चानुषी

दिशः शक्तिं वाग्बलाप विना ।

वायुः शक्ती ददत्यं विचक्षणम्

पञ्चा प्रविष्टी शिवं तर्कभूतान्ताम् ॥ ( सु. १।१।४ )

अथ इपीयवासात् तत्र भुतयोनिं सर्वविद्याऽग्नयश्च यथासात् चक्षणात् 'च'

स परमेश्वर एव, न शरीरः, न प्रवानम् । न शरीरस्य अल्पशक्तेः, न अपि अनात्मनः प्रधानस्य, अयं अपीपन्यासः सम्भवति ।

23 *And because of the description of his form*  
In the same section it is said,—“Heaven is his head, the sun and the moon are his eyes, the quarters his ears, the uttered Vedas his speech, air his breath, and the world his heart Out of his two feet has come out the earth. This Person is the Inner Self of all creatures ” Because of the description of form here,—the form of the Source of all things as consisting of all appearances, it is the Supreme Lord, and neither the embodied self nor the *Pradhāna* Such a description of form is not possible in the case either of the embodied self whose power is limited or of *Pradhāna*, which is a not-self

## २४ । वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ।

२४ । आन्दीग्योपनिषदि पञ्चमप्रपाठके एकादशादिषु अध्यायेषु “को नु आत्मा किं ब्रह्म” इति, “आत्मानमेव ब्रह्म वैश्वानरः सम्प्रति अब्येपि तमेव नो ब्रूहि” इति च उपक्रम्य द्युसूर्यवात्वाकाश-वारिपृथिवीनां सुतेजस्वादिगुणयोगम् एकैकोपासन-निन्दया च वैश्वानरः प्रति एतेषां मूर्द्धादिभावमुपदिश्य आत्मायते, “यस्त्वेवमेव प्रादेशभावम् अभि-विमानम् आत्मानं वैश्वानरम् उपपान्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्व्वात्मव्यवसृजति । तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्द्धेव सुतेजाश्चतुर्विधश्च प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा सन्देहो बहुलः’ बक्षिरेव रयि पृथिव्येव पादावु एव वेदिर्लोमानि वह्निर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यो मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः” इत्यादि । अत्र “वैश्वानर आत्मा” परमात्मा भवितुम् अर्हति । कुत ?—‘साधारणशब्दविशेषात्’ । साधारणशब्दस्य विशेषः साधारणशब्दविशेषः । यद्यपि एतौ उभयौ अपि आत्मवैश्वानरशब्दौ साधारणशब्दौ, वैश्वानरशब्दस्तु जाठर-भूताग्नि-देवताना वयानां साधारणः, आत्मशब्दश्च जीवपरमेश्वरस्यो द्वयोः, तथापि विशेषो

दग्धं दध्नं परमेष्ठपरत्वं तयोः सम्प्रत्यक्षम् । उद्वृत्तपुत्रिष्ठिः । निष्ठानि  
परमेष्ठं नृपं स्वस्मयति ।

24 *The Vaisvānara means the Supreme Lord on account of the particular meaning of the general terms* In the fifth *Prapāthaka* of the *Chhāndogya* Upanishad in the chapters beginning with the eleventh the scripture, beginning with "What is our self and what is Brahman?" and "You now know this Vaisvanara self do thou instruct us about him" teaches that heaven the sun air ether water and the earth possess the qualities of good light &c disparages the distinct meditation of each of these and teaching that they stand to the Vaisvānara as the head &c. says, But he who meditates on the Vaisvānara Self as thus limited as in space eats food in all worlds in all beings, in all selves. (However) of this Vaisvānara verily the head is possessed of good light the eye multiform (or having the world as its form) the breath moving in various courses, the trunk manifold the bladder wealth the feet the earth the chest the altar the hairs the holy grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire the *manas* the Anvā hārya fire and the mouth The Āhavanīya fire &c. Here the "Vaisvānara Ātmā is the Supreme Self Why?— On account of the particular meaning of the general terms. Though both the terms, Ātmā and 'Vaisvānara are general terms, Vaisvānara meaning indifferently the gastric juice the elemental fire and the god of fire, and Ātmā meaning the individual and the Universal Self yet they have here a particular meaning which shows that they are here applied to the Supreme Lord. The attributes mentioned in the texts quoted point to him alone.

## २५ । अर्थमात्रमनुमानं स्यादिति ।

२५। परमेश्वरस्य अर्थमात्रं स्मृत्युक्तं भगवद्गीतैकादशाध्यायादिषु उक्तं तैत्तिरीयस्य वैश्वानरश्रुतिम् अनुमापयत्, अस्य वैश्वानरशब्दस्य परमेश्वरपरत्वेन अनुमानं लिङ्गं गमकं स्यात् इत्यर्थः । 'इति'शब्दः हेत्वर्थः ।

25 And because the form described in the *Smṛiti* is an inference The world-form of the Supreme Lord described in the *Smṛiti*, for example in the eleventh chapter of the *Bhagavadgīta*, helps to infer (or explain) the Vaisvānara *Smṛiti* passage on which it rests, that is, constitutes an indicatory sign of the term 'Vaisvānara' denoting the Supreme Lord 'Iti' in the aphorism means 'therefore'

## २६ । शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानान्नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्टुपदेशादसम्भवात् पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ।

२६ । अथ शङ्का—'शब्दादिभ्यः' अर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धेभ्यः वैश्वानराध्यादिशब्दभ्यः, 'अन्तःप्रतिष्ठानात्' वैश्वानरस्य पुरुषाभ्यन्तरावस्थान-कथनात् च, 'न' न वैश्वानरः परमेश्वरः, परन्तु जठराग्नि एव प्रत्येतस्य । शङ्कानिराशः,—'तथा' जठराग्नौ 'दृष्टुपदेशात्' परमेश्वर इत्यत्र उपदेशात्, वैश्वानरस्य परमेश्वरार्थं युक्त एव । 'असम्भवात्' वैश्वानरस्य कथितपुरुषलक्षणस्य अर्थान्तरस्य असम्भवात् च न शङ्का युक्ता । 'पुरुषम् अपि च' 'एनम्' वैश्वानरम् 'अधीयते' वाजसनेयिनः शतपथब्राह्मणे ।

26 If it be said, "No, because of the word and other reasons, and because of its existing within," then the reply is, "no, because we are told to see him there, because of the impossibility, and because one school,

*speaks of him as the Person* Our opponent may object thus —Because of the word and other reasons, that is because there are words in the text such as 'Vaisvānara and Agni' which are well known to mean other things and because of its existing within that is because the text speaks of the Vaisvānara as existing within the individual therefore Vaisvānara does not mean the Supreme Lord but the gastric juice. Our reply to the objection is as follows. Because the text teaches us to see the Supreme Lord there in the gastric juice therefore the Vaisvānara properly means the Supreme Lord and nothing else. And because of the impossibility that is because it is impossible that the Vaisvānara which is spoken of as possessing the characteristics of a person should mean otherwise therefore the objection is invalid. Besides, the Vājasaneyins in the *Satapatha Brahmana* speak of the Vaisvānara as a person.

२७ । अतएव न देवता भूतञ्च ।

१० । 'यत् एव उक्तेभ्य ईदृशं न देवता देवता अप्रदेवता, न भूतं च भूतादि च ।

27 From this verily that is for these reasons, Vaisvānara is neither a god—not the god of fire,—nor an element —i.e. not the elemental fire.

२८ । साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनि ।

१८ । साक्षात् अपि अऽऽप्युपाधि मुख्यं विना अपि उक्तवाक्य परमेश्वरोपासन परिसृष्टि चविरीच' न कश्चित् विरोधः अस्ति, इति जैमिनि मन्वते ।

28 *Jaimini thinks that even in supposing direct meditation there is no contradiction* Jaimini thinks that even if we suppose that the meditation of the Supreme Lord is taught in that passage directly, without reference to the adjunct of the digestive fire, there is no contradiction

### २८ । अभिव्यक्तैरित्याश्मरथ्यः ।

२८ । 'अभिव्यक्तै' हृदयादिषु उपलब्धिस्थानेषु परमेश्वरस्य विशेषण-प्रकाशान्, "इति" "प्रादेशभाव" श्रुति ( छा० ५।८।१ ) तस्मिन् अपि उपपद्यते, इति 'आश्मरथ्यः' एतन्नामक आचार्य्य मन्यते ।

29 *Asvarathya thinks that the text applies to the Supreme Lord on account of manifestation* 'On account of manifestation' that is, as the Supreme Lord is specially manifested in such places of realisation as the heart, the text speaking of *pṛādeśhamātra*, 'of the measure of a span' (Ch v 8 1) applies to him, so thinks Āchārya Āsmarathya

### ३० । अनुष्मृतेर्वादरिः ।

३० । 'अनुष्मृते' यत प्रादेशभावहृदयस्थितेन मनसा परमेश्वर अनुष्मर्य्यते 'ध्यायते', तत स "प्रादेशभाव" उच्यते, इति मन्यते 'वादरि' नामक आचार्य्य ।

30 *Badari thinks that God is so called on account of meditation* 'On account' of meditation, that is because the Supreme Lord is meditated upon by the mind which is situated in the heart, which is of the measure of a span, so

he is described as of the measure of a span—so thinks Ācharya Bādari

३१ । सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिभूया हि दर्शयति ।

३१ । 'सम्पत्ते' सम्पदुपासना निमित्तं 'मादिममात्र' द्रुति स्तात् 'इति' सम्पत्ते  
नमिति । 'तदा हि' समागमकाले वाङ्मनेमिब्राह्मण ( १ । १ । १ ) परमेश्वर  
मादिब्रह्मावस्थितिं दर्शयति । सम्पत्तिं सम्पदुपासना वा —ध्यानेन दृश्यवस्तुनि  
परमेश्वरं च दर्शयति ।

31 *Jaimini says the text is intended for sampatti (a form of meditation) Another text of a similar import shows this For sampatti—for teaching the sampat form of meditation the "pradesamdita text is intended—so says Jaimini Another text of a similar import the Vdjasaneyi Brahmana (Satapatha x 6. 1) teaches meditation on the Supreme Lord in the heart of the measure of a span Sampatti or sampat updsand means the realisation of the non-difference of the Supreme Lord with a visible object*

३२ । आसनस्ति चैनमस्मिन् ।

३२ । 'अस्मिन्' मूढप्रवृत्तानामपि मादिममात्रे 'एतत्' परमेश्वरम् आसनानि  
आवासा 'च' आवासापनिबन्धि ।

32 *And the Jābāls speak of him as in that place And the Jābāls also in the Jābālopanishad speak of him as dwelling in that place, that is in the span measured space between the head and the chin*



## समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

तृतीयः पादः ज्ञेय-ब्रह्मबोधकास्पष्ट-श्रुतिवाक्यानां समन्वयः



### १। द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ।

१। मुख्यकोपनिषदि श्रूयते,—

यस्मिन् द्यौ पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोत

मन सह प्राणैश्च सर्व्वे ।

तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या

वाचो विमुञ्चयामृतस्यैव सेतु ॥ (रा० १५)

अत 'द्युभ्वाद्यायतन' द्यु-भू-आदि-आयतन स्वर्गपृथिव्यादे आधात, ब्रह्म एव,  
न अन्यत् । कुत ?—'स्वशब्दात्' अस्मिन् आयतने ब्रह्मवाचकस्य 'ब्रह्म'शब्दस्य  
प्रयोगात् ।

1 *The Support of heaven, earth &c, is Brahman, on account of the use of his own proper word, i e 'self'*  
It is said in the *Mundaka Upanishad* "Know that one self alone in which heaven, the earth, the sky, and the sensorium, with all the vital airs, are woven Give up other words He is the bridge of immortality" (II 2 5) Here the support of heaven, earth &c is Brahman, and nothing else Why ?---Because the word 'self', which properly means Brahman, is applied to it

० । सुतोपसृज्य अपदेयात् ।

१ । इति परम् एव इह धुमापायतनं दृश्यते अथ 'सुतोपसृज्यता सुतो  
आत्मनेन दृश्यता अस्ति' इत्यादि । तदाहि —

यथा नद्यः अन्येनाग्रा समुद्रं

इति नद्यन्ति नामकपी विहाय ।

तथा विद्याम् नामकपादिसुतं

यथापि पुनश्च सुपतिं निन्दन् ॥ ( सु. १।१।८ )

2 Because he is spoken of as one to whom the libera-  
ted go. On this ground also is the support of heaven and  
earth Brahman and nothing else that he is spoken of as  
one to whom the liberated go as to their self. For instance  
it is said in the same Upanishad — As flowing rivers are  
absorbed in the sea, giving up their names and forms so  
the wiseman freed from name and form enters the Divine  
Person who is higher than the high " (iii 2 8)

२ । नाशुभानमनच्छब्दात् ।

१ । 'न अशुभानम् न सांख्यमिति परिच्छित्वा' इति धुमापायतनस्यैव  
प्रतिपत्त्यम् । अत्रापि — अतश्च द्वात् अशुभमिति तत्प्रतिपादकस्य अशुभ-  
अशयनात् ।

3 Not the inferred on account of the absence of  
words denoting it. It should not be thought that the in-  
ferred, that is the Pradhāna assumed in the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti  
is the support of heaven and earth. Why?—Because no  
words denoting it are mentioned in the text in question

## ४ । प्राणसृच्च ।

४ । 'प्राणसृत्' जीव 'च' न दग्ध्वाद्यायतनम् ।

4 *Nor is the living self* Nor is the living (lit life-bearing), that is the individual self, the support of heaven and earth

## ५ । भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

५ । यत श्रुति "तमेवैकं जानय स्वात्मानम्" इति ( २।२।५ ) ज्ञेयज्ञातृभावेन जगदीयतनात् प्राणसृत्त भेदं व्यपदिशति ।

5 *For distinction is shown* For scripture, in saying "Know that one self alone" (II 2 5) shows the distinction of the living self from the Support of the universe as the Knower

## ६ । प्रकरणात् ।

६ । यत इदं प्रकरणं परमात्मन एव ।

6 *Because of the section* Because the present section relates to the Supreme Self alone

## ७ । स्थित्यदनाभ्याच्च ।

७ । तृतीयमुच्छेदे श्रूयते,—

ज्ञा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया  
समान वृच्च परिप्लवजाते ।  
तथोन्म प्लिप्पल स्वादिति

अनन्यन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥ ( सु० ३।१।१ , ऋक् १।१६४।२१ )

अथ भिन्नदशायां परमात्मन इति बीदासीत्येव अवस्थान तथा जीवत्वेन  
'अद्वय' अवस्थानात्, इति भेदव्यवस्थायां 'अद्वय'त्वतस्तु अतीवैव सिद्धम् ।

7 *And by reason of indifference and eating* It is said in the third *Mundaka* — "Two birds, related to each other and friends, are sheltered in the same tree. One of them eats sweet fruits, while the other looks on without eating (in. 11 *Rik* I 164 21) Here by reason of indifference and eating that is by the indifference of the Supreme Self and the eating—the enjoyment of the fruits of its actions on the part of the individual self—two distinguishing marks it is established that the support of heaven and earth is not the individual self

८ । भूमा सम्प्रसादादभ्युपदेशात् ।

८ । आत्मीयस्युक्तं ( पा० २२ २३ इत्याद्यासु ) 'भूमा' प भाव्या एव न प्राणः ।  
अद्यात् १—सम्प्रसादात् अभ्युपदेशात् । सम्प्रसाद इति सुपुंसं शानम् उच्यते  
सम्प्रसादोदति अद्यात् इति निष्पत्त्यात् । तस्मां च सम्प्रसादवशात् प्राणः जायते  
इति । ( मन्त्रे ३३ ) प्राणः एव सम्प्रसादः परिमेषति । प्राणात् एव भूमा उपदिष्टा  
भावात् प्राणात् अद्यात् परमात्मा भूमा भवितुम् अर्हति ।

8. *The Bhṛmā is the Supreme Self for it is spoken of as higher than the vital air* The *Bhṛmā* (Infinite) spoken of in the *Chhândogya Sṛuti* (viii. 23 24 &c.) is the Supreme Self and not the vital air Why ?—For it is spoken of as higher than "the state of great bliss. "The state of great bliss" means the state of dreamless sleep on account of the description of it,—the self feels great bliss

in it (*Prasna* iv 6) In that state of great bliss the vital air (it is said) awakes (*Prasna* iv 3) So here, by "the state of great bliss" the vital air is meant Because the *Bhūma* is spoken of as higher than the vital air, therefore the '*Bhūma*' is the Supreme Self, different from the vital air

८ । धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

८ । अपि च वे भूमि श्रूयन्ते धर्माः, अन्यद्दर्शनादि व्यवसायाभावः, सुखत्वम्, अमृतत्वम्, स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्, सर्वगतत्वम्, सर्वान्मत्वम् च, एते परमात्मनि एव उपपद्यन्ते । अतः परमात्मा एव भूमा ।

9 And the attributes of the *Bhūman* that are mentioned, the absence of seeing, hearing &c, other things, blissfulness, immortality, establishment in his own glory, all-pervasiveness, and being the self of all, are all possible only of the Supreme Self Hence the Supreme Self alone is the *Bhūmā*

१० । अक्षरमखरान्तर्धृतेः ।

१० । बृहदारण्यकोक्तम् ( ३।८।७, ८ ) 'अक्षरम्' परमात्मा एव, न वर्णः । 'अखरान्तर्धृते' पृथिव्यादेः आकाशान्तर्धृत्य विकारजातस्य धारणात् । तत्र समस्तस्य ध्विकारजातस्य आकाशे प्रतिष्ठितत्वम् उक्त्वा "कस्मिन् न खलाकाशं शीतश्च प्रीतश्च ?" इति अनेन प्रश्नेन इदम् अक्षरम् अवतारितम्, तथा च उपसङ्गतम्,—“एतस्मिन् न खल्वक्षरे गार्धाकाशं शीतश्च प्रीतश्चेति । न च विकारजातधारणं ब्रह्मणः, अन्यत् सम्भवति ।

10 *The Akshara is the Supreme Self on account of its supporting all phenomena* The Akshara mentioned in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (iii 8 7 8) is the Supreme Self and not a letter on account of its supporting all phenomena beginning with the earth and ending in the ether. There having spoken of all phenomena as supported by ether the scripture introduces this *Akshara* with the question "In what is ether woven like warp and woof?" and concludes thus—"Verily O Gārgi it is in this Akshara that ether is woven like warp and woof. Now it is not possible for any one or anything else than Brahman to support all phenomena."

११ । सा च प्रमादनात् ।

११ । सा च' अत्र 'प्रमादनात्' परमेश्वरस्य एव कार्यं । अस्यात् ?—प्रमादनात् यतः प्रमादनादपूर्वकं कारणम् इह दूयते—'एतन्न सा च परमं प्रमादने मासि सूर्या चन्द्रमसौ विद्यन्ते तिष्ठतः' (इह १।८।८) इत्यादिना । प्रमादनात् च परमेश्वरं अत्र न दर्शयन्तं प्रमादनात् समर्थम् ।

11 *And this is the work of the Supreme Lord only on account of command* And this, the supporting of all phenomena beginning with the earth and ending in ether is the work of the Supreme Lord alone. Why?—On account of command—for texts like "By the command of that Akshara, O Gārgi the sun and the moon exist supported (Br iii 8. 9) speak of supporting by command. Now commanding is the work of the Supreme Lord. It is not possible for an inanimate object

## १२ । अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ।

१२ । इत्थं अक्षरम् परमात्मा एव, यतः श्रुतिः अक्षरम् 'अन्यभावात्' वक्ष्योक्त्य-  
चेतनभावात् 'व्यावर्तयति' पृथक्त्वा कथयति, "तदा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यं द्रष्टुं  
श्रीवसतः सत्त्वविज्ञातं विज्ञात ( ब्रह्म ३।११ ) इत्यादिना ।

12 *And on account of its being distinguished from things which are different* And for this reason also is the Akshara nothing but the Supreme Self, that scripture distinguishes the Akshara from 'things which are different,' that is inanimate objects such as letters, for instance in the text "That Akshara, O Gārgi, is an unseen seer, an unheard hearer, an unthought of thinker and an unknown knower" (Br iii 8 11)

## १३ । ईक्षतिकर्म-व्यपदेशात् सः ।

१३ । प्रश्नोपनिषद् पञ्चमप्रश्ने उक्तं ओकार 'स' परमात्मा एव, यतः तम्  
'ईक्षतिकर्म'त्वेन ध्यानविषयरूपेण 'व्यपदिशति' श्रुतिः — "स एतस्माज्जीवधनात् परात्परं  
पुरिश्रयं पुरुषमीक्षते" । ( प्रश्न ० ५।५ ) इति ।

13 *It is he, for he is spoken of as the object of sight.* The 'Om' mentioned in the fifth *prasna* (question) of the *Prasna* Upanishad is 'he', the Supreme Self, and none else, for the scriptural text, "from this Concentration of life (i.e. the source of all life) he sees the Person, higher than the high and pervading all organisms" (Pr v 5) speaks of him as the object of sight, that is of meditation





गति-ब्रह्मलोकशब्दौ भवतः । “इमा सर्वा भूता अपरहर्गच्छन् एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति ।” ( ऋ० ८१२ ) तत्र प्रकृतं दृश्यं ब्रह्मलोकशब्देन अभिधाय तद्विषया गतिं प्रकाशयद्वाच्यानां जीवानाम् अभिधीयमानां दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मता गमयति । ‘तथाहि’ सुत्यन्तरे ( छा० ६।८।१ ) “सता सीस्य तदा सम्पन्नी भवति” इति एवमादौ सुप्तप्रवस्थायां ब्रह्मविषय गमनम् ‘दृष्ट’ । तत् एव दर्शनं दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मवाच्यत्वे ‘लिङ्गम्’ प्रमाणम् ।

15 The “small” (*ākāśa*) is Brahman on account of going and a term, for thus is it seen, and this seeing is a sign. For this reason also is the Supreme Lord alone the “small” that at the end of the passage treating of the “small” there is the mention of a going and there is the term “Brahmaloka,” both of which refer to the Supreme Lord. “All these creatures,” it is said, “day after day going into that Brahma-world do not discover it” (*Ch viii 3 2*) This passage speaks of the “small” in the term “Brahma-world” and of individual selves called “creatures” as going there, and thus shows that the “small” is Brahman. And in another scriptural text, “He, my dear, becomes united with the True &c” (*Ch vi 8 1*) we read of the self going to Brahman in dreamless sleep, and this becomes a sign or proof that the “small” means Brahman.

१६ । धृतेश्च सहिज्जोऽत्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ।

१६ । “अथ य आत्मा स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषा लोकानामन्तर्मा दाय” । ( छा० ८।११ ) अत्र दृश्यस्य ‘धृते’ च जगद्धारणात् च परमेश्वर एव दृश्यः । कुत ?—‘अस्मिन्’ परमेश्वरे ‘अत्य’ ‘सहिज्ज’ जगद्धारणाशक्तौ ‘उपलब्धे’ दर्शनात् सुत्यन्तरे,—“एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रकाशने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विद्यतौ तिष्ठतः” ( ऋ० ३।८।८ ) इत्यादौ ।



18 *If it be said, from the mention of the other one, that that is meant, we say 'No', because of the impossibility* If it be doubted that because at the end of the passage the other one, that is the individual self, is meant by the "small," then we must say that this doubt should not be cherished, because the attributes of sinlessness &c, are impossible in the case of the individual self

### १८ । उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपसु ।

१८ । 'उत्तरात्' उत्तरस्यात् प्रागापत्यात् वाक्यात् "एवमेवैष सप्रसादोऽप्याच्छरीरात् समुत्थाय पर ज्योतिरुपसृज्यते येन रूपेणाभिनिव्यस्यते ।" ( छा० ८।१२।३ ) इत्यादि 'चित्' यदि जीवश्च भवेत्, सा न युक्ता, यत 'आविर्भूतस्वरूप' ज्ञानमनेन प्रकाशितब्रह्मभाव जीव एव तत्र उक्त । 'तु' शब्द पूर्वपक्षनिरासार्थः ।

19 *If the doubt arises from a subsequent passage, we say that there the individual self, with its true nature manifested, is spoken of* If the doubt that the "small" is the individual self arises from a subsequent passage where Prajāpati speaks, for instance the text, "Thus does this serene being, rising above this body, and having reached the highest light, appears in its own form" (Ch VIII 12 3), then it is not reasonable, for that passage speaks of the individual self with its unity with Brahman manifested through the power of knowledge 'Tu' (but) rejects the objector's view

### २० । अन्यार्थस्य परास्मर्शः ।

२० । दहरवाक्यशेषस्य जीव-परास्मर्शं च 'अन्यार्थ' परमेष्ठिनस्वरूप निर्देशार्थः ।

20 *And the reference has another meaning And the reference to the individual at the end of the passage treating of the small" has another meaning—it is meant to set forth the real nature of the Supreme Lord*

२१ । अहंशुतेरिति चेत् तदुक्तम् ।

११ । अहंशुते दहामण्य अनायतेन सुतो दहामण्य अहंशुतेन दहामण्येन वाच्य इति चेत् 'तत्' समावापम् द्वितीयपक्षस्य सत्यं न 'उक्तम्' एव ।

21 *If the doubt arises from the scriptural declaration of smallness it has been answered elsewhere If it is objected that the small does not mean the Supreme Lord because the term dahara means small and scripture speaks of the dahara akasa as small then we say that we have answered the objection in the seventh aphorism of the second pāda*

२२ । अनुक्षतेऽप्य च ।

११ । अनुक्षतेऽपि च उक्तम् —

न तत्र सूर्यो भवति न चन्द्रता च

मेवा विद्युती भवति कुतश्चनपि ।

तमेव भूतानुभूतिं सर्वं

तस्य भाषा सुखमिदं विभाति ॥ (१।१।१ )

अवीर्य सर्वप्रकाशक आकाश परमाकाश एव । कुतः ?—अनुक्षते अनुभूतान्

“तमेव भात्ममनुभाति सर्वम्” इति सर्वस्य तदनुभात्मयवस्थात् । ‘तस्य च’ “तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति” इति च परमात्मानं गमयति ।

22 On account of reflecting, he who is spoken of in the Mundaka text is the Supreme Self And “his” &c. indicates that Self The Mundaka Upanishad says, “The sun does not shine there, nor do the moon and the stars These lightnings do not shine there How can this fire ? After that shining One alone does all shine All this shines by his light ” (II 2-10) The all-revealing Self spoken of here is the Supreme Self Why ? On account of ‘reflecting,’ for in the clause “All shines after him” all things are said to reflect him ‘And his,’ i e “And all this shines by his light,” also indicates the Supreme Self

२३ । अपि च स्मर्यते ।

२३ । ‘अपि च’ परमात्मन इदं सर्वावभासरूपं भगवद्गीताश्रुतौ पञ्चदशाध्याये कथ्यते,—

न तन्नासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः ।

यद्गत्वा न निवर्तन्ते तद्भ्राम परमं मन ॥ ६ ।

यदादित्यगत तेजो जगन्नासयतेऽखिलम् ।

यच्चन्द्रमसि यश्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥ १२ । इति ।

23 And this is said in the Smṛiti also And that aspect of the Supreme Self which reveals all things, is also spoken of in the fifteenth chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā Smṛiti*, thus,—“Neither the sun nor the moon nor fire reveals that abode (or aspect) of mine from which no one returns”

(Verse 6) The light in the sun which illuminates the whole world that which is in the moon and in fire,—know that light to be mine (Verse 12)

२४ । मन्दादेव प्रमित ।

१४ । ऋषीपनिषदि द्वितीयाध्याये प्रथमब्रह्मा श्रूयते —

ब्रह्ममात्रं पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।

ईशानी भूतमन्मस्य न ततो विमुमुक्षते ॥ एतदेतत् ॥ ११ ।

ब्रह्ममात्रं पुरुषो मणीतिरिवायमस्य ।

ईशानी भूतमन्मस्य य एवाय स उच्यते ॥ एतदेतत् ॥ १२ ।

अथ मन्दात् एव ईशानादि-परमात्मनात्मन मन्दात् एव प्रमितयति यत् 'प्रमित' सुपुन ब्रह्म-परिमित. पुरुष परमात्मा एव न विद्यानामा ।

24 The measured is Brahman from the term itself In the Kathopanishad chap. II vall 1 it is said —  
—“The Person of the size of the thumb is seated in the middle part of the body He is the Regulator of the past and the future. So the wiseman does not hate any one. This is that. The Person of the size of the thumb is like a light without smoke. He is the Regulator of the past and the future. He is today and he will be tomorrow (12,13) Now from the term itself that is from such words in the text quoted as Regulator which mean the Supreme Self it is proved that the measured that is “the Person of the size of the thumb mentioned in the text is the Supreme Self alone, and not the individual

२५ । हृदयेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ।

२५ । शास्त्रस्य 'मनुष्याधिकारत्वात्' 'हृदयेक्षया तु' अङ्गुष्ठपरिमित-मनुष्यहृदया-  
वस्थानम् अपेक्ष्य च परमात्मन ऽङ्गुष्ठमावृतम् उच्यते ।

25 *It is so described with reference to the heart because the study of the scriptures is man's sphere* As the study of the scriptures is man's sphere, the Supreme Self is described as of the size of a thumb-with reference to its dwelling in man's heart, which is of the size of a thumb

२६ । तदुपर्यपि वादरायणः सम्भवत् ।

२६ । 'तदुपरि अपि' तेषां मनुष्याणाम् उपरिष्ठात् ये देवादयः, तान् अपि शास्त्रम्  
अधिकरोति, इति वादरायण आचार्य नन्यते । 'सम्भवात्' यतः देवादीनाम् अपि  
अधिकार-कारणं विग्रहवत्त्वादि सम्भवति ।

26 *According to Bādarāyana beings above man are also entitled to that study, for that is possible* The teacher, Bādarāyana, thinks that beings such as the gods, who are above man, are also entitled to the study of the scriptures, for in their case also these causes, for instance that of having bodies, that give that title, do exist

२७ । विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ।

२७ । देवादीनां शास्त्राधिकारे अविरोधे अपि 'कर्मणि विरोधः' स्यात्, यतः  
अङ्गुष्ठे योगेषु युगपत् एकस्य विग्रहवत् देवस्य सन्निधानं न उपपद्यते । 'इति चेत् न' ।  
'अनेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात्' यतः श्रुति एकोकस्य देवस्य अनेकरूपग्रहणं दर्शयति ।

27 *It cannot be said that this is opposed to sacrificial rites for the scriptures speak of their assuming many forms* Though nothing stands in the way of the gods being entitled to the study of the scriptures, yet it may be said that this is opposed to the performance of sacrificial rites, for the presence of the same embodied god at the same time at different sacrifices is unreasonable. But it is not so for scripture speaks of the same god assuming many forms

२८ । यद् इति चेदात प्रमवात् प्रत्ययागुमानाम्याम् ।

१८ । अथचि चरितेधि चपि 'यद्' विरीष' स्मात् । पूर्वमीमांसायां यन्दाईरी निव्यसन्त्यम् चानित्य वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं स्थापितं दिवानाच मन्त्रात्मकत्वं दमितम् । तेषां मरीचकत्वनाशो तु अनित्यत्वं प्रसज्येत, नित्यस्य यन्दास्य अनित्येन चर्येण निव्यसन्त्ये प्रवीतमामि वेदप्रामाण्यस्य च विरीष' स्मात् । 'इति चेत् न । 'यत्' प्रमवात् यत् एव हि वेदिवात् यद्वात् दिवादिष्वं जगत् प्रभवति । द्रव्यगुणचक्षुषा हि व्यक्तय एव उत्पद्यन्ते, न चाज्ञापय । चाज्ञातिसिद्ध यन्दागं निव्यसन्त्यम् । कर्त्तुं पुनः प्रवक्तव्यं यद्वात् प्रभवति जगत् इति ? प्रत्ययागुमानाम्याम्—प्रत्यय हि सृतिः, प्रामाण्यं प्रति अनपेक्षमात् । अनुमानं चरितः, प्रामाण्यं प्रति अपेक्षमात् । तै हि यन्दापूर्वीं छटि दर्शयत ।

28. *It cannot be said that it is opposed to the Word for the world originates from it as appears from Sruti and Smriti* It may be said that though not opposed to sacrificial rites, it (the gods title to scripture in virtue of their being embodied) is opposed to the 'Word' The *Pūroḍ Mīmāṃsā* establishes the authoritativeness of the



Veda on the fact of the eternal connection of word and meaning and shows that the gods are of the nature of *matras* (Vedic texts) If they were supposed to have bodies, their non eternity would result from such a supposition, and if eternal words were supposed to have non-eternal meanings, the eternal connection of word and meaning would be destroyed and the authoritativeness of the Veda would become questionable But we say that all this would not follow For 'from this,' that is from Vedic words, the world, including the gods, originates Of substances, qualities and actions, it is indeed the individuals, and not the species, that originate, and it is with the species, and not with the individuals, that words are eternally connected But how do we know that the world originates from Vedic words? From *pratyaksha*, direct knowledge, and *anumana* inference The *Śruti* is direct knowledge, for it does not depend on any thing else for its proof, and the *Smṛiti* is inference, for it depends on *Śruti* Both of them declare that the world proceeds from the Word

२६ । अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ।

२६ । 'अत एव च' देवादे जगत् वेदशब्द-प्रभवात् एव च वेदशब्दस्य नित्यत्वम् प्रत्येत्यम् ।

29 *And from this follows eternity* And from this,—from the origination of the world, including the gods, from Vedic words, there follows the eternity of these words

३० । समान नामरूपत्वाद्याहतावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च ।

१ । समान नामरूपत्वात् न पाइती अपि चरितेभ्य द्यनात् स्मृति च इति पञ्चदे । पाइती प्रलयात् पुन सृष्टौ समान नामरूपत्वात् न पूर्वकालोप-नामरूप-माह प्रदयनात् 'अपि चरितेभ्य एव मित्र' । प्रकृति अपि ईवादि जयत आयत्तिक विनाम न मरति । यत प्रदयस्य ईवादि आपेयिक निवन्तात् विदमानास्तस्य न चरित् विरिध-चरित । कृत-पुन नामरूपयो समत्वम् ?—दयनात् स्मृतेश्च कम्पति हि तत् स्मृति-स्मृतिदुः । "तृतीयमसौ धाता यवापूर्वमवस्यत् । त्विष ५ विद्वीयन्ता रीचमवी स्व' ( अक् १ । ११ । १ ) इति स्मृति ।

धर्मपूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृति शान्ति मामिहाम् ।

कल्पये पुत्राणि कल्याणी विद्वजाम्बम् ॥

प्रकृति आमवटम् विद्वजामि पुन पुन ।

भूतधामनिमं कृतवमवम् प्रकृतिवद्यात् ॥ मन् ( १५, ८ )

इति चरित ।

30 And on account of the sameness of name and form in the renovation of the world there is no contradiction as appears from Sruti and Smriti. And as, in the creation of the world after its destruction, the names and forms of the previous cycle remain the same the above doctrine remains uncontradicted. That is, even at the destruction of the world the world, including the gods is not destroyed once for all. Therefore, as the gods and other things, the meanings of the Vedic words, are relatively eternal, the authoritativeness of the Veda is no way prejudiced. But how can we know that names and forms remain the same?—From the *Sruti* and the *Smriti* both of which declare this. A *Sruti* text says, 'The

Creator made the sun, the moon, the sky, the earth, the middle regions and heaven, as they were before" (*Rik* १ 120 3) And a *Smṛiti* text, "O son of Kuntī, at the end of a cycle all things return to my [lower] nature at the beginning of [every] cycle I create them again With the instrumentality of my [lower] nature I create again and again this assemblage of creatures, devoid of freedom, being subject to [their respective] natures [moulded by previous deeds]" (*Bh* 1x 7, 8)

### ३१ । सञ्चादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ।

३१ । छान्दोग्योपनिषदि तृतीयाध्याये उक्ता सधुविद्या देवोपासनात्मिका एव, न नस्या देवादीनाम् अधिकारः सम्भवति । एव सञ्चादिषु विद्यासु देवाधिकारस्य 'असम्भवात्' विद्याभावे एव देवानाम् 'अनधिकार' मन्यते आचार्य 'जैमिनि' ।

32 As the gods can have no title to the 'Madhu' and other vidyās, Jaimini thinks they have no title to any vidyā The 'Madhu Vidyā' given in the third chapter of the *Chhāndogya* Upanishad consists of the worship of the gods, the gods therefore can have no title to it On account of this impossibility of the gods having title to the 'Madhu' and other vidyās (meditations) the teacher, Jaimini, thinks they are unentitled to all vidyās

### ३२ । ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ।

३२ । 'ज्योतिषि' ज्योतिर्भवे पिण्डे आदित्यादीनां देवतावचनानां शब्दानां 'भावात्'

मयीगत् दीवाद्य चन्द्रादिवत् चरितम्, एव । इत्यत्र चरितम् एव तेषां वैदुः इति  
मन्ते जैमिनि ।

32. And because deva is applied to light As the words Aditya and the like meaning the gods are applied to light to shining globes,—the gods and such other objects are only inanimate things like mud. From this also Jaimini thinks they have no title to the study of the Vedas.

३३ । भावस्तु वादरायणोऽस्ति हि ।

३३ । अत्र १५० तु 'भावं वैदुः दीवादीनाम् अपिवाच्यं चरितम् मन्ते ।  
'हि' यत तेषां विषये दृष्टेत्, सामान्यं च 'चरितम्' ।

33 But Bddarāyaṇa admits the existence of this title as there is a power in the gods to assume bodies But Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the gods are entitled to the study of the Vedas, for they have the power of assuming bodies

३४ । शुभाश्व रादनादप्यवणात् तदादेवथात् सृष्यते हि ।

३४ । न शुभश्च अपिवाच्यं विद्यासु विनाध्ययनाभावात् । अथ तच्च द्वाभ्यामी  
परिवदं चतुर्विध्यम् उच्यते । संवर्गविद्यायां शुभस्य ज्ञानसुते अपिवाच्यं ? इति शङ्का  
निरासाय इदं शब्दम् । चतुर्वत् तत्रोक्ते क जानदुति संवर्गं रक्षते उच्यते 'शुभ'शब्द  
न जातिवाचकः । 'हि' यत त ग १५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त् ३५०त्  
तदा ३५०त् तत्र शब्देन सप्त जानदुतिः । अत्रोक्तं सामान्यं विद्यावाचित् शुभशब्देन  
सप्त जानदुतिः 'यच्च' शब्दो जीवा ३५०त् वा सृष्यते ।

34 The term 'Súdra' expresses his sorrow, as he had heard a speech disrespectful to himself and had gone with that grief. This aphorism is meant to meet the following objection —A Sudra is not entitled to the *vidyás*, as he cannot study the Vedas. How is it then that the title of Jánasruti, a Súdra, to the Sambarga Vidyá given in the fourth chapter of the *Ch'hândogya* Upanishad is recognised? Now, the fact is that the term 'Sudra' used by Raikva in the dialogue between him and Jánasruti given in the passage in question does not mean caste. For, as he had heard himself disrespectfully spoken of by a flamingo and had gone to Raikva with sorrow caused thereby, the term 'Súdra' uttered by Raikva expresses Jánasruti's sorrow or his going with sorrow.

३५ । चतुर्विधगतेऽन्तरत्वे चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ।

३५ । 'उत्तरव' सवर्गवाक्यशेषे ( ४।३।५ ) 'चैत्ररथेन' एतन्नाम्ना चतुर्विधं जनमि व्याख्यातुं 'लिङ्गात्' जानयते 'चतुर्विधगते' चतुर्विधं सिद्धे 'च' न रेकोच्चारितं श्रुद्रशब्दं जगतिवाचकम् ।

35 And because the Kshatriyahood of Jánasruti is established by a mark, -his being mentioned later on with Chitraratha. For this reason also the term 'Súdra' uttered by Raikva does not mean caste, that the Kshatriyahood of Jánasruti is established by a mark, namely his being mentioned along (in the same section) with a Kshatriya named Chitraratha later on, that is at the end of the passage containing the Sambarga Vidyá (iv 3 5)

३६ । संस्कारपरामर्शात् तदभावानिष्ठापाय ।

३६ । इत्यत्र न यस्मै विद्याविष्कारः यत् विद्यादर्थिभ्यः (वा ०।१।१ द् १।१) उपनयनादयः संस्काराः परागम्यन्ते, तदत्र न संस्काराभावात् 'संस्कारादयः प्रवर्तन्ते' (कौ १।४।१।११६)

36 And on account of the mention of purificatory ceremonies (in the case of the higher castes) and of their absence in the case of Sūdras And for this reason also are the Sūdras unentitled to the vidyās that in several passages dealing with them (for instance *Chh vii 1 1 Pr 1 1*) purificatory ceremonies like the *upanayana* are mentioned, while in the case of the Sūdras the absence of such ceremonies is often spoken of (for instance in *Manu x 4* and *x 126*)

३७ । तदभावनिर्द्धारणे च प्रवृत्ते ।

३७ । इत्यत्र न यस्मै विद्याविष्कारः यत् दाम्पत्योपनिषत् चतुर्थोऽध्याये न काम्योपनिषत्-संवादे उपनिषत्तत्त्वात् तदभावनिर्द्धारितं प्रोक्तम्; तम् उपनिषत्तत्त्वात् च प्रवर्तते ।

37 And because Gautama proceeded to initiate Jāddā on the ascertainment of his not being a Sūdra And for this reason also are the Sūdras unentitled to the vidyās that in the fourth chapter of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* in the dialogue between Gautama and Satya kama, the former proceeded to initiate the latter only when it had been ascertained that he was not a Sūdra.

भूताकाश । 'अर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात्' यतः श्रुतिः, "ते यदन्तरा तद् ब्रह्म" इति नामरूपाभ्याम् 'अर्थान्तरत्वादिना' भिन्नार्थत्वादिना लिङ्गेन ब्रह्म व्यपदिशति । न च ब्रह्मेण अन्यत् नामरूपाभ्याम् अर्थान्तरं सम्भवति, सर्वस्य विकारजातस्य नामरूपाभ्याम् एव व्याप्तावत्वात् । नामरूपयोः अपि निर्वहणं निरङ्कुशं न ब्रह्मेण अन्यत्र सम्भवति । "सर्वं देवतैश्चत हन्ताहमिमांसी देवता अनेन जीवनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि" (छा० ६।३।२) इति ब्रह्मकर्तृत्वश्रवणात् । 'तद् ब्रह्म तदद्वयं स आत्मा' इति च ब्रह्मवादस्य लिङ्गानि ।

41 The 'Akasa' is Brahman, as he is spoken of as something different &c It is said in the Chhandogya Upanishad, "Verily Akāśa' is the revealer of names and forms, that within which these are contained is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (viii 14 1) The Akāśa (ether) mentioned here is the Supreme Self, and not elemental ether, for in the words "within which these are contained" scripture indicates Brahman by such marks as differentiation from names and forms There cannot be anything else than Brahman that is different from names and forms, for all phenomena are evolved from names and forms Besides, nothing else than Brahman can reveal names and forms, for the Sruti speaks of the creative agency of Brahman in the words, "This Deity willed, 'Well, let me enter these three deities with this living self and reveal names and forms'" (Ch. vi 3 2) The words, "That is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self" are also indications that Brahman is meant here

४२ । सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्मदेन ।

४२ । ४५दारप्यकीपनिपद, चतुर्थ्याध्याये "कतम आत्मेति योज्यं विज्ञानमय

शब्देषु वचनमिति पुरुषः ( ३।१।० ) इति उपपन्नं भूतान् चान्यविधेयं प्रपञ्चं इति ।  
 वहीश्व. आत्मा परब्रह्म एव न संगरी, यतः सुषुप्ती 'उत्तुहानी च चक्षुः' इति  
 परमात्मनः शरीरान् भिन्नं व्यपदिशति ।

42. *The Self is Brahman because he is spoken of as different in dreamless sleep and departure* In the fourth chapter of the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad* the *Śruti* begins with 'Who is that self? He who is within the heart, among the *prāṇas* the person of light consisting of knowledge" (iv 3 7) and gives a lengthy exposition of the nature of the self. The self mentioned here is the supreme and not the transmigrating self for scripture speaks of the Supreme Self as different from the embodied self in the states of dreamless sleep and departure from the body

४३ । पत्यादिमय्देभ्यः ।

४३ । इतः चर्मसारि-भक्ष्यप्रतिपादनपरम् एतत् वाक्यम् चरणात्मकम् यतः  
 चर्मिन् वाक्ये 'पत्यादि' इत्येकः—“स सर्वज्ञ इत्येव सर्वभक्षाला सर्वभक्षिपति”  
 ( ३।३।११ ) एवञ्चातीत्येकः—चर्मसारि शब्द-प्रतिपादनपरः भवति ।

43 *And on account of such words as Lord &c* That this passage treats of the nature of the non transmigrating Self is also known from the fact that such words as Lord &c., in the passage "He is the Lord of all the King of all the Protector of all &c. (iv 4 22) set forth the nature of the non transmigrating Self



## समन्वय-नाम-प्रथमाध्याये

चतुर्थः पादः—अव्यक्तादि-सन्दिग्ध-पदानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयः

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१ । आनुमानिकमप्येकोषामिति चेन्न शरीर-रूपका-विन्यस्त-  
गृहीतेर्द्दर्शयति च ।

१ । कठीपनिषदि पठ्यते,—

इन्द्रियेभ्य परा अर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च पर मन ।

मनसश्च परा बुद्धिं पुंसेरात्मा महान् पर ॥

महत् परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात् पुरुष पर ।

पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति ॥ ( १।३।१०, ११ )

अव्यक्ताव्यक्तास्य अप्रधानत्वं दर्शयति सूत्रकार । ‘एकोषाम्’ आखिना कठशाखिनाम्  
“अव्यक्ताम्” आनुमानिका साध्यभृत्युक्ता प्रधानम् ‘अपि’ उपलभ्यते, तत् एव जगत  
कारणम् ‘इति चेत् न’ । ‘शरीर-रूपका-विन्यस्त-गृहीते’ यत शरीरम् एव अत्र  
रथ-रूपका-विन्यस्तम् “अव्यक्त”शब्देन परिगृह्यते, न साध्यकल्पित प्रधानम् । प्रकारान्तरे  
“आत्मान रथिन विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु” ( १।३।३ ) इत्यादौ श्रुति शरीररूपका  
‘दर्शयति च’ ।

1 If it be said that the “avyakta” of one school is the  
inferred ‘Pradhāna’, then we say “no”, for the term  
refers to the body likened to a chariot, and scripture  
shows thus We read in the Katha Upanishad —“The

objects are superior to the senses, the sensorium is superior to the objects, the understanding superior to the sensorium and the great self (the cosmic self Hiranyagarbha) superior to the understanding. The undeveloped is superior to the great self and the Supreme Person superior to the undeveloped. There is nothing superior to the Person he is the end the highest goal. (1 3 10 11) The author of the aphorisms shows that the *avyakta* or undeveloped is not the *Pradhāna*. If it be said that the *avyakta* of one school—the *Kathas*—seems to be the inferred that is the *Pradhāna* spoken of in the *Sāṅkhya Smṛiti* and that is the cause of the world, then we say no for it is the body likened to a chariot and not the *Pradhāna* fancied by the *Sāṅkhya*, that is meant by the term *avyakta*. And scripture shows the likeness of the body to a chariot by saying "know the self to be the charoteer and the body to be the chariot" &c. in another passage (1 3 3)

२ । सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्थत्वात् ।

१ । "अव्यक्तं" तु सूक्ष्मं शरीरम् इति । तत् एव अव्यक्तं प्रकृतम् 'अव्यक्तं' न तु सूक्ष्मं शरीरम् ।

2. But the subtle body, is meant for the name suits it. But the *avyakta* is the subtle body for the name *avyakta* suits that alone and not the gross body

३ । तदधीनत्वादर्थधत् ।

१ । शरीरस्य अव्यक्तीत्यव्यक्तत्वात् तदधीनत्वात् सूक्ष्मशरीराधीनत्वात् तस्य सूक्ष्म-

शरीरस्य जीवात् परत्वम्, “महत् परमव्यक्तम्” इति । ‘अर्थवत्’ यथा तस्मिन् एव वाक्ये इन्द्रियव्यापारस्य अर्थाधीनत्वात् अर्थानाम् इन्द्रियेभ्यः परत्वम् ।

3 *The subtle body is superior to the individual self because of dependence on it, as objects* The subtle body is superior to the individual self, because the bondage and liberation of the latter is dependent on the former, “The undeveloped is superior to the great self” ‘As objects,’ that is as, in the same passage, objects are said to be superior to the senses because the functions of the latter are dependent on objects

## ४ । ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

४ । न इह “अव्यक्ता” ज्ञेयत्वेन उच्यते । तस्मात् अपि न “अव्यक्ता” शब्देन प्रधानम् अभिधीयते ।

4 *The ‘avyakta’ is not the Pradhāna also because it is not spoken of as something to be known* The ‘avyakta’ is not spoken of here as something to be known For this reason also the Pradhāna is not meant by the ‘avyakta’

## ५ । वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ।

५ ।

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं

तथाऽरसस्निग्धमगन्धवच्च यत् ।

अनाद्यनन्तमहत् परं ध्रुव

निचात्य तन्मृत्युमुखात् प्रमुच्यते ॥ (१।१।१५)

इदं कठमुक्तिं सांप्रसीक प्रमाणं 'वदति इति चेत् न । 'किं दत्तं 'मात्रं' परमात्म-  
एव इदं कथितं 'प्रकृत्यात्' यत्तु इदं प्रमाणं बाह्य एव ।

5 *If you say the text speaks of Pradhāna we say no for the Intelligent Self is here spoken of because of the section. If you say that the katha text 'That which is without speech without touch without form without decay without taste without smell eternal without beginning and end greater than the great and unchangeable — knowing that the worshipper is delivered from the mouth of Death' (1 3 15) speaks of the Pradhāna taught by the Sāṅkhya, then we say no for the Intelligent Supreme Self is really spoken of here, because this section relates to the Intelligent Self*

६ । अथाप्यमिव धैवमुपन्यास प्रत्यक्ष ।

६ । इत्यत्र प्रमाणम् "अथवा गुणवत्त्वं इत्यत्र वा, यस्यात् अथाप्यम् एव  
पदावागाम्—अपि जीव परमात्मानाम्—अस्मिन् प्रकरणे 'एवम्' इत्यत्रानुमानार्थान्  
वक्तव्यतया उपन्यासं उपदिष्टं दृष्टमिति तद्विषय एव 'अप्रकृतं' न 'दत्तं' 'प्रमाणं' इत्य-  
उपन्यास इति चेत्ति ।

6 *And there is thus a mention of and a question about only three things. For this reason also is the Pradhāna not meant by the term *avyakta* nor an object to be known that in this section only three things,—fire, the individual self and the Supreme Self—are mentioned thus that is as things to be spoken of by way of granting a boon and the question relates to these three things only. There is neither a mention of nor a question about any other thing*

## ७। महत्त्वम् ।

७। इत्यत्र न “अव्यक्तम्” प्रधानम्,—यथा “महत्”शब्द सांख्ये, सत्त्वानां अपि प्रधानं प्रयुक्तं, न तम् एव वैदिके अपि प्रयोगे अभिधत्ते, तथा “अव्यक्त” शब्द अपि न वैदिके प्रयोगे प्रधानम् अभिधातुम् अर्हति ।

7 And the case is like that of mahat And for this reason also is *avyakta* the Pradhāna,—As the Sāṅkhyas apply the term “mahat” to the mere substance first generated, and not in the Vedic sense, so the term *avyakta*, as used in the Veda, cannot denote the Pradhāna

## ८। चमसवदविशेषात् ।

८। श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि कथ्यते,

अजामेका लोहितशुक्लश्या

वह्नी मजा सृजनाया नरुपा ।

अजो ह्येको जूपमाणीऽनुशेते

जह्वात्येना सक्तमोगामजोऽन्य ॥ ( ४।५ )

अत्रोक्ता “अजा” सांख्योक्त प्रधानम् इति न शक्यते नियन्तुम् । ‘अविशेषात्’ विशेषावधारण-कारणमावात् । ‘चमसवत्’ यथा हि “अर्वाग्विलम्बमस ऊर्ध्ववृद्ध” ( ६० २।२।३ ) इति अस्मिन् भन्वे स्वातन्त्र्येण अयं नाम ‘सौ चमस अभिप्रेतः’, इति न शक्यते नियन्तु, यतः सर्वत्र अपि यथाकथञ्चित् अर्वाग्विलम्बादि-कल्पना उपपद्यते ।

8 ‘Ajā’ does not mean the Pradhāna on account of the absence of any special characteristic, as in the case of the spoon “It is said in the Svetāsvatara Upanishad — “The one she-goat or unborn (Nature or elementary subs-

tance) red white and black, bearing many creatures and uniform—some unborn (self) lies near her and enjoys her while some other unborn (self) abandons her after she has been enjoyed (iv 5) It cannot be said that the “unborn spoken of here is the Brahman taught by the Sāṅkhya. For there is no reason to take the word in that special sense. As in the case of the spoon that is as it cannot be said that in the text There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above (Br II 2. 3) a particular spoon is distinctly meant for in every case the idea of having the mouth below &c. applies more or less so in this case.

८ । ज्योतिरप्यक्षमा तु तथा ज्ञधीयत एके ।

८ । ज्योतिरप्यक्षमा तु ज्योतिःप्रभुता तैजोऽवयवतया चतुर्विधमृतपामस्य मज्जतिमृता तु इवम् यत्रा प्रतिपत्तव्या । कस्यात् ?—‘तथा हि एके ज्योतिर— इत्यो यत्—‘यथोपनिषद्’ यथा सति ब्रह्माध्यायस्य चतुर्थस्य ३ प्रथमवाक्यस्योक्तम् ।

9 But the elements beginning with light are meant by *ajd*, for some teach this. But this *ajd* is to be understood as the substance of the four kinds of elements beginning with light and consisting of *teja ap* and *anna*. Why ?—For some, that is the Chhândogya, teach this in the first four verses of the fourth section of the sixth chapter of their Upanishad

१० । कस्यमोपदेशाच्च भेषादिवदविरोध ।

१ । तथा कस्यमोपदेशात् यतः मृतप्रकृते यजालं कस्यन्या एव उपदिशन्ति



enumerated the *Pradhāna* &c are not to be taken as mentioned in the scriptures for the *Sāṅkhya* categories are diverse and there is excess. Though certain categories are enumerated in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* text. In whom the five five people and ether rest him alone I believe to be the Self. I who know and am immortal believe him to be Brahman the immortal (iv 4 17) it must not be apprehended that the *Pradhāna* &c. are taught in the *Sruti*. Why not?—For the twenty five *Sāṅkhya* categories are diverse and every five of them have no common characteristics by reason of which they may be included by five and five in the total twenty five. So by five five people the twenty five categories are not meant. And also because there is excess, the twenty five categories cannot be meant. The addition of ether and the self makes the Vedic categories more than twentyfive.\*

## १२। प्राणादयो वायवेऽपि ।

११। प्राणा यः प्राणः पचुः शीतम् पच मन एव पचन्न। विनश्यत् । वासवेऽपि यत् प्राणस्य प्राणमुत पचपचयत् शीतस्य शीतं मनसो य मनः विदुः (शाशा१८) इति वास्तव्येति ते एव उक्ताः । जगदन्तर्भात् प्राणादयः जगदन्तर्भावा भवन्ति ।

12. The five five people are breath &c., as appears

\* As to the five principal Indian tribes of Vedic times, see the Editor's *Krishna and the Puranas*. But the author of the aphorisms gives a psychological interpretation of the phrase 'पच पचन्न।' ।



from the end of the passages. Life &c., that is life, the eye, the ear, food and the sensorium are meant by "the five five people" for these are the things that are mentioned at the end of the passage, thus, they who know the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, and the *manas* (mind or sensorium)" (iv 4 18) On account of their being related to people, the word "people" is applied to life &c.

### १३ । ज्योतिर्पैक्षेधामसत्यन्ने ।

१३ । 'पैक्षेध' शक्तिना—कल्पानाम्—'अन्नं असति' अन्नशब्दे अविद्यमाने अपि पूर्वमन्वोक्तेन ( ४।४।१६ ) 'ज्योतिषा' ज्योतिशब्देन तेषां पञ्चसंख्या पूर्व्यते इति वाक्यशेषः ।

13 In the case of some, the number is made up by 'light' in the absence of 'food' In the case of one school, the Kānvas, though 'food' is absent, the number is made up by 'light' mentioned in the preceding verse (iv 4 16)

### १४ । कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ।

१४ । वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगत्कारणविषय भूतवैचित्र्यम् अस्ति इति न आशङ्कनीयम्, यत प्रतिवेदान्तं सत्यमानेषु 'आकाशादिषु' क्रमादिद्वारके भूतवैचित्र्ये सति अपि, एकास्मिन् वेदान्ते यथाभूतं सर्वज्ञ सर्वेश्वर सर्वोत्पन्नक अद्वितीय 'कारणत्वेन' कारणरूपेण व्यपदिष्ट, तथाभूत एव वेदान्तान्तरेषु अपि व्यपदिश्यते ।

14 Notwithstanding diversity of views as to things created, like ether &c, there is no diversity as to the Creator, as he is mentioned in one passage as well as in

others It must not be apprehended that there is any diversity of views in the Vedānta passages as regards the cause of the world, for notwithstanding diversity of views in the different Vedāntas as to the order in which things like ether &c., were created the same omniscient, all pervading and undivided Lord of all who is assigned as the Cause in the one Vedānta, is mentioned as the Cause in the others also

## १३। समावाप्तीत् ।

१३। “असत्ता इदमव भाषीत् ( त १।२।१ ) इति न च असत् निराकारं वा। अथ न ?—समावाप्तीत् यत् ।

“असत्तेव स भवति । असत् ब्रह्मेति चेद् अस्मि ।

अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद् अस्ति । अतमेव ततो विदुरिति ॥ (१।३।३)

इति असत्तादपवादित्वं अस्तित्वस्य च ब्रह्म अमलमादिस्वात्-परम्परया प्रत्यवात्मानं निर्वाच्यं श्रीऽकारमवत इति तमेव प्रकृतं समावाप्ति ।

15 No absolute non-existence is meant for there is a re statement—By such texts as Non being indeed was this in the beginning (Taitt ii 7 1) scripture does not declare a selfless non being as the cause. Why not ? For there is a re-statement that is, in the passage, If any one thinks Brahman to be non existent, he himself becomes non-existent,” (ii. 6 3) scripture condemns the tenet of non-existence and having ascertained the existent Brahman as the inner self in the form of the successive sheaths beginning with the nutrimental, re asserts the same with the words He willed” &c.

## १६ । जगदाचिन्मात् ।

१० । चापोतकि-नातमीयनिर्दिष्टं द्रुतं "यो ये पश्यन् एतदां पुराणां यथा,  
यस्य वै तत् क्वा म वै दिशितम् इति ।" ( ११२ ) अतः तत्तत् पुराणेन्द्र एव, न  
जीव न सागर प्राण च । कदाचिन्—सर्वज्ञ—"पश्यन्"मन्त्र—'जगदाचिन्मात्' ।  
अत्रच सप्रतिष्ठ भवन् "एतन्"मन्त्र—निदिश्यते, दिशितम् स क्वामे- च वक्ष्यते ।

16 The "Inowable" is the Supreme Lord for the term "person" means the world In the Kaushitaki Brahman Upanishad it is said,—"O Baliki, he who is the creator of these persons, he of whom these are creations, verily he is to be known" (iv 19) He who is described in this passage as "to be known" is the Supreme Lord, and not the individual self or the chief vital air, for the "persons" in the passage means the world The world directly proximate is indicated by the word "these" and spoken of as the work of him who is to be known

## १७ । जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गं नेति चेत् तद्व्याख्यातम् ।

१० । आपशिखण्डनम् । 'जीव-मुख्यप्राण-लिङ्गात्' पूर्वोक्तवाक्येणैव जीवलिङ्गं  
मुख्यप्राणलिङ्गं च भवति, अथ अत्र परमेश्वरप्राण न युक्तम्, 'इति चेत्', 'तत्' पूर्वम्  
एव, प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमे पादे एकविंश-सूत्रे 'व्याख्यातम्' ।

17 If this statement be questioned because of the marks of the individual self and the chief vital air, then we say that we have already explained this. An objection is met here If it be said that because at the end of the above passage there are the marks showing

that the individual self and the chief vital air are meant therefore it is not reasonable to understand the Supreme Lord by the above word then we say that we have already explained this before in the 31st aphorism of pāda 1 Chap. 1.

१८ । अभ्यार्यन्तु जैमिनि प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि धर्मिके ।

१८ । अपि च न एव एव निरास्तित्वं जीवमभान वा इदं वाक्ये स्यात् ब्रह्मभान वा इति एतः शब्दः वाक्ये 'अस्यापि ब्रह्मभानपदार्थे जीवपरामर्शे' जैमिनि मन्वते ।  
 व्याख्यानम्—'प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यां' वाक्येति प्रश्नं तत्पदविषयम् च दृष्ट्वा । प्रश्नवाक्यं तुर्लभ्यितपुनर्वचिरे,—'अथ एतद् वाक्यात् पुनर्वचमपि जैतन्मूलं कुत एतन्मात्रं इति (जीवी ३।१८) । प्रतिषेधनम् तथा व्याख्यानम् अपि,—'एतां सुप्तं सञ्च न च एतन् पञ्चमपदार्थिन् प्राच एवमवा भवति । स यथा प्रतिबुध्यते यथापेक्षयात् सार्था दिव्यो विष्णुस्त्रिधा विप्रविष्ट एवेमिवैतच्चात्मन प्राचा यथापतन विप्रतिष्ठते । प्रक्षिप्यै दिवा दिव्यो जीवाः । सुवृत्तिनामि परैव ब्रह्मणा श्रीवः एवतां सञ्चति, परञ्चत् च ब्रह्मणः प्राचादिकं जगत् आपते इति उपनिषत्सुर्लभं । चर्मिके अपि च, एकं मायिन्—यजुर्मन्त्रिन्—इन्द्रादिकञ्जीवनिवदि (१।१।१६) एवम् एव चक्षयन्ति ।

18. Jaimini thinks the passage has another import from the question and the explanation and so thinks one school. And it is not to be disputed whether this passage deals with the individual self or with Brahman for Jaimini thinks that it has another import—that it deals with the individual self in order to establish Brahman. How?—It appears from the question and the answer in the passage. The question, which is about a person roused from sleep

is this, “Wherein, O Bālāki, did this person sleep? Where was this person? Where did this person come from?” (*Kau* iv. 19) The answer and the explanation follow,— “When the individual sleeps and does not dream, then he becomes one with this life. When he awakes, then, as sparks from a burning fire fly around, so from this Self fly around the senses towards their respective seats, from the senses the cosmic powers, from the cosmic powers the worlds.” The Upanishad concludes that in deep sleep the individual self attains unity with the Supreme Brahman and from the Supreme Brahman goes out the world beginning with the vital air. And one school, the Vājasaneyins, also says the same thing in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad (ii 1 16)

## ૧૯ । વાક્યાન્વયાત્ ।

૧૯ । વૃહદારણ્યકે મૈત્રેયીબ્રાહ્મણે ( ૨૧૪, ૪૫૫ ) શ્રૂયતે, “માત્મા વા અરે દ્રષ્ટવ્ય શ્રીતત્ત્વો મન્ત્રત્ત્વો નિદિઘ્યાસિતત્ત્વો મૈત્રેયાત્મનો વા અરે દર્શનેન શ્રવણેન મત્ત્વા વિજ્ઞાનેનેદં સર્વં વિદિતમ્” ( ૪૫૫ા૬ ) । અતઃ દ્રષ્ટવ્યત્વાદિરુપેણ પરમાત્મા એવં ઉપદિશ્યતે । વાક્ષાત્ ?—‘વાક્યાન્વયાત્’ તસ્મિન્ એવં શ્રુત્ય વાક્યસ્ય અન્વયાત્, યતઃ હૃદ વાક્ય પૌર્વાપયર્થેણ આવેદ્યમાણ પરમાત્માનં પ્રતિ અન્વિતાવયવં લક્ષ્યતે ।

19 The self to be seen &c is the Supreme Self because of the reference of the passage In the *Maitreyi Brahmana*’ of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad (ii 4 , iv 5) we read “Verily the Self is to be seen, heard, understood and deeply meditated upon, O Maitreyi. When the Self has been seen, heard, understood and known, then all this is

known" (li 5 G.) Here it is the Supreme Self that is taught as the object to be seen &c. Why ? Because of the reference of the passage —when considered from beginning to end, it is seen in all its parts to refer to the Supreme Self

२० । प्रतिष्ठासिद्धे लिङ्मात्रमवश्यम् ।

१ । अति च प्रतिष्ठा — "वाञ्छां विहाते गतम् इदं विदितं भवति, "इदं सर्वं यत्प्रमाणा इति च । तत्र प्रति-पादितं लक्षणं एतत् लिङ्गं यत् निर्दिष्टं दृष्टव्यं विद्याभजनं दृष्टव्यं नदीनम् । इति लिङ्गोऽयम् एव विद्यायां परमात्मनो अभिधानं उपलक्षणम् — इति आशयः वाच्यः मन्त्रः ।

20 *Asmarathya thinks that the representation of the self as something to be seen &c is the sign of the fulfilment of the promise* There is a promise in this passage,— 'The self being known all this is known and also, All this is that self' Now this mark—the statement that the self denoted by the word dear is to be seen &c., indicates the fulfilment of the promise It is for the fulfilment of the promise that the individual and the Supreme Self are taught in the beginning as identical so thinks the teacher Asmarathya.

२१ । उत्कृष्टमित्यत एव भावादित्योक्तोऽस्मि ।

११ । 'उत्कृष्टमित्यतः' इति संवादात् उक्तव्यं जीवात्मनः 'एवभावात्' नृत्तलक्षणात् इदम् अभिधानं उत्कृष्टमिति चोक्तोऽस्मि वाच्यः मन्त्रः ।

21 *Audulomi thinks that this teaching is due to that*

*state (identity with Brahman) of the self* The teacher Audulomi, thinks that on account of that state,—that is identity with Brahman, of the individual self, when risen or liberated from its contact with the body and other adjuncts, it is taught in the beginning as so identical

## २२ । अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ।

२२ । परमात्मन जीवात्माभावेन 'अवस्थिते' अवस्थानात् इदम् अस्मिन्नेन उपनिषत्सु,  
इति काशकृत्स्न आचार्य मन्यते ।

22 *Kāśakṛtsna thinks it is due to its existence in that form* The teacher Kāśakṛtsna thinks that because the Supreme Self exists in the form of the individual, therefore scripture teaches this in the beginning.

## २३ । प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ।

२३ । ब्रह्म जगत 'प्रकृति' उपादानकारण 'च' निमित्तकारण च, न केवल निमित्तकारणम् एव । एव हि 'प्रतिज्ञा-दृष्टान्तौ' 'न उपपद्येते' न वाच्येते । प्रतिज्ञा तावत् एकाविज्ञाने सर्वविज्ञानम् "उत तमादेशमप्राचो येनास्तुत स्तुतं भवत्यनत नतन-विज्ञात विज्ञातमिति" ( छा० ६।२, ३ ) । उपादानकारण-विज्ञाने एव सर्व-विज्ञान सम्भवति, यत कार्यम् उपादानकारणात् अव्यतिरिक्तम् । दृष्टान्त अपि ब्रह्मोद्-सुवर्णादिः—“यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मन्मथं विज्ञात स्यादाचारम्भण विकारी नामधेयं मृत्पिकेत्येव सत्यम्” ( छा० ६।३ ) ।

23 *Brahman is also the material cause, as this doctrine is consistent with the promise and the example*

Brahman is both the material and the occasional cause of the world, and not merely its occasional cause. For thus only are the scriptural promise and example found to be self-consistent. The promise — knowing all by knowing one, — is as follows — Have you asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard, that which is not known becomes known ? (*Chh.* vi 2 3) It is only by knowing the material cause that all is known for the effect is one with the material cause. The example, such as clay iron gold is as follows — My dear as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known the modification being merely a name created by speech while the truth is that it is merely clay " &c. (*Chh.* vi 3)

२४ । अभिधोपदेयाच्च ।

२४ । अभिधा' घटिर्लवण — "बहु सां प्रजापि ( ऋ ६।१।१ ) इति ।  
यसां उपदेयात् च ब्रह्मणं यत्पूर्वं प्रकृतिर्लवणं उपपद्यते ।

24 *This is also proved by the statement of purpose*  
Purpose means the creative purpose — "May I be many may I multiply ! (*Chh.* vi 2. 3) From the scriptural teaching of this purpose also follows the truth that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world

२५ । साक्षाद्योभयान्नामात् ।

२५ । इत्यत्र प्रकृति' ब्रह्म यत्कारणं साक्षात् ब्रह्म एव कारणम् उपपत्त्य  
'उमी प्रमद-प्रकृती आपादिते ब्रह्मेति सुती । तदाहि,— सन्नादि इ वा इमानि



भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते आकाश प्रत्यक्षं यन्ति” ( छा० १।१।१ ) । यत् हि यस्मात् प्रभवति यस्मिन् च प्रलीयते तत् तस्य उपादानं प्रसिद्धम् ।

25 *Also by the teaching that Brahman is the direct cause of both creation and dissolution* For this reason also is Brahman the material cause that Scripture teaches that Brahman is directly the material cause of both creation and dissolution Thus, “All these beings take their rise from *Akāśa* (meaning Brahman) and return into *Akāśa*” (*Chh* I 9. 1) Now, it is well-known that the material cause of a thing is that from which it rises and into which it returns

२६ । आत्मकृतेः परिणामात् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र प्रकृतिं ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मप्रक्रियायां “तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत” ( तै० २।७ ) इति आत्मनः कर्मत्वं कर्तृत्वं च दर्शयति । कथं पुनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य सत् क्रियमाणत्वं शक्यं सम्पादयितुम् ?—‘परिणामात्’ पूर्वसिद्धः अपि हि सन् आत्मा विशेषेण विकारात्मना परिणमयामास आत्मानम् इति । ‘परिणामात्’ इति चेत् पृथक् सूत्रम्, तस्य एषः अर्थः, इत्यत्र प्रकृतिं ब्रह्म यत्कारणं ब्रह्मण एव विकारात्मना अयं परिणाम आत्मायते,—“सर्वं त्यक्ताभवत्, निरुक्ताच्चानिरुक्ताच्च” ( तै० २।६ ) इत्यादिना ।

26 *This is proved by the self making itself by modification* For this reason also is Brahman the material Cause, that in speaking of Brahman in the words, “It made itself” (*Taitt* II 7) scripture represents Brahman as both the subject and object of action. But how could

something already existing make itself?—By modification  
The self though already existing changed itself into a  
certain effect If “by modification” were taken as a distinct  
aphorism the meaning would be this—For this reason also  
is Brahman the material cause that scripture thus speaks  
of Brahman himself as having modified himself into the  
form of an effect—“He became *sat* (what has form) and  
*tyat* (what is formless) the defined and the undefined.  
(*Taitt* ii 6)

## २०। योनिय इि गीयते ।

१०। एतच्च सूत्रं त्रिंशद् ५५। च इन्द्र योनि इति अपि पठ्यते ईशानसु—  
“ब्रह्मो योनिं पुनश्च इन्द्रयोनिम् (मु ३।१।१) इति “यस्मिन् योनिं यो यस्मिन्  
योगः” (मु १।१।६) इति च। “योनिं प्रकृत्य प्रकृतिवचनं प्रकृतियुक्तः भवेति।

27 And because Brahman is spoken of as the source  
For this reason also is Brahman the material cause that in  
the Vedantas he is spoken of as the source Thus, ‘The  
Creator the Lord the source of (the lower) Brahman  
(*Mun* iii 1 3) and “That source of things which the wise  
see (*Mun* i. 1 6) Now it is well known that “source  
means a material cause

## २८। एतेन सर्वं व्याख्याता व्याख्याता ।

१८। ‘एतेन प्रमाणवा प्रतिषिद्धवाक्यवाक्यायेन ‘सर्वं’ अत्रादि वाच्यवादो अपि

प्रतिपिद्धतया 'व्याख्याता.' । ते अपि प्रधानवादवत् श्रुतिविरुद्धा. श्रोतव्या. । 'व्याख्याता व्याख्याता.' इति पदाम्बास, स्यात्समाप्तिं द्योतयति ।

28 *Hereby all are explained, are explained* Here by, by this series of arguments refuting the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Pradhāna, all, that is such theories also as that atoms are the cause of the world, are explained by way of refutation. It should be known that they too are opposed to the scriptures. The repetition of the phrase "are explained" indicates the end of the chapter.

## अविरोध नाम द्वितीयाध्याये

प्रथम पाद—भाष्यादि स्मृतिभयुक्ततर्कैः

ब्रह्मकारणवादस्य विरोधपरिहार



१। अत्यूतनयकागदीयरसद्वा इति चेवान्यअत्यूतनयकागदीय-  
प्रसङ्गात् ।

१। ब्रह्मकारणवादस्य स्मृतिविरुद्धत्वं तदवयव परिहरति । पूर्वपक्षः—ब्रह्म  
कारणत्वेन तदर्थं 'अत्यूतनयकागदीयस्य' भवत् कारणात्तत्त्वान्तिनी इतिमविरोधोक्त  
तदर्थं कृति 'अत्यूत' च तदनुसारित्वा अतएव 'तदवयव' इति 'अत्यूत' प्रमेये न ।  
इति धीत् न । यदि अत्यूतनयकागदीयस्य ब्रह्मकारणत्वं अविरोधेन एवम् अपि  
यथा ब्रह्मकारणत्वं अत्यूतनयकागदीयस्य भवत्यत्यूत ।

1 If it be said that in that case the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti would be untenable we say no for in the other case the other smṛitis would be untenable An objection based on the doctrine of Brahman as the cause being opposed to the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti is raised and answered The *Pūrṇapakṣha* (objector) says —If it be said that in case the doctrine of Brahman as cause be accepted the objection of the untenableness of the smṛiti would arise that is the Sāṅkhya Smṛiti which teaches a cause other than Brahman and other smṛitis agreeing with it would be untenable, we say No If the doctrine of Brahman as cause were to be reject

ed on the ground that in that cause some *smṛiti* or *smṛitis* would be untenable, the objection would arise that on its rejection other *smṛitis*, those which teach the causality of Brahman, would be untenable '

## २ । इतरेषाञ्चागुपलब्धेः ।

२ । इत्यत्र भृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गं न दोषः, यत् प्रधानात् इतराणि यानि प्रधान-परिणामत्वेन साख्यस्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके च उपलभ्यन्ते ।

2 And on account of the non-recognition of the others On this ground also is the objection of the untenable-ness of *smṛiti* invalid, that the *mahat* and others imagined as other than and effects of Pradhāna in the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti* are recognised neither in the Vedas not in the world

## ३ । एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ।

३ । 'एतेन' साख्यस्मृतिप्रत्याख्यानं 'योग' योगस्मृति अपि 'प्रत्युक्तः' प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्या । तथापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रम् एव कारणं महदादीनि च कार्यानि अलोकावेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्पन्ते ।

3 By this Yoga is answered It should be seen that by thus rejecting the Sāṅkhya *Smṛiti* the Yoga *Smṛiti* also is rejected And yet the Sāṅkhyas imagine, in opposition to the *Sṛuti*, an independent cause called Pradhāna and Mahat and others as its effects, things which are unknown both to the Vedas and to people in general.

४ । न विमलघटत्वादेभ्य तथात्यं च गजान् ।

४ । इन्द्रादिकं तत्र नमिन् ३ । ५२ — 'एतं दर्शितं ५३ २ जगत्  
विमलघटत्वात् तद्वत्तत्त्वात् मिथ्यात्वं न न इन्द्रादिकं नान्यत् । तदानीं च  
इन्द्रादिकं विमलं न च तद्वत्त्वं सुखं दर्शयामहे । "५३ तथा ५४ । ५५  
( तत्ति ११६ ) इति तत्त्वज्ञानसिद्धिः ५६ । तत्ति ११७ । तद्वत्त्वं इन्द्रात् विमलं  
वत्तत्त्वं जगत्त्वं नान्यत् ।

तत्र विमलं च दर्शितं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्तत्त्वं तत्ति ५५ । तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं  
"तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ ।  
इति च परमादा भूतत्त्वं विमलं तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ ।  
तद्वत्त्वं विमलं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं तद्वत्त्वं  
तद्वत्त्वं ( तत्ति ११७ ) इति च परमादा इति । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ । तत्ति ५५ ।

4 *The doctrine is not true on account of its (the world's) distinct nature which is taught in the Vedas*  
The doctrine of Brahman as cause is again objected to on grounds of reason —On account of its distinction —the distinction of an unconscious and impure world—from a conscious and holy Brahman, the doctrine of Brahman as cause is not reasonable That it is so,—that Nature is distinct from Brahman—is known from scripture also. In the words "conscious and unconscious, scripture by recognising the unconscious as a certain division of reality admits an unconscious world distinct from Brahman. But sometimes scripture speaks of things regarded as unconscious as if they were conscious, thus Earth said "That light thought (*Ch vi 2.3*) "That water thought (*Ch vi.2.3*) are texts bearing on the consciousness of the elements. Those on the consciousness of the senses are "The senses, quarrel

ing about their respective superiority, went to Brahman,' (Br vi 1. 7), "They said to speech, 'Do sing for us' " (Br I 3 2) &c The answer to this objection is given in the 5th aphorism

### ५ । अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।

५ । 'तु'शब्दः शङ्काम् अपगुदति । न खलु "मृदन्नदीत्" इति एवञ्जातीयकया श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वम् आशङ्कनीयम्, यत 'अभिमानिव्यपदेश' एषः । मृदाद्यभिमानिव्यपदेशे वागोद्यभिमानिव्यपदेशे च चेतना देवता वदन-सवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम् । कस्मात् ?—'विशेषानुगतिभ्या' भेदसंयोगाभ्याम् । भोक्तृणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च 'विशेषः' भेदः प्राक् अभिहितः । कौषीतकिन प्राणसंवादे अघिष्ठानु चेतनत्वपरिग्रहाय प्राणान् "देवता"शब्देन विशिंषन्ति । सर्वत्र च सत्कार्यवादेतिहासपुराणादिषु वागादिकारणेन सह अनुग्राहिकाया देवताया 'अनुगति' संयोग इत्युच्यते ।

5 But such a text only speaks of the presiding deity on account of distinction and connection The word 'but' sets aside the objection From such a text as "The earth spoke" the consciousness of the elements and the senses must not be thought of, for it only speaks of the presiding deity (the deity, in this case, who regards the earth as herself or her body) In mentioning actions like speaking and conceiving, possible only for conscious beings, conscious deities, deities presiding over earth, speech &c, are meant, and not mere elements or causes How? 'On account of distinction and connection' The distinction of the subject on the one hand and elements and senses on the other has already been pointed out In the dialogue on *Prāna*, the (Kaushītakin, for the purpose of the presiding

deity distinguish *Prdna* with the term *devata* (a deity) And everywhere in *mantras*, *arthavādas* (descriptions of things illustrating the meaning of the *mantras*) stories and histories, we find the connection of auxiliary deities with speech and other senses.

६ । दृश्यते तु ।

६ । 'तु'ब्रह्म पूर्वप्रथमं व्यावर्तयति । अतः सत्त्वं विलक्षणत्वात् न इदं ब्रह्म न ब्रह्मकृतिकम् इति न अपरम् एकात्मम् । 'दृश्यते' हि लोके चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेन ईशवादिना विलक्षणानां ईशगणादीनाम् उत्पत्तिं अचेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेन बीजवादिना इतिवर्तीनाम् ।

6 But it is seen But sets aside the *pārvaṇakṣha* What has been said about the world not being caused by Brahman because of its distinction from him is not absolutely true In the world it is seen that hair nails &c. though different from their cause, grow out of men and other beings known as conscious and that scorpions &c. arise from cowdung and such other things known as unconscious.

७ । असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमाश्रित्यात् ।

७ । ब्रह्मकारणत्वादिमाश्रित्यैवाप्यसत्त्वं इति प्रसङ्गेन 'इति चेत् न' । प्रतिषेधमाश्रित्यात् प्रतिषेधमात्रं हि इदं न असत् प्रतिषेध्यम् अस्ति । यथा अपि हि इदानीम् अपि कार्यं कारणान्मना सत् एव माश्रित्यैवापि इति स्पष्टम् ।

7 If it be said that in that case the effect is non



*existent, we say 'No, for it is a mere negation.'* If it be urged that in case Brahman were acknowledged as the cause of the world the effect would have to be declared as non-existent before its origination, then our reply is, 'No, for such a declaration would be a mere negation without anything to be negated Just as at present this effect is existent only as in the cause, so was it before its origination

### ८ । अपीतो तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ।

८ । पूर्वोक्तं,—‘अपीतो’ प्रत्यये ‘तद्वत्प्रसङ्गात्’ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मण कार्यस्य इव अयुक्ष्यादिरूपताप्रसङ्गात्, कारणे अविभागम् आपद्यमानं कार्यम् आत्मीयेन दीपेन कारणं दूषयेत्, इति प्राप्ते ब्रह्मकारणत्वादि-दर्शनम् ‘असमञ्जसम्’ आसमीचीनम् एव ।

8 *On account of a similar objection arising in respect of final re-absorption, this doctrine is inconsistent* The *pūrvapakṣa* says, Because a similar objection arises in respect of the final re-absorption, because Brahman the Cause would in that state be tainted by impurity and such other qualities like the effect, for the effect, entering into the cause and becoming indistinguishable from it would taint it with its defects, therefore the system that teaches Brahman to be the cause of the world is inconsistent with itself

### ९ । न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ।

९ । न एव अक्षदीयदर्शने किञ्चित् असमञ्जसम् अस्ति । यत् तावत् अभिहितं

कारणम् अपिमच्छत् कार्यम् आक्षीयेन वर्णेषु कारणं दूषयितुं शक्तिः, तत् न युक्तम्  
 घटात्मभावात् । सन्ति हि घटानां यदा कारणम् अपिमच्छत् कार्यम् आक्षीयेषु वर्णेषु  
 न दूषयति । तत् यथा मृदावादेन मृगप्रकृतिकालं विज्ञायां पुनः मज्जतिम् अपिमच्छत्  
 न ताम् आक्षीयेन वर्णेषु संशुश्रुतिः । स्वकादम् च सुवर्णविज्ञायां अपीतो न  
 सुवर्णम् आक्षीयेन वर्णेषु संशुश्रुतिः । प्रविहीविज्ञायां चतुर्विधं सूतधाम न प्रविहीम्  
 अपीतो आक्षीयेन वर्णेषु संशुश्रुतिः ।

9 *Not so for there are instances* The author of the  
 aphorisms replies —There is no inconsistency in our sys-  
 tem. What has been said as to the effect tainting the  
 cause with its own defects by entering into it is not reason-  
 able. For there are instances of effects not tainting the  
 causes with their defects by entering into them For ex-  
 ample when plates and such other things, which are differ-  
 ent forms of objects made of clay are absorbed in their  
 substance, they do not impart their own qualities to it So  
 also ornaments and such other things made of gold do not  
 impart their qualities to gold when they are absorbed in it  
 So again the four kinds of objects which are forms of the  
 earth do not communicate their qualities to the earth when  
 they are absorbed in it

### १० । स्वप्नचदोपास ।

१ । न च अक्षीये दृश्ये असामान्यदीर्घाद्यपि व्याप्य प्रतिवादिन स्वप्ने अपि  
 ईदृशः दोषः सति । तत् तावत् अमिहितं निराचक्षत्वात् न ह्येवं ज्ञातुं मज्जतिमिदम्  
 इति, प्रवाक-प्रकृतिकतायाम् अपि समानम् एतत् यत् सञ्ज्ञायाः मृदादिदीर्घात् प्रवागात्  
 मृदादिमिव ज्ञातुं लभ्यति न च नुपपद्यते । तथा अपीतो कार्यस्य कारणविभागा-  
 नुपपन्नात् कार्यस्य कारण-दूषणमपि अपि समानम् ।

10. *And because there are faults in his own system* It is not reasonable for our opponent to find fault with our own system, for there are similar faults in his own system also. What he says about Brahman not being the material cause of the world because the two are different in nature, applies equally to the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the material cause of the world, for the Sāṅkhya derives the world characterized by sound and such other qualities from the Pradhāna devoid of such qualities. Similarly, as our opponent teaches the non-difference of effects with the cause in the final absorption, his objection as to the cause being tainted by the effect applies equally to his case

११ । तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्ष-  
प्रसङ्गः ।

११ । 'तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादपि' इत्यत्र न आगमगम्ये अर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यं, यच्चात् निरागमा पुरुषोत्तमप्रेक्षानावनिवन्धना' तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता । 'अन्यथानुमेयम्' अथ उच्येत अन्यथा ययम् अनुमास्यामहे यथा न अप्रतिष्ठानदीष भविष्यति । 'इति चेत्, एवम् अपि अविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः' तर्कात् तर्कान्तरं समुत्थास्यति, अतः तर्कस्य 'विमोक्षः' विराम न भविष्यति । अथवा प्रतिष्ठित-तर्कालाभे अपि 'अविमोक्षः' सुकृत्यभावः, यतः तर्कातीतम् अपरोक्षज्ञानम् एव मोक्षकारणम् ।

11 *And because reasoning is baseless* And if it be said that one should reason otherwise, then it must be said that there is no release even in that case And for this reason also should reasoning not be relied on in matters to be known from scriptures, that reasonings not founded on the scriptures but only on individual opinions, are base-

less. If it be said We shall reason otherwise so that our reasoning may not be baseless, even then there is no release reasoning will arise out of reasoning and so there will be no end of reasoning Or (to explain this part of the aphorism otherwise) liberation cannot be obtained even by well founded reasoning for direct knowledge transcending reasoning is alone the means of liberation

१२ । एतेन श्रुष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याता ।

११ । 'एतेन' प्रधानवादनिराकरणकारिण श्रुष्टापरिग्रहा अपि श्रुष्टे सन् व्याख्यप्रवृत्तिमि अपरित्यज्यता अन्तादिकारणव्यादौ अपि व्याख्याता निराहता ।

12 *Herewith are refuted other systems not accepted by competent persons* Herewith that is with the refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Pradhāna other systems, such as theories of causation like Atomism, which are not accepted by competent persons like Manu, Vyāsa &c., are refuted.

१३ । भोक्तृपक्षेऽविभागश्चेत् स्यात्सोक्तवत् ।

१३ । ब्रह्मकारणवादपरिग्रहे भोक्तृपक्षे भोक्तृ भोक्तृभावमात्रे भोक्तृत्वञ्च भोक्तृभावमात्रे चविभाज्य स्यात् इति 'चित्' श्रुतेः, तदुच्यते—आत्मीकवत् एवम् अविभाज्य । स्यात् यथा बीजं द्वयते,—समुद्रात् उपकायन अगम्यते अपि तद्विचारणां केन-चोचि-तरङ्ग-ह्रस्वादीनाम् अतरेतर विभाज्य आकाशश्च च पटस्थुपाविनिमित्त विभाज्य इति । एतत् परमकारणात् ब्रह्मणो अगम्यते अपि उपपन्न भोक्तृ भोक्तृत्वच, विभाज्य ।

13 *If it be said that in that case, the subject and the object interchanging their natures, there would result an absence of difference between the two, we say, 'Let it be so, as in the world' If it be objected that on the acceptance of the theory of Brahman as cause there would be left no difference between the subject and the object, for in that case the subject would take the character of the object and the object that of the subject, we reply, 'Let there be such an absence of difference, such as we see in the world Froth, ripples, waves, bubbles &c, which are modifications of the sea, and which are not different from the watery sea, are yet distinguishable from it and from one another In the same manner space seems divided on account of limiting adjuncts like pots &c So the distinction of subject and object, though they are different from the Supreme Cause, Brahman, is reasonable*

### १४ । तदनन्तत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ।

१४ । 'तदनन्तत्वम्' कारणात् ब्रह्मण कार्यस्य जगत अनन्तत्वम् अवगम्यते 'आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' शब्दादोग्योक्तात् "वाचारम्भण विकारो नामवेद्य शक्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" (६।१।४) इति वाक्यात्, एतदर्थक-श्रुत्यन्तरेभ्य च ।

14 *The effect is one with the cause on account of such scriptural terms as 'origin' &c That the effect, the world, is one with the Cause, Brahman, is known from such words as 'origin,'—from the *Chhândogya* text, "The modification is merely a name having its origin in speech, clay alone is the real object" (vi 1 4) and from other scriptural texts of similar import*

## १३ । भावे चोपलब्धे ।

१३ । इतश्च कार्यस्य कारणात् अनन्त्यस्य भवत्यस्येति यत् कारणात् 'भावे सत्ये' एव कार्यस्य सत्यम् उपलभ्यते ।

15 And because the effect is seen to exist on the existence of the cause From this also we know the unity of the *कारण* and the effect that the existence of the effect is seen only on the existence of the cause.

## १६ । सत्त्वाद्यावरस्य ।

१६ । अवरस्य परावर्तिनः कार्यस्य प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कारस्य कारणात्मना सत्त्वात् स्थितं च कार्यस्य कारणात् अनन्त्यस्य भवत्यस्येति ।

16 And because the consequent exists in the antecedent We know the unity of the cause and the effect also from the fact that the consequent, the effect exists before its origin in the cause and in the form of the cause.

## १७ । असद्व्यपदेशावेति चेन्न धनमान्तरेण यावद्व्यपदेशात् ।

१७ । 'असद्व्यपदेशात्' ( तै० १० ) इति असद्व्यपदेशात् न प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्यम्, 'इति सत्यं न' इति ब्रूमः । न हि अन्त्याद्यन्त्यामिमांश्च प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य असद्व्यपदेशः । किं तर्हि ?—आज्ञातगामक्यत्वात् यथात् अज्ञातगामक्यत्वं वर्जानाम् । तत्र वर्जान्तरेण 'असद्व्यपदेशः' । अथम् एतत् प्रवक्ष्यते ?—वाक्येणात् "वशात्मानं स्वमनुभवत ( १० ) इत्यादि ।

17 If it be said No because the effect is spoken of

as non-existent', then the reply is, 'No, because it is spoken of in the sense of a different state, as appears from the closing part of the passage' If it be said that the effect does not exist before its origin in the cause, because the effect is spoken of as non-existent in the passage, 'Verily the world was non-existent in the beginning' (*Taitt* ii 7), then we reply It is not in the sense of absolute non-existence that the effect is spoken of as non-existent before its origin What then ? The non-manifestation of name and form is a state different from that of their manifestation It is in the sense of that state that the non-existence of the effect is spoken of But how is that known ? From the closing part of the passage, 'That (Brahman) made itself " (ii 7)

१८ । युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ।

१८ । 'युक्ते च शब्दान्तरात्' च प्राक् उत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वम् कारणात् च अनन्त्यत्वम् अवगम्यते । युक्तिं तावत् वर्ण्यते—क्षीरात् एव दधि उत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकाया , मृत्तिकाया एव घट उत्पद्यते, न क्षीरात्, इति यावत् । शब्दान्तरं तावत्—"सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्" ( छा० ६।१।१ ) इत्यादि ।

18 From argument and from another scriptural text The existence of the effect before its origin and its unity with the cause are known from argument and from another scriptural text Here is the argument it is from milk and not from clay that curd is produced , it is from clay and not from milk that a pot is made, and so on The text referred to is this "This (world), my dear, was only Being in the beginning &c " (*Chh* vi 1 1)

૧૯ । પટલસુ ।

१८। यथा च सर्वेष्टितात् पन्थात् प्रसारितः पटः अभिप्र, तथा अश्वत्थात् शारङ्गात्  
प्लवः कार्यम् अभिप्रम् ।

19 *And the case is like a piece of cloth* And as a piece of cloth spread out is one with the same rolled in so is the manifest effect one with the unmanifested cause.

२० । यथा च मायादि ।

१ । 'यथा च प्राप्ताद (प्राच्यपानसमाप्तिशान्दता) सुखमाकाङ्क्षन्त्यम्  
(अथ १) तथा कारणात् कार्यम् अन्त्यम् ।

20 And like the Prana and the rest And as Prāna and the rest (prāna apāna samāna udāna and vyāna) are one with the chief Prāna (Pra 3) so is the effect one with the cause.

२१ । इतरन्वपदेयाचिताकारण्यादिदीपप्रसक्ति ।

११। पूर्वोक्तं — इतरथापिमात् इतरथा जीवन् ब्रह्मात्मकत्वात् इतरथा वा  
नष्टस्य जीवात्मकत्वसम्भवात् द्वितीयव्यादिद्विषयस्य चिदात्मनो नष्ट-मरण-वन्मना  
पश्चात्तत्त्वं प्रसज्येत । एवं चत्वाण्येवमेव वा ।

21 The one being called the other the fault of doing harm and such other things would attach to the self. The *Pārvapakṣa* says—As in the theory of Brahman as the Cause, the one is said to be the other—the individual called



Brahman or Brahman called the individual, the fault of doing harm and such other things attaches to the Self, that is it becomes liable to the charge of doing such harm to itself as that of birth, death and bondage So this theory is unreasonable

## २२ । अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ।

२२ । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्वपक्ष व्यावर्तयति । ब्रह्म जीवात् 'अधिकम्', 'भेदनिर्देशात्' यत "आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य" ( बृह० २।४।५ ) इति एवञ्जातीयका कागृकार्मादिभेद-निर्देश ब्रह्म जीवात् अधिकम् इति दर्शयति ।

22 But Brahman is greater than the individual, on account of the declaration of difference The word 'but' sets aside the *pūrvapaksha* Brahman is greater than the individual, on account of the declaration of difference, for texts like "The Self, my dear, is to be seen " (Br II. 4 5) declare that the individual and the Universal are distinguished as subject and object, and thus show that the latter is greater than the former

## २३ । अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ।

२३ । यथा अश्मना प्रस्तराणां केचित् महार्हा मणयः, अन्ये मध्यमवीर्या, अन्ये च प्रहीणा पाषाणा इति अनेकविध वैचित्र्य दृश्यते, यथा च बीजानां बहुविध पत्र-पुष्प-फल-गन्ध-रस-दि-वैचित्र्यम् उपलभ्यते, तथा एकस्य अपि ब्रह्मण्य जीव-प्राज्ञ-पृथक्त्वं कार्य-वैचित्र्यं च उपपद्यते, इति अतः 'तदनुपपत्ति' पर-कल्पित-दोषः न उपपद्यते ।

23 The case being analogous to stones and such



25 *And the case is similar to that of gods and such other beings. As we see in the world that the gods, the manes, the sages and such other beings make palaces, chariots &c unaided and simply by the power of their meditation, so is it possible for Brahman also to create the world merely by his own power*

२६ । कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्व-शब्दकोपो वा ।

२६ । पूर्वपक्षसूत्रमेतत् । निरवयव-ब्रह्मकारणवादे 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति' कृत्स्नस्य न सग्रस्य ब्रह्मस्य काव्यरूपेण परिणाम प्राप्नोति । यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत् सावयवम् अभविष्यत्, तत अस्य एकदेशः पृथगस्येत, एकदेशः च अवस्थानस्येत । निरवयव तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्यः अवगम्यते । अतः एकदेशपरिणामासम्भवात् कृत्स्नपरिणामप्रसक्तौ सत्या जूलोर्ऽदः प्रसज्येत । अथ एतद्विपरीतकारणं सावयवम् एव ब्रह्म अभ्युपगम्येत, तथा अपि 'निरवयवत्व-शब्दकोप' ब्रह्मस्य निरवयवत्व-प्रतिपादक-शब्दानां कोप आनर्थक्यं स्यात् ।

26 *Pūrvapakṣa — Either the whole of Brahman must be conceived as changed into the world or the texts declaring his incorporeality must be regarded as meaningless* If the incorporeal Brahman be regarded as the cause of the world, the whole of Brahman must be conceived as changed into the effect, that is the world. If Brahman were corporeal like the earth and such other things, one part of him might be conceived as changed and the other as remaining unchanged. But Brahman is known from the scriptures as incorporeal. So, it being impossible that a part of him is changed, the whole must be conceived as changed, the consequence being that the very roots of all things must be conceived as lost. If, to avoid this objectionable conclusion,

Brahman be conceived as corporeal the texts declaring his incorporeality must be regarded as meaningless

२० । अतस्तु गच्छभूतत्वात् ।

२० । 'तु' 'यन्' न पूर्वपक्षे परिहरति । न तावत् हृत्ययमत्र चरति । कुत ? — 'सुत' । यथा एव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिरुत्पत्तिर्यथा एव विकाराद्व्यतिरेकेण च विग्रहः अवस्थानं गृह्यते । 'यन्' भूतत्वात् 'यन्' भूतं यन्ममापन्नं हि ब्रह्म । ब्रह्म च जगदस्य च विग्रहश्च प्रतिपाद्यति — यत्तत्त्वमसि निश्चयवर्ता च । तदा हि —

तदीजति तच्च जति तद्गृहे तद्विनिश्चि ।

तदन्तर्गतं सुखं तदु सुखं तदन्तर्गतं वाच्यं ॥ ( इत्यादि ३ )

अप्रियवैकी भुवर्गं विविदा

कपं कपं प्रतिहृषी बभूव ।

पञ्चतथा सुखभूतत्वात्वात्

कपं कपं प्रतिहृषी बभूव ॥ ( अठ १।१।८ )

27 But it is not so on account of scriptural texts and because the scriptures are the source But sets aside the *pūrvapakṣa* The whole of Brahman is not changed into the world How is this known ?— From the scriptures. As they teach that Brahman created the world so do they teach that he exists without being changed As the scriptures are the source —the source of the knowledge of Brahman And the scriptures teach both that Brahman is not wholly changed into the world and that he is incorporeal. For instance, It moves and it moves not. It is far and it is near It is in all this, and it is out of all this. (Iśd 5) 'As the one fire, entering the world, takes the

form of each object it burns, so the one Inner Self of all creatures takes the form of each object and is also beyond all objects" (*Katha* 11. 2 9)

## २८ । आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ।

२८ । अपि च न एव अत्र विवदितस्य कथम् एकस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि अनेकाकारा सृष्टि स्यात्, यत 'आत्मनि' अपि एकस्मिन् स्वप्नदृशि 'विचित्रा' अनेकाकारा सृष्टय पश्यन्ते, "न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पत्न्यानी भवन्त्याय रथान् रथयोगान् पथ सृजते" (बृह० ४।१।१०) इत्यादिना ।

28 *For in the self too various such creations are seen* And it must not be objected in this matter how in the same Brahman various kinds of creation are possible, for in the same self, in its dreaming state, various such creations are spoken of in texts like, "There are no chariots, no chariot-drawers, no roads in it, but the self creates chariots, chariot-drawers and roads" (*Br* 1v. 3 9)

## २९ । स्वप्नदोषाच्च ।

२९ । परेषाम् अपि एष समान स्वप्ने दोषः । प्रधानवादिन अपि निरवयवम् अपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतं कार्यस्य कारणम् इति स्वप्नः । तत्र अपि कृतज्ञप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वात् प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति निरवयवत्व-  
कोप वा ।

29 *And because of objections to the opponent's own view* The same objection may be urged against the view

of our opponents. They the Sāṅkhyas, also teach that the incorporeal unlimited Pradhāna, devoid of sound and other qualities, is the cause of an effect that is the world which is corporeal limited and endowed with sound and other qualities. To this view also the objection applies that the Pradhāna, because it is incorporeal is wholly changed into its effects, or that the doctrine of its incorporeality must be set aside.

### ३० । सर्वोपेता च दर्शनात् ।

१ । इतश्च ब्रह्मणा प्रपञ्चवृत्तः उत्पद्यते यत् आ परा द्रव्यता सर्वोपेता सर्व-  
शक्तियुक्ता इति दम्बयति सुति । तदाहि "सर्वशक्तो सर्वज्ञान सर्वशब्दः सर्वरस  
सर्वस्पर्शमहामायावाक्चक्षुःश्रोत्रः ( का ३।१।३।१ ) "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद्यमानमर्थ-  
तपः" ( सु १।१।८ ) "एतस्य वा चक्षुःस्य प्रकाशने गामि कर्णोच्चक्षुःमयी विदुषो  
तिष्ठतः" ( बृ ३।१।८ ) इत्याद्या ।

30 And the Supreme Deity is endowed with all powers for it is seen. And the creation of the world by Brahman is reasonable also for this that scripture teaches that the Supreme Deity is endowed with all powers. For instance, Having all actions, having all desires having all odours, having all tastes, pervading all this, without speech without partiality " (Ch iii 14 2.) Who is all knowing all perceiving whose austerility (or meditation) consists in knowledge (Mund i 1 9) Under the control of this Immutable Being O Gārgi the sun and the moon exist upheld. (Br iii 8. 9)

३१ । विकारणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम् ।

३१ । 'विकारणत्वात्' परदेवताया निर्निद्रितत्वात् 'न इति चेत्' न सा काश्चाय प्रभवेत् इति यदि भाशङ्केत, तदा यत् न वक्तव्य 'तत् उक्तम्' पश्चात् एव एकादशतमसूत्रे. पर ब्रह्म न तर्कावगाह्यम् इति । तथाच च शास्त्र,—

“अपाणिपादौ जघनौ ग्रहीता

पश्यत्यचक्षु स शृणोत्यकर्ण ।” ( श्वेत० ३।१८ )

इति अकारणस्यासि ब्रह्मण सर्वसामर्थ्ययोग दर्शयति ।

31 If it be said 'No, because Brahman has no organs,' then we say we have already answered that objection. If it be objected that as the Supreme Deity has no organs he is unable to act, then we say that we have already said in our eleventh aphorism what has to be said on the matter. The Supreme Brahman is not comprehensible by reasoning. And texts like the following speak of Brahman as capable, even though without organs, of doing everything,—“He is without hands or feet, yet he walks and handles, he sees without eyes and hears without ears” (Svet III 19)

३२ । न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ।

३२ । पूर्वपक्ष,—‘न’ परमात्मा जगत् रचितवान्, प्रवृत्ते ‘प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् । न हि परित्यक्त्य परमात्मन प्रयोजनाभावात् प्रवृत्तिः सम्भवति ।

32 *Pūrvapakṣa*, No, because action requires motive. The Supreme Self did not create the world, for action

requires a motive. As the Supreme Self is self-satisfied and has no motive, it is not possible for him to act.

३३ । लोकावत्तु लीलाकैवल्पम् ।

३३। 'तु शब्देन चासिद्धं पण्डितानि। यथा भाषे कश्चित् पात्रवत्तस्य राज्ञः  
स्वतिरिक्तं विहितं प्रयागनम् जनमिसन्नायै केवले लीलाकपा प्रगतय कीदृशविद्वारेण  
भवति। एवम् ईश्वरस्य अपि जननेस्य विहितं प्रयागनान्तं स्वभावात् एव केवले लीला  
कपा प्रगतिं भविष्यति।

33 *But creation is only sport as in the world*  
But sets aside the objection As in the world a king  
whose desires are satisfied does certain deeds without  
wishing to gain some end but only for the sake of sport  
or amusement so God also may be conceived as acting not  
out of any need but simply out of his own nature as a  
matter of sport

३४ । वैषम्यनेर्हृष्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति ।

३४। जयन्तं भृङ्गं च स्त्रादि ब्रह्मन् तत्प्राप्त्यर्थमुक्तं भवन्नाम् कुर्यात् न 'न  
 ईष्यत्' प्रसज्येत । अपिचान्तात् क्त्वा ईष्यत् चटि च स्यमान् प्राप्तिना प्राप्तमप्यन्वयो  
 यथेष्टये । 'किं क्त्वा क्त्वा' तथा क्त्वा अपिचान्तात् 'दम्पति' ।

34 *Differences and cruelty are not to be ascribed to him on account of dependence as scripture shows*  
The differences of pleasures, pains &c. in the world and even their cause, cruelty are not to be ascribed to God On account of dependence,—for God's creation depends on



the good or bad deeds done in their past incarnations by the creatures to be made For scripture speaks of this dependence

३५ । न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नाऽनादित्वात् ।

३५ । प्राक् सृष्टे 'अविभागात्' विभागस्य अभावात् न' नास्ति तत् 'कर्म' यदपेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टि स्यात्, 'इति चेत् न' न युक्तम् एतत् 'अनादित्वात्' यत ससार अनादिः ५५ ।

35 If it be said, 'There is no deed on account of absence of distinction', then we say 'No, on account of there being no beginning' If it be objected that as there was no distinction before creation, there could then be no deed on which differences in creation might depend, then the reply is that this objection is not reasonable on account of the absence of beginning, as creation has no absolute beginning

३६ । उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ।

३६ । ससारस्य अनादित्वम् 'उपपद्यते' युक्त्या सिध्यति, 'अपि च' 'उपलभ्यते' श्रुतिस्मृत्यो दृश्यते ।

36. It is proved and seen That creation has no beginning is proved by reasoning and is seen from *Sruti* and *Smriti*

३० । सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेय ।

३० । इत्यत्र ब्रह्मकारणत्वादे मुक्त एव यस्मात् कश्चिन् ब्रह्मणि सत्यं सार । सर्व-  
धर्मोपपत्तेय-सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेयः उपपत्तेयः ।

37 *And as all causal characteristics are found in Brahman* For this reason also is the theory of Brahman as the cause of the world reasonable that in him are to be found all the characteristics of a true cause namely omniscience omnipotence and the like.

## अविरोध-नाम-द्वितीयाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः नास्त्य-वैशेषिक-बौद्धादि-मतस्य ण्डनम्

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१। रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नागुमानम् ।

१। अपि 'च' 'नागुमानम्' न अचेतनं जगत्कारणम् अनुमतस्य भवति । कुत ?  
'रचनानुपपत्ते' यत तात्पर्यं त्वे रचनाप्रयोगानुसृत्य नवप्रव-विन्यास न उपपद्यते ।

1 And an unconscious cause is not to be inferred, for orderly arrangement is impossible for it. And further, an unconscious cause of the world is not to be inferred, for under its agency the arrangement of parts according to needs is not possible

२। प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

२। अचेतन-कारणस्य 'प्रवृत्ते' अनुपपत्ते च न तादृशं कारणम् अनुमातव्यम् ।

2 And on account of activity And as it is not possible for an unconscious cause to act, such a cause should not be inferred

३। पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत् तत्रापि ।

३। 'चेत्' यदि एवम् उच्यते,—यथा चीरम् अचेतनं स्वभावेन एव क्षयविषयं

प्रवर्तते दद्यात् यः जलम् चक्षितम् समावृत एव भीष्मापकाराय भवन्त्येव सर्वं प्रधानम् अपि  
 चक्षितम् समावृत एव पदार्थविद्बुद्धे प्रवर्तित इति । न एतत् साधु उच्यते एत  
 एव अपि परोक्षज्ञो च चेतनाभिहितः एव प्रवर्तते अनुमिमीमहे ।

3 *If it be said that it acts like milk and water then we say—even there (consciousness is necessary) If it be said—as milk though unconscious naturally acts in nursing the calf as also water though unconscious naturally flows for the good of the world so Pradhāna too may be supposed as acting for the good of man,—then we must say that such argumentation is not valid for in these cases also we may infer that milk and water act under conscious guidance*

### ४ । ध्यतिरेकानवस्थितेयामपेक्षत्वात् ।

४ । साक्षात् चक्षितं प्रधानं साक्षात्पश्य-व्यतिरेक्येव न अवतिष्ठति । पुरुषस्य  
 जलमोक्ष—न प्रवर्तते न निवर्तते । यत्तु प्रधानम् अपेक्षकम् । अपेक्षकत्वात्  
 च दृष्टवितुं प्रधानं भवेत् साक्षादेव पश्यितम्, कदाचित् न पश्यितम् इति एतत्  
 अनुमत् ।

4 *As Pradhāna has nothing beyond it and as it depends on nothing (it cannot be cause) The Pradhāna imagined by the Sāṅkhyas can exist without any external support Their Puruṣha is indifferent he neither impels nor restrains. Pradhāna therefore is not dependent on anything As its activity depends on nothing it is not reasonable to think that it sometimes changes into the forms of *maṇat* and other things and sometimes does not so change*

### ५ । अन्यत्वभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ।

५ । यथा तृणपात्रवोटकादि निमित्तान्तर-निर्गमेष स्वभावात् एव चीराद्याकारं परिणमते, एव प्रधानम् अपि सद्भूत्याकारिणं यस्मिन् स्यत्, इति न वक्तव्यं, यत् शरीर-सम्बन्धात् अन्यत् तृणादि न चीरीभवत् । वेगो एव उपपन्नो तृणादि चीरीभवति ।

5 *The case is not similar to the turning of grass &c into milk, for they do not so turn elsewhere (than in animals)* It must not be said that as grass, leaves, water &c naturally turn into the forms of milk and other things independently of other causes, so Pradhāna too may be supposed to change into the forms of *mahat* &c, for it is only in relation to organisms and not elsewhere that grass and such other things become milk. It is only when taken by a cow that they take that form

### ६ । अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ।

६ । यद्यपि स्वाभाविकम् एव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिम् अभ्युपगच्छेम तथापि दोष अनुपज्येत एव । कुत ?—‘अर्थाभावात्’ यथा एव प्रधानं सहकारि किञ्चित् न अपेक्षते, एव प्रयोजनम् अपि किञ्चित् न अपेक्षिष्यते इति, अतः प्रधानम् पुरुषस्य भवं सावधितुं प्रवर्तते, इति द्वयं प्रतिज्ञां ह्रीयेत ।

6 *Even if spontaneous activity were admitted (the doctrine would be objectionable) on account of the absence of a purpose* Even if we were to admit that the Pradhāna can act spontaneously, yet the Sāṅkhya doctrine would be objectionable. How? On account of the absence of a purpose. As the Pradhāna is independent of

a helper or co agent, so must it be supposed to have no reference to a purpose and therefore the doctrine that it acts in order to effect the good of man must be pronounced untenable.

८। पुरुषाग्मवदिति चेत् तथापि ।

[illegible]

7 *If the case were considered similar to that of a man or of a stone even then (the doctrine would be open to objection) — It may be sought to re establish the Sankhya doctrine by citing parallel instances like the following — As a lame man, having the power of seeing but without that of moving mounts upon another man having the power of moving but without that of seeing and makes him move or as a magnetic stone though itself unmoving yet moves iron so may the Purusha be supposed as making the Pradhāna act. To this we reply Even this does not make the doctrine free from objection For this supposes the Pradhāna to be active by itself and denies that it is the Purusha that makes it act Besides, how can the*

indifferent Purusha make the Pradhāna act ? Even a lame man makes a blind man move by means of his words and such other things. But the Purusha, inactive and devoid of *gunas*, cannot put forth any activity. And it cannot be said that like the magnet it induces activity by mere proximity, for if the proximity of the Purusha were supposed constant, the Pradhāna would have to be considered as constantly active.

### ८ । अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

८ । सत्त्वगज्जलसाम् अन्योन्यगुण-प्रधानभावम् परस्परं प्रति 'मङ्गाङ्गिभावम् उत्पद्यमान्येन स्वरूपसाक्षेण यत् अवस्थानम् सा प्रधानावस्था । तस्याम् अवस्थाया गुणानां स्वरूपनाशमयोत् 'अद्वित्वं परस्परं' प्रति संनकारित्व 'न उपपद्यते' । 'अङ्गित्वस्य अनुपपत्ते च' प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्ति न अवकल्पते ।

8 (*It is objectionable*) because the mutual relation of the *gunas* as principal and subordinate is impossible.

The state of Pradhāna means that in which the *gunas* give up the mutual relation of principal and subordinate and exist in equipoise in their respective natures. In that state it is not possible for the *gunas* to be principal and subordinate to one another, that is, to help one another, for in that case their respective natures would be destroyed. And because the mutual relation of principal and subordinate is impossible, therefore it is unreasonable to think that the Pradhāna can act.

### ९ । अन्यथानुमितौ च प्रवृत्तिवियोगात् ।

९ । 'अन्यथा अनुमितौ च' यथा यथा कार्योत्पाद उपपद्यते तथा तथा गुण-

ଅନ୍ୟତମେ ବ୍ୟକ୍ତିଃ ସଂସାରଃ । ସର୍ବେ ବିଶ୍ଵାତ୍ମକାଃ । ତଃ କାଂ ସର୍ବଜନଃ  
 ୧୮ ଅନ୍ୟତମେ ବ୍ୟକ୍ତିଃ ସଂସାରଃ । ତଃ ବିଶ୍ଵାତ୍ମକାଃ । ତଃ କାଂ ସର୍ବଜନଃ ।  
 ଅନ୍ୟତମେ ବ୍ୟକ୍ତିଃ ।

9. I ven on another supposition (the objections re-  
 main in force on a count of the *Pradhāna* being devoid  
 of the power of knowing—I ven if another supposition be  
 made if the nature of the *gunas* be supposed so as to  
 make action possible—if it be supposed that even in the  
 state of equilibrium the *gunas* remain capable of being  
 unequal to it (being superior or inferior to) one another  
 —the objections arising from such arguments as the im-  
 possibility of an uncommensurable principle causing an orderly  
 arrangement wou'd remain as before.

## ୧୦ । ବିମତିତ୍ଵେପାପାମମଧ୍ୟମ୍ ।

୧ । ପାମାତ୍ମବିତ୍ତଃ ସଂସାରଃ । ସର୍ବଜନଃ — ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ଜଗନ୍ନିର୍ବାସୀ ସମ୍ପଦ  
 ତାମାସି ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ପଦାଦେ । ନତା ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ଜଗତ ନାମ ସବ୍ୟମ୍ ପଦାଦିନି ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ  
 ବ୍ୟକ୍ତିଃ । ନତା ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ବିଶ୍ଵାତ୍ମକାଃ ସର୍ବଜନଃ ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ପଦମ୍ । ମିତ୍ତ  
 ପଦମ୍ ଶ୍ରୀକୃଷ୍ଣ ତା ବ୍ୟକ୍ତିଃ କୃପା ଜଃ ବିଶ୍ଵାତ୍ମକାଃ ସର୍ବଜନଃ । ନତାମ୍ ସର୍ବ  
 ସବ୍ୟମ୍ ବିଶ୍ଵାତ୍ମକାଃ ।

10. And the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine is conflicting on ac-  
 count of its contradictions. And the *Sāṅkhya* doctrines  
 are mutually contradictory. Sometimes they say there are  
 seven senses, sometimes eleven. Sometimes it is taught that  
 the *tanmātras* or elementary substances proceed from the  
*mahat* and sometimes from *ahankāra* or egoity. Some



times they speak of three *antahkaranas* or internal organs, and sometimes of one Besides, it is well-known that the doctrine is in conflict with the *Sūti*, which teaches that God is the cause of the world, and with the *Smṛiti* that follows it For this reason also the Sankhya system is conflicting

## ११ । महद्दीर्घवद्वा ऋक्षपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ।

११ । अथ वैशेषिकानाम् अभ्युपगम — कारणद्वयसमवायिन गुणा. कार्यद्रव्ये समानजातीय गुणान्तरम् आरभन्ते, युक्तेभ्य तन्तुभ्य युक्तस्य पटस्य प्रसवदर्शनात्, तद्विपर्ययादर्शनात् च । तच्चात् चेतनस्य ब्रह्मण्य जगत्कारणत्वे अभ्युपगम्यमाने कार्ये अपि जगति चेतनं समवेद्यात्, तद्वद्दर्शनात् तु न चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं भवितुम् अर्हति इति । इमम् अभ्युपगमं तदीयथा एव प्रक्रियया व्यभिचारयति । यथा परमाणौ परिमण्डलात् परिमाणात् सत, अणु ऋक्षश्च द्रव्यकं जायते, महद्दीर्घश्च त्र्यणुकादि, न परिमण्डल, यथा वा द्रव्यकात् अणो ऋक्षात् च सत महद्दीर्घश्च त्र्यणुक जायते, न अणु, न उत ऋक्ष, एव चेतनात् ब्रह्मण्य अचेतनं जगत् जनियते ।

11 *The origin of the world from Brahman is quite as justifiable as the origin of the great from the minute and of the long from the spherical atom* This is the argument of the Vaiseshikas “Qualities inherent in a causal substance give rise to other but *similar* qualities in the substance that constitutes its effect For instance, we observe that from white threads white cloth is produced, and never the contrary Hence, if one assumes the intelligent Brahman to be the cause of the world, one should expect to find intelligence also in the effect, viz the world But as this is not the case, the intelligent Brahman cannot



12 *The action of atoms is not possible in either of the two cases viz whether adrishta inheres in the self or in the atom Hence follows the absence of that (that is creation and pralaya)* The Sutrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world. This doctrine arises in the following manner — Substances which consist of parts, such as pieces of cloth, etc, are seen in the world to originate from co-essential substances as threads, etc, in a state of combination From this may be drawn the general conclusion that *all* substances which are wholes consisting of parts originate from co-essential substances in a state of combination. And, the particular substance at which this distinction of whole and part comes to a termination, and which sets a limit to the division of things into smaller constituent parts, is the atom Now, the whole universe, with mountains, oceans, etc, is composed of parts, and being formed of parts, it has a beginning and an end And there can be no effect without a cause Therefore, the atoms are the cause of the universe This, in substance, is Kanâda's doctrine Against the above doctrine the following is asserted by the Sutrakâra —It must be admitted that atoms, when in a state of isolation, depend on action for their combination, for we perceive that the combination of threads, etc, is brought about by action Action being an effect, a cause to bring it about must be assumed If, now, the unseen principle (adrishta) is assumed to be the cause of the original motion in the atoms, we answer This unseen principle may inhere either in the self or in the atom But, in both cases, it is equally impossible for the unseen principle to be the cause of motion in the atoms,



reasoning would lead to a regressus ad infinitum For, just as a binary compound, though absolutely different from the two constituent atoms, is connected with them by Kanâda by means of a relation of Samavâya, so the relation of samavâya itself, being absolutely different from the things to be connected, would require a second relation of samavâya to connect it with them, 'absolute difference' being a common characteristic of both the cases For the connection of the second, third, etc, relations of samavâya, further such relations would have to be assumed, and so on, involving a regressus ad infinitum.

### ૧૪ । નિત્યમેવ ચ ભાવાત્ ।

૧૫ । અપિ ચ અથઽ પ્રવૃત્તિસ્વભાવા વા નિવૃત્તિસ્વભાવા વા ઉભયસ્વભાવા વા અનુભયસ્વભાવા વા અમ્યુપગમ્યેરન્ ગત્યન્તરાભાવાત્ । ચતુર્થા અપિ ન સપ્પયતે । પ્રવૃત્તિસ્વભાવત્વે 'નિત્યમ્ એવ' પ્રવૃત્તે 'ભાવાત્' પ્રલયાભાવપ્રસક્તઃ । નિવૃત્તિસ્વભાવત્વે અપિ નિત્યમેવ નિવૃત્ત ભાવાત્ સર્ગાભાવપ્રસક્તઃ । ઉભયસ્વભાવત્વં ચ વિરોધાત્ અસમજસમ્ । અનુભયસ્વભાવત્વે તુ નિમિત્તવશાત્ પ્રવૃત્તિનિવૃત્ત્યો અમ્યુપગમ્યમાનયો અદૃષ્ટાદિઃ નિમિત્તસ્ય નિત્યસન્નિવાનાત્ નિત્યપ્રવૃત્તિપ્રસક્તઃ । અતન્ત્રત્વે અપિ અદૃષ્ટાદિ નિત્યાપ્રવૃત્તિપ્રસક્તઃ । તસ્માત્ અપિ અનુપપન્ન પરમાણુકારણવાદઃ ।

14 And on account of the permanent existence of activity or non-activity in the atoms Further, consider the question whether the atoms should be assumed to be essentially active (moving), or essentially inactive, or essentially both active and inactive, or essentially neither active nor inactive There can of course be no more alternatives But none of these four alternatives can be supported. If

the atoms are essentially active their activity is permanent and hence *pralaya* becomes impossible. If essentially inactive their inertia is permanent and creation is impossible. Their being essentially both active and inactive is inadmissible, because involving a self-contradiction. If the atoms are essentially neither active nor inactive and if it is assumed that their activity or inactivity is due to some operative cause such as *adrishta* etc., then on account of the permanent proximity of such an operative cause permanent activity in the atoms has to be admitted. And if *adrishta*, etc. are not assumed permanent inactivity in the atoms has to be admitted. On these grounds also the doctrine of atomic causation is to be rejected.

### १५ । अणुादिमत्ताच्च विपर्ययो दग्धनात् ।

१५ । आद्यपक्षानां दृष्ट्याणाम् अवयवस्य विमल्यमानतां यदा परं विभागं न भवति ते चतुर्विधाः क्वाण्मिमांसा परमाद्यश्च चतुर्विधस्य क्वाण्मिमांसा भूतमीतिवत्स्य च अत्रा. निर्याच इति यत् वैमर्षिकः अभुपक्षेति, स तिस्राम् अभुपक्षस्य निरालम्बन एव । यदा क्वाण्मिमांसा पक्षेणान् क्वाण्मिमांसा विपर्ययः प्रसज्यते । परमाद्यश्च विचया अभुपक्षस्य अनित्यत्वं च तिस्राम् अभिमत विपरीतम् आपद्येति इत्ययम् । कुतः ?— दग्धनात् एव भावे दृष्टत्वात् । यत् हि लोके क्वाण्मिमांसा वस्तु तत् अकारणत्वापेक्षया व्युत्पन्नम् अनित्यं च दृष्टम् । तत् यदा पक्षे तन्नान् अपेक्ष्य व्युत्पन्नं अनित्यं च भवति, तन्नाशं च यद्यन् अपेक्ष्य व्युत्पन्ना अनित्या च भवन्ति, तथा च यमी परमाद्यश्च क्वाण्मिमांसा ते अभुपक्षेति, तस्यान्ते ते अपि कारणावन्ता तदपेक्षया व्युत्पन्ना अनित्या च प्राप्नुवन्ति ।

15 And from the atoms having colour etc (as held by the Vaiseshikas) the opposite conclusion to theirs

*follows , as it is thus observed* The Vaiseshikas assume that when substances composed of parts are continuously divided and sub-divided into parts, the limit beyond which such sub-division cannot go is constituted by the atoms, which are eternal, and which, being themselves of four different classes (corresponding to the four elements), and possessed of the qualities of colour, etc , are the origins of the whole material universe, which too, is composed of four different elements, and is possessed of the qualities of colour, etc This assumption is groundless, as from the circumstance of the atoms possessing colour and other qualities, the opposite of their minuteness and permanency would follow , i e , it would follow that compared with the ultimate cause, they are themselves gross and non-permanent, which is a conclusion opposite to what the Vaiseshikas intend to establish Why so ? Because it is observed that whatever objects in this world are possessed of colour and other qualities, are, compared with their causes, gross and non-permanent A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross and non-permanent compared with its threads, and the threads again are gross and non-permanent compared with their filaments Now, the atoms are admitted by the Vaiseshikas to be possessed of colour, etc , Therefore, they too must have causes, compared with which they are gross and non permanent

१६ । उभयथा च दोषात् ।

१६ । गन्ध-रस-रूप-स्पर्श-गुणा स्थूला पृथिवी रूप-रस-स्पर्श-गुणा सूक्ष्मा आपः, रूप-स्पर्श-गुण सूक्ष्मतम तेजः, स्पर्श-गुण सूक्ष्मतम वायुः, इति एवम् एतानि चत्वारि

भूतानि सूक्ष्म सूक्ष्म भूतानि लोके लक्ष्यन् । तद्वत् परमाण्वन अपि सूक्ष्म सूक्ष्म गुणा  
 कन्धेऽनू न वा । उभयथा च क्षोणानुपङ्ग अपरिहाज एव स्यात् । कन्धामाने  
 तावत् सूक्ष्म-सूक्ष्म-गुणत्वे सूक्ष्मभूतानां भूतानुपपत्तौ अपरमावृत्त प्रसङ्गः । न च अन्तरि  
 अपि भूतानुपपत्तौ भूतानुपपत्तौ भवति इति उच्यते चायैव भूतेषु गुणानुपपत्तौ भूतानुपपत्तौ  
 न भवति । अकन्धामाने तु सूक्ष्म सूक्ष्म-गुणत्वे परमाण्वलक्षण-प्रसिद्धये यदि तावत् सम्यो  
 एककभूतान्, एव कन्धेऽनू ततः तिर्यसि लक्ष्ये उपलब्धि न स्यात् अपि कपलक्ष्येऽनू  
 वृत्तिः । च दस-दस-स्पर्शानां का भूतानुपपत्तौ लक्ष्येऽनू । अथ सम्यो  
 भूतानुपपत्तौ, एव कन्धेऽनू ततः अपि सम्यो उपलब्धि स्यात् तिर्यसि सम्यो  
 लक्ष्येऽनू वायौ च सम्यो लक्ष्येऽनू । न च एवं दृश्यते । तस्यात् अपि भूतानुपपत्तौ  
 परमाण्वलक्षण-प्रसङ्गः ।

16 *And as difficulties arise in both cases* Earth has the qualities of smell taste colour and touch and is gross. Water has the qualities of colour taste and touch and is fine. Fire has the qualities of colour and touch and is finer still. Air has the quality of touch only and is the finest of all. Thus, in the world, the four elements are observed to have the qualities of grossness and fineness. Now the question arises whether the atoms constituting the respective elements should or should not be assumed to have the corresponding qualities of grossness and fineness. Either assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. If they are assumed to differ as gross and fine, the grosser atoms, having greater size, will cease to be atoms. That an increase of qualities cannot but be attended with an increase of size, we affirm from our observation of material bodies produced by causes. If on the other hand, we assume, in order to maintain the equality of all atoms, that they do not differ as gross and fine, we may



either suppose that they all have only *one* quality each, in which case we should not perceive touch in fire, nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour and touch in earth, since all qualities existing in effects must have, as antecedents, the same qualities in their causes Or, we may suppose all atoms to have *all the four* qualities, in which case we should perceive smell in water, smell and taste in fire, and smell, taste and colour in air, which we never do On these grounds also the doctrine of atomic causation is to be rejected

### १७। अपरिग्रहाच्चाल्यन्तमनपेक्षा।

१७। परमाणुकारणवाद न कस्यिदपि शिष्टे केनचिन् अपि अग्नेन परिगृहीत, इति अत्यन्तम् एव तस्य 'अनपेक्षा' अनादरं कर्तव्यं वेदेवादिभिः ।

17 *And as the doctrine of atomic causation is not accepted by any authoritative persons, it is to be disregarded altogether* The doctrine of atomic causation has not been accepted by any persons of authority in any of its parts It therefore merits entire disregard at the hands of those who take their stand on the Veda

### १८। समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः।

१८। 'नयं बौद्धमत-खण्डनम् । बौद्धा वयं वादिनः भवन्ति । केचित् सर्वज्ञास्त्ववादिनः, केचित् विज्ञानास्तिलमात्रवादिनः, अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यवादिनः, इति । अत्र ये सर्वज्ञास्तिलवादिनः' बाह्यम् आन्तरञ्च वस्तु उपगच्छन्ति भूतं भौतिकं चित्तं चैतज्ज, तान् तावत् प्रतिब्रूयते । अत्र भूतं पृथिवी-वातादयः, भौतिकं रूप-आदयः, चक्षुरादयः, च ।



(1) the aggregate of the elements and of the derivatives of elements, whose cause are the atoms, and (2) the five aggregates caused by the internal groups, are recognised by our opponents. But even if the two classes of aggregates supposed by them to proceed from the above two causes be admitted, the actual formation of aggregates cannot be proved (on the theory of our opponents). Why so? Because the parts constituting the aggregates are devoid of intelligence (and hence unable to combine of their own accord), and also because the Buddhists do not admit any other permanent intelligent being, such as a percipient self or a ruling Lord, who could effect the aggregation of the parts.

### १६। इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादि चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् ।

१६। अविद्या, संस्कार, विज्ञानं, नामरूप, षडायतन, स्पर्श, वेदना, तृष्णा, उपादानं, भव, जाति, जरा, मरण, शोक, परिवेदना, दुःख, दुर्मनस्ता च, इति एव जातीयका इतरेतरहेतुका वीक्ष्यन्ते क्वचित् सच्चिदा विनिर्दिष्टा, क्वचित् प्रपञ्चिता । एवम् अविद्यादि-कालापि अपि परस्पर-निमित्त-नैमित्तिक-भावेन चट्टीयन्भवत् अनिशम् आवर्तमाने अर्थाचिन्ता उपपन्ना संहति 'इति चेत्, तत् न' । कस्मात् ?—'उत्पत्तिमात्र-निमित्तत्वात्', यत् 'इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वे' अपि अविद्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वम् उत्तरोत्तरस्य उत्पत्ति-मात्रनिमित्तं भवत् भवेत्, न तु संघातोत्पत्तेः किञ्चित् निमित्तं सम्भवति । भोक्तुं अभावात् संहति न सिध्येत् इत्यभिप्रायः ।

19 If (the formation of aggregates be sought to be explained) through the cycles of nescience, idea etc., standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say, 'No, because each link is merely the cause of the origin of the

*immediately succeeding link and not of any aggregation* Nescience idea, perception name and form the support of the six senses touch feeling desire activity birth species decay death grief lamentation pain mental affliction and the like are spoken of as a chain of mutual causes in the Buddhist system sometimes cursorily some times at length. It is the contention of the Buddhists that as the cycles of nescience etc. forming chains of mutual causes and effects, revolve unceasingly like water wheels, therefore the existence of aggregates proved by implication. But this contention we cannot accept. Why so? Because this argument can explain only the origination of the members of the series and nothing more. For even if we admit the theory of mutual causation each antecedent would merely be the cause of each subsequent member there would be nothing to stand as the cause of the formation of aggregates. We mean that in the absence of a permanent percipient self it is impossible to establish the formation of aggregates.

२० । उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ।

१ । बोद्धव्यमस्मादिह यस्मिन् अनुपपन्नं — उत्तराद्यम् चर्षं तत्पयमानं ब्रूयत्यत्र निबध्यते इति । न च एवम् अनुपपन्नता पूर्वान्तरयोः चर्षाः श्रुतव्यमात्रं सत्यस्यैव ग्राह्ये । निबद्धमात्रं निबद्धत्वं वा पूर्वस्यैव तत्पयमानत्वात् उत्तराद्य-  
श्रुत्यं न तत्पयमाने ।

20 As, according to the Buddhists on the origination of the subsequent moment the preceding one ceases to be

*causal relation cannot be established* The Buddhists who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only, say that when the second moment comes into being, the first ceases to be. On this admission, it is impossible to establish a relation of cause and effect between the antecedent and the consequent moments. The former, which ceases or has ceased to be, and is therefore non-existent, cannot be the cause of the latter.

## २१ । असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ।

२१ । अयं 'असति' एव हेतौ फलोत्पत्तिं ब्रूयात् । 'प्रतिज्ञोपरोधः' स्यात् । चतुर्विधान् हेतून् प्रतीत्य चित्तचैवा उत्पद्यन्ते इति इयम् प्रतिज्ञा हीयते । निर्हेतुकाया च उत्पत्तौ अप्रतिवन्धात् सर्वं सर्वत्र उत्पद्येत । अयं उत्तर-क्षणीत्पत्तिं यावत् अवतिष्ठते पूर्वक्षणे इति ब्रूयात्, ततः यौगपद्यं हेतुफलयोः स्यात् । तथा अपि 'प्रतिज्ञोपरोधः' स्यात् । "क्षणिका सर्वे सक्तारा" इति इयं प्रतिज्ञा उपपद्येत ।

21 *Non-existence of cause, while the effect takes place involves contradiction of admitted principle, otherwise, simultaneity of cause and effect* Should it now be urged in reply to our last argument, that even in the absence of a cause the effect may arise, there would be the contradiction of an admitted principle. It would mean the abandonment of the principle that mind and things mental originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes. Moreover, if origination without cause be admitted, there would be nothing to prevent *anything* from originating at *any* place or time. If, on the other hand, it should be said that the antecedent continues until the

consequent has come into being that would imply the simultaneity of cause and effect which also would be the contradiction of an accepted principle viz that all impressions are momentary

२२। प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्या निरोधामाप्तिरविच्छेदात् ।

११। अपिच वेदादिना अपादयति “बुद्धिर्वाच्यं नपादयत् संकृतं चपिचच ।  
अथाह—मदात् तत्त्वभावात् ‘प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधात्’ अपतिसंख्यानिरोधात् आकाशत्  
च अथात् सर्वं बुद्धिर्वाच्यं बुद्धिमत्कामितम् ‘संकृतम् चतुपाद्यम् ‘अपिचं चपचत्  
स्यादि च । भावना बुद्धिपूर्वक विनाश—‘विनाशयामि इति बुद्धे’ बीजमभावात्  
विनाश—प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधं भाष्यते । तद्विपरीते स्तत् विनाश, अपतिसंख्यानिरोधं ।  
आकाशम् चापराधमावभासम् । इदानीं निरोधद्वयं प्रत्याचटे—प्रतिसंख्या अपति  
संख्या निरोधयोः’ अपाप्ति, अमुभय न प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधं अपतिसंख्यानिरोधस्य सम्भवतः  
इत्यत्र । अथाह ?—‘अपिचं दात् भावमवाच्यं अविच्छेदात् न हि कार्यकारण  
मवाच्यं लिखं दृश्यते इत्यत्र ।

22. *The two Buddhistic doctrines of cessation dependent on and cessation independent of acts of the mind are alike untenable there being no real interruption*  
Besides, the Nihilists imagine “Excepting the three principles, all that is the object of knowledge comes into being and is transient. The three principles are (1) Cessation dependent on an act of the mind which means such destruction as is preceded by an act of thought, in other words, destruction by an effort of the thinker with the thought I will destroy (2) Cessation of the opposite kind that is spontaneous cessation without an act of the

mind. (3) Space, that is mere absence of covering or occupation. Now, the two kinds of cessation are being refuted, Cessation which is dependent on an act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent, are both impossible. Why so? Because of the absence of interruption. The flow of existences is never interrupted, i.e., the current of causes and effects is never observed to be arrested.

### २३। उभयथा च दोषात् ।

२३। य. अविद्यादिनिरोधः बौद्धमतं प्रतिषेध्यात्प्रतिषेध्यानिरोधान्नपाती, स नसम्बन्धं ज्ञानात् वा स्वयम् एव वा भवति? पूर्वमिह कस्मै निरोधेति विनाशोपप्रतिज्ञा-  
हानि प्रसज्येत, उत्तरमिह तु ज्ञानसाधनोपदेशस्य आनन्दक्यं प्रसज्येत । एवम् 'उभयथा'  
उभयविकल्पे,—बुद्धिपूर्वक-विनाशे, अबुद्धिपूर्वक-विनाशे च,—दोषप्रसङ्गात् असमञ्जसम्  
इदं दर्शनम् ।

23 And because both alternatives are open to objection. The question arises, whether the cessation of *avidyā*, etc., which must be included in the two kinds of cessation discussed above, is to come through perfect knowledge, or of its own accord. The former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Buddhist doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause. The latter alternative would involve the uselessness of instruction for the acquisition of perfect knowledge. Hence both alternatives, that of the cessation of ignorance through knowledge or that of its cessation without knowledge, being equally objectionable, the Buddhist doctrine is unreasonable.

## २४ । आकाशे चाविशेषात् ।

२४ । आकाशे च वैतर्किकानाम् अव्युत्थारोपः असुखः, अविशेषात् यतः पूर्वाश्रयो निरीक्षणी इव आकाशस्य अपि अविशेषेण व्युत्थलम् उपपद्यते ।

24 And in the case of Space also (the doctrine of its non-existence is untenable) because it does not differ (from the two other non existences, viz. the cessations )

In the case of Space also the ascription of non-existence by the advocates of universal and ceaseless destruction is unreasonable, because substantiality can be established in the case of Space no less than in the case of the two cessations

## २५ । अनुधुतिश्च ।

२५ । अपिच वैतर्किकः सर्वत्र वस्तुनः अविश्वताम् व्युत्थलम् उपपद्यते, अपि अविश्वताम् व्युत्थलम् । न च सा सम्भवति,— अनुधुतिः अनुभवम् अनु उपपद्यमानात् आरब्धात् । अनुभववतो आरब्धवर्ता च एव एव स्यात् । “यः एव यत् पूर्वम् इदम् अद्यापि सा एव इदम् इदानीं बाधमि इति अनुभव-आरब्धी एकत्वात् एव वर्तते यत् प्रत्ययः सम्भवति । ततः अनुभव आरब्धी एकवर्तमानात् अनुभवस्य अनुभवावयवस्य आत्मनः च स्वात्मिनम् एव प्रतिपद्यते, न अविश्वता ।

25 And on account of remembrance (the theory of momentariness breaks down )

The advocate of the doctrine of destruction, assuming all things to be momentary is bound to extend that assumption to the perceiving person also But this is impossible from the fact of remembrance which succeeds percep-



tion The person perceiving and the person remembering the perception must be one and the same. This conviction, viz, "The 'I' that saw this thing sometime ago, is identically the same 'I' that am now remembering it" is possible only when the perception and the subsequent remembrance arise in one and the same person. From the fact that the perception and the subsequent remembrance are functions of one and the same person, the legitimate conclusion is the *permanency* of both the perception and of the person who is the subject of the perception, and not their *momentariness*.

## २६ । नासतोद्भत्वात् ।

२६ । "अभावात् भावोत्पत्तिः" इति यत् वैनाशिका मन्यन्ते, तत् न उपपद्यते । 'नासत्' न असत् अभावात् भावानाम् उत्पत्तिः सम्भवति । 'उद्भत्वात्' यत् जगति अभावात् भावोत्पत्तिः न दृश्यते ।

26 *Existence cannot arise out of non-existence, as it is never observed*

The theory that entity springs from non-entity, as held by the philosophers of destruction, is untenable. The origination of something from nothing is impossible. Existence is never in the world observed to spring from non-existence.

## २७ । उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ।

२७ । यद्वि च अभावात् भावोत्पत्तिः अभ्युपगम्येत, 'एवं' सति 'उदासीनानाम्

अपि कर्तृहीनानाम् अपि विधिः अभिमत-साधनं स्यात् । न तु एतत् दुष्करी चेत्  
यः स्वमेव वा शब्दमिति ।

27 *On that assumption success (would automatically come) to the inactive also*

If it be admitted that from non entity entity can spring then people would obtain their purposes without going through any activity This is absurd and not maintained by anybody

२८ । नामाव उपलब्धे ।

२८ । शब्दो बोद्धव्यः “न विद्यान्यतिरिक्ती बाह्यार्थमिति ज्ञेयमेव । यत्र तं  
विद्यान्यतिरिक्तमिति ज्ञेयमेव । नामाव बाह्यत्वं यद्यपि यथावत् न उपपद्यते ।  
उपलब्धे यतः प्रतिमत्पक्षे वाच्यं कुत्र च घटा इति वाच्यं यद्यपि एव उपलब्धमेव  
न च उपलब्धमानं न यथावत् भवितुम् अस्ति । भाष्ये तु विस्तीर्ण विचारः दृश्यः ।

28. *The non-existence (of external objects) cannot be maintained on account of (our) consciousness (of them)*

Some Bauddhas (the Vijnānastitvamātravādin) hold that no outward things exist apart from consciousness. The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute that doctrine. The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because in every act of perception we are conscious of an external thing such as a post, a wall, a jar a piece of cloth etc. and that of which we are conscious cannot but be existent. This is discussed at length in Sankarāchārya's Bhāṣhya.

## ३८ । वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ।

१८ । यदुक्तं बौद्धेन “स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवत् जागरितगोचरा अपि स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययाः विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन भवेयुः” तत् प्रतिपत्ताव्यम् । अत्र उच्यते, ‘न स्वप्नादिवत्’ न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवत् जाग्रदप्रत्यया भवितुम् अर्हन्ति । ‘वैधर्म्यात्’ यतः स्वप्नजागरितयो वैधर्म्यं विरुद्धस्वभावः भवति । स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु प्रबुद्धस्य बाध्यते सिद्ध्यामयम् उपलब्धं भवति, न च एव जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु कास्याजित् अपि अवस्थाया बाध्यते ।

29 *And (waking perceptions) are not like dreams, because different in nature from them*

Let us now examine the statement made by the Bauddhas that the ideas of posts, etc., of which we are conscious in the waking state may arise in the absence of external objects, like the ideas of a dream. We maintain that it is wrong to describe waking perceptions as similar to the ideas of a dream, as the dreaming and the waking states are essentially dissimilar. The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness, and are perceived to be false. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, are never negated in any state.

## ३९ । न भावोऽनुपलब्धः ।

१९ । यदपि उक्तं वैनाशिकेन “विनापि अर्थेन ज्ञानवैचित्र्यं वासनावैचित्र्यात् एव अवकाशयते” इति, तत्प्रतिपत्ताव्यम् । अत्र उच्यते, ‘न भावः,’ वासनानां भावः उत्पत्ति एव न उपपद्यते तद्धेतुभूतानां बाह्यानां अर्थानां अनभ्युपगमात् । तथाहि, वासना नाम मञ्जारविशेषाः । मञ्जारा च न आश्रयम् अन्तरेण अवकाशयन्ते । आश्रयस्तु अनभ्युपेती

बोद्धः । अपिच चर्चोत्तरं च निमित्तं हि प्रत्ये मानसं वाच्यं भवति ।  
 चन्द्रब्रह्मसंज्ञे चर्चोत्तरं निमित्तं विविदा वाच्यं । मतेषु १ चन्द्रब्रह्मं यत्  
 चर्चोत्तरं विदा चन्द्रब्रह्मसंज्ञं न चन्द्रब्रह्मं तत् निम्बब्रह्मसंज्ञं न चन्द्रब्रह्मं १

30 *The existence (of mental impressions) is not (consistent with the Buddha view) on account of the non perception (of external things)*

We now address ourselves to the examination of the statement of the Bauddhas that the variety of perceptions can be explained from the variety of vāsana (preceding mental impressions) without any reference to external things. We remark that on the Buddhist view the origination of vāsana (preceding mental impressions) itself is impossible — external objects, which are their origin not being admitted. Again a vāsana (mental impression) is a kind of modification and modifications cannot take place unless there is a substratum to be modified, which the Bauddha does not admit. And it is only because external things are perceived that mental impressions become various in kind corresponding to the various objects of perception. How indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? As mental impressions are never observed to arise except through the perception of external objects, so we conclude that the Bauddha hypothesis of an independent series of mental impressions is inadmissible.

३१ । अपिचत्वात् ।

३१ । यदि चाप्यपि मानम् (चर्चोत्तरसंज्ञादीन्) नाम वाच्यं तत्रैव बोद्धेत्

परिकल्पित, तदपि 'कणिकत्वात्' न वासनानाम् अधिकरणं भवितुम् अर्हति । 'न हि कालवयसमन्विनि एकधिन् अन्वयिनि असति कट्प्ये वा सञ्चार्यदृग्निनि देगकाल-निमिषापेक्ष-वाभगाधीन-स्मृति-प्रतिमन्वानादि-स्वप्न-सम्भवति" इति ग०८१ ।

31. *And on account of (the Buddhist doctrine of general) momentariness, (the ālayavijñāna conceived by that doctrine also comes to nothing)*

The so called *ālayavijñāna* (sum total of ideas corresponding to the ego) that has been conceived by the Buddhists as the support of mental impressions, cannot constitute the permanent substratum of impressions, because that *vijñāna* also is admittedly momentary. As Sankarācharva says, "Unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future, or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time and cause" (Thibaut's translation)

३२ । सर्व्वथानुपपत्तेश्च ।

३२ । यत् 'सर्व्वथा' सर्व्वप्रकारेण वैनाशिका सत 'अनुपपन्नः', तत् सर्व्वथा अयम् अनादिकथीय, इत्यभिप्रायः ।

32 *And (the Buddhist doctrine is to be rejected) because of failure of proof on all sides*

As the Buddhist doctrine proves inconclusive from all points of view, so it is to be entirely disregarded.

### ३३। नैकस्मिन्नसम्भवात् ।

३३। इदानीं जलमत्त निरूप्यते । जलम् चतुर्धा भावत भवत्तु निम्नः  
 जलम् भाव इति शक्यम् । १। जलानां भवत्तु । संवत्त एव जलान्तेषु इति दो  
 एव पक्षो भवत्तु, अन्तेषाम् एतदा जलान्तेषाम् । तदा इलम् चतुर्धा भवत्तु  
 भावते,—पक्षान्तिभावात् । भावः । अन्तेषाम् पक्षान्तिभावात् । भावान्तिभावात्  
 पुनरान्तिभावात् । अन्तेषाम् पक्षान्तिभावात् । २। जलम् च इति । जलम् भाव  
 इति एवम् । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु ।  
 इमं जलमन्तिषाम् भावम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु । अन्तेषाम् भवत्तु ।  
 च अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।  
 अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।  
 अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।  
 अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।  
 अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।  
 अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् । अन्तेषाम् भावम् ।

33 (*The Jaina doctrine is not (to be accepted) on account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes existing) in one and the same thing*)

We now proceed to refute the Jaina doctrine. Jīva (soul) ajīva (non soul : i. e. objects of enjoyment of the soul) āśrava (movement of the senses towards their objects) samvara (restraint of the activity of the senses) nirjara (destruction of sin by self mortification) bandha (bondage of karma) and moksha (the soul's release from bondage and ascent to the highest regions)—these seven categories are acknowledged by the Jainas. Briefly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories only viz. soul and

non-soul, as the others are included in them. They also recount another set of five categories different from the above two, under the name 'astikâya' (a term literally meaning 'existing bodies,' and denoting categories). These 'astikâya' categories are—jîva (soul), pudgala (material body), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), and âkâsa (space). They also set forth various fanciful inner sub-divisions of all these categories. Moreover, they apply to all things the following peculiar process of reasoning which they call the saptabhangînaya. It may be that it is, it may be that it is not, it may be that it both is and is not, it may be that it is indescribable, it may be that it is, and is also indescribable, it may be that it is not and is also indescribable, it may be that it both is and is not, and is also indescribable. Thus they ascribe contradictory attributes, such as being and non-being, simultaneously to one and the same thing, and maintain that one and the same thing is on the one hand existent and on the other non-existent, on the one hand permanent and on the other non-permanent.

To this we reply as follows. Your doctrine is unreasonable, because it is impossible that such contradictory attributes as existence and non-existence etc should inhere in one and the same thing at the same time.

३४ । एवञ्चात्माऽकातृज्ञम् ।

३४ । यथा एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विषयधर्मासम्भवी दोषः स्यादादे प्रसक्तः, 'एवञ्चात्मान' अपि 'अकातृज्ञम्' असर्वगतत्वम् परिच्छिन्नत्वम् इति यावत् अपरः दोषः, अतश्च यथादिवत् आत्मन अनित्यत्वम् प्रसज्येत । शरीरपरिभाषा हि जीवः इति जैना-

सम्भवे । अत्रापि च । ऐरपरिमाणं । जीवः नात्र जगत्तु, एवमित्युच्यते । अपि जगत्तु  
जीवान्-जीवन-व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । अत्र भिन्न परिमाणं यदीति सम्प्रतीयते तत् सत्यम् ।

अथ पक्षार्थः । ईदृशोऽपरिमाणो न केचित् जीवानामत्र । उपपत्त्यति, तदुक्तरी  
प्रतिपत्तौ न केचित् उपपत्त्यति, इति उच्यते तत्र अपि उच्यते परस्परम् ।

34 *And similarly (the Jaina doctrine leads to) non universality of the self*

We have discussed one objection against the Syādvāda (the Jaina doctrine) viz. the impossibility of contradictory attributes co existing in the same thing. Another objection is that according to that doctrine the soul is not universal (not omnipresent *i e.*, of limited extension) whence it follows that the soul is non eternal like jars etc. The Jainas maintain that the soul is of the size of the body. How can the soul we ask the size of whose body is liable to change in different births as well as in the stages of infancy youth and old age in one and the same birth fit in with all these different sizes of bodies?

The Jaina may say that as the soul enters by turns a large and a small body some particles accede to or withdraw from it. To this hypothesis the next sūtra furnishes a reply

३५ । न च पक्षायादव्यविरोधो विचारः ।

३५ । 'न च पक्षायात् न च ईदृशो जीवानामत्र ईदृशो अवस्थापनमात्रं  
'अपि विरोधः' अतिरिक्तं जीवान् ईदृशपरिमाणमात्रं उपपादयितुं शक्यते । कुतः ?—  
'विचारः' यतः अवस्थापनमात्रमात्रमात्रं अपि न चापूर्वमात्रं अपरमात्रं



जीवस्य विक्रिप्रावच तावत् मरिणाद्यम् । विक्रिप्रावचो च चमोदिवत् अनित्य-  
प्रसज्येत ।

35 *Nor (can the Jain doctrine) attain self-consistency through (the hypothesis of alternate (accession and withdrawal of particles), for (such hypothesis involves the soul in a liability to) change etc*

Nor can the hypothesis of the accession and withdrawal of particles corresponding to the increase and decrease of bodily size consistently prove the co extensiveness of the soul with the body Why so ? Because it involves the soul's liability to change etc If constant repletion and depletion through the accession and withdrawal of particles be admitted with respect to the soul, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the soul is liable to change. If liable to change, it follows that it is non-eternal, like the skin etc

३६ । अन्त्यावस्थितेष्वभिधनित्यत्वादविशेषः ।

३६ । जैनै 'अन्त्यास्य' मोक्षावस्थाभाविन जीवपरिमाणस्य 'अवस्थिति' नित्यत्वम्  
इच्छन्ते । 'अन्त्यावस्थिते' अन्त्यास्य जीवपरिमाणस्य अवस्थिते नित्यत्वात् 'अभिधनित्यत्वात्'  
आयमध्यमयो अपि जीवपरिमाणयो नित्यत्व-प्रसङ्गात्, 'अविशेष' जीवपरिमाणे सर्वदा  
एव अभेदप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, जीवः सर्वस्यासु अवस्थानु अभेदेन अणु, सहान् वा स्यात्, न कदापि  
अरीरपरिमाण, इत्यर्थः ।

36 *As (the size of the soul is held by the Jainas to be) unalterable in the final (liberated) state, its permanency in the other two (initial and medial) states also*

*follows Hence (the theory of the) variability (of the soul's size) is not (admissible)*

The Jains maintain the unalterability of the size of the soul in its final (released) state. From the attribute of unalterability inherent in the size of the soul in its final state follows unalterability in its initial and medial states also. Hence the soul must be considered as having always one and the same size, whether minute or great and not having the (varying) sizes of its bodies.

इति । पक्षेणामञ्जस्यत् ।

३० । इदानीं कैवल्यविज्ञान-ईश्वरवाद प्रतिविशति । ईश्वरस्य भाषित-  
नैवास्तिक ब्रह्मविज्ञान-मार्गतत्त्वप्रकाशेन मित्र कैवल्यमिति आरम्भे न तु उपपादानकारणम्  
ईश्वरं कल्पयति । न तु 'यस्य ईश्वरस्य जगत्कारणत्वम्' उपपद्यते । अत्राह ?—  
असामञ्जस्यत् इति मध्यम-सत्त्वमसीन आचिमेदान् विदधत ईश्वरस्य रायवेवादि  
प्रसक्त पक्षदादिषु पक्षीश्वरत्वम् प्रसज्यते ।

37 *Īśvara (cannot be the cause of the world) on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine)*

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to refute the doctrine which says that Īśvara having the attribute of a general ruler only is the cause of the world. Those Sāṅkhyas that admit Īśvara, the Māheśvaras, the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣika and others, teach that Īśvara is different from Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, and is only the operative cause and not the material cause also of the world.

The Sūtrakāra remarks that the doctrine of the Īśvara (of these theories) being the cause of the world is in

admissible. Why so? On account of inappropriateness, because, if Īsvara be supposed to ordain for various classes of creatures unequal positions, some low, some middle, and some high, then it follows that he is subject like us to bias and prejudice, and is no real Īsvara

### ૩૮ । સંવત્સાનુપપત્તેષ્વ ।

૩૮ । इतथ केषान-नियन्तृ-ईश्वरवादस्य असामञ्जस्य यत् प्रकृति-पुरुष-व्यतिरिक्तस्य ईश्वरस्य ताभ्या सह संवत्स न उपपद्यते, संवत्स विना च ईशित्व न उपपद्यते ।

38. *And because no connection (of Īsvara with souls and with Pradhāna) can be established.*

The doctrine of Īsvara as only a ruler presents this further difficulty that Īsvara being entirely distinct from nature and souls, can have no connection with them Being unconnected, it is impossible to establish that he is their ruler.

### ૩૯ । અધિષ્ઠાનાનુપપત્તેષ્વ ।

૩૯ । इतथ तार्किक-कल्पितस्य ईश्वरवादस्य असामञ्जस्य यत् प्रत्यक्षे सदादौ कुम्भकारस्य अधिष्ठानवत् सम्यक्त्वे रूपदिहीने प्रधाने ईश्वरस्य अधिष्ठान न उपपद्यते ।

39. *And because the rulership (of Īsvara) cannot be established*

The doctrine of Īsvara held by the argumentative philosophers is untenable on the following ground also That the potter can control the clay etc., which are all

objects of perception. But the Pradhāna is devoid of form and other qualities, and is therefore not an object of perception. Hence Īsvara's control (rulership) over the Pradhāna cannot be established.

४० । चारणवचनेन भोगादिभ्य ।

४ । 'चेत्' यदि मयेत ईश्वरस्य प्रधानाविठानं पुनस्तु चारणवत् इन्द्रियाविठानवत् छात् तच्चापि तत् 'न' उपपद्यते । भोगादिभ्यं यत् प्रवृत्तस्य चारणाविठानस्यामे ईश्वरस्य तद्वत् सुखदुःखमीवादस्य प्रसङ्गीरन् ।

40 *If it be said (that Īsvara governs the Pradhāna) just as (the soul governs) the organs of sense we say No. Because the enjoyment of pleasures etc. (which affect the soul through the senses, cannot be predicated of Īsvara.)*

*If it be adduced that Īsvara's control over the Pradhāna is similar to the soul's control over the senses we say that this is untenable. For from this analogy it would follow that Īsvara is subject to pleasure and pain like the soul.*

४१ । अतएवमसर्वव्यवता वा ।

४१ । इत्यतः तार्किक-परिच्छेदितस्य ईश्वरवादस्य अनुपपत्तिरिति यत् तदवधि ईश्वरस्य अनन्तत्वं असर्वव्यवता वा प्रसज्येत । यदानीं च प्रधानम् अनन्त्यात् पुनस्तद्विषयी मिथ्या इति साध्यादस्य अन्वयव्यवृत्तेः । तत्र विधाय—'सर्वेभ्य ईश्वरेभ्य'

प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणाम् आत्मनश्च इयत्ता निर्दिष्टा न वा निर्दिष्टा ?” उभयथापि दोषः अनुभूत एव । यत् हि लोके इयत्तानिर्दिष्ट वस्तु घटादि दृश्यते तत् अल्पवत् दृष्टम् । तथा प्रधान-पुरुषेश्वर-त्रयम् अपि इयत्तानिर्दिष्टत्वात् अल्पवत् स्यात् । अनिर्देशं सति ईश्वरस्य असर्वज्ञता प्रसज्येत ।

41 (The doctrine of Ísvara leads to the dilemma that Ísvara is) *either of limited magnitude or of limited knowledge*

The doctrine of Ísvara held by the argumentative philosophers is invalid for this reason also, that from their doctrine follows either finitude or want of omniscience on the part of Ísvara. The Sāṅkhyas etc maintain that the Pradhána is unlimited, and the souls which are different from the Pradhána are also unlimited. Now the question arises, does the omniscient Ísvara define the measure of the Pradhána, the souls, and himself, or does he not define it? Both alternatives are objectionable. All things in this world that are observed to be defined in extent, such as jars, etc are also observed to be limited. Therefore, if, on the one hand, we say that the measures of the Pradhána, of the souls, and of Ísvara have been defined, it follows that they are all limited. If on the other hand we say that their measures have not been defined by Ísvara, it follows that Ísvara is not omniscient.

४२ । उत्पत्तिसम्भवात् ।

४२ । अथ भागवतानां चतुर्व्यूहवाद प्रत्याख्यायते । ते मन्यन्ते भगवान् एव

एकं वायुं विद्यन्-मानसं च परमावतलम् । स चतुर्धा भावान् प्रविभज्य  
प्रतिष्ठितं वायुं च व्यूहयेत् सङ्घस्य व्यूहयेत् प्रद्युम्न-व्यूहयेत् अनिरुद्ध-व्यूहयेत्  
च । वायुं नाम परमात्मा सङ्घस्य नाम जीवः प्रद्युम्नं नाम मनः  
अनिरुद्धं नाम अहंकारः । त्रयो वायुं परं प्रकृतिः इति सङ्घर्षात्मा कार्यम् ।  
वायुं वा सङ्घस्य उत्पद्यते सङ्घस्यात् च प्रद्युम्नः प्रद्युम्नात् च अनिरुद्धः । अथ  
प्रमाणम्—वायुर्विषयस्य परमात्मनः सङ्घर्षप्रत्ययं जीवस्य उत्पत्तिं भवति,  
अनिरुद्धादि-जीव-प्रकृतात् । उत्पत्तिमत्त्वे हि जीवस्य अनिरुद्धः । ईदृशं प्रमाणम् ।  
तस्यात् असङ्घता मायवतामां भवति ।

42 (The doctrine of the Bhāgavatas is unsatisfactory)  
on account of the impossibility of the origination (of  
individual souls from the highest Lord)

Now we are going to refute the doctrine of the four  
Vyūhas (or forms assumed by the Lord) held by the  
Bhāgavatas. They maintain that the one holy (Bhagavat)  
Vasudeva is of the essence of pure knowledge and he  
it is that really exists. He, dividing himself fourfold  
appears in four forms (vyūhas) as Vāsudeva, Sankarshana  
Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vāsudeva is the Highest Self  
Sankarsh na the individual soul Pradyumna the sensorium  
(*manas*) and Aniruddha the principle of egoity (*ahankāra*)  
Of these four Vāsudeva is the ultimate causal essence  
and the other three, Sankarshana etc., are his effects.  
Sankarshana springs from Vāsudeva, Pradyumna from  
Sankarshana, and Aniruddha from Pradyumna.

On this system we remark that it is not possible that  
Sankarshana, the individual soul should be produced from  
Vāsudeva, the Highest Self for in that case it would  
follow that the individual soul is finite in duration. From

the very fact of being originated, non-permanency and other imperfections would cling to the soul. The theory of the Bhāgavatas is therefore unreasonable.

४३ । न च कर्तुः कारणम् ।

४३ । इत 'च' भागवताना कल्पना असङ्गता यत 'कर्तुः कारणम्' उत्पद्यमान लोके 'न' दृश्यते । वर्णयन्ति तु भागवता कर्तुः जीवात् सङ्कर्षणसञ्ज्ञात् कारणं मनः प्रद्युम्नसञ्ज्ञकम् उत्पद्यते, तस्मात् च अहकारः अनिरुद्धसञ्ज्ञकः उत्पद्यते इति । न तु एतस्य दृष्टान्तं श्रुतिप्रमाणेष्वपलभ्यमानम् ।

43 *Nor is the origination of the instrument from the agent (tenable).*

This fact also renders the theory of the Bhāgavatas indefensible that in this world an instrument (such as a hatchet, etc.,) is never observed to spring from an agent. But the Bhāgavatas teach that from an agent, *viz* the individual soul termed Sankarshana, there springs its instrument *viz* the internal organ (*manas*) termed Pradyumna, and from that again *its* instrument the ahamkāra, named Aniruddha. But we meet neither with observed instances nor with scriptural passages in favour of such a statement.

४४ । विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ।

४४ । यदि वा मन्येत, न सङ्कर्षणादथ जीवा, सर्वे एव एते विज्ञानादि-ऐश्वर्य-

धर्मो भवितुः वासुदेवात्, एवं सङ्गपत्तादी 'विद्यानादिभारि अपि तन्मतिपिब' पूर्वोक्तस्य  
 उत्पत्तिरसम्बन्ध-दीर्घस्य अप्रतिपिब' भावीति एव एव' दीप' भवा' तन्निर्णय प्रसङ्गेन  
 उपर्य' । अथम् ?—अदि तावत् अभिप्राय परस्परभिन्नाः एव एते वासुदेवादयः  
 यत्वा ईदृशाः गुणवर्थाश्च न एवाम् परमात्मकत्वम् अस्ति ततः समेक्षेण सङ्गता  
 "अथपानैकी वासुदेव, इति सिद्धान्तो न स्मरितः जायते । अथ अथम् अभिप्राय एवम्  
 एव सत्त्वत एते यत्वा स्युर्वा गुणवर्थाश्च, ततः कार्यत्वा ज्ञेयी सत्त्वात् अतिवशः  
 भावात् उत्पत्तिः न सम्भवेत् ।

44 *The objection (that Sankarshana etc. cannot be produced from Vāsudeva, etc.,) is not removed even if the existence of supreme knowledge etc. (be assumed in all the four vyāhṛas)*

It may be asserted that Sankarshana and the other *vyāhṛas* are not the individual soul the sensorium etc., but that each and everyone of them is Vāsudeva himself possessed of all the characteristics of a Ruler (*viz* supreme knowledge etc.) Even on such a hypothesis the objection previously raised (against the origination of the *vyāhṛas*) persists it applies still only in another form. How so? If in the first place, it be meant that the four *Īśvaras* distinct from one another *viz* Vāsudeva etc. have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self then it would amount to the assumption of more than one *Īśvara*, and the abandonment of the principle of One holy (Bhagavat) Vāsudeva. If in the second place it be meant that from the one Highest Being have arisen the four forms, all having equal attributes, then it would place cause and effect on an equal footing and there would remain no super eminence in the cause to make the causation of effect possible.



४५ । विप्रतिषेधाच्च ।

४५ । 'विप्रतिषेधात्' विरुद्धातिदग्गनात् 'च' भागवत-मत, उपेत्य, । गुण-  
गुणित्व-काल्पनादि-लक्षण बहुविध वचनविरोध तेषां शास्त्रं उपलभ्यते,—ज्ञानैश्वर्य-  
शक्ति-यल-वीर्य-तेजांसि गुणा, आत्मान एव एते भगवन्त वासुदेवा, इत्यादि । वेद-  
प्रतिषेधश्च भवति,—चतुर्षु वेदेषु परं श्रेयोऽलम्बुं प्राप्नुयित्वा इदं शास्त्रम् अधिगतवान्,  
इत्यादि-वेदनिन्दादग्गनात् । तस्मात् असङ्गता एषा कल्पना, इति सिद्धम् ।

45. *And on account of contradictions also (the Bhāgavata system is unacceptable)*

Further, the Bhāgavata doctrine is to be disregarded because there are various contradictions in it. Many contradictions are met with in their authoritative books in respect of attributes and the beings possessing those attributes, e g, knowledge, ruling capacity, strength, valour, and spirit are spoken of, sometimes as qualities, and sometimes as selves, holy Vāsudevas, etc. Moreover, there is contradiction of the Vedas also. The following passage, which disparages the Vedas, is to be found in their books,—“Having failed to obtain the highest bliss from the four Vedas, Sāṅdilya studied this Śāstra.” For this reason the theory of the Bhāgavatas is unreasonable.

## अविरोध-नाम द्वितीयाध्याय

तृतीयं पाद—सङ्गभूतविषयाणां जीवविषयाणाञ्च

श्रुतिवाक्यानां विरोध परिहार



### १। न विपद्यते ।

१। सर्वत्रात्मनस्तद्विस्तृत्य निर्देयत्वं तद्विस्तृतीयत्वं चापान्विधीय भवनात्, यत्र दातृ कर्मणे । तत्र तदम् तावत् आकाशम् आग्निं विस्तृतं—किम् दातृ कर्मणं चत्ति, तत आग्नि इति । तत्र तावत् पूज्यस्य प्रतिपद्यते न विपत् न आकाशम् कर्मणः । अथान् १—‘चक्षुः न हि कश्चित् प्रकाशं चक्षुः कर्मणं चत्ति, यदा वासाव्यं कर्मण्य ३३ ब्रह्मसामान्यम् ।

1 The Pūrvapakshin says that *ākāśa* (space or ether) *has no origin as there is no scriptural passage* (stating the origination of *ākāśa*)

The object of this *pāda* is to clear the meaning of and remove the apparent contradictions in the passages bearing on creation in Vedānta texts. In this connection we shall first consider the question whether *ākāśa* (space or ether) has an origin or not and as usual first hear the Pūrvapaksha.

The Pūrvapaksha maintains that *ākāśa* has no origin. Why so? Because in the scriptures it is not mentioned

in the sections which treat of origins, e g , the *Chhandogya* Upanishad, first prapāthaka, sixth khanda

## २ । अस्तितु ।

२ । 'तु'-शब्द पचान्तर-परिग्रहे । सा नाम आकाशस्य छान्दोग्ये भूत् उत्पत्तिः, श्रुत्यन्तरे 'तु अस्ति' । तैत्तिरीयका द्वितीयवक्षारम्भे समामनन्ति,—“सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म” इति उपदिश्य,—“तस्माद् वा एतस्मादाकाशं सम्भूतं” इति ।

2 But, it may be said, *there is* (another scriptural passage, which mentions the origination of *ākāśa* )

The word 'but' here indicates that the Pūrvapaksha is going to introduce a possible objection against his own position, with a view to controvert it. It is true, the objector may say, that the origination of *ākāśa* is not mentioned in the *Chhāndogya* , but it is mentioned in other scriptural passages. For the Upanishad of the Taittirīyakas, at the commencement of the second Valli, after teaching that “Brahman is the truly existent, intelligent, and infinite,” goes on to say, “From that same spiang *ākāśa* ”

## ३ । गौण्यसम्भवात् ।

३ । पुनरेव पूर्वपक्षः । नास्ति विद्यदुत्पत्तिश्रुतिः या तु इतरा विद्यदुत्पत्तिवादिनी श्रुतिः उदादिता, सा 'गौणी' भवितुम् अर्हति । यथा लोके “आकाशं कुतः,” “आकाशं जातं” इति एवञ्जगतीयका गौण्यप्रयोगः अस्ति, एवम् इयं श्रुतिरपि गौणी द्रष्टव्या । कस्मात् ?—‘असम्भवात्’ यतः कारणसामग्र्यसम्भवात् आकाशस्य उत्पत्तिः न सम्भवति ।

अपात्मन समवायि सममवायि निमित्तकारणम् इति द्वित्वं सर्वम् उक्त्यनान्न समुत्पद्यते । द्रव्यस्य च पञ्चशातोपक्रमं चैतन्न द्रव्यं समवायिकारणं भवति । समवायिकारणानां संख्यया अवलम्बनिकायम् । यन्मूलकादि निमित्तकारणम् । आकाशस्य विविधस्य एव कारणस्य अभावेऽपि उच्यते न सञ्जयतः । उपतिमतां च निःशून्यदीनां पूर्वोत्तरात्मनीं विविधं सञ्जायते, प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकाशनादि कार्या न वदुः, यथात् न भवति इति, य काय र पुनः न पूर्वोत्तरात्मनीं विविधं सञ्जायितुं शक्यते । किं हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः अनन्तरं त्रयं अनुविशतं अन्तिमं वदुः इति शक्यते अन्तरप्रागुत्पत्तेः ? तस्यात् विमुक्तदिनपञ्चात् न आकाशस्य सञ्जयति ।

3 (That scriptural passage, however must be taken to have) *a secondary sense because* (the origination of *dhṛṣṭā*) *is impossible*

The Pārvaṇakṣa now refutes the objection raised in the last Sūtra ] In reality there is no scriptural passage mentioning the origination of *dhṛṣṭā* The passage quoted as referring to the origination of *dhṛṣṭā* must be taken as having only a secondary (i.e. figurative) significance. Just as amongst common people a secondary (figurative) use of the word is met with in such expressions as "make room *dhṛṣṭā*" "room (*dhṛṣṭā*) has been made" and so forth similarly these scriptural expressions also have only a secondary meaning Why so ? On account of impossibility i.e. because it is impossible to prove the existence of the necessary conjunction of causes in the case of *dhṛṣṭā* According to Kāṇḍa whatever is originated is originated from three kinds of causes, viz. inherent causes, non-inherent causes, and operative causes. The inherent cause of a substance consists of several substances of the same kind. The non-inherent cause is the conjunction of the substances.

constituting the inherent cause Machines, instruments, etc, constitute the operative cause In the case of *ākāśa*, none of the three causes exist, therefore the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible Further, it is possible for things which are caused, such as fire etc, to have differences between their earlier and later stages, e g, before the origination (of fire), light and the other effects of it did not exist, while they appear after its origination But about *ākāśa*, it is not possible to conceive such difference between the earlier and the later conditions Is it possible to maintain, we ask, that before the origination of *ākāśa*, there were no spaces, no apertures, no holes ? Or this reason, as well as from the characteristic qualities of *ākāśa*, such as all-pervadingness etc, it follows that it is unoriginated

### ४ । शब्दाच्च ।

४ । पुनरपि पूर्वपक्षे । न केवलं तर्कात्, 'शब्दात् च' श्रुतिवचनात् च आकाशस्य अजत्व-सिद्धिः । यत आह,—“वायु-वातरिचक्षैतदमृतम्” ( बृह० २।३।३ ) । न हि अमृतस्य उत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते । “आकाशवत् सर्वगतं नित्यं” इति च आकाशेन ब्रह्म सर्वगतत्व-नित्यत्वाभ्यां चर्माभ्याम् उपनिषान् आकाशस्य अपि तौ घर्माः सूचयति । न च तादृशस्य उत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते ।

4 From the Vedas also (the non-origination of *ākāśa* follows )

(The Pārvaṇakṣa continues That *ākāśa* is uncaused follows not only from logical reasoning, but also from the words of the scripture. It says, “Air and this mid-region

are immortal, (Br II 3 3) What is immortal can not have an origin. Another passage Omnipresent and eternal like *ākāśa* by comparing Brahma to *ākāśa* in respect of omnipresence and eternity intimates that the same two qualities belong to *ākāśa* also in which case origination cannot be attributed to it.

### ५ । व्यापकेकस्य प्रसङ्गस्यत् ।

५ । पूर्वपक्षे वतीत्यनुवृत्तिताम् आमहाम् वारयति । आमहा तु — कथं पुनः तस्य वा एतस्या वाच्यं न काम्यं सम्भूतं (ते १।१) इत्यादिषु सुतिषु एकस्य “सम्भूतं सत्त्वं तत्र प्रवर्तितं चतुर्वर्णमात्मन्यमुपस्थितं सम्भवति चाकाम्यं च योच्यते” इति । अत उक्तम् उच्यते,—‘एकस्य अपि “सम्भूतं सत्त्वं विवर्णविशेषमात्मनोच” मुख्यं प्रकाशं’ इत्यात् प्रसङ्गस्यत् । यथा तत्तिरीषोपनिषदि वतीत्यत्राम् ‘ब्रह्म सत्त्वं चतुर्वर्णं तपति च योच्यं प्रदीपं’ आनन्दे आदिकारं च मुख्यं प्रदीपं तद्वत् ।

5 (A secondary as well as a primary sense) of one and the same word (*sambhūta* i. e. *sprang*) is possible just as in the case of the word *Brahman*

The Pūrvapakṣa replies to an objection that may arise out of his statement in the third sūtra. The objection is this—How can one and the same word *sambhūta* (*sprang*) be used in the scriptural texts commencing with “From that Self sprang *ākāśa* (*Taittī* II 1) once in its primary meaning with regard to fire etc., and again in its secondary meaning with regard to *ākāśa*? The reply of the Pūrvapakṣa to this objection is—The one word

*sambhūta* (sprang) may, according to the different subjects to which it refers, have primary as well as secondary uses, like the word 'Brahman'. In the third Valli of the same *Taittiriya* Upanishad the word 'Brahman' is used in its secondary sense with regard to food etc., and to austerities, and also in its primary sense with regard to the First Cause, whose essence is bliss. Similarly with respect to '*sambhūta*'

### ६ । प्रतिज्ञाऽहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः ।

६ । सिद्धान्तपक्षोऽयम् । “आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे भुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्वं विदितम्” ( बृह० ४।५।६ ) एवञ्च प्रतिवेदान्त 'प्रतिज्ञा' विज्ञायते । तस्या प्रतिज्ञायाः एवम् एव 'अहानि' अनुपरोधः स्यात्, यदि 'अव्यतिरेक' अस्मिन् कृतस्त्वस्य वस्तुजातस्य विज्ञेयात् ब्रह्मण्य स्यात् । व्यतिरेके हि सति “एकविज्ञानेन सर्वं विज्ञायते” ( छान्दोग्ये ६।१।३ ) इति द्वयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत । स च अव्यतिरेक एवम् एव उपपद्यते यदि कृतस्त्व वस्तुजातम् एकस्मात् ब्रह्मण उत्पद्येत । ‘शब्देभ्य च प्रकृतिविकाराव्यतिरेक-न्यायेनैव प्रतिज्ञासिद्धिः अवगम्यते । “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तदेकत्वं तत्तेजोऽस्तजत” इति ( छा० ६।२।१-३ ) एव काव्येजातं ब्रह्मण्य प्रदर्श्य अव्यतिरेकं प्रदर्शयन्ति “एतदात्मानमिदं सर्वम्” ( छा० ६।८।७ ) इत्यादिप्रपाठक-समाप्ते । तद्वयदि आकाशः न ब्रह्मकार्थः स्यात्, न ब्रह्मणि विज्ञाते आकाशः विज्ञायेत । ततश्च प्रतिज्ञाहानिः स्यात् ।

6 (In reply to the foregoing statements of the Pūrva-paksha, we say that) *according to the words of the scriptures propositions once affirmed therein for establishment remain confirmed (lit. unabandoned) only on the admission of the non-difference (of the entire world with Brahman)*

This is the reply from the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra. Throughout the Vedāntas, propositions like this are constantly found affirmed. When the Self has been seen heard perceived and known then all this is known" (*Bṛ* IV 5 6.) Such affirmations remain unabandoned (i. e. uncontradicted) only if everything in the world is held to be non-different from (i. e., identical with) Brahman the object of (Vedantic) knowledge. Only in the event of admitting a difference between them would the proposition "By the knowledge of one thing every thing is known (*Chh* VI 1 3) be contradicted. That identity (i. e. the identity of the entire world with Brahman again is possible of affirmation only if everything in the world originates from Brahman. And it is understood from the words of the scriptures that that affirmation can be established only through the theory of the identity of the material cause and its effects. Thus the passages Sat (the truly existent one only O dear (disciple was all this in the beginning—one only without a second "it thought, — it sent forth fire etc. (*Chh* VI 2 1 3) after declaring in the first place, that all effects are produced by Brahman, proceed to declare, in the second place, that everything is identical with Brahman viz. in the passages commencing with In it all that exists has its Self' (*Chh* VI 8 7) to the end of the prapāthaka. Now if *ākāśa* be not an effect of Brahman then it cannot become known by Brahman being known, and such a supposition would involve the abandonment of propositions previously affirmed.



### ७ । यावत् विकारन्तु विभागो लोकावत् ।

७ । 'तु'-शब्द आकाशस्य उत्पत्तौ असम्भवाशङ्काया निवृत्त्यर्थः । न खलु आकाशोत्पत्तौ असम्भवाशङ्का कर्तव्या, यत 'यावत्' किञ्चित् 'विकार'जात दृश्यते तावान् एव 'विभाग लोके' लक्ष्यते, न तु अपिक्तात किञ्चित् कुतश्चित् विभक्तम् उपलभ्यते । विभागश्च आकाशस्य पृथिव्यादिस्य अवगम्यते, तस्मात् सोऽपि विकारी भवितुम् अर्हति ।

7 But, as observed in the world, there is division (i e separation of one thing from another) only so far as (things {are} modifications (of other substances, i e. are effects, and not causes)

The word 'but' is meant to exclude the doubt that the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible. We should not suppose that the origination of *ākāśa* is impossible. For in this world, division (i e, separation of one thing from another) is observed only in so far as modifications (i e, things produced, as effects, from other substances, such as jars, pots, etc,) are observed, and nothing that is not an effect is anywhere seen to be divided. Now, *ākāśa* is perceived to be divided (distinct) from the earth, etc. Hence *ākāśa* also must be an effect.

### ८ । एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ।

८ । एतेन विद्युत्त्याख्यानैर्मातरिश्वा विद्युदाद्यश्च वायु अपि व्याख्यातः । यं किञ्चिन्नीतिम् भवत्येता आकाशस्य उत्पत्तिपक्षे सशयः, पूत्रपक्षः, सिद्धान्तश्च कृत्वा, चाशङ्कित्पक्षौ अपि न एव बीजनीया इति वाक्यग्रेषु ।

8 By the above, air (also) is explained

The above explanation of (the origination of) *ākāśa* (from Brahman) serves also for air of which *ākāśa* is the support. The same steps as have been employed in the discussion about the origin of *ākāśa* viz. the preliminary doubt, the *Pārvaṇakṣha*, and the establishment of the hypothesis, should be applied in the case of the origin of air also

### ८ । असम्भवंसु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

८ । विद्युत्पद्मवत् सत्त्वरूपि भवत् कुतश्चित् उत्पत्ति इति स्यात् समन्वि-  
मतिः । ताम् चामहाम् अपनेतुम् इदं कृतम् । न खलु सत सद्व्यवस्थया ब्रह्मण-  
कुतश्चित् चत्तत् सद्वत् उत्पत्ति आगदितव्या । क्वथात् ?—अनुपपत्त यत  
जात्यवस्थायां सामान्य विनिर्वाहमात्रात् प्रवृत्तिविचारभावे न उपपद्यते । न अपि  
सर्वव्याप्य यत सामान्यात् विनिर्वाह उत्पद्यमाना इत्यत्र सद्वत् पदार्थः । न तु  
विनिर्वाह सामान्यम् । न अपि चत्तत् निरावृत्त्यात् अवयवस्य सम्बन्धित  
( वा दाशर ) इति पाप्यवयवत्त्वं ।

9 *But the Sat (the truly existent One i. e. Brahman) has no origin for that is impossible*

Here some one might think that like *ākāśa* and air Brahman too might have an origin in something else. The purpose of the present Sūtra is to remove such doubt. It is unreasonable to imagine that Brahman whose essence is Being itself may have his being from something else. Why so? Because it is impossible. Because, the condition in which one thing becomes an origin and another its product never arises unless the cause and the

effect are distinguishable as general and particular (as clay and a jar). Nor, again, can the Sat spring from anything particular, because it is observed that particular forms of existence are produced from what is general, (as jars etc from clay etc) and never the general from the particular. Nor, further, can the Sat (Being) spring from asat, 'non-being', because the asat has no self (and therefore cannot be a cause), and further, there is this reproachful passage in scripture, "How could that which *is*, spring from that which *is not*?" (*Chh VI 2, 2*)

### १० । तेजोऽवस्तयाह्वाह ।

१० । 'तेज' 'अत' सातरिश्चन जायते । कस्मात् ?—'तथाहि आह' "वायोरग्नि" ( तै० २।१ ) इति ।

10 Fire proceeds from that 'i e air', for such is stated (in scripture)

Fire proceeds from that, i e, air Why so? For, it is thus said, viz, in the passage "Fire (proceeded) from air" (*Taitti Up II, 1*)

### ११ । आपः ।

११ । "अवस्तयाह्वाह" इति अनुवर्तते । 'आप' 'अत' तेजस जायन्ते । १ कस्मात् ?—'तथाहि आह' "तदधीऽसृजत" ( छा० ६।२३ ) इति "अग्नेराप" ( तैत्ति० २।१ ) इति च ।

## 11 Water (proceeds from fire)

The words proceeds from that (i. e. fire) as declared in scripture have to be supplied from the previous Sūtra. Water proceeds from that, i. e. fire. Why so? For it is thus said viz., in the passages It sent forth water (*Chh* VI 2 3) and From fire water (*Taitti* II 1)

## १२। पृथिव्यधिकाररूपगण्डान्तरेभ्यः ।

११। 'ता आर पृथग्वदन्त्यां प्रजापतिर्वासीति ता अपमथयन् ( इति ६।१।४ ) इति सूत्रे । तत्र संशयः — यत् अनेन "अथ मन्त्रेन ग्रीहिषणादि अथर्ववेदे च सोदनादि ऋग्वेदे, ऋ या इतिही इति । यत् सूत्रम् — पृथिवी एव 'अथ' मन्त्रेन विवक्ष्यते । अथान् १ — पञ्चम्यात् कदात् मन्त्राणां च । अतिकार, तावत् "तत्तत्रोऽथयन् "तदन्तोऽथयन् ( इति ६।१ ) इति च महाभूत विवर्षा वसति । तत्र समामाना पृथिवी महाभूत विवर्षा न पञ्चम्यात् प्राच्याणि परिपहन्त्या । तदा कपम् अपि वाक्त्ररूपे पृथिव्यनुसृत्य दृश्यते — "यत् कृत्वा तत्पश्यति ( इति ६।१ ) । भूविष्ठं हि पृथिव्याः तत्र कपम् । सुपत्ताम् अपि समानाविद्यमानम् 'अथ' पृथिवी ( तैत्ति १।१ ) "तद्वदन्त्यां मत् आसीत् तत् समकल्पत सा पृथिव्यामवत् ( इति १।१।१ ) इति च ।

12. (In the scriptural text declaring the origin of food from water) food is to be taken in the sense of earth because of the subject matter the colour and other passages

We read in the scripture, That water thought May I be many may I grow forth It sent forth food, (*Chh* VI 2, 4 Here doubt arises, whether the word food denotes

rice, barley, and such other eatables as cooked food, etc., or, the earth. We say it is the earth that is intended to be meant by the word 'food'. Why so? On account of the subject matter, on account of the colour 'of earth', and on account of other passages. In the first place, the subject matter of that passage is "the elements," as seen from the preceding passages, "It sent forth fire, it sent forth water" (*Chh* VI II). In the enumeration of the successive elements, the next turn (after fire and water) is that of 'earth', and it would be improper to pass it over and to assume without a reason that the meaning of the word 'food' is 'rice, barley' etc. In the second place, the colour of 'food' too, as mentioned in a complementary passage, viz., "The dark colour is the colour of food" (*Chh* VI, 3), agrees with that of earth. The predominant hue of earth is dark. In the third place, other scriptural passages dealing with the same subject declare that "what was there as the froth of the water condensed and formed earth" (*Bri* I, 22).

### १३। तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात् सः ।

१३। किम् इमानि वियदादीनि भूतानि स्वयमेव स्वविकारान् सृजन्ति, आक्षेपित्वं परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना अवतिष्ठमान अभिध्यायन् त त विकारं सृजति, इति सन्देहे "तत्तेज ऐक्षत", "ता आप ऐक्षन्त" (का० ६।२।४) इत्यादि श्रवणात् भूतानां स्वात्मना चैत् अवकल्पेण, तत्र उच्यते, 'स एव, तदभिध्यानात्' 'स' परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन आत्मना अवतिष्ठमान अभिध्यायन् त तं विकारं सृजति । कुत ?—'तल्लिङ्गात्' यत् सृष्टिप्रकरणे तस्य एव लिङ्गं नियन्तृत्वादिलक्ष्यं कथयन्ति । तथाहि शास्त्रं, -

‘य इतिहा तिष्ठन् इतिहा चक्री यं इतिहा न केन यत्न इतिहा मती/ या इतिहा  
चक्री यमयत्न न चाभावात्पिषत (इह ३।०) “तदस्य वदु धाम् (वा ६।१।१)  
इत्यादि । यत् तु ईश्वरस्य चरितस्योः तत् परमेश्वरस्य एव द्रष्टव्यम् ।  
एव तुम्हम् महात्मा ॥५५॥

13 (Now the elements do not produce other elements of themselves) but it is he (i. e., the Lord who produces them) through his creative thought because he has been mentioned (in the scriptures as the Creator)

Here a doubt may arise Do *akāśa* and the other elements themselves send forth their effects, or does the Highest Lord abiding as the selves of those elements, produce those effects by his creative thought? If the independent action of the elements should be imagined from such scriptural passages as “the fire thought” “the water thought” (*Chh* VI 2 3 and 4) etc., we say in reply that it is the Highest Lord, who abiding as the selves of the various elements, produces, by his creative thought the respective effects Why so? Because in the section on creation it is his characteristics as Ruler etc. that are mentioned, e. g., “He who dwelling in the earth is yet distinct from the earth, whom the earth cannot know to whom the earth is as a body and who controls the earth from within,—he it is who is thy Self thy inmost Ruler the Immortal (*Bṛ* V 7) It thought, may I be many” (*Chh* 2 3) etc. The thinking and hearing attributed (in certain texts) to water fire etc., must be viewed as due to the fact of the Highest Lord having entered them (and not their independent thinking

and hearing.) It is to exclude the possibility of this doubt that the word 'but' is used in this *sūtra*

### १४ । विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ।

१४ । भूतानाम् उत्पत्तिक्रमं चिन्तित । अतः इदानीम् अप्ययक्रमं चिन्त्यते । 'तु'-शब्दः पूर्वपक्षनिरासे । 'अतः' उत्पत्तिक्रमात् 'विपर्ययेण' विपरीतेन क्रमेण प्रलयक्रमः भवितुम् अर्हति । स एव क्रमः 'उपपद्यते च' युक्तः च भवति । यतः लोके दृश्यते येन क्रमेण सोपानम् आरुढं ततः विपरीतक्रमेण अवरोहति । अपि च दृश्यते 'सद' जातं घटशरावादि अप्ययकाले भङ्गावम् अभ्येति, अन्नश्च जातं हिमकारकादि अद्भावम् अभ्येति । अतश्च उपपद्यते एतत् यत् पृथिवी अन्नं जाता सती स्थितिकालातीते अपि अपीयात्, आपश्च तेजसी जाताः सत्यं तेजः अपीयुः । एव क्रमेण सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरश्च अन्नतरम् अन्नतरश्च कारणम् अपीय सर्वं कार्यजातं परमकारणं परमसूक्ष्मञ्च ब्रह्म अभ्येति इति वेदितव्यम् ।

14. *The order (of dissolution), however, is the reverse of this (i.e., of the order of creation) Such is also proved (by experience.)*

The order of creation of the elements has been discussed hitherto. Now we proceed to consider the order of their retraction (into Brahman). It is reasonable to assume that the order of dissolution should be the reverse of the order of creation. Such a (reverse) order is also proved (by experience,) for it is observed in the world that a man, when ascending a stair, takes the steps in a particular order, which he has to reverse when he descends. It is also observed that things made of clay, such as jars, platters, etc., on being destroyed, pass back into clay, and things produced from water, such as snow, hail-stones, etc., pass





Doubt may be thrown on the order of creation of the elements as detailed in the previous Sûtras. Thus, The intellect and the sensorium should be admitted to have places somewhere in the succession between the elements and Brahman, because these two have been indicated, *i e*, enumerated as steps in creation, in the *Mundakopanishad* (11 1) The Sutrâkâra says that if this view be held, and if thence it be doubted that the order of the elements (in creation etc) as described above is thereby subverted, we say, No, such doubt is not to be entertained, because as far as the successive steps of creation and dissolution are concerned, there is no difference whatsoever between the elements (akâsa, air, fire, etc) and the organs, (the intellect, the sensorium, the eye, the ear, etc) Now, if, (as held by us), the organs are made up of the elements, then their origination and dissolution are identical with the origination and dissolution of the elements, and hence we have not to look for any alteration of order on account of these two, *viz*, the intellect and the sensorium. If, however, it be supposed that the organs are not made up of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements need not be affected by the organs, for under that supposition, the organs may all have been produced first and the elements last, or else the elements may have been produced first and all the organs last

१६। चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो मातृस्तद्धोव-  
भावित्वात् ।

२६। न भूतकारणवत् जीवस्य उत्पत्तिप्रलयौ क्तः । 'तद्व्यपदेश' जीवस्य जन्म-



The self is not originated , because there is no scriptural text which says so And also because from such scriptural texts as "It (the self) is unborn, eternal, the ancient" (*Kath* II 18), etc , the eternity of the self is known

## १८ । ज्योतिरेव ।

१८ । अयम् आत्मा 'ज्ञः' नित्यचैतन्य । 'यत एव' यतः परम् एव ब्रह्म उपाधि-सम्पर्कात् जीवभावेन अवतिष्ठते, ब्रह्मण्यस्य "सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तम्" ( तैत्ति० २।१ ) इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः चैतन्यस्वरूपत्वम् अवगम्यते तथात् हेतो जीव चैतन्यस्वरूपः एव ।

18 *For this very reason (the self is) intelligent* This self is eternally intelligent 'For this very reason', i.e., because it is the highest Brahman himself that exists as the (individual self) through its contact with limiting adjuncts (upādhi), and also because the intelligent character of Brahman is known through such scriptural texts as "Brahman is true, intelligent, and infinite" (*Taitti* II, 1), etc , therefore the individual self is intelligent in character

## १९ । उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ।

१९ । इदानीं किमपरिमाणं जीवः, इति चिन्त्यते । तत्र पूर्वपक्षः,—'उत्क्रान्ति-गत्यागतीनाम्' उत्क्रान्तिः शरीरात् वह्निर्गमनं, गतिः लोकान्तरगमनम्, आगतिः लोकान्तरात् अत्र आगमनम् । तासां श्रुतिप्रमाणात् परिच्छिन्नं अणुपरिमाणं जीवः, न विभुः, न च देहपरिमाणः । न विभो चलनम् अवकल्प्यते, देहपरिमाणत्वं च जैनमतपरीक्षायां निरस्तम् ।

19 (The Pūrvapaksha says that the individual self is

of atomic size, on account of the mention in the scriptures )  
*of its passing out going and returning*

We now pass on to the consideration of what size the individual self is. First as usual we have the Pārva pakṣha, (in Sūtras 19 to 28) As the self is said in the scriptures to pass out of the body, to go to other worlds and to come back from other worlds to this, so it must be of limited and atomic size and it can neither be all pervading nor of the size of the body. Passing from place to place is impossible in the case of an all pervading body and the theory of the self being of the same size as the body has already been refuted in course of the examination of the Jaina doctrine.

## २० । स्वात्मना चोत्तरयो ।

१ । पुनरपि पूरयत् । उत्तराणि चरन्ति चरन्तीति चरन्त्येव चरन्ते, उत्तरं तु गतान्ती नाचरन्ते, उच्यते, स्वात्मना चरन्त्यर्थेन एव उत्तरं चरन्त्येव उच्यते अस्ति इति वाच्यम् ।

20 *And on account of the two latter (going and returning) being connected with the self (it is a moving thing and hence of atomic size)*

The Pārvaṇpakṣha continues. We concede that passing out does not necessarily indicate motion for passing out may be attributed even to a self whose *karma* has been exhausted and which ceases thenceforth to move. But the two latter *viz.*, 'going' and 'returning' are not possible in the case of something that does not move.

These two latter, viz, 'going' and 'returning' can have connection with (i e, application to) self-activities only, (i e, their application to selves indicates that selves move, and consequently must be atomic in size

२१ । नाप्युरतश्च्युतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ।

२१ । एतच्च पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम् । 'अतश्च्युते.' अणुत्वविपरीतश्च्युते, यतः "स वा एष महान् अज" ( बृह ४।४।२२ ), "आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्य." एवञ्जातीयका श्रुति आत्मन अणुविपरीतत्व महत्वम् इति यावत् कथयति, तत आत्मा 'न अणु इति चेत् न' । कस्मात् ?—'इतराधिकारात्' यत एवञ्जातीयका श्रुति इतराधिकारेऽत्र ब्रह्मप्रकरणे कथिता, न जीवप्रकरणे ।

21 If it be said that (the self) is not atomic, on account of there being scriptural texts stating the contrary, we say, No, for (in those texts) the subject matter is different (viz Brahman)

The Pūrvapaksha continues. If it be objected that from scriptural texts which deny the above statement (i e, the statement of the atomic size of the self), such as "He is that great, unborn" (Bṛi IV 4 22) "Like ākāśa he is omnipresent and eternal" and the like, the opposite of atomic size, i e, a great size, is to be inferred in respect of the self, we say, No Why so? Because such scriptural statements are made in connection with another subject-matter, that is Brahman, and not the Jīva

२२ । स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्याम् ।

२२ । एतत् च पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम् । अणुत्व दृढयति । 'स्वशब्द' साक्षात् अणुत्व-

वाची मन् "एकीकृतत्वात् चेतसा विदितव्य (सुख ३।१।८) इत्यादि । तन्मात्रम्  
तद्वन्मात्रम् ।

वाचाप्यतमात्रमत्र मत्तया कल्पितम् च ।

भाषी श्रीः च विदितं च चातन्यस्य कल्पते ॥ (चेता ४८)

"वाचाप्यतदुक्तं मत्तवममात्रमत्रापि मत्तवमादुक्तं मत्तवमी मात्र इति वदिदम्  
मात्रम् इति भाष्यी । तासां प्रमाणाणां च जीवस्य अक्षयम् अक्षयते इति  
वाच्यम् ।

22. And (the self is proved to be atomic in size) from the identical word being mentioned and the self's measurement by division being given (in the scriptures)

The Pūrvapakṣa continues. The atomic size of the self is further corroborated by the two following facts. First, the very word meaning atomic size is used in the scriptures, as for example in the passage 'This subtle (i.e. atomic) self is to be known by the mind &c. (Mund III 1 9) Secondly the unmaṇa or measurement by division (of the self) is given in the following scriptural text — "The self is to be known as a hundredth part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair and yet it is worthy of obtaining infinitude. (Svet V 9) The commentary named 'Bhāmātī thus paraphrases the above scriptural text — "From the point of a hair is first divided its hundredth part. From that hundredth part again is divided its hundredth part. Then that is the measurement spoken of — From these two corroborative evidences also follows the atomic size of the individual self"

## २३ । अविरोधचन्दनवत् ।

२३ । पूर्वपक्ष-सूत्रम्,—आपत्तिखण्डनम् । अणवे सति एकदेशस्य जीवस्य सकलदेशगतोपलब्धिं विरुध्यते, इति न ग्राहनीयं, यतः, 'चन्दनवत् अविरोधः,' स्यात् । यथा हरिचन्दनविन्दुः शरीरैकदेशसम्बन्धोऽपि सन् सकलदेहव्यापिनम् आह्लाटं करोति, एव जीवोऽपि देहैकदेशस्य सकलदेहव्यापिनीम् उपलब्धिं कारिष्यति । त्वक्-सम्बन्धात् च अस्य सकलगरीरगता वेदना न विरुध्यते, त्वक् च हात्प्रश्नशरीरव्यापिनी ।

23 *There is no incompatibility (between the self's atomic size and its perceptions extending over the entire body), as in the case of sandal-paste*

The Pūrvapaksha refutes an objection. If the self's size were atomic, then it could reside only at one point of the body, and perceptions extending over the entire body would be inconsistent with such a size—This doubt need not be entertained, because there is no incompatibility, 'as in the case of sandal-paste'. Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though in actual contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body, so the soul, abiding at one point of the body only, may cause perceptions extending over the whole body. As the self is connected with the skin (the seat of sensations), the extension of the self's sensations throughout the whole body is not contrary to reason, for the skin extends over the whole body.

## २४ । अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदि हि ।

२४ । पूर्वपक्षे आपत्तिखण्डनम् । चन्दनविन्दोः 'अवस्थितिवैशेष्यात्' प्रत्यक्षात्

एकदेशवर्तिन्यस्य जीवस्य तु एकदेशवर्तित्वस्य अपरपक्षत्वात् अविद्यात् न न चन्दनविन्दु-  
जीवस्य वृत्तान्तः प्रविशितुम् अहति इति चेत् न । अभ्युपगमात् इति हि यत् “इति  
हि एव आत्मा” ( ब्र० ३।६ ) इत्याकारं गती जीवस्य अपि चन्दनविन्दुवत् अवस्थिति  
वैशेष्यम् अभ्युपगम्यते ।

24 *If it be objected* (against the last Sûtra) that the (sandal paste has a) *specific location* (which the self has not) *we say No For there is a statement* (of specific location for the self in the scriptures) *viz within the heart*

The Purvapaksha refutes another objection It may be again objected that the spot of sandal paste has a specific location for we actually observe its position in one part of the body but as regards the self its position in one part of the body can neither be observed nor inferred.—This objection too should not be raised. For in such scriptural passages as ‘The self is in the heart (Pras ill 6) etc. specific location has been admitted in the case of the self as distinctly as in the case of the spot of sandal paste

२५ । गुण्यादाः क्षीयन्तः ।

१३ । पूर्वोपदिष्टवृत्तान्तान् दर्शयति । यथा क्षीये अहेतुदेशवर्तिना भविष्यदौप-  
प्रधत्तौना प्रमा अहन्मयिनी सती ज्ञातुं न हि कार्यं करोति तथा जीवोऽपि हेतुदेशवर्तौ  
हेतुमयिनीम् उपलब्धिं करोति ।



*just as in the world (the light of a lamp pervades a whole room)*

The Pūrvapaksha refutes another objection Just as in the world, the light of lamps or gems placed in one part of a room illuminates the whole room, and thus produces an effect in the whole room, similarly the self, though abiding in one part of the body only, may produce perceptions throughout the entire body

२६ । व्यतिरेको गन्धवत् ।

२६ । पूर्वपक्षे आपत्तिखण्डनम् । कथं पुन गुण गुणिव्यतिरेकेण अन्यत्र वर्तमानं वर्तेत ? इति न आशङ्कनीयं, यत् 'गन्धवत्', यथा कुसुमादि-गन्धवत्द्रव्य-व्यतिरेकेण एव गन्धस्य अन्यत्र वृत्तिः भवति, तथा अणो अपि सत् जीवस्य चैतन्यगुणस्य 'व्यतिरेक' विशेष भविष्यति ।

26 *Extending beyond (is possible) as in the case of odour*

The Pūrvapaksha refutes still another objection "How can a quality extend beyond that in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere?" This doubt is not to be entertained Because just as odour may exist in (i.e. extend to) a place beyond where the odoriferous objects, such as flowers etc., are, similarly the quality of intelligence may extend beyond the self, although the latter should be atomic

२७ । तथा च दर्शयति ।

२७ । पूर्वपक्षे स्मृतिप्रमाणम् । स्मृति 'च तथा' जीवस्य चैतन्यगुणेन समस्त-

शरीर व्यापितं 'वा नीलम् वा मयत्तमम्' (इह १।४।० ; शीरो ४।१० ; शानी पाद१)  
इत्याकारं वाच्यम् 'दर्शयति' ।

27 *And thus (the scripture also) declares*

The Pārvaṇpakṣhin quotes scripture to support himself. Scripture also declares that the self pervades 'the entire body by means of its quality viz intelligence in such passages as Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails (Bri 1.4.7 Kau 13.20 Chh viii.8.1 etc.)

२८ । पूयगुणदेगात् ।

१८ । पूयपदं सुयन (प्रजापत्यम्) । "पश्या शरीरं समावृत्तं (शीरो १।१०)  
"तदेवां मायायां निमग्नं विमानम् आकाश (इह १।१।१०) इत्यादि-श्रुतिभ्यः  
वाक्यप्रदी । अतः सावधानम् 'इह' उपनिषदात् शीरोऽन्तर्गतम् एव शरीरव्यापिता  
अवश्यम् ।

28 *On account of separate statement (of self and intelligence as agent and instrument, in the scriptures)*

The Pārvaṇpakṣhin quotes scripture again to support himself. The self and its intelligence have been clearly distinguished as agent and instrument in such scriptural passages as "Having taken possession of the body by consciousness (Kau 13.6) and "Then (the intelligent self) having absorbed all intelligence through the intelligence of the senses (Bri 11.1, 17) etc. whence it is to be understood that the self pervades the body only through intelligence, which is its quality

२८ । तदगुणसारत्वात् तु तद्व्यापदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ।

२८ । सिद्धान्त-सूत्रमेतत् । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्ववत् व्यावर्तयति । न जीव वस्तुतः अपरिमाणः । कथं तर्हि अणुत्वादि-व्यपदेशः ? इति, अत आह, जीवस्य 'तद-गुणसारत्वात्' उपाधिगुण-सारत्वात् बुद्धिगुणप्रधानत्वात्, इत्यर्थः —यत बुद्धेः गुणा इत्यादिषु सुख दुःखम् इत्यादयः एव जीवस्य संसारवृत्ति प्रधान कारणं ततः, तस्य 'तद्व्यापदेशः' अपरिमाणकथनम् । 'प्राज्ञवत्', यथा प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मनः सगुणोपासनेषु उपाधि-गुणसारत्वात् अपरिमाणत्वादि-व्यपदेशः, "यणीयान् हृद्विषां यवादा" ( छा ३।१।४३ ) "मनोमय प्राण-शरीर" ( छा ३।१।४२ ) 'सर्वगतं सर्वरसं सर्वकामं सर्वसकल्पं" ( छा ३।१।४२ ) इति एवमकारः, तद्वत् ।

29 But it is to the predominance of its quality (i.e. its limiting adjunct, viz. buddhi or intelligence), that the ascription of that (i.e. atomicity) to it is due, as in the case of the Intelligent Self (i.e. Brahman)

Now begins the reply of the Sutrakara. The word 'but' denotes the rejection of the position of the Pūrva-paksha. In reality, however, the self is *not* of atomic size. Then, how is it that atomicity etc. have been attributed to it (in the scriptures)? Because of the predominance of its quality, that is of *buddhi*. It is the qualities of *buddhi* (such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc.), that constitute the main cause of the transmigratory existence of the individual self. Hence the (secondary or figurative) ascription to it of atomic size (the size of 'buddhi') 'as in the case of the Intelligent Self' (i.e. Brahman). Just as in those sections of the scriptures whose topic is meditation on the qualified Brahman, the Highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness



of its quality, i.e. *buddhi*. From this it follows that the conjunction of *buddhi* and the self, they being different entities, must necessarily come to an end, and the self, when disjoined from the *buddhi*, will become unsupported, and hence non-existent." To this we reply that this objection is not to be entertained, because the conjunction of the self with *buddhi* lasts just as long as the individuality of the self lasts. The self's connection with *buddhi* is true only in its state of (fictitious) transmigratory existence, and not in its real existence. But how is it known that the self's connexion with *buddhi* lasts just as long as its individuality lasts? Because that is seen in the scriptures, which declare, "The Person of light, whose essence is knowledge, dwelling within the heart, surrounded by the *prāṇas*, he remaining identical, wanders along the two worlds, as if thinking, as if moving" (*Bṛi.* IV 3 7), etc. Here the expression "whose essence is knowledge" means "whose essence is *buddhi*" Again with regard to the words "remaining identical" we may ask "identical with what?" The evident answer, based on the proximity of words, is "with *buddhi*" Further, by the expressions "as if thinking", "as if moving", it is meant that the self does not think and move on its own account, but thinks as it were, and moves as it were, because the *buddhi* to which it is joined really thinks and moves. Hence the self's transmigratory (individual) existence is due only to connexion with *buddhi*.

३१ । पुंश्चादिवत् तस्य सतीऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ।

३१ । आपत्यन्तर-खण्डनम् । ननु सुषुप्तिप्रलययो, न शक्यते आत्मन बुद्धिसम्बन्धः

अन्तरङ्गं सदा तदीयं सर्वविधावित्तम् अनुपपन्नम्, तन्निरातं समाप्तं कर्त्तुं न  
 शक्नोति, “कदा चैव तदा कदाचिद् भवति भवति (वा० १५२) ।  
 तत् सदा बुद्धिजन्यम् एव । अन्तरङ्गम् । अतः कदाचिद् वाच्यं—बुद्धिजन्यम्  
 वाच्यं अन्तरङ्गम् एव बुद्धम् । ‘तुल्यं दिवम् सदा वाच्यं अनुपपन्नम् एव  
 तदनुपपन्नं तदा बुद्धिजन्यं सदा बुद्धिरो दीप्तं वाच्यं विद्यमानं ‘अभिज्ञानं’ अदिति  
 वाच्यम् एव बुद्धिरो न तु तदा वाच्यं विद्यमानं अनुपपन्नम् ।

31 *Because it is reasonable that what exists (potentially afterwards) manifests itself like virile power &c*

The Sūtrakāra refutes another objection. In the states of deep sleep and *pralaya* (the absorption of created things in Brahman) no connection of the self with *buddhi* can be affirmed for in those states according to the scriptures, all modifications pass away and an unqualified state is reached, as seen in the passage, He becomes then O dear (disciple) reunited with the True he is gone to his own (*Chh. VI 8 1*). Then how can it be said that its connection with *buddhi* lasts as long as the self exists?” To this objection we reply that it is reasonable to suppose that the self remains connected with *buddhi* as long as it lasts. Like virile power &c.” As the vital seed and moustaches potentially exist in childhood and are afterwards manifested, so it is reasonable to hold that during sleep the self’s connection with *buddhi* continues to exist in a potential state and it is manifested during the waking state and not that it suddenly and unaccountably emerges again after cessation during sleep.

३२ । नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धि-प्रसङ्गोऽन्यतर-नियमो वाऽन्यथा ।

३२ । चिदात्मस्य दृष्टीरुगेति । 'अन्यथा नित्योपलब्धि अनुपलब्धि वा प्रमज्येत इन्द्रियविषयाणां सन्निधाने सति नित्यम् एव उपलब्धि स्यात् । अथ हेतौ वर्तमाने सति अपि फलाभावे, ततः अपि नित्यम् एव अनुपलब्धि, स्यात्, न च एव दृश्यते । अथ 'वा अन्यतर-नियम' आत्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्ध अभ्युपगन्तव्यः । न च आत्मन शक्तिप्रतिबन्धः सम्भवति, तस्य अविक्रियत्वत् । न अपि इन्द्रियस्य, यत पूर्वोत्तरयोः चण्डयोः अप्रतिबद्धशक्तिकस्य तस्य शक्तिः एकधात् न प्रतिबध्येत । तथात् व्यक्तम् एतत्—'तदगुणसारत्वात् तदव्यपदेश' ( २२तमे सूत्रे ) ।

32 Otherwise, there would be either constant perception or constant non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (*viz* the self and the senses)

The Sutrākāra strengthens his position Otherwise, *i e*, supposing we did not acknowledge an internal organ (*buddhi* or *manas*) through whose attention and non-attention perception and non-perception took place, we should have to admit either constant perception or constant non-perception There would result perpetual perception whenever there would be the conjunction (of the self) with the senses and the objects of sense, or else, even if the cause having been present, the effect did not arise, there would follow perpetual non-perception Neither of these is actually observed. Or else, we should have to assume 'a limitation of either' *i e*, that there are obstacles in the way of energy, either of the self or of the sense-organs But the former is not possible, as the self is not capable of any modification or limitation, nor the latter, as there is no reason why the energy of the sense-organ which is non-

obstructed in the preceding and the following moments should without any cause, be obstructed (in the intervening moment.) Hence the explanation (given in Sūtra 29) of the attribution of minuteness to the self (owing to its connexion with *buddhi*) is reasonable.

३३ । कर्त्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्वात् ।

३३ । तद्गुणधारात्वादिकारिण एव अपरीक्ष्यि जीववत् प्रपञ्चते । 'कर्त्ता च सर्वं जीवः स्मृतः । कर्त्तात् १—शास्त्रार्थवत्वात्' इति एव च धर्मेण गुणधारा दृष्टम् इति एवविधं शास्त्रम् अवबन्तं भवति, चक्षुषा तत् चक्षुषं स्मृतम् । तथा इदम् अपि शास्त्रम् अवबन्तं भवति,—'एव हि द्रष्टा श्रुता गीता प्राप्ता रसविता मन्ता बीजा कर्त्ता विद्यानाम् पुङ्गवः' इति ( मन्त्रे ३८ ) ।

१

33 *The self is an agent for* (it is on that admission that the words of the scripture acquire a meaning)

By the section on the predominance of the quality of *buddhi* another attribute of the individual self is set forth. The individual is an agent. Why so? Because it is only thus that meaning can be given to such scriptural texts as "He should perform sacrifices, make fire oblations, give donations" and the like otherwise the texts become meaningless. Similarly a meaning attaches to this text also on the same supposition:—Verily this person who is the seer the hearer the smeller the taster the perceiver the thinker the agent, and who has knowledge for his essence &c." (*Pras* IV 9)



## ३४ । विद्वागोपदेशात् ।

३४ । इतश्च जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं यत् शान्त्य अप्रावभ्यासां तस्य विद्वागोपदेशात्,—  
 “स ईयतेऽयतो यत्र कामम्” इति ( बृह ४।१।१२ ), “स्त्रे शरीरे यदाकाम परिवर्तते”  
 इति च ( बृह २।१।१८ ) ।

34 (And) on account of the teaching about the self's wandering about

The self is proved to be an agent, also because scriptural texts mention its wandering about in the state of sleep, e g, “The immortal one goes wherever he likes” (Bri IV 3, 12), and also, “He moves about, according to his pleasure, in his own body”, (Bri II 1, 18)

## ३५ । उपादानात् ।

३५ । इतश्च जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं यत् जीवप्रकरणे युति कारयानाम् ‘उपादान ग्रहणं’  
 सङ्कीर्तयति, यथा, “तदेवा प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानम् आदाय” इति ( बृह २।१।१७ )  
 “प्राणान् गृहीत्वा” इति च ( बृह २।१।१८ ) ।

35. (And) on account of the teaching about the self's taking.

The self is proved to be an agent, also because the scriptures in the section dealing with the individual self speak of it as taking its instruments, e g, “Having taken the intelligence of the *prānas* through its own intelligence” (Bri. II. 1, 17), and “Having taken the *prānas*” (Bri. II. 1, 18)

३६ । व्यपदेमाद्य श्रियायां न चेन्निर्ह्यविपर्ययः ।

३६ । इत्यत्र जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं एतत् चरत् लोचिक्यो वदिक्यो च श्रियायां कर्त्तृत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः, अथा, “विद्यानं यद्यं तदुते कर्त्तृत्वञ्च तदुतेऽपि च ( वेदिः १।३ ) । ननु विद्यानमप्यं बुद्धी उपनिबन्तः, कथम् अनेन जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं नृप्यते इति चेत्, न । जीवस्य एव ‘निर्ह्यं, न बुद्धेः । न चेत् जीवस्य स्यात् ततः ‘निर्ह्यंविपर्ययः’ स्यात् “विद्यानेन इति निरदिश्यत न “विद्यानम्” इति ।

36. Also because it is described (in the scriptures as an agent) with regard to action: If (the soul were) not (meant as the agent these would have been a different description

The self is proved to be an agent also from this, that the scripture speaks of its being an agent both in secular and in Vedic actions, e g., ‘The *viṇḍna* performs the sacrifices, it performs all acts *Taittī II 5*) If it be objected that the word *viṇḍna* here applies to *buddhi* so how can it indicate the agency of the self?—we say No The self is meant here, not the *buddhi*. If the self were not meant, then the description would have been different. The language would then have been *Through viṇḍna it performs* not *Viṇḍna performs*. (See also Sūtra 38

३७ । उपलब्धिवदनियमः ।

३७ । अथाह यदि बुद्धिश्चेतिरिच जीवः कर्त्ता स्यात्, सः स्वतन्त्र एतत् त्रियं द्वित्य एव आत्मनः नियमितं सम्पादयेत् न विपर्येतम् । विपर्येतम् अपि तु सम्पादयन्

उपलभ्यते । न च स्वतन्त्रस्य आत्मन ईदृशी प्रवृत्ति अनियमेन उपपद्यते, इति अत उत्तरं पठति,—‘उपलब्धिवत् अनियमः’ । यथा अयम् आत्मा उपलब्धिं प्रति स्वतन्त्रोऽपि अनियमेन इष्टम् अनिष्टं च उपलभते, एवम् अनियमेन एव इष्टम् अनिष्टञ्च सम्पादयिष्यति ।

37 *There is absence of restriction (in regard to the self's action as agent) just as in regard to perception*

An objection may be raised here “If the self, as distinct from the *buddhi* were the agent, then it would, because independent, do exclusively what is pleasant and useful to itself, and never the opposite. But it is observed to do the opposite also. It is not reasonable that the independent self should act thus unrestrictedly (i. e., do what is pleasant and what is unpleasant indiscriminately)” To this objection we reply. Just as the self, though free with regard to perception, perceives unrestrictedly both what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, so does it perform unrestrictedly both what is pleasant and what is unpleasant.

३८ । शक्तिविपर्ययात् ।

३८ । इतश्च विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्त जीव कार्ता भवितुम् अर्हति । यदि पुन विज्ञान-शब्दाया बुद्धि एव कार्ती स्यात्, तत ‘शक्तिविपर्ययः’ स्यात्, कारणशक्तिं बुद्धे हीयेत, कार्पुशक्तित्वात् आपद्येत, तत् च अन्याय्यम् ।

38 *On account of the reversal of power*

The self as distinct from *vijnāna* has to be admitted as an agent for the following reason also. If *buddhi* were

denoted by the word *vijnāna* and were the agent there would take place a reversal of power *Buddhi's* power as instrument would have to be denied and its power as agent would have to be affirmed which is unreasonable.

### ८ । अभाष्यभाषासु ।

१८ । इत्यत्र आत्मनः कर्तृत्वमिति यतः विद्वान्नुपपदिष्टः समाधिः—“आत्मा वा चरं द्रष्टव्यं शीतघ्नी मलय्या निदिध्यासितव्यः ( इह १।३।३ ) ‘सोऽप्येष्टव्यं स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ ( ब्रा ८।८।१ ) ‘अमित्येतं ध्यात्वा आत्मानम्’ ( मु १।१।६ )— इति पूर्ववच्च आत्मनः कर्तृत्वमेव न उपपद्यते ।

### 39 And on account of the impossibility of samādhi

That the self is an agent follows from this also that the meditation taught in the Vedānta, as characterised in such texts as the following is possible only if the self is an agent — ‘The Self is to be seen heard, thought and meditated upon (Bri II 4 5) ‘The Self we must seek out the Self we must try to understand’ (Chh VIII 7 1) Meditate on the Self as Om (Mund II 2 6)

### ४० । यथा च तत्त्वोभयथा ।

४ । ‘च’ शब्दः ब्रह्मविषयतायै । आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं न आभाविष्ये मन्तव्यम् । यथा ‘तथा कृतवत्त्वत्वादि-कारणवत्ता कर्तृत्वमिति, विमुक्तवासादिद्वयं निष्कामात्, भवति एवम् आत्मा अपि जनचादीनि कारणानि चक्षिष्य कर्तृत्वमिति आभाषणवत्त्वत्वात् एव एवम् उभयथा कर्तृत्वमेव कर्तृत्वमेव न भवति ।

40. *And as the carpenter (is an agent when working with his tools, and a non-agent at other times) so is the self both (agent and non-agent)*

The word 'and' here is used to remove a doubt. The self's activity is not to be supposed as inherent in its nature. Just as a carpenter, with his adze and other tools in hand, is an agent, but when he has laid aside the adze and other tools, is a non-agent, similarly the self is an agent only in relation to its instruments, but is a non-agent by its own fundamental nature. It exists in the states both of activity and inactivity.

४१ । परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

४१ । जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं 'परात्' एव भवति, न 'तु' तत् ईश्वर-निरपेक्षं, यत् 'तत्' ईश्वरापेक्षया श्रुति एव उपदिशति, यथा, "एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति त यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनियते एष ह्येवासाधु कर्म कारयति त यमघो निनीयते" इति (कौषी ३।८), "य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मानम् अन्तरो यमयति" (बृह ३।७।२३) इति च ।

41 *But (the self's activity is) from the Supreme Being, because scripture teaches that*

The activity of the individual self is due to the Supreme Being, and not independent of Īśvara. Because 'that', i.e., its dependence on Īśvara, is taught in the scriptures, thus, "And it is he who makes that individual do virtuous deeds whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds. And it is he who makes that individual do vicious deeds

whom he wishes to lead down (from these worlds)" *Kam* III 8<sup>1</sup> and again, He who dwelling within the self rules the self from within " *Bri* III 7 23)

४२ । ज्ञानप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ।

४२ । ननु एवम् ईशस्य क्वापिदृष्टे सति ब्रह्मणोऽपि स्वैव स्याताम् जीवस्य च यज्ञतः कर्मप्रतिष्ठा स्यात् । न इति लक्षणम् । न यत् पूर्वपक्षस्यावगतत्वात् । ईश्वरः जीवस्य ज्ञानप्रयत्नापेक्षं जीवज्ञानं चर्माचर्मं ब्रह्मापेक्षं एव तत्तत् फलानि विवर्तं विवर्तते । अथ पुनः अक्षय्यस्य ज्ञानप्रयत्नापेक्षं ईश्वर इति ?—विहित प्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः एवं हि "धर्मोऽर्थाः धर्मिनः," "ज्ञानं च न ज्ञानिनः" इति पञ्चादौपम्यस्य विहितस्य प्रतिषिद्धस्य च अक्षय्यस्य सादृश्यं सन्नतिं अत्रैवा तत् अक्षय्यं स्यात् । 'आदि शब्देन पुनश्चापवैयर्थ्यं अपि साध्यम् ।

42 *But (Īsvara) has regard to the efforts made (by individual selves) for thus only is saved the significance of injunctions prohibitions et cetera*

An objection refuted But if causal agency thus belongs to Īsvara, it follows that he is unjust and cruel and that the individual self has to undergo the consequences of what it has not done. —Not so. The word 'but sets aside the objection Īsvara has regard to the efforts made by individuals, *i e.*, to the inequality of their virtuous and vicious actions and so allots to them corresponding unequal results. But how is it known that Īsvara has regard to the efforts made? For thus only do injunctions and prohibitions become significant *i e.*, only if Īsvara has regard to the efforts made by individuals do injunctions such as "He

who is desirous of 'heaven should' perform sacrifices" and prohibitions such as "A Brâhmana must not be killed", etc become significant. Otherwise, they become meaningless. The words "et cetera" are meant to include "the significance of human efforts, etc."

૪૩ । અશો નાનાત્મપદેશાદન્યથા ચાપિ દાશકિતવાદિચ-  
મધીયત એકે ।

૪૩ । જીવ ઈશ્વરસ્ય અથ ભવિતુમ્ સર્હતિ, ન તુ સ એવ । કયાત્ ? — 'નાના-  
ત્મપદેશાત્' યત શાસ્ત્રે "સોઽન્વેષ્ય સ વિજિજ્ઞાસિતત્ત્વ" ( છા ૫૭૧ ), "એતમેવ  
વિદિતા મુનિર્ભવતિ" ( વ્રહ ૪૧૪૨૨ ), "ય આત્મનિ તિष्ठન્ આત્માનમ્ અન્તરો  
યમયતિ" ( વ્રહ ૩૭૨૩ ) इति च एवञ्जातीयका भेदनिर्देश अस्ति । अन्यथा च अपि  
व्यपदेश अस्ति अनानात्वस्य प्रतिपादका । तथाहि 'एके' शास्त्रिन ब्रह्मण 'दाशकित-  
वादित्वम्' दाशकितवादिभावम् 'अधीयते' उपदिशन्ति । आथर्वणिका ब्रह्मसूक्ते "ब्रह्म  
दाशा ब्रह्म दासा ब्रह्मैवेमे कितवा उत" इत्यादिना । दाशा ये एते कौवर्ता प्रसिद्धा,  
ये च असौ दासा स्वामिनि आत्मानम् उपचिपन्ति, ये च अन्ये कितवा धृतकृत, ते  
सर्वे ब्रह्मैव, इति हीनजन्तूदाहरणेन सर्वेषाम् एव जीवानाम् ब्रह्मत्वम् आहुः । अतः  
भेदाभिदावगमाभ्याम् अशत्त्वावगमः ।

43 (The individual self is) a part (of Brahman), because, their difference is taught (in certain texts), and because, contrariwise, some (schools teach) his identity with fishermen, gamblers, etc

The individual self is to be considered a 'part' of Īsvara, not Īsvara himself Why so ? First 'on account of the declaration of difference', i e, because the difference

(between the Highest Self and the individual self) is indicated in such scriptural passages as "The Self we must seek out the Self we must try to understand" (*Chh* VIII 7 1) He who knows him becomes a *manu* (*Bri* IV 4 22) He who dwelling within the self rules the self from within" (*Bri* III 7 23) and the like. And secondly because there are texts teaching otherwise : e. g. some members of a certain Vedic School speak of Brahman's becoming fishermen gamblers etc. The Ātharvanas in their Brahmasukta say Brahman is the fishermen Brahman is the slaves, Brahman is these gamblers" etc. By mentioning the instances of such low class beings as the fishermen who are commonly known as *knivartas*, the slaves, who give themselves away to their masters, and the gamblers, and by stating that they are all Brahman, the Ātharvanas have declared that all individual selves are identical with Brahman. From these two views of difference and non-difference there results the view of the *jīva* being a part of Brahman.

#### ४४ । मन्त्रवर्णनम् ।

४४ । श्रीव ईश्वरस्य चक्षु एव, यत मन्त्रवच विद्वत्तनम् एतम् वचम्  
अवगतमवति, यथा, "तावत्तस्य महिमा तयो न्यात्माय पूजय" । पादोऽयं मन्त्रो मृतानि  
विधादभ्यासतं दिवि ( अथ १ । १ । १ वा १ । १ । ११ । १६ ) ।

44 And on account of the Mantra,

*Jīva* is a part of *Īsvara*, because a *mantra* (Vedic text)



also intimates the same view, *e g*, "Such is its greatness, greater than it is the Person One foot of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven" (*Rik* X. 30, 3, *Chh.* III, 12, 6)

## ૪. । અપિ ચ સ્મર્યતે ।

૪૫ । ભગદ્ગીતાયામ્ 'અપિ ચ' જીવસ્ય ફેશ્વરાશ્વત્વમ્ 'સ્મર્યતે', યથા, "મમૈવાશી જીવલોકે જીવમૂત સનાતન" (૧૫.૭), તદ્વાત્ અપિ અશ્વાવગમઃ ।

45 *Moreover, it is so stated in the Smṛiti*

In the *Bhagavad-gītā* also *jīva* is spoken of as a part of *Īśvara*, *e g*, "In the world of living beings an eternal portion of me becoming the individual self &c" (XV 7).

## ૪૬ । પ્રકાશાદિવન્નૈવં પરઃ ।

૪૬ । આપત્તિસ્થાનમ્ । નનુ જીવસ્ય ફેશ્વરાશ્વત્વ-સ્વીકારે તદોચિત્તં દુઃખેન અશિત્તં ફેશ્વરસ્ય અપિ દુઃખિત્વમ્યાત્, ક્વતિ ચેત્ શ્લેષત, તદા ઉચ્યતે,—'ન એવ પર' યથા જીવ સંસારદુઃખમ્ અનુભવતિ, ન એવ પર ફેશ્વર અનુભવતિ । 'પ્રકાશાદિવત્' યથા પ્રકાશ સૌંદર્ય, ચાન્દ્રમસ વા વિચિત્ર વ્યાપ્ય અવતિષ્ઠમાન અક્ષુણ્ણ્યાદ્યુપાધિસંસ્થત્વાત્ તેષુ સ્વજીવ-વક્ષાદિભાવ પ્રતિપદ્યમાનેષુ તત્તદ્ભાવમ્ ઇવ પ્રતિપદ્યમાન અપિ ન પરમાર્થતઃ તત્તદ્ભાવ પ્રતિપદ્યતે, યથા ચ આકાશ ઘટાદિષુ ગચ્છત્સુ ગચ્છન્ ઇવ વિભાવ્યમાન અપિ ન પરમાર્થતઃ ગચ્છતિ, યથા ચ ઉદ્દશરાવાદિ-કમ્પનાત્ તદ્ગતે સૂર્યપ્રતિવિમ્બે કમ્પમાને અપિ ન તદાન્ સૂર્ય વશુતઃ કમ્પતે, એવ બુદ્ધાદ્યુપક્રિતે જીવાશ્ચે અગ્રે દુઃખાયમાને અપિ ન તદાન્ ફેશ્વર દુઃખાયતે ।

46 (The individual self is liable to pleasure and pain but) *not so the Supreme Being like light etc*

An objection refuted. "If we admit that the self is a part of Īvara, then on the self's being afflicted by pain Īvara too whose part it is, would be afflicted by pain"—To this objection we reply "Not so the Supreme Being" i.e., the Supreme Īvara does not feel the pain of the worldly state as the individual does. Like light etc. i.e. just as the light of the sun or the moon which fills all space appears to assume the straight and curved form with the assumption of such and such forms by the limiting adjuncts e.g. fingers etc. with which it is in contact but does not really do so and just as *akāśa* although appearing to move when (the containing) jars etc. are moved does not really move and just as the sun although its image appears to tremble when the cup of water reflecting it is shaken does not really tremble—similarly Īvara, although the part of him limited by *buddhi* and other adjuncts, and named the individual self be affected by pain is not so affected

४७। अरणि च ।

४७। अरणि च व्यापारदं यथा क्षेत्रेण कुक्षिं न परः स व्यापते इति यथा,

तत्र वा परमात्मा हि स निर्दो मित्रं वा शूरा ।

न क्षिप्यते कर्षेद्यपि पश्यन्नभिमन्यसा ॥

अर्थः अरणीं योऽस्ती मीचद्वये स युज्यते ।

स समवर्तमानसि यस्मिन् युज्यते पुनः ॥

‘अ मर्यादा’ ‘समाभनति च इति वाक्येन । “वसीरन्” विपक्षे आत्मानमवसी

इमिवाकाशीति" ( ऋक् १।२६४।२१, मुण्ड ३।१।१, श्वेत ४।६ ) इति, "एकतया सर्व-  
भूतात्मेरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकादु खेन वाद्य ( कठ ५।११ ) इति च ।

47 *The Smritis also* (teach that *Īsvara* is not subject to pain).

*Vyāsa* and others state in their *Smritis* that the Highest Self is not affected by the pain of the individual,  
e g —

"The Highest Self that dwells there is eternal and  
devoid of qualities,  
He is not stained by the fruits of actions, any  
more than a lotus-leaf by water  
But that other self who is active in character,  
is subject to bondage and liberation  
He is bound again and again with the seventeen-fold  
aggregate "

Here, 'the seventeen-fold aggregate' means the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five *pranas*, *manas*, and *buddhi* ] From the word 'also' we are to understand that the scriptures too teach the same, e g, "One of the two enjoys the sweet fruit, while the other looks on without eating" (*Rik* I 164. 21, *Mund* III 1 1, *Svet* IV 6), and "So the one Inner Self of all creatures, beyond all objects, is not mixed up with the sorrows of the world" (*Katha* V 11).

४८ । अनुज्ञापिहारी देहसम्बन्धाज्जोतिरादिवत्

४८ । आपत्तिखण्डनम् । आत्मनः एकत्वे अपि वैदिकी लौकिकी च अनुज्ञा-

पतिङ्गो विविन्विषी कथं ज्ञाताम् ? आत्मन ईदमन्वन्मात् । अतिरिक्तम्  
यदा अतिरिक्तं एवमेव अपि इव संप्रति कश्चिं परिहिते न इतरः, यदा च यद्विचाराः  
वचनार्थादयः उपपादयन्, नद्विचारा अपि सन्ता नतर्हिदयः परिहितानि, तदा  
वदतामस्मि ईदमेवायमात्मा अपि अतीत्यन्तामात्मा अपि तदा ईदमन्वन्मात् एव  
वतः अपरं वदन्तः स्यात् ।

48. (Though the one Highest Self appears in all things yet) *permissions and prohibitions* (have arisen) *on account of the connexion (of the Self) with bodies as in the case of fire etc*

An objection refuted How do permissions and prohibitions, both Vedic and secular become possible though the Self is one only ? — On account of the Self's connexion with bodies, as in the case of fire etc Just as fire is one only yet we shun a fire which has had contact with flesh (i.e. has burnt a corpse) but not any other fire just as such things consisting of earth as diamonds, beryls, etc. are esteemed while corpses etc though equally consisting of earth are shunned — so although to the one Self without a second there are no things to be either avoided or accepted and consequently no obligations to be fulfilled yet on account of its connexion with bodies, certain actions become enjoined and certain others prohibited

४८ । अत्र तिस्राध्यायिकम् ।

४८ । आत्मन कथनम् । एवाव्याप्त्युपपत्ति एवकर्तृत्वात् आत्मन सर्ववस्तु-  
सम्बन्धे अतिरिक्त्येतत् शीघ्रम् । सर्ववस्तु अतीत्यन्तमिति ज्ञात् — पापकारी सुखी

भवेत्, पुण्यकारी च दुःखी भवेत्,—इति एतत् न शङ्कनीयम्, यत 'अमृताति' उपाधि  
अमृतानात्, अव्याप्ते, बुद्धिभेदेन भोगाभेदात्, कर्मफलस्य 'अव्यतिकरः' अभिप्रायः  
स्यात् ।

49 *And on account of the non-extension (of individual selves) there is no confusion (of the results of actions)*

Another objection refuted "If we admit the unity of the Self, there will be only one undivided activity of that one Self, and so confusion may arise in connecting individual selves with the fruits of their respective actions Their fruits of actions may get mixed up amongst themselves Doers of evil may secure happiness, and doers of good misery " This doubt is not to be entertained, because there is no extension of adjuncts, i.e. because, through the 'buddhi' of individual selves keeping distinct from one another, the enjoying selves also remain distinct from one another and therefore no mixing up of fruits of actions can possibly take place

५० । आभास एव च ।

५० । इत्यत्र कर्मफलस्य अव्यतिकारः यत जीवः परमात्मन आभास एव, न स  
एव साक्षात्, न अपि वस्तुत्वरम् ।

50 (And because the individual self is only a reflection (of the Highest Self

There can be no confusion of the results of actions of various selves also for this reason, that the individual self

is only a reflection of the Highest Self and is neither directly that (the Highest Self) nor a reality different from it.

### ५१ । अदृष्टानियमात् ।

५१ । सर्वज्ञ-आपादातीनां वक्राभवाद् अर्थकृत्तया अतिव्याप्य प्रत्ययान् अदृष्टान् अनिवारम् । तत्र सर्वज्ञसर्वज्ञत्वम् अदृष्टम् साधारणं चक्षते न च आरब्धं वक्तव्यं अतः अत्र एव आशयः इदम् अदृष्टम् इति नियमे वृत्तभावात् एव एव दाव ।

51 *There being nothing to limit adrishta i.e., the unseen results of action within the limits of particular selves confusion would follow)*

The theory of many selves as held by the Sāṅkhyas and Kāṇādas, leads to the confusion of the results of actions, because there is nothing to limit them to particular selves. In their doctrines, adrishta, which is of the nature of religious merit or demerit inheres in non particular and non intelligent causes. As thus there is no limitative reason for any particular adrishta belonging to any particular self the theory is open to the objection referred to.

### ५२ । अभिसम्बन्धादिव्यपि चैवम् ।

५२ । यदि लक्ष्येत 'यदम् इदं फलं प्राप्नुवामि' इति परिहृयन्ति, इत्य प्रत्ययै इत्य आरब्धादि, इति एवमिहाः अभिसम्बन्धात् न प्रत्ययार्थं प्रत्ययभावात् अदृष्टान् आशयान् न स्वस्वामिभारं निर्वहन्ति' इति न एतत् बुद्धम् यत् अभिसम्बन्धात् अपि साधारण्येन

सग मयीनेन सर्व्यात्मसमिधो क्रियमाणा अतः तेषां निश्चयमङ्गत्वं न उपपद्यते 'तेषु अपि च एव' दीपानुपद्र' एव ।

52 *The same (objection holds) with respect to resolutions etc.*

It may be said that such resolutions as "Let me secure that end," "Let me avoid this," "Let me strive for this," "Let me do this," etc, which arise in each particular self, are sufficient to determine which particular self stands to which particular *adrishta* in the relation of ownership—This is not, however, tenable, because the resolutions also (according to the above theorists) are made through the non-particular conjunction of *manas* with the self in the proximity of all selves. Hence the same objection applies also to resolutions, etc

५३ । प्रदेष्टादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ।

५३ । अयं उच्येत, "आत्मन विभुत्वे अपि शरीर-प्रतिष्ठेन मनसा सयोगः शरीरावच्छिन्ने प्रदेशे एव भविष्यति, अतः अभिप्रायानाम् अट्टस्य सुखदुःखयो च प्रदेशकता व्यवस्था भविष्यति" इति, तत् अपि न उपपद्यते । कस्मात् ?—'अन्तर्भावात्' यतः विभुत्वाविशेषात् सर्वे एव आत्मन सर्वशरीरेषु अन्तर्भवन्ति । तत्र वैशिष्टिकादिभिः शरीरावच्छिन्न अपि आत्मन प्रदेष्टुं कथयितुं न शक्यं । शरीरम् अपि सर्वआत्मसन्निधौ उत्पद्यमानम् "अस्य एव आत्मन न इतरेषाम्" इति न निश्चयः शक्यः । तथात् एकात्मपक्षे एव सर्वोपाभावः, इति अभिप्रायः ।

53 If it be said that the differentiation of the results of actions of different selves is effected *by the difference of*

*place* (of their different bodies then we say) *No because the self is within* (all things)

An objection refuted. "Although all selves are all pervasive, yet their conjunction with the *manas* which is placed in the body takes place in that part of the self which is limited by the body and thus the necessary differentiations among the resolutions, and the *adrishta*, and the pleasures and pains resulting from actions, may all be secured through differences of locality"—This explanation too is not tenable. Why so? Because the self is within all things. There being no distinction between selves as regards their all pervading nature *all* selves are within *all* bodies. The *Vaiseshikas* and others, therefore cannot reasonably assume any part of the self to be limited by the body. Moreover the body too originates in proximity to all selves, and consequently it is impossible to limit it as belonging to any one particular *s* If to the exclusion of all others. Hence we conclude that the only doctrine free from all objections is the doctrine of the unity of the Self



## अविरोध-नाम-द्वितीयाध्याये

चतुर्थः पादः प्राणैन्द्रियविषय-श्रुतिवाक्यानां विरोध-परिहारः



१ । तथा प्राणाः ।

१ । विषयविषयः श्रुतिप्रतिषेधः तृतीयेन पादेन परिहृतः, चतुर्थेन इदानीं प्राणविषयः परिह्रियते । यथा लोकादयः परमात् त्रिधा उत्पद्यन्ते, 'तथा प्राणाः' अपि तस्मात् उत्पद्यन्ते । "एतस्मादात्मन सर्वे प्राणा सर्वे लोका सर्वे देवा सर्वानि भूतानि च व्युत्स्रन्ति" ( ऋह २।१।२० ) एवञ्जातीयक श्रुतिवचन प्राणीत्पत्तौ प्रमाणम् ।

1 So are the *pranas* ( produced directly from Brahman)

In the third páda it has been shown that there is no conflict of scriptural passages on the subject of *akáśa* etc. The same will now be done in the fourth páda on the subject of the *pránas*. The first Sūtra says that as the worlds etc., are produced from the Highest Brahman, 'so are the *pránas*' also produced from him. Such scriptural passages as "From that Self issue forth all *pránas*, all worlds, all gods, all beings" (*Bṛi* II 1 20), etc support the origination of the *pránas* (from the Highest Brahman)

२ । गौण्यसम्भवात् ।

२ । नहि प्राणानाम् उत्पत्तिश्रुतिः गौणी भवितु सम्भवति प्रतिज्ञाहानि-प्रसङ्गात् ।

"इदं नु माया विद्या मयि विद्यते भवति । (मु १।१।१) इति हि  
 पदविद्यते सर्वविद्यते इति य एव तत्त्वज्ञान इदम् आयादते 'एतन्मायायते माय  
 मय मयोन्यायि च' (मु १।१।१) इत्यादि । या च प्रविष्टा माया मयस्य  
 ज्ञान इदं विद्यायु निश्चिन्ति, कीदृशी न ज्ञानमाय मयस्य विद्यते इति ।

2. *Because a secondary sense (of the scriptural text on the origin of the pranas) is impossible*

The scriptural texts on the origin of the *pranas* from Brahman cannot be taken in a secondary sense (i.e. they are not figurative statements nor do they mean that the *pranas* are produced from Brahman indirectly through something else.) Otherwise, propositions previously asserted would become contradicted. The passage 'What is that venerable Sir through which when it is known everything else becomes known?' (*Mund* I 1 3) after having first asserted that the knowledge of everything may be obtained from the knowledge of one proceeds to substantiate that assertion by such statements as 'From him are born *prana* the sensorium and all the sense-organs' (*Mund* II 1 3) etc. Now the assertion can be substantiated only if the whole world, including the *pranas* etc. is an effect of Brahman but it becomes contradicted if the texts on the origin of the *pranas* are taken to have only a secondary sense.

॥ तत् प्राक युतेय ।

१ । इत एव आवासीयानाम् इव प्राचानाम् अपि मुखा एव जन्मयुति यतः तत्

“जायते” इति एक जन्मवाचि पदं प्राणेषु ‘प्राक्’ पूर्व्वं द्युत सत् उत्तरेषु आकाशादिषु अनवर्तते । “एतथाज्जायते प्राणी भवे सूर्येन्द्रियाणि च खं वायुं ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी” (सु २।१।३) इति अत्र आकाशादिषु मुख्य जन्म इति प्रतिष्ठापितं तत्सामान्यात् प्राणेषु अपि मुख्यम् एव जन्म भवितुम् अर्हति ।

3 Also because that (the word ‘jáyate’ = is born) is used in a scriptural text first (with reference to *prana*)

It is clear that the scriptural statement about the origin of the *pranas* is to be taken literally, just like the statements about *ākāśa* etc, because the identical word indicating origination, (*viś*, ‘jáyate’ = is born) is used in a certain text first about *prāna*, and then successively about *ākāśa*, etc For it is a settled matter that in the passage “From him are born *prāna*, the sensorium, all the sense-organs, ether, air, fire, water, and the earth, the container of all” (*Mund* II 1 3), the origin (‘birth’) is to be taken in a literal sense with reference to *ākāśa* etc From parity of reasoning, it follows that the origin is to be taken in a literal sense in the case of the *prānas* also

### ४ । तत्पूर्व्वकत्वात् वाचः ।

४ । ‘वाच’ इति वाक्प्राणमनसाम् उपलक्षणम् । छान्दीग्ये ( ६।२।३ ) ‘तत्तेजोऽष्टजत’ इति एतस्मिन् प्रकरणे प्राणानाम् उत्पत्तिं न पठ्यते, तेजोऽवन्नानाम् एव तथाशां भूतानां ब्रह्मण उत्पत्तिं श्रूयते । तत्र एव पुनः ( ६।३।४ ) तेजोऽवन्नेभ्य वाक्प्राणमनसाम् उत्पत्तिं कथिता । अतः ‘वाच’ वाक्प्राणमनसाम् ‘तत्पूर्व्वकत्वात्’



उदाहृता, विरीधात् तु अन्यतमा संख्या आध्यवसातव्या । 'तत्र अल्पकल्पनोपगोधात् समसंख्याध्यवसानं हतिमिदापि च संख्यान्तरवचनम् इति गम्यते । अत्र उच्यते,

5 (The Pūrvapaksha maintains that the *prānas* are seven, because that (number) is both understood and specified

The apparent conflict of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the *prānas* has been removed. The same will now be done with respect to their number. As usual, we have the Pūrvapaksha first. Scriptural passages disagree about the number of the *prānas*, which are mentioned in various places as seven, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen. What should we take to be their correct number? They are seven. Why so? *First*, because that number 'is understood' in such passages as "The seven *prānas* spring from him," (*Mund* II 1 8) etc. *Next*, because that number 'is specified also' in the passage "Seven, indeed, are the *prānas* of the head." If, (continues the Pūrvapakshin,) it should be objected that the *prānas* have been stated to be eight in number in other scriptural passages, so how under the circumstances can they be seven only? our reply is True, the number eight is also mentioned. But as the different enumerations (*viz.*, seven and eight) are mutually contradictory, we have to decide in favour of one number. And we decide in favour of the number seven, following the principle that a smaller conjecture (simpler hypothesis) is always to be preferred. We also consider that the other (*i.e.*, larger) enumerations result from the inclusion of the various modifications 'of the fundamental seven).

६ । हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ।

६। सिद्धांतमयमेतत् । इत्याद्य तु अपरी समस्तं जतिरिति । प्राणा दूयने  
( इह शाश्वतं इत्यादी ) । समतिरिति प्राणि स्थिते अवधारिते अपि समस्तं त कार्माणां  
समावृत्तं मयति । हीनाविक्त-संख्या विमतिपयो हि अविद्या संख्या संयाद्या भवति  
तस्या हीना अनाभवति न तु हीनायाम् अविद्या । 'अत' न एवं मगधम् अप-  
वन्धीयसीवात् मग एव प्राणा स्तु इति । उत्तरसंख्यागुणीयात् तु एका म एव ति प्राणा  
स्तु । मनु एकादशत्वात् अपि अविद्धि शाश्वतं मयी मले उदाहृते । मयम् उदाहृते न  
तु एकादश कार्यजातेभ्यः अविद्धं कार्यजातम् अति पदपम् अविद्धं करणं कथ्येत ।  
मयं मयै-रूप-रम गम-विषया पञ्चबुद्धिभेदाः तदर्थानि पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि वचनानि  
विश्वकोत्कर्षागन्ताः पञ्च कथ्यभेदाः तदर्थानि च पञ्चबुद्धेन्द्रियाणि । समीपविषयं  
वेकाल्यगति मग तु एकादशमेव उदाहृतिर्बलं तदेव इतिभेदात् कथितं भिन्नवत् अपदिशत  
"मवीदतिरुद्धावधितं च इति ।

6 (In reply to the Pūrvapakṣa the Sūtrakāra says.—) *But (in addition to the seven prāṇas scripture mentions) the hands etc This being a settled matter therefore, (we must) not (conclude) thus (i.e. that the prāṇas are seven only)*

To the above the *Sātrakāra* replies thus —In addition to the seven *prāṇas* scripture mentions other *prāṇas* also such as the hands, (*Bṛi* III 2, 8 etc.) The existence of *prāṇas* in excess of the number seven must be accepted as a settled fact. The number seven may however be reconciled with this fact for it is contained within the greater number. Whenever there arises a dispute as to number between a greater and a less, the greater number has to be accepted for the smaller number is contained

within the greater, but not the greater within the smaller 'Hence', we say, 'not thus', i.e., it is unreasonable to argue for the sake of a smaller conjecture (i.e., a simpler hypothesis) that the number of *prāṇas* is seven only. Rather we should conclude, in deference to the larger number, that their number is eleven. It may be objected that scripture mentions numbers higher even than eleven, e.g., twelve and thirteen. To this the *Sūtrakīra* replies: True, such numbers are, indeed, mentioned. But no additional functions over and above the eleven (enumerated below) exist, for the performance of which it would be necessary to assume additional organs. Intellectual activities are of five kinds, having for their objects sound, touch, colour, taste and smell respectively, for which there are the five organs of perception. Actions, too, are of five kinds, viz., speaking, taking, going, evacuation and procreation, for which there are the five organs of action. And finally, there is *manas*, which has all things for its objects, and whose activity extends to the past, the present, and the future, and which is one only, though having various functions. On account of the plurality of its functions, it is sometimes variously designated as '*manas*' or '*buddhi*,' '*ahamkāra*' or '*chitta*'

### ७ । अणवक्ष ।

७ । अमुना प्राणानाम् एव स्वभावान्तरम् अभ्युच्चिनोति । अथवा च एते प्राणाः प्रतिपत्तव्याः । अणुत्वं च एषां सौख्यपरिच्छेदौ, न परमाणुतुल्यत्वम्, अन्यथा तेषां कृत्स्नदेहस्यापि कार्यं न उपपद्यते । सूत्रा एते प्राणाः । स्थूला चित् सु मरुत्काले

प्रदीप्तान् निर्दिष्टान् विनात् पश्चि इव अन्तर्ध्वान् विधत्मान् पादये । परिच्छिन्ना  
च एव प्राणाः । तर्हि यता ईत् शु उन्मूलित-प्रकाशितं कुलम्बाकोपं प्राण  
तद् य त्व च जीवस्य न विध्यत् ।

### 7 And (the *prāṇas* are) minute

The Sātrakīra adds another characteristic quality of the *prāṇas*. They must be viewed as minute. Their minuteness comprises the qualities of subtilty and limited extent but not atomic size as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects all over the body. The *prāṇas* must be subtle had they any magnitude they would be visible as issuing out of the body of a dying man at the moment of death to persons watching by like snakes issuing out of holes. The *prāṇas* must be limited had they been all pervading scriptural statements about their passing out of the body going and coming would be contradicted thereby and it could not be established that the essence of the individual self consists in the qualities of that (i.e., its limiting adjunct or *buddhi*). Vide Sātra II 3 29)

### ८। श्रेष्ठयः ।

८। मुख्यप्राण इत्यप्यन्यत् प्रप्रविष्टात् । “नाशशरीरे हि ब्रह्मधर्माणि दृष्टे  
(सूत्र १।११८) “आनीद्वान् शरीरात् तद्वत् इति भातुमुपते, सन्निधि प्राण दृश्यति ।  
तस्यात् प्राण प्राण इति चक्षुषि सति जायते । “आनीत् मन्दं तु न भातुमुपते  
प्राणशरीरं दृश्यति “अनात् इति विमलत्वात् । “अनात् चामना युक् (सु १।१।१)  
इति च भूतप्रकृते प्राणादि-मनस-विशेष इति च दृश्यति । तस्यात् आरम्भशरीर  
प्रदर्शनार्थ एव अयम् “आनीत् मन्दं इति ।



## ८ । न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेगात् ।

८ । न एव सुप्तप्राणं किंश्चिद्व्यतिष्ठति इत्यर्थेन प्रमाणम् । तत्र प्राणं तान्त्रिकं व्यतिष्ठति वायुं प्राणं इति । एवं हि व्युत्पद्यते — 'यं प्राणं स एव वायुः पञ्चविधं प्राणी, वायुः ज्ञानं उदयनं सत्तानं' इति । अथवा सामानाभिप्रायात् समानकर्मण्यसि प्राणं इति प्राप्तम् । एवं हि सामान्यं चाप्युच्यते, — 'सामान्या करण्यसि प्राणाणां वायवः पञ्च' इति । अथ उच्यते, — 'न वायुः' प्राणः, न अपि करणव्यापारः । कतं — पृथगुपदेगात् यार्थो तावत् प्राणस्य पृथगुपदेगो भवति — 'प्राण एव तद्व्याप्यवर्गं पादं स चाधुना ज्योतिषा भासि च तपति च' इति ( एत ३।१८।४ ) । न हि वायुः एव मनः वायो प्रथम उपदिश्यते । तथा करणहरो अपि पृथगुपदेगो भवति । न हि करण-

कदा एव यत् कार्यं इदं यदि ज्ञेयं । तदा "एतच्चान्यत्र प्राणो नान्यत्रोच्यते च यो वायुः" (मु १।१।१) इति एवमाह्वयः यदि प्राणो कार्यं च प्राण इव, प्रज्ञा च बुद्धि इव ।

9 (The chief *prāṇa* is) neither air nor the function (of an organ) be *anvay* (in the scriptures) it is mentioned separately (from both)

The discussion now turns upon the nature of that chief *prāṇa*. It may be argued by the Pūrvaapakṣin that the chief *prāṇa* is nothing but air according to the scripture which says, "Breath is the same as air which assumes five forms viz. *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, *udāna* *samāna*" or following the Sāṅkhyas, it may be said that the *prāṇa* is the combined function of all the organs for the Sāṅkhyas teach that "The five airs *prāṇa* etc. are the common function of the organs." The Sūtrakara replies that the *prāṇa* is neither air nor the function of an organ. Why not? On account of separate mention in the scriptures. From air *prāṇa* is distinguished in the passage "Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot shines and burns with air as its light" (*Chh* III 18 4). If *prāṇa* were air itself it would not have been mentioned separately from air. Again *prāṇa* is also mentioned separately from the functions of the organs in the scriptures. If it were a mere function of an organ it would not be mentioned separately from the organs. Further we have to consider that in certain passages such as "From him are born *prāṇa* *manas* all the organs *akāśa* air" (*Mund* II 1 6) etc., *prāṇa* is mentioned separately from both air and the organs.

## १० । चक्षुरादिवत् तु तत्सहश्रिष्टादिभ्यः ।

१० । किं प्राणः जीववत् अस्मिन् शरीरे स्वातन्त्र्यं प्राप्नोति ? न । 'तु'-शब्दः प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं व्यावर्त्तयति । चक्षुरादीनि जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं च प्रति उपकरणानि, न स्वातन्त्र्याणि । तथा मुख्य प्राणः अपि जीवस्य सर्वार्थकारत्वेन उपकरण-भूतः, न स्वातन्त्र्यः । कुत ?—'तत्सहश्रिष्टादिभ्यः' अतः तत्सह चक्षुरादिभिः सह प्राणः प्राणसंवादादिषु ( प्रश्ने २ ) शिष्यते । समानधर्माणाम् एव सहशासनं युक्तम् । 'आदि'-शब्देन सहतत्त्वाचेतनत्वादीन् प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्य-निराकरण-हेतून् दर्शयति ।

10 *But* (the chief *prāṇa* is not independent in the body like the self It is subordinate to the self,) *like the eye etc , because the scripture treats of it along with them, and also for other reasons*

Is the chief *prāṇa* to be considered independent in this body, like the self ? No The word '*but*' sets aside the independence of the chief *prāṇa* The eye and other organs are subservient instruments of the self in respect of its activities and enjoyments, and are not independent Similarly the chief *prāṇa* is also a subservient instrument of the self in respect of the fulfilment of all its objects, and is not independent Why so ? 'Because the scripture speaks of the chief *prāṇa* along with them' in the colloquy of the *Prāṇas* (*Pras* II ) and in similar other passages It is appropriate to impart instruction on two things in conjunction only when their attributes are similar. The words '*and other reasons also*' denote that there are other reasons that impugn the independence of the chief *prāṇa*, such as its being composed of parts, its being non-intelligent, etc

## ११ । अकारणत्वाच्च न दीपश्चायाहि दम्यति ।

११ । यदि चक्षुरादिवत् प्राणस्य जीवं प्रति अकारणत्वं अनुपपद्येत, तदा तस्य अपादिवत् विवक्षान्तरं प्रसज्यत । न तु वादस्य अपरं कार्यम् अवगम्यते यदयम् अयं वादस्य प्राणः प्रतिश्रापित इति । अत्र उच्यते — न तावत् विवक्षान्तरमस्य दीपः, प्राणस्य अकारणत्वात् । न हि चक्षुरादिवत् प्राणस्य विवक्षयस्तिष्ठेदित् अकारणत्वं अनुपपद्येत । न च अस्य एतावता कार्यमात्र एव । कथम् ? — तस्मा हि क्षुतिं प्राणान्तरिणं अमृतमन्त्रमात्रं मुख्यप्राणस्य वैमर्षितं कार्यं दम्यति । प्राणस्यैवादिषु ( प्रश्ने १ ) प्राणनिमित्ते एव श्रोत्रस्य उत्तुङ्गानि प्रतिष्ठेदिति ।

11 *The objection (of the chief *prāṇa* not having an object) is not valid because it is not a sense-organ for thus (the scripture) declares*

An objection may be urged here. If the chief *prāṇa* is admitted to be an instrument in relation to the *Jīva*, like the eye etc., then it will follow that we must assume a sense-object also for it just as we have colour for the eye. But there is no twelfth function (over and above the eleven enumerated in the sixth Sūtra) for which a twelfth *prāṇa* could be assumed. To this objection the Sutrakāra replies. The objection that another *sense* object would have to be assumed is not valid, for the chief *prāṇa* is not a sense-organ. we never assume that the chief *prāṇa* is, like the eye etc., a sense-organ by virtue of its determining a special sense-object. But the chief *prāṇa* is not on that account, devoid of function. Why so? Because the scripture declares that the chief *prāṇa* has a specific function which cannot be performed by the other *prāṇas*. In the colloquy of the *Prāṇas* (*Pras II*), and other

passages, it has been shown that the self's departure from and continuance in the body depend on the chief *prāna*

## १२ । पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनीवद् व्यपदिश्यते ।

१२ । इतश्च अस्ति मुख्यप्राणस्य वैशेषिकं कार्यं यत् 'पञ्चवृत्ति' अथ व्यपदिश्यते श्रुतिषु,—प्राणोऽपानी व्यान उदान समान इति ( भ्रमे ३ ) । 'मनीवत्' यथा योवादि-निमित्ता शब्दादि-विषया मनस पञ्चवृत्तयः प्रसिद्धा, एव प्राणस्य अपि ।

12 (In scripture the chief *prāna*) is designated as having five functions, like the sensorium

That the chief *prāna* has its specific function is proved by this also that in scripture it is designated as having five functions, viz *prāna*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna* (*Pīas* III) 'Like the sensorium', i e, just as the sensorium has five well-known functions, which have sound, etc for their objects, and ear, etc, for their causes, so has the *prāna*

## १३ । अणुश्च ।

१३ । अणु च अथ मुख्यप्राण प्रत्येतव्य इतरप्राणवत् । क्वचित् तु आधिदैविकेन समष्टिरूपेण दैत्यगर्भेण प्राणात्मना प्राणस्य विस्तृतम् आश्रयते, न व्यष्टिरूपेण ।

13 And (the chief *prāna* is) minute

Like the other *prānas* the chief *prāna* too is to be considered minute In certain scriptural passages, indeed, the all-pervasiveness of *prāna* is spoken of But that

quality belongs only to its universal aspect i.e., to the active principle in creation presided over by a deity appearing as Hiraṇyagarbha whose essence is *prāṇa* or life and not to its individual aspect

### १४ । ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानस्तु तदामममात् ।

१४ । तेषु प्रकृता एव हि सप्तदिव्ये वायु इत्येव आत्मा प्रभवन्ति चार्वाकान् देवताधिष्ठिता प्रभवन्ति इति विचार्यते । तत्र उच्यते — ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु । यत्र 'तु' मन्त्रेण सप्तदिव्या प्रधाना प्रशान्तिं प्राप्नुवन्ति । ज्योतिरादिभिः चक्षुर्गन्धिभिः श्रित्वादिदीप्तिभिः देवताभिः अधिष्ठितं वायुदिग्गजप्रजातं वातायं प्रवर्तनं इति प्रतिज्ञायते । ईदृशं चक्षुः 'तदामममात्' तदाहि चाममन्ति — 'अधिरांमृन्मा मृतं प्रविशन्' (ऐत १।४) इत्यादि । अथ च वायुमात्रं मुख्यमस्य देवतात्मना अधिष्ठातव्यम् अङ्गीकृत्य उच्यते । न हि देवतात्मनो प्रत्याप्यस्य यत्र वायुं मुनि वा वायुं विदेव सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः । तथा 'वायुं प्राप्य भूमा नदिदेव प्राविशन्' (ऐत १।४) इति उक्तमहिं अपि दीक्षितव्यम् ।

14 But (the *prāṇas* are) *presided over by* (the deities) *fire etc., because it is thus declared by scripture*

Here arises a dispute as to whether the *prāṇas* about which we have been discussing are able to produce their respective effects by their own power or by virtue of their being presided over by divinities. The Sūtrakāra says But the *prāṇas* are presided over by Fire etc. Here the word 'but' sets aside the independent activity of the *prāṇas*. The Sūtra declares that the different organs, viz. speech etc. enter on their respective activities, by being presided over by the divinities animating fire etc. The reason for

saying so is, 'Because it is thus declared by scripture', *viz* in the passage "Agni, having become speech, entered the mouth" (*Aita* I 4), etc. The statements about Agni's becoming speech and entering the mouth are made on the assumption of his acting as a presiding deity, (not as a mere element) For if we deny the connexion of fire with a divinity, we cannot see why it should have a special connexion either with speech or the mouth. Along with the above passage, we have others about air etc. to take into account, such as, "Vayu, having become breath, entered the nostrils" (*Aita* I 4), etc.

### १५ । प्राणवता शब्दात् ।

१५ । सतीषु अपि प्राणानाम् अधिष्ठात्रीषु देवतासु 'प्राणवता कार्यकारण-संघात-स्वामिना शरीरेण एव एषा प्राणानां सम्बन्धं श्रुते अवगम्यते, न देवताभिः । तथा हि श्रुतिः,—“अथ यत्र एतत् आकाशमनुविषणं चक्षुः स चाक्षुषं पुरुषो दर्शनाय चक्षुःस्थो वेदेदं जिब्राणोति स आत्मा गन्वाय ब्राह्मम्” ( ऋ ८।१२।४ ) इति एवञ्जातीयका शरीरेण एव प्राणानां सम्बन्धं श्रावयति ।

15 (The connection of the *prāṇas* themselves is, however, not with those presiding divinities, but) *with that to which the prāṇas belong* (i.e., with the embodied self, as we learn) *from the scriptures*

Although there are those divinities presiding over the *prāṇas*, yet, we learn from the scriptures that it is with the owner of the *prāṇas*, i.e., with the embodied self, which is the master of the aggregate of working organs, that the

*pranas* have connexion (and not with those divinities) Such scriptural passages as 'Wherever the eye is fixed on *ākāśa* there is the person of the eye' the eye itself is the instrument for the purpose of seeing. He who knows (i.e. resolves) 'Let me smell this' is the self the nose itself is the instrument for the purpose of smelling (Chh VIII 12. 4) and similar other passages declare the connection of the *pranas* with the embodied self only.

१६ । तस्य च मित्यत्वात् ।

१६ । इतः प्राणैरेव एव प्राणानां मुख्यं यत् तस्य च मातृ च यच्चित् प्राणिं भोजं तेन 'मित्यत्वं' व्याप्तिर्लभ्यते इति शङ्कानाम् ।

16 And because that (i.e., the embodied self only) has a fixed place in the body

From this also follows the connection of the *pranas* with the embodied self and not with the presiding divinities that it is the former that has a fixed place in the body as the enjoyer (of pleasure and pain) and not so the gods.

१७ । त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादभ्यस्येष्टात् ।

१७ । मुख्यं एव इतरे च व्यपदेशे प्राणा अनुप्राणा । तत्र इहम् अपरं यदिहति च मुख्यं एव प्राणस्य इतिमिदं इतरे प्राणा आसीन्मिदं तत्प्राणस्य इति । अत्र सत्यति — 'त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशात्' इति प्राणं चर्त्तयित्वा अवशिष्टं ।



एकादश प्राणा इन्द्रियाणि उच्यन्ते । 'तत्रोपदेगात्' यत "एतस्माज्जायते प्राणी मन  
सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च" ( सु १।१।३ ) इति एवञ्जातीयकेषु श्रुतिप्रदेशेषु पृथक् प्राण. व्यभिचिष्यते,  
पृथक् च इन्द्रियाणि ।

17 *They (the brānas) are sense-organs, besides the chief (prāna), because so designated 'in the scriptures'*

One chief *prāna*, and the other eleven *prānas* have been discussed in due order. Here arises another doubt, *viz*, whether the other *prānas* are merely different functions of the chief *prāna*, or are they different entities? The *Sūtrakāra* says 'They (the *prānas*) are spoken of as eleven sense-organs, distinct from the chief *prāna*' 'Because so designated', *i e*, because in such scriptural passages as "From that are born the *prāna*, *manas* and all the organs" (*Mund* II 1 3) etc, the *prāna* and the sense-organs are mentioned separately

१८ । भेदश्रुतेः ।

१८ । इतश्च इतरे प्राणा सुत्यात् प्राणात् तत्त्वान्तरभूता, यत मुख्य प्राण श्रुतौ  
सर्वत्र वागादिभ्य भेदेन उच्यते । बृहदारण्यकम् १।१।२, १।५।३ द्रष्टव्यम् ।

18 *On account of the scriptural statement of difference (between the chief prāna and the other prānas)*

Another reason why the other *prānas* are to be viewed as different entities from the chief *prāna* is that the chief *prāna* is everywhere in the scriptures spoken of as different from speech etc, as in *Bri*. I 3 2 and I. 5 3.

१८ । वैलक्षण्यम् ।

१८ । एतच्चात् अपि भुक्तात् प्राचात् वा ।।दीन्द्रियाणां वृत्त्यान्तरिर्हि यच्चात् तन्म तेषां च वैलक्षण्यं लघुचमीद भवति । सुषेडु बागादिषु मुख्या एका जायते । स एव एका लम्बा चगात्, चासा तु इतरे । तस्य एव प्राचस्य भवत्विष्य। उत्पत्त्याऽपि च दीन्द्रियाण्यपि कृतम्, न इन्द्रियाणाम् । विषयान्वितं कृतम् च इन्द्रियाणां न प्राचस्य । इति एवज्ञातीयक सूत्रान् लघुचमीद प्राचिन्द्रियाणाम् ।

19 *And on account of the difference of characteristics (between the chief *prāṇa* and other *prāṇas*)*

Another reason why the organs such as speech etc., are to be viewed as different entities from the chief *prāṇa* is this,—that there is a difference of characteristics between them. When speech etc. are asleep the chief *prāṇa* alone is awake. The chief *prāṇa* alone is beyond the reach of death, while the other *prāṇas* are subject to death. It is the abiding and departing of the chief *prāṇa* (and not of the sense-organs) that cause the maintenance and destruction respectively of the body. On the other hand, the sense-organs are the causes of the perception of the sense-objects, and not the chief *prāṇa*. Thus there are manifold characteristics distinguishing the chief *prāṇa* from the sense-organs.

२० । संज्ञानूर्तिक्लृप्तिसु विवृत्तुर्व्यत उपदेयात् ।

१ । वाच्यीये ( ६।१।१ ३ ) प्रथमवारं चिन्तितुं प्रसिद्धाय उप-  
दिश्यते —“सर्वं ईश्वरीयं वृत्त्यादिसमाधिनी ईशता यन्निव शीघ्रं लभ्यते प्रविश्य नासक्य

व्याकारवाणीति । तासां द्विवत् द्विवत्तमैकैका कारवाणीति । तत्र सश्रय किं जीवकर्तृकम् इदं नामरूपव्याकरणम् आहोस्वित् परमेश्वरकर्तृकम् इति ? अत्र चयते,—परमेश्वर-कर्तृकम् इति । ‘तु’-शब्देन पूर्वपक्षं व्यावर्त्तयति । ‘सञ्ज्ञामूर्त्तिकलृप्ति’ नामरूप-प्रकाशनम्, ‘द्विवत्कुर्वन्त’ मूलभूततय-रचयितु मिश्रणकर्तृकं परमेश्वरस्य एव क्रिया भवितुम् अर्हति, न जीवस्य । ‘उपदेशात्’ यत् “सैव देवता” इति उपपन्नस्य ‘व्याकारवाणि’ इति उत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण परस्य एव ब्रह्मण्य व्याकर्तृत्वम् इह उपदिश्यते । ननु “जीवेन” इति विशेषणात् व्याकरणस्य जीवकर्तृकत्वम् अर्थावसितं युक्तम्, न एतत् एवम् । “जीवेन” इति एतत् पदम् ‘अनुप्रविश्य’ इति अनेन सम्बध्यते आगन्तव्यात्, न ‘व्याकारवाणि’ इति अनेन । तेन हि सम्बन्धेन “व्याकारवाणि” इति अयं देवताविषय-उत्तमपुरुष औपचारिकः कल्प्येत । न च गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिषु नानाविधेषु नामरूपेषु अनीश्वरस्य जीवस्य व्याकरणसामर्थ्यम् अस्ति ।

20 *But the evolution of names and forms is due to him who makes things tripartite (i.e. to Ísvara), because it is so taught (in scripture)*

The section of the *Chhândogya Upanishad* which treats of (*Brahman* VI 3 2 and 3), after describing the creation of fire, water and earth, goes on to say, “That divinity thought, ‘Having entered those three entities in the form of this living self, let me evolve names and forms, let me make each of these three tripartite’” Here the doubt arises whether the agent in the evolution of names and forms is *jíva* or *Ísvara*. The *Sutrakára* says, it is *Ísvara*. The word ‘but’ is intended to set aside the view that the *jíva* is the agent. ‘The evolution of names and forms’ can only be the action of ‘him who makes things tripartite’ i.e., of *Ísvara*, who creates and blends together in various combinations the three primordial elements and never of *jíva*. ‘Because, it is so taught in the scripture’, i.e., because the

above scriptural text begins with the words that divinity and by using the first person in let me evolve teaches that the Supreme Brahman and no other is the evolving agent. If it be urged that from the qualifying expression in the form of this living self it may be inferred that the agent in the evolution is jiva, we say No not so. The connection of the phrase in the form of this living self is with the words having entered which are proximate to it and not with the words let me evolve. Should that expression be connected with the words let me evolve it would be necessary to assume that the first person used with reference to the Divinity in let me evolve is only metaphorical. But really no self other than the Lord can have the power of evolving the multiplicity of names and forms such as mountains, rivers and seas.

## २१ । मांसादि भौमं यथागन्धमितर्यथैव ।

११ । भूमिं विभूतज्जलान् पुष्पैश्च उपमुञ्चमाणाया मांसादिकार्यम् अथागन्धं निपद्यत । तथा हि भुक्तिः — 'अन्नमयितं यथा विधीयते । तस्य च स्थितीं चागुच्य पुष्पं भवति सो मध्यमस्तन्नामं योऽविच्छिद्यन्मनः ( का ६।३।१ ) इति । विभूतज्जलान् भुक्ति एव एषा श्रीहृदयनाथब्रह्मणेन चयते इत्यभिप्रायः । एवम् इतर्यथैव अप्रतिग्रही यथागन्धम् भुक्तिवचनागुचरीच काव्यम् अवनन्तम् — भूमौ लीहितं प्राक्च यथा चाप्यम् अन्वि सत्या वाक् तत्रम् इति ।

21 According to scriptural statement flesh &c (proceed) from earth and (other things) from the other two (i.e., fire and water )

From tripartite earth (i.e., food) when assimilated by

man, proceed flesh etc , as effects, according to scripture For the scriptural text says, "Food, when eaten, becomes threefold Its grossest portion becomes foeces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion *manas*," (*Chh* VI 5 1) , which indicates that it is the tripartite earth that is consumed by man in the shape of rice, barley, etc Similarly we have to learn from the scriptures the effects of the other two elements, water and fire, *viz* , that urine, blood and breath are the effects of water, and bone, marrow and speech those of fire

## ૨૨ । વૈશેષ્યાત્ તુ તદ્વાદસ્તદ્વાદઃ ।

૨૨ । અર્થ 'તુ'-શબ્દેન દોષમ્ અપગુદતિ । યદિ સર્વમ્ એવ નિઘત્કૃત મૂત-મૌતિકમ્ અવિશેષશ્ચુતે "તાસાં નિઘત નિઘતમેકૈકામકારીત્" ( છા ૬ા૧૪ ) કતિ, કુત તર્હિ અય વિશેષવ્યપદેશઃ, કદં તેજઃ, કદા આપ, કદમ્ અન્નમ્ કતિ ? અવ ઉચ્યતે, સતિ અપિ નિઘત્કારણે, કાચિત્ કાચ્ચિત્ મૂતધાતો આધિક્યમ્ ઉપલક્ષ્યતે, અગ્રે તેજ-આધિક્યમ્, ઉદકસ્ય અવાધિક્યમ્, પૃથિવ્યા અન્નાધિક્યમ્ કતિ । તસ્માત્ 'વૈશેષ્યાત્' સ્વભિન્ સ્વભાગસ્ય આધિક્યાત્ એવ 'તદ્વાદ' તેજોઽવન્ન-વિશેષવાદ મૂતમૌતિકવિષય ઉપપદ્યતે । 'તદ્વાદસ્તદ્વાદ' કતિ દ્વિકતિ અધ્યાયપરિસમાપ્તિ દ્યોતયતિ ।

22 But on account of distinctive characteristics they have their various designations

The word 'but' here repels an objection Now, if all elements and things composed of them are alike tripartite, as mentioned indifferently in the scriptural text, "He made each of them tripartite" (*Chh* VI 3 4), then why are things differently named, as when we say 'this is fire, this is water, this is earth' ? The *Sūtrakāra* replies Though all

things have alike been made tripartite, yet we observe in different things a preponderance of different elements in flames a preponderance of fire in liquids of water in earthy solids of earth. It is on account of these distinctive characteristics i.e., the preponderance in them of their own characteristic portions, that they have their various designations i.e. it has been possible to have these special designations with reference to the elements and their products, viz., fire water and earth. The repetition of the last word of the Sūtra indicates the termination of the chapter

## साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये

प्रथमः पादः जीवस्य संसारगतिः

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१ । तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति सम्भरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाम्याम् ।

१ । अथ प्रथमे पादे छान्दोग्योक्ताम् पञ्चाग्निविद्याम् आश्रित्य जीवस्य संसारगति-  
प्रमेदं प्रदर्शयते । स “तदन्तर-प्रतिपत्तौ” देहात् देहान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ देहान्तर-ग्रहणार्थं  
देहबीजं भूतसूक्ष्मं ‘सम्भरिष्वक्तः’ परिवेष्टित ‘रंहति’ गच्छति इति अवगन्तव्यम् । कुत ?  
प्रश्ननिरूपणाम्याम्, तथाहि प्रश्नं श्वेतकेतुः प्रति प्रवाहयस्य, “वेत्थ यथा पञ्चम्यामाहुता-  
वाप पुरुषवचसी भवन्ति” इति ? ( छा ३।३।३ ) ‘निरूपणं’ च प्रतिवचनं द्यु-पर्जन्य-  
पृथिवीपुरुष-योषित्सु पञ्चसु अग्निषु अज्ज्ञा-सीम-वृष्ट्यन्त-रेतीरुषा पञ्चाहुती दर्शयित्वा,  
“इति तु पञ्चम्यामाहुतावाप पुरुषवचसी भवन्ति” इति ( छा ३।३।१ ) । तस्मात् अग्नि-  
परिवेष्टित जीव ‘रंहति’ प्रगति इति गम्यते ।

1 (The self), in obtaining another (body), goes enveloped (by the subtle parts of the elements), for so say a question and (its) answer (in the scriptures)

The first páda of this Chapter explains the different modes of the self's passing through its worldly state on the basis of the Panchágni-vidyá (the knowledge of the Five Fires) as taught in the Chhándogya Upanishad We must understand that “it” (i.e. the self) “in obtaining

another i.e. in passing from one body to another) goes enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements, which are the seeds of the body in order that it may assume a new body. How do we know this? From a question and its solution" is given in the scriptures. The question referred to was put by Prādhana to Svetaketu — Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man? (Chh V 3 3). The answer is given by the entire passage which after having explained how the five libations in the forms of Sraद्धा Soma, rain, food and seed are offered in the five fires i.e. heaven, purjanyā, the earth, man and woman concludes with the words. For this reason is water in the fifth oblation called man (Chh V 9 1). From this we are to understand that the passing self goes enveloped by water.

## २। त्रिधात्मकत्वात् तु भूयस्त्वात् ।

१। अप्समन्त्रवच-आमर्ष्यात् आवा ईवनामि अहिं सन्धिरिचम इति इति न चामर्षितम् यत् त्रिधात्मकत्वात् अपां द्वित्यत्र च त्रिधात्मकत्वात् तिस्रोऽवयवमिधितत्वात् द्वितीयस्तु अपा च भूयस्त्वात् वातुभ्याम् सुधी "वाप इति उक्तम् । यत् अप मन्त्र न मन्त्र वाप एव द्वितीयोक्त्या भूतत्वात् कर्तव्यं विदुम् ।

2 But because (water itself is) of tripartite nature (water alone is mentioned in the scripture) on account of its preponderance

If we take the literal meaning of the word used in the above scriptural text, viz., water a doubt may arise that the self goes enveloped by water alone. This doubt



however, is not to be entertained "Because of the tripartite nature" of water as well as of the body, which are composed of the three elements fire, water and earth, and also "because of the preponderance" of water in the seed of the body, the word 'water' (alone) has been made use of in the scriptures Hence by the single word 'water' is to be understood the mention of the subtle parts of all the elements which constitute the seed of the body

### ३ । प्राणगतेश्च ।

३ । इत्यथ अवगम्यते यत् भूतसूक्ष्मं सम्परिवृत्तं जीवः देहान्तरग्रहणार्थं गच्छति, यतः देहान्तर-प्रतिपत्तौ प्राणानां गतिः श्राव्यते ( बृह ४।४।२ ) । सा च प्राणानां गतिः आश्रयम् अन्तरेण न सम्भवति इति, अतः प्राणगतिप्रयुक्तानां तदाश्रयभूतानाम् अपांश्च अपि भूतान्तरोपप्लवणानां गतिः अवगम्यते । न हि निराश्रया प्राणाः क्वचित् गच्छन्ति तिष्ठन्ति वा जीवतः, अदर्शनात् ।

### 3. And because of the going of the *prāṇas*

That the self, when going to assume a new body, is enveloped by the subtle parts of all the elements, is seen from this also,—that the scriptures state that when a new body is obtained, the *prāṇas* too go from the old body to the new (*Bṛi.* IV 4 2) Now this movement of the *prāṇas* is not possible without an abode or vehicle of the *prāṇas* Hence, we have to infer that water also, mixed with parts of the other elements, goes (from the old body to the new) serving the purpose of a vehicle for the moving *prāṇas* For the *prāṇas* cannot, without such a vehicle, either move or abide anywhere, as we observe in living beings.

४। अग्न्यादि-गतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्न भातयात् ।

४। श्रुतिः मरणकाले वायुदण्डं प्राणा अप्यादेः गतान् गच्छन्ति इति वक्ष्यति —  
 वक्ष्यते बुद्धयः गतं प्राणि प्राण्यतः प्राणं प्राणा ( इव ३।१।१६ ) इत्यादि ।  
 अथ चेत् यदि अप्यादि मतिश्रुतिः न एव प्राणा ईदृशान् मतिवन्ती त्रीदश सङ्ग-  
 दन्त्या इति चाग्रहान्, तन् न चादित्यम् । कुतः ?— भातयात् यत्  
 अग्न्यादिनाम् अप्यादि मतिश्रुतिः भातः गीतो एव । वायुदण्डिहावीषां अप्यादि  
 अग्न्यादीनां वायुदण्डिहावीषादीनां मरणकाले उपस्था निश्चितानाम् अपेक्ष्य प्राणा ए-  
 व अप्यादीन् गच्छन्ति इति व्यचक्षते ।

4 If because of scriptural statements about (speech etc) entering into fire etc (it be said that the *prāṇas* do not accompany the self) we say No because (those scriptural statements are) metaphorical

Scripture declares that at the time of death speech and the other *prāṇas* go to Agni and the other gods e.g. in the passage "When the speech of the dead person enters into fire breath into air etc. (*Bṛi* III 2. 13) Now if because of such scriptural mention of the going (of the *prāṇas*) to fire etc., it be conjectured that at the time of the self's passing to a new body the *prāṇas* do not accompany the self we say that such conjecture is not admissible Why so? On account of the metaphorical character of the above scriptural statement. The entering of speech etc. into fire etc. is metaphorical. Fire etc., are the presiding deities of speech etc. and (during life) they co-operate with speech etc. at the time of death this co-operation ceases. It is this fact only which is meant to be conveyed metaphorically by such expressions as "Speech etc. enter into Fire etc."

५ । प्रथमेऽश्वत्थादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः ।

५ । 'प्रथमेऽश्वत्थात्' यत प्रथमे अग्नौ अपा अश्वत्था नास्ति, परन्तु अज्ञाया, तत पञ्चम्याम् आहुती आप पुरुषवत्त्वं भवन्ति इति एतत् निर्धारयितुं न शक्यते इति 'चेत्' आशङ्कते, तत् 'न' आशङ्कितम्, 'हि उपपत्ते ता एव' यत तव अपि प्रथमे अग्नौ अज्ञाशब्देन ता आप एव अभिप्रेत्यन्ते इति एतत् उपपद्यते सन्दर्भस्य पूर्वापरम् आलोच्य ।

5 If the objection be raised that water) *is not mentioned in the scripture with reference to the first* (of the five fires), we reply *No There also, water and nothing else (is meant), as appears from the fitness of things*

Here a doubt may arise, *viz*, that it cannot be concluded that 'in the fifth oblation water is called man,' because water is not mentioned in the scripture with reference to the first of the five fires, 'which are, in order, heaven, parjanya, the earth, man and woman', *vide* Sutra 1), but sraddha (faith) is said (to be the offering for that fire) But such doubt is not to be entertained We declare that by the word sraddha, it is water that is meant, "on the ground of fitness," *i e*, when we consider the passage in its entirety, it appears to be in the fitness of things to conclude that in the case of the first fire also, water is meant by the word sraddha

६ । अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणा प्रतीतिः ।

६ । 'अश्रुतत्वात्' यत अत्र प्रकरणे अपाम् इव जीवानां यावद्विज्ञा कश्चित् शब्द नास्ति, तत न ते अपपत्तिरिति चेन्न, इति चेत्, 'इष्टादिकारिणा प्रतीतिः', एतत्

न आग्निहोत्रम् अतः 'एव य इमे याम इटापूर्ते दत्तमिष्टुपायते ते धममभि  
सम्भवन्ति ( ऋ ३।१।१ ) इत्यपक्रम इटादिवाचिण्यं घृमादिना पिबवाकेन यथा अन्  
प्राप्तिं ज्ञापयति, "आवागावद्भममभेय सोमो राजा ( ऋ ३।१।४ ) इति । ते एव  
इष्टं यमि प्रतीवन्ते, 'तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्प्रती देवा 'यद्वा सुहृतिं तस्या आर्तं सोमो राजा  
सम्भवन्ति ( ऋ ३।४।१ ) इति स्मृति-सामान्यात् ।

6 Should it be objected that (selves are) *not distinctly mentioned in (that particular) scriptural passage* (and consequently they do not pass enveloped by water) we say *No because the performers of sacrifices (i. e., their selves) are understood*

An objection refuted Granting that water is referred to under the word *sradddhā* as contended in the last Sūtra, there is, yet no word in the scriptural passage which may be taken to refer to the selves. Hence, not being stated by scripture, we cannot allow that selves, when moving from one body to another are enveloped by water To this objection we say No This doubt should not be entertained because the performers of sacrifices etc. are understood For in the passage beginning 'But they who living in a village practise sacrifices works of public utility and almsgiving go to smoke (*Chh* V 10 3) it has been described that those persons who perform sacrifices reach the moon by passing along the path of the *Pitris* e. g. 'From *ākāśa* they go to the moon that is Soma, the King' (*Chh* Up V 10 4) Now these same persons (i. e., performers of sacrifices &c.) are doubtless meant in the above scriptural statement about the Five Fires also as we conclude from the parallelism of expression in the passage In that fire the devas offer *sradddhā*

as an oblation. From that oblation rises Soma, the King"  
(*Chh* V 4 2)

### ७। भाक्त वाऽनात्मविस्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति ।

७। कथं पुन उदम् इटादिकारिणां स्वकर्म्मकलोपभोगाय रक्षया प्रतिज्ञायते यावता तेषां धूमप्रतीकं वर्त्मना चन्द्रमसमधिष्ठानां अन्नभाव दर्शयति "एष सोमो राजा तदेवानाम् अन्न तदेवा भक्षयति" (शा प्र १०।४) इति ? अत्र उच्यते 'भाक्त वा' औपचारिकम् एव एषाम् अन्नत्वम्, न सुखम् । इटादिकारिभिः यत् सुखविहाय देवानां तत् एव एषा भक्षणम् अभिप्रेतम् । 'अनात्मविस्वात्' इटादिकारिणान् आत्मज्ञानाभावात् तेषां देवोपभोग्यभाव उपपद्यते । 'तथाहि दर्शयति तथाहि श्रुतिनात्मविदा देवोपभोग्यता दर्शयति,—“अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपासीत्योऽसावन्योऽन्नमभीति न स वेद यथा पयरेव स देवानाम्” इति ( बृह १।४।१० ) ।

7 (The statement about selves becoming the food of the gods is) *metaphorical*, because they do not know the Self ; for thus the scripture declares

An objection answered But how can it be maintained that the performers of sacrifices etc should proceed towards the enjoyment of the fruit of their works, considering that they are declared to become the food (of the gods) on reaching the moon by the path leading through smoke, as in the passage "That is Soma the King That is the food of the gods, the gods eat it" (*Chh* V 10 4) ? To this we reply The conversion into food is to be understood in a metaphorical, not in a literal sense The fact that the gods *rejoice* with the performers of sacrifices, is meant to be conveyed by the statement that the gods *eat* them. 'Because they do not know the Self', i.e., from the want of

a true knowledge of the Self in the performers of sacrifices, it follows that such performers are objects of enjoyment for the gods. For thus the scripture declares i.e. the scripture declares that those who do not know the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods, as in the passage Now if a man worship another deity thinking that the deity is one, and he himself is another that man is devoid of knowledge. He is like a beast for the devas. (Bri I 4 10)

८ । कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान् दृष्टश्रुतिभ्यां ययेत्मनेवच ।

८ । इटादिकप्रतिष्ठा चूमादिवस्त्राणां चण्डनचर्ममणिकडाणां मुष्णभोगाणां तत्र प्रवर्तनीयं चावापते — तस्मिन् यावत् चण्डानामुपनिषत्तमेवाभ्यां पुननिवर्तने भवितुम् (आ ३।१।१३) इत्यादि यावत् समीपवर्तनां ब्राह्मणादि-मीनिमापयने अप्युपवर्तनादिर्भवितुम् इति (आ ३।१।१०) । तत्र इदं विचार्यते किं निरनुशयां मुष्णकृतं चण्डाच चण्डीकृति, चाकीर्त्तिनं सागुमया इति ? अत्र उच्यते — कृतात्यये कृतवत् इटादि चर्त्ये चण्डोपमोऽपि चण्डोऽपचये सति अनुशयवान् मुष्णसंसारविवृण्ण चण्डीकृति पुनश्च प्रविपद्यते भवितुम् यथा स्तम्, 'अनेवच' तद्विपर्ययी च । चण्डोऽपि चण्डादेः उपसंश्रयान् विपर्ययं प्रतीयते । दृष्टश्रुतिभ्यां श्रुतिश्रुतिप्रमाणाभ्याम् इदम् अवगच्छते ।

8. According to both Sruti and Smritis when the karma has run its course the self (re-descends) with a residuum (of karma to another body) along the same way but in the inverse order

Scripture has it that the selves of the performers of sacrifices etc., ascend to the sphere of the moon, through the path of smoke etc., and after having enjoyed

the fruits of their works on that plane, re-descend thence e.g., the words beginning with "Having dwelt there till the falling off, they return again by the same way by which they came" (*Chh* V. 10 5), up to the words, "Those of good conduct obtain the birth of Brahmanas etc, those of evil conduct the birth of dogs etc" (*Chh.* V 10. 7) Now the question arises Do they descend after *exhausting* the fruits of all their works, and consequently without any remainder (of works), or do they descend with a residue (of unrequited works)? To this question we reply "When the *karma* has run its course", i.e., when the works performed by them such as sacrifices etc, have been depleted by the enjoyment of their fruits, and "with a residuum" (i.e., of *karma*) yet left after such enjoyment of fruits, "they re-descend" (to obtain a new birth), by the same path "by which they came", but "not thus," i.e., in the inverse order The inverse order we infer from the mention of clouds etc, during 'descent' "According to scripture and smṛiti", i.e., this is proved on the authority both of *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*

### ८ । चरणादिति चेन्नोपलक्षणादर्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः ।

८ । 'चरणात्' "रमणीयचरणा" इत्याद्या श्रुति 'चरणात्' आचरणात् एव योनि-  
प्राप्तिं दर्शयति, न अनुश्रयात्, 'इति चेत् न', यत् 'कार्ष्णाजिनि' आचार्यः मन्यते यत्  
चक्षा श्रुति 'उपलक्षणाधी', श्रुतिस्तु-"चरण"शब्द लक्षणेन अनुश्रयशेषक, इत्यर्थः ।

9 *Should* (the assumption of a residuum of karma) *be objected to because of (the word) 'conduct,' we say,*

10 Because *Kārshnājini* considers that (conduct) has an implied meaning, (viz. the residuum)

An objection refuted. It may be said that such expressions in the scriptural text as "conduct" of good conduct etc., point out that the new birth is the result of conduct and not of a residuum of *karma*. To this objection we say No. Because in the opinion of the teacher *Kārshnājini* the above scriptural text has an implied meaning i.e. the word "conduct" in the above text implicitly means the residuum of *karma*.

१० । आनयक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात् ।

१ । अत्रापेक्षान्तरमिति न चेत्तत् । इति चतुर्थमपि अत्रापि आनयक्यम् । एवमप्यत्र, इति चेत् न । तदपेक्षत्वात् एतत् इत्यत्रापि अपेक्षम् । न हि यदापेक्षितं तदपि अपेक्षितम् । अतः चेत्तत् । आनयक्यम् । इति न पुनरिति चेत् । इत्यत्रापि ।

10 If it be said (that on the above assumption conduct) becomes purposeless we deny this because (works) depend on conduct

Another objection refuted. It may be said that on the assumption that new birth is due to the residuum of *karma* and not to conduct conduct becomes inconsequent. This objection is invalid on account of the dependence on it "i.e., because such works as sacrifices etc. depend on conduct. One who is not of good conduct is not entitled to perform them. This we know from smṛiti passages such as Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify



११ । सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु वादरि ।

११ । 'वादरि तु' अत्रार्थः 'सुकृतदुष्कृते एव' "सकृत्"-उच्यते प्रकाशये, इति मन्त्रे । तथात् "रत्नाग्रेसरस्य" समस्तकर्मात्, "स पुण्यस्य" विदितकर्मिणः इति निर्णयः ।

11 But *Badarī* (holds that "conduct" means) the good and evil works themselves

But the teacher *Bīdarī* holds that by the word "conduct" are meant the good works and evil works themselves. Hence we conclude that men "of good conduct" are the performers of praiseworthy works and those "of evil conduct" are the performers of blameable works

१२ । अनिटादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

१२ । पूर्वपक्षः । 'अनिटादिकारिणाम् अपि' चन्द्रमण्डल गन्तव्यत्वेन 'श्रुतम् । तत्राहि अविशिष्टा कौपितकिन समामनन्ति—“यै वै के चाप्यादीकात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमन्मेव ते भव्ये गच्छन्ति” ( कौषि १२ ) इति ।

12 (The *Pūrvapakshin* says that ascent to the moon is stated in the scripture about those also who do not perform sacrifices &c

The *Pūrvapaksha* Scripture speaks of the sphere of the moon as a place of resort for those also who do not perform sacrifices &c, e g, the *Kaushītakins* make this unspecified statement, "All who depart from this world go to the moon" (*Kau* I 2)

१३। संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरिपामारोहावरोहो तदतिदर्शनात् ।

१३। 'तु मन्त्रं पूर्यपच ज्ञायतयति । इदकारिण एव भीमाय चन्द्रमसम्  
चारीकृतिं न इतरि । न तत्र अतिदकारिणा भीमा अस्ति । ते संयमने समान्ये  
व्यदुष्कृतागुण्या यामी यातये । अनुभूय पुन एव इमं लोकां प्रति अवरोहति ।  
इतिरिणम् अतिदकारिणाम् एवभूतो चारीकृ चवरोही भवतः । तदतिदर्शनात्  
यतः यमवचनगुणा वृत्तिः भवताम् अतिदकारिणा यमव मतो दृश्यति —

“न शल्पस्य प्रतिभाति शर्व

ममाद्यन्ते विततीहि मूढम् ।

अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति ज्ञानी

पुन पुनममापयति मे ॥ ( ऋ १।१।६ )

13 (The Sūtrakāra says) *No For those others (i. e. non performers of sacrifices) ascent and descent take place through the enjoyment (of fruits of actions) in Samyamana the city of Yama for them) such a course is declared (in the scriptures)*

The word 'but discards the Pūrvapakṣa. It is only the performers of sacrifices who ascend to the moon going there for the enjoyment (of the fruits of their good works) not others. For those who do not perform sacrifices, there is no enjoyment in the moon. These latter suffer in Samyamana, the abode of the god of death, the torments provided by Yama in accordance with their evil deeds, and then they re-descend to this world. Such are the ascent and descent of the others, (i. e. the non performers of sacrifices) as we maintain on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that non performers of

११ । सुकृतदुष्कृते ऽवेति तु वादरिः ।

११ । 'वादरि तु आचार्यं 'सुकृतदु-कृते ऽव' "वर्ण"-शब्देन प्रख्यायते, इति मन्यते । तथात् "रमणीयवर्णा" प्रशस्तकर्माणां, "कपृत्रवर्णा" निन्दितकर्माणां इति निर्णयः ।

11 *But Bādari (holds that "conduct" means) the good and evil works themselves*

But the teacher Bādari holds that by the word "conduct" are meant the good works and evil works themselves. Hence we conclude that men "of good conduct" are the performers of praise-worthy works and those "of evil conduct" are the performers of blameable works

१२ । अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

१२ । पूर्वपक्षः । 'अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च' चन्द्रमण्डल गताव्यत्वेन 'श्रुतम्' । तथाहि अविशिष्टेषु कौषितकिण समामनन्ति—“ये वै के चाध्याप्नोकात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति” (कौषि १।२ ) इति ।

12 *(The Pūrvapakshin says that ascent to the moon) is stated in the scripture about those also who do not perform sacrifices &c*

The Pūrvapaksha Scripture speaks of the sphere of the moon as a place of resort for those also who do not perform sacrifices &c, e g, the Kaushītakin make this unspecified statement,—“All who depart from this world go to the moon” (*Kau* I 2)

१३ । संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरियामारोहायरोहो तद्वतिदर्गनात् ।

१३ । 'तु' इह 'तु' भूयपच व्यापयति । इति कारिण एव भोदाय चदमनम्  
 कारिणि, न इतरि । न तत्र अनितकारिणो भोगः क्वचि । न संयमने । तान्ति  
 मनुष्या ता अपरं यमो दातता अनुभूय पुन एव इमं भोक्षं वति चररीर्त्तन ।  
 इतरियाम् अनितर्त्त कारिणाम् एवमुक्तो 'चररी' चररीहो भवतः । तद्वति नात्  
 यतः समवचनसम्बन्धेन कृतिः अयताम् अनितकारिणो यमव द्वाता इत्यति —

“न भवत्यस्य प्रतिभाति वाचं

प्रमाद्यन्ति विपरीतं नृदम् ।

अयं भोक्षा नास्ति पर इति ज्ञानी

पुनः पुनः प्रमाद्यन्ते मे ॥ ( अठ १११६ )

13 (The Sūtrakāra says) No For those others (i. e., non performers of sacrifices) ascent and descent take place through the enjoyment (of fruits of actions) in Samyamana the city of Yama for them) such a course is declared (in the scriptures)

The word but discards the Pūrvapakṣa It is only the performers of sacrifices who ascend to the moon going there for the enjoyment (of the fruits of their good works) not others. For those who do not perform sacrifices there is no enjoyment in the moon. These latter suffer in Samyamana, the abode of the god of death the torments provided by Yama in accordance with their evil deeds and then they re-descend to this world. Such are the ascent and descent of the others, (i. e. the non performers of sacrifices) as we maintain “on the ground of such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural passage embodying Yama's own words declares that non performers of

sacrifices, when they die, fall into Yama's power, thus, "The future life is not revealed to a man without understanding, thoughtless and deluded by the fascination of wealth. One who thinks that this world alone exists and there is no future world, comes under my sway again and again" (*Kath* I 2, 6,)

### ૧૪ । અસ્મિન્તિ ચ ।

૧૪ । અપિ ચ મનુ-વ્યાસીદય. સ્મૃતિકર્તા૨૧ સયમને પુરે યમાયત્તં કપૂયકર્મવિપાક કથયન્તિ ।

14 *The smritis also (declare) this.*

Moreover, authoritative writers of Smṛiti, like Manu, Vyāsa, etc., declare that in the city of Samyamana evil works are requited under Yama's rule.

### ૧૫ । અપિચ સપ્ત ।

૧૫ । અપિચ સપ્ત નરકા રૌરવપ્રમુખા દુષ્કૃતફાલોપભોગમૂભિલેન પૌરાણિકૈ અર્થ્યન્તે । તાન્ અનિષ્ટાદિકારિણ પ્રાપ્નુવન્તિ, ન ચન્દ્રલોકામ્ ।

15 *Further, there are the seven hells (for the non-performers of sacrifices)*

Further, the Purana-writers mention seven hells named Raurava etc., where the fruits of evil deeds have to be suffered (by their doers). Non-performers of sacrifices go to them, and not to the lunar regions.

## १६ । तत्रानि च तद्वाप्यादिविरोधः ।

१६ । तत्र विद्वद्भ्य इदं—यथायथा वातना वाचकर्मणा चतुर्भविनि इति, वातना तत्र शोकादिषु च वा विद्वद्भ्यः कालविहाता कल्पन् इति—न इत्याह तत्रानि तत्र च यः सन्नु नरैर्दुःखैर्वापातु तत्र एव यमस्य च विहातृत्वाप्यात् कालना येन तन्नु च विहातृ भवति । यमस्यैव एव हि ते विद्वद्भ्यः वाच्यम् ।

16. And there is no contradiction (in this mention of seven hells) because in all of them he (i. e., Yama) acts (as overlord)

An objection answered. It may be said that the statement that evil-doers suffer the punishments ordained by Yama is contradicted by the mention in the smritis of other beings, such as Chitrugupta etc., as superintendents in Raurava etc. To this we say No there is no contradiction, as in those seven hells also there is the activity of Yama as the overlord Chitrugupta etc., are mentioned by the smritis only as superintendents employed by Yama.

## १७ । विद्याज्ञानयोरेति तु प्रकृतत्वात् ।

१७ । 'तु' यमः साक्षात्परीक्षयाभ्यभक्षाम् चक्षुर्जननादाम् लब्धिनिति । तत्र ज्ञान-यमः च विज्ञानायैव इति चरतिद्वये । यथापि विद्यायां विद्या यथापि लीला न लब्धयते ( भा ३।१।१ ) इति ज्ञान प्रकृत प्रतिपत्त्यावहरी मूढते कर्तव्यी यदीर्ष कर्तव्येन तानीमानि यथायथाप्युक्तवर्तनीनि मूलानि भवन्ति । ज्ञानस्य विद्ययाप्येव द्वितीयं ज्ञानम् । तेषामपि लीला न लब्धयते ( भा ३।१।२ ) इति । तत्र "यदीर्ष यदीर्ष" इति विद्याकर्तव्यी इति एतत् । यथा? प्रकृतत्वात् यथा विद्याकर्तव्यी एव द्वितीय विद्यायैव यथा प्रतिपत्ती प्रकृते । एतत् उक्तं भवति—यि च न विद्या

साधनेन देवयाने पथि अधिष्ठता नापि कामेणा पितृयात्रे, तेषाम् एष. तृतीयं यस्या  
संवति इति । तस्मात् अपि न अग्न्यादिकारिणि चन्द्रमा प्राप्नोति ।

17 (Not all) *but* (only those who follow the paths) of .  
*knowledge and works* (reach the moon) For, *these two*  
*are the subjects of discussion* (in the scriptural passage)

The word 'but' is meant to discard the idea sought to be established on the strength of the scriptural text of another Sâkhâ (*viz*, the *Kaushîtaki*, see Sutra 12), that "all departed go to the moon" The word "all" there is to be taken as referring to those qualified (by knowledge or works) In the section of the scriptures known as "The Knowledge of the Five Fires," in course of reply to the question "Do you know why that world never becomes full?" (*Chh. V 3 3*), we have the text, "Small creatures which repeatedly come and go, (*i e*, are constantly being re-born), do not pass along either of those two ways For them (the law is) 'Live and die' Theirs is a third place Therefore that world never becomes full" (*Chh V 10 8*) Here by the expression "two ways" we are to understand knowledge and works Why so? Because "they are the subjects under discussion", *i e*, only "knowledge" and "works" are under discussion as the means for entering "the path of the gods" and "the path of the fathers" respectively. The meaning is, that for those who are neither entitled by knowledge to have access to the path of the gods, nor by works to have access to the path of the fathers, there is this third path From this consideration also we infer that non-performers of sacrifices etc, do not reach the moon

१८ । ७ ऋतोये तयोपलब्धे ।

१८ । ७ ऋतीयं व्याप्ति ईदृशमाय आश्रीताम् पचसंख्यानिबन्धं पादतन्त्रम् । तयोपलब्धे यत् तेषां आ ति संख्यानिबन्धम् अन्तरि एव वञ्चितम् प्रचारिकं ऋतीयं न भवति उपलब्धम्,—“जायते म्रियते” इति एतत् ऋतीयं व्याप्तम् इति ।

18. *With regard to the third place (the rule of five oblations for securing a new body) does not apply for thus is it perceived*

With regard to the third place the rule of the oblations being five in number for the purpose of obtaining a new body need not be attended to. For thus is it perceived :—because it is seen that the third place is reached in the manner described in the words, Live and die theirs is a third place without any reference to the fixing of the number of oblations as five

१८

१८ । अर्थितेऽपि च श्लोके ।

१८ । अपिच अर्थिते श्लोके द्रोचष्टचतुष्टयप्रवर्तीनां सीताद्रीपदी प्रवर्तीनां च अभीनिगमम् । तत्र द्रोचदीनां यावत्प्रतिषेधा एका आहुति नास्ति । षट्चतुष्टयादीनां तु क्षीयितृपुत्रविवर्धये हि अपि आहुती न स्तः । यथा च तत्र आहुति-संख्यानाम् अनादय भवति एवम् अत्रापि भविष्यति । अतश्च अपि रित-सीधम् अन्तरि एव म्रिय मज्जनं कृत्वा कर्म पचे इति श्लोके वक्ति । [ यत्र अत्रापि च कृतार्थे भावभाष्यं चतुष्टयमिति । अहं तु जन्तूनाम् अभीनिगमम् रित-सीधं विना कस्य च अभिज्ञतम् अतश्चाप्येव च मन्त्रे । ]



19 *There is, moreover, the tradition in the world* (of births without all the five oblations being offered)

Moreover, there are traditions in the world of the birth of Drona, Dhrishtadyumna, Sítá, Draupadī, etc., without mothers. In the case of Drona etc., one oblation, viz., that offered into the woman, is wanting. In the case of Dhrishtadyumna etc., even two oblations, viz., those offered into the man and into the woman, are wanting. As in these cases the number of oblations was set aside, so may it be in others too. It is also well-known in the world that the female crane conceives without a male, on hearing the rumbling of thunder.

[Note by Editor. Here, as elsewhere, I have followed the meaning of the Sūtra and the trend of the Bhāṣhya. But in my personal opinion, the birth of animals or men except through mothers and fathers is contrary both to fact and reason.]

## २० । दर्शनाच्च ।

२० । अपिच चतुर्विधे भूतश्रामे जराजगण्डज-स्वेदजोन्निज-लघणे स्वेदजोन्निजयोः शाल्यधर्ममन्तरेण एव उत्पत्ति-‘दर्शनात्’ च आकृति-संख्यानाद्य भवति । एवम् अन्यत्र अपि भविष्यति ।

## 20 *Further, this is observed also*

It is, further, observed that of the four classes of organic beings, viz., viviparous animals, oviparous animals, animals born of heat, and vegetables, the last two classes are born without the union of the sexes. In their case

the number of oblations is set aside. So may it be in others too

२१ । तृतीयगन्दावरोध संशोकाजस्य ।

२१ । ननु "तेषां स्वप्नवां भूतानां बीजेषु बीजानि भवन्ति—अथ त्रयं बीजसम्प्रदायम् इति ( ब्राह्मी ६।१।१ ) । अथ विविच एव भूतपातः सूर्यते, अथ भूतपातस्य चतुर्विधत्वं प्रतिपादयत् ( ऐत १।१ ) ? इति अथ उच्यते—“अथ त्रयं बीजसम्प्रदायम् इति अथ तृतीयेन त्रिसम्प्रदायेन एव संशोकाजस्य स्वेन्द्रस्य अवरोधः संसङ्गा इति प्रत्येतत् यत् सप्तत्रिंशत् । उभयोः अपि तुल्येन भूतुः बीजैश्चन्द्रस्य ।

21 (In scriptural texts which enumerate only three classes of organic beings) *the third term is meant to cover also (the class) which springs from heat*

An objection refuted It may here be questioned that in the scriptural text Of all these beings there are only three kinds of germs, *vis.*, that springing from an egg that springing from a living being, and that springing from earth : *e.*, vegetables (Chh VI 3 1) only three kinds of organic beings are admitted how then can it be assumed (as has been done in the *Aitareya Upanishad* III 3) that there are four classes? To this we reply The third class in the above passage *vis.*, that springing from earth must be understood to include, by implication the class of that which springs from heat because both these classes have this characteristic in common, *vis.*, that they spring by shooting from earth and water

( १ १ १ १ )

२२ । सामाध्यापनिस्यपत्ते ।

२२ । अथ चन्द्रबीजात् चन्द्रोद्भवत्वात् पटीत्यति । इयम् चन्द्रोद्भूतिः भवति —

“अथैतमेवाध्वान पुनर्निवर्तन्ते यथेतलाकाशमाकाशाद्वायु वायुर्मूला घृमी भवति घृमी मूलाऽपि भवत्यमं मूला मेघी भवति मेघी मूला प्रवर्षति ।” ( का प्र १०५, ६ ) इति । तत्र संशयः,—किम् आकाशादिस्वरूपम् एव अवरोहन् प्रतिपद्यन्ते किंवा आकाशादि-साम्यम् इति ? अत्र उच्यते, ‘साम्यापत्ति’ आकाशादि-साम्यप्राप्ति भवति, न स्वरूप-प्राप्ति । ‘उपपत्ते’ यत साम्यप्राप्ति एव उपपद्यते । आकाशस्वरूपप्राप्तौ वाय्वादिक्रमेण अवरोहः न उपपद्यते, आकाशस्य विमुक्तात् ।

22 (During descent from the moon, the self) *enters into similarity*, (and not identity, with *ākāśa* etc ), *because this (only) is possible*

The mode of descent from the moon is now the subject of investigation Here is a scriptural text regarding the descent, “They return again, by the way they came, to *ākāśa*, and from the *ākāśa* to air (The sacrificer then), having become air, becomes smoke ; having become smoke, he becomes mist , having become mist, he becomes a cloud, he rains down ” ( *Chh* V 10 5 and 6 ) Here a doubt arises, whether the descending selves pass into a state of identity with ether etc , or into a state of similarity ? We reply that it is a state of similarity, and not that of identity “Because this only is possible”, *i e* , a similarity only is possible If the self were to become identical with *ākāśa*, it would not be possible for it to descend through the series of air etc , (for *ākāśa* is all-pervading)

२३ । नातिचिरेण विशेषात् ।

२३ । अत्र संशयः,—किं दीर्घं कालम् अवरोहन् आकाशादिसाम्येन अवतिष्ठन्ते उत अन्यम् इति । अत्र उच्यते,—‘न अतिचिरेण अगतिविलम्बेन आकाशादिसाम्येन

चक्षुष्यस्य ते इमां मृगम् आपवन्ति । कुत एतत् चक्षुष्यस्य ?—विशेषात् युतो विशिष्टदर्शनात् । तथाहि शीघ्रादिमावापये चक्षुष्यं युतिं विशिष्टं — “चक्षुषी चे खलु दुर्मिष पतनम् ( का ३।१।६ ) इति । युतिष पतनम् दुर्मिष मतरे, दु खतरम् चक्षात् शीघ्रादिमावात् निःसरणं भवति इत्यर्थः । तत् पदं दुःखं निष पतनं प्रदर्शयन् पूर्वोक्तं दुःखं निष पतनं दर्शयति । सुखनिष पतनं च अविनिष पतनं एवत्यति, इतः तद्विषयं चक्षुषी यतीत्यमति सुखदुःखमीमं न चक्षुष्यति ।

23 (The descent takes) *not a very long time* (as appears) *from a special statement*

A doubt may arise as to whether the descending selves remain in a state of similarity to *ākāśa* etc. for a long or for a short time. We reply they descend to this earth after remaining in a state of similarity to *ākāśa* etc for a not very long period. How is this known? From the fact that a special statement is made in the scriptures in this connection. After having mentioned the entrance of selves into the states of rice etc. scripture makes this particular statement — From thence the escape is more difficult (*Chh* V 10 6) meaning that the escape from the state of rice etc. is more painful. Here the scripture, by mentioning the subsequent escapes as comparatively more painful implies that the preceding escapes are comparatively more pleasant. Now a more pleasant escape here can only mean a quicker escape for at that stage the body is not yet formed, and consequently the experiencing of pleasure and pain is impossible.

२४। अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिज्ञापात् ।

२४। अन्याधिष्ठितं चक्षुषी नोति अविष्ठितं शीघ्रादी संसर्गमात्रम् अनवीक्ष्यत् ।



अपि प्रसम्भवत्यत इति अतः सुखम् एव अनुभवति। शीघ्रादिजन्म अतः तत्र  
मौली कल्पना अनपेक्षिता इति, तत् परिकीर्यते—‘न’ अयम् विद्वद् एव वैदिक  
वर्णं यदात् अतः श्राव्येण,— अग्नीषोमीयं पञ्चमन्त्रमिति इत्यादिना विहितम् ।  
अतः पञ्चमन्त्राणां शान्तिनामो शीघ्रादि संज्ञेयमात्रं तद्वाच्यं इति उपचर्यते ।

25 *If it be said (by those who hold that selves are literally born as plants etc. that the performance of sacrifices is) sinful we deny that on the ground of scripture*

It may be held by some that sacrificial works are sinful involving as they do the killing of animals etc., and that such works may even have undesirable results. The statement that selves with an unrequited residuum of *karma* are born as rice etc., should therefore, be taken literally. It is unnecessary to imagine that the statement may have an indirect meaning. To this we reply. No the work enjoined by the Veda is not sinful but holy.

On the ground of scripture : c because scripture sanctions it by such texts as Let him offer an animal to Agni and Soma. Hence we conclude that the statement about selves in their descent from the moon becoming rice etc. only means that they come into contact with the plants (and not that they actually become the selves of those plants)

२६ । इति सिङ्ग-योगोऽयम् ।

२६ । इत्यत्र शीघ्रादि-संज्ञेयमात्रं तद्वाच्यं अतः ‘अयं’ शीघ्रादिमात्रस्य अनुपपत्त्यम्  
अनुभवति। इति सिङ्ग-योगोऽयम्—“दी यो हि अयम् अति यो इति सिङ्ग-योगोऽयम्”

એવ ભવતિ” ( છા પ્રા ૧૦૬ ) ક્ષતિ । ન ચ અત્ર મુખ્યઃ રેત-સિગ્માવ સમ્ભવતિ । ચિરજાતો હિ પ્રાપ્તયૌવનો રેત સિક્ ભવતિ । કથમ્ અન્નગત અનુશયી રેત સિક્ ભવિષ્યતિ ? અત્ર તાવત અવશ્યે ‘રેત સિગ્મયોગ’ એવ પુશ્ચરોયોગ એવ રેત,સિગ્માવ અમ્યુપગમ્યન્ત્ય । તદ્વત્ ત્રીહ્યાદિભાવ. અપિ ત્રીહ્યાદિયોગ એવ ક્ષતિ અવિરોધ. ।

26 (Another ground for the above statement is that according to scripture), *after that* (i.e., after becoming plants, the self enters into) *conjunction with one that performs the act of generation*

That “becoming plants etc ” means nothing but mere contact with plants etc , is seen from this also that according to scripture selves to which a remainder clings, after becoming plants etc , become beings who perform the act of generation, as seen in the passage, “For whoever eats the food, whoever performs the act of generation, that again he (the self) becomes” (Chh V 10 6) Here, it is clear that the statement about “becoming beings who perform the act of generation” cannot be taken in a literal sense , for, it is a long time after birth, viz , on the attainment of youth, that one becomes capable of generation. How should the self that has passed into the food eaten become a generator ? Here we are constrained to interpret the expression “becoming a generator” by “entering into conjunction with something that generates, i.e. with a male body ” Similarly, we infer, consistently with the above interpretation, that the self’s “becoming a plant” merely means its “entering into conjunction with a plant”.





## संघन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये

द्वितीयः पादः जीवेश्वरयोः सम्बन्धः

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१ । सन्धेः सृष्टिराह हि ।

१ । इदानीं जीवस्य अवस्थामेदः प्रपञ्च्यते । इदम् आनन्ति “स यत्र प्रसृजतीति” इति उपक्रम्य “न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पत्न्यानि भवन्ति अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथं सृजते” (बृह ४।३।८, १०) इत्यादि । तत्र संशयः, किं प्रबोधे इव स्वप्ने अपि पारमार्थिकी सृष्टि आहोस्वित् मायामयी इति । तत्र तावत् पूर्वपक्ष ‘सन्धेः’ जाग्रत्-सुषुप्तिस्थानयोः सन्धौ, स्वप्ने इत्यर्थः, तत्परत्वा एव सृष्टिः भवति । ‘आह हि’ यत् पूर्वोक्ता श्रुतिः एवम् एव आह ।

1 (The Pûrvapakshin says that) *in the intermediate state* (between waking and sleep), *creations* (of the mind are real), *for scripture says so*

In this pâda the different states of the living self, waking, dreaming, sleeping etc, will be discussed. We have, on this subject, the scriptural texts commencing with “When he falls asleep” up to “There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads. He himself creates chariots, horses, roads.” (*Bri* IV. 3 9 and 10). Here a doubt arises whether the creation in dreams is real, like that in the waking state, or illusory. The Pûrvapaksha maintains that “in the intermediate state”, where the

waking and sleeping states coalesce, i.e. in dreams there is a real creation. Because "scripture says so", as seen in the passage referred to.

## २ । निर्मातारं चेके पुत्रादयश्च ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षं द्रष्टव्यम् । अपि च 'एके' आश्रित्य जलिन एव सर्वो स्यात् । कामानां निर्मातारम् आत्मानं चामनन्ति,—“य एव सुतेषु जायति कामे कामे पुत्रश्चो निर्दिष्टाश्च ( ऋ १।१।८ ) इति । पुत्रादयश्च तव कामा अभिप्रेयन्ते । तस्मात् सत्यरूपा एव सर्वो सृष्टिः ।

2. *And some (have stated the self to be) a creator (in the intermediate state) Even sons etc (are said to be created in that state, as things longed for)*

The Pârvaṇakṣha strengthens its position. Moreover the members of one Vedic school declare the self in that very intermediate state to be the maker of objects of desire, e.g., He, the Person who is awake in us when we are asleep shaping one object of desire after another" (*Kath.* II. 2. 8) Even sons etc. are there mentioned as objects of desire. Hence the world created in dreams is real.

## ३ । मायामात्रं तु कार्त्तृस्थेनानभिप्यक्तक्षरूपत्वात् ।

१ । विद्यापक्षम् एतत् । तु-मद-पूर्वपक्षं निरसति । सर्वो सृष्टिः 'माया-मात्रं' मायामयी, न परमादिष्ठो । 'कार्त्तृस्थेन अनभिप्यक्तक्षरूपत्वात्' मयः क्षात्रिकी सृष्टिः 'कार्त्तृस्थेन' सर्वपरमात्मैवशुद्धैव, ईश्वरादिनिमित्त-सम्पत्त्या । अनदिन च अभिप्यक्तक्षरूपः न सर्वम् ।

3 But (says the Sûtrakâra, the dream-world) is merely illusory, because its nature does not manifest itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality)

The Sûtrakâra's view. The word 'but' discards the Purvapaksha. The creation in the dream-state is a mere illusion, it is not real "Because it does not manifest itself with the totality of the attributes" (of real things) The nature of the dream-creation does not manifest all the attributes of real things, viz, consistency in relation to space, time, and causality, and non-contradiction of actuality

४ । सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेराचक्षते च तद्विदः ।

४ । भाषाभाषणात् तर्हि न कश्चित् स्वप्ने परमार्थगन्ध इति ? न, इति चक्षते 'सूचकश्च' यत् स्वप्नं सूचकश्च भवति भविष्यती साध्याधुनी । 'श्रुतेः' "यदा कर्म कर्म्येषु स्थितं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति । समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात् तस्मिन् स्वप्ननिदर्शने ॥" इत्यादे 'आचक्षते च तद्विदः' स्वप्नविज्ञानविदश्च मन्यन्ते, "कुञ्जपारोहणादीनि स्वप्ने धन्यानि खरयागादीनि अधन्यानि" इति । [ सर्वार्थहेतानि अप्रमाण्यानि कल्पनाभावाणि, इत्यन्ये । ]

4 (The dream) is indicative (of the future) according to Sruti. Experts also say so.

Here one may question If dreams are nothing but illusions, does it not follow that they can have no connection whatsoever with reality ? Not so, we reply For dreams are also indicators, i e, are prophetic of future good or evil. This follows from scripture, which has this

If a man actively engaged for the realisation of some object happens to dream of a woman he may infer success from the omen of that dream, and other similar texts. "Experts also say so i.e. those who have mastered the science of dreams also say — 'Riding on elephants etc. in dreams is lucky, and riding on donkeys is unlucky' [Note by the Editor—My personal opinion however is that all this (dream interpretation) is groundless and imaginary]

५ । परमिथ्यानात् तु तिरोहितं ततो ज्ञान्य बन्धविपक्षयो ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षो बन्ध मयरेवम् जीवदृष्टौ, परमात् 'परमिथ्यानात् परमिथ्यं यत्नत् तस्यैवासादृशो वृत्तिः स इदम् अस्ति । २ । किन्तु जीवदृष्टौ परमात् बन्धनात् अपि तत् 'तिरोहितम् आच्छादितम् इव अविवक्षितव्यवधानात् । 'तत ईदृशं द्वितीं पक्षं हि ज्ञान्य जीवस्य 'बन्धविपक्षयो बन्धभाषो भवति' ।

5 (If it be contended that dream-creations may be real) *through the creative thought of the Supreme Self* (the Supreme Self and the individual self being really one we say No. The knowledge of such oneness is *hidden* (from the individual self) *and hence its states of bondage and release are due to him*

The Pūrvapakṣhin may say that as Jīva and Īsvara are fundamentally one, therefore the creations of dreams may be real through the power of the creative thought of the Supreme Self. The word 'but sets aside this supposition. The oneness of Jīva and Īsvara though true, is yet hidden

or covered, as it were, by the veil of *avidyā* (nescience) And Jīva's bondage and release also are from him, *i e*, God, due to ignorance or knowledge of his true nature.

### ६ । दृश्ययोगाद्वा सोऽपि ।

६ । 'स. अपि' जीवस्य ज्ञानैश्वर्यतिरोभावः 'दृश्ययोगात्' शरीरसम्पर्कात् एव भवति । 'वा'-शब्दः जीवेश्वरयोः अन्यत्वाशङ्का-व्यापन्नार्थः ।

6 Or, that (the veiling) is due to (the individual's) connection with the body

"That" (meaning the concealment of the self's knowledge and lordship) is due to connection with the body. The word 'or' is meant to discard the suspicion that Jīva and Īsvara may be separate entities.

### ७ । तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च ।

७ । स्वप्नावस्था परीक्षिता, इदानीं सुषुप्तावस्था परीक्ष्यते । 'तदभावः' स्वप्नावस्था-सुषुप्तम् इत्यर्थः, 'नाडीषु आत्मनि च' भवति । 'तच्छ्रुतेः' यतः तत् एव श्रुतिभिः अवगम्यते ( छां ६।८।१, २, ८।६।३, बृह ४।३।२१ इत्यादीषु ) । नाडीकथनस्य व्यवहारिकम् इति मन्यते भाष्यकारः, परमाद्यतः, "ब्रह्म एव अनपायि सुप्तिस्थानम्" । ( प्रश्नोपनिषत् ४।६-११ द्रष्टव्या ) ।

7 The absence of that (*i e*, of dreams, in other words the state of dreamless sleep) takes place in the arteries and in the self, for the scripture says so

The dreaming state has been discussed. We shall now discuss the state of dreamless sleep "The absence of

that, i.e., of dreams, in other words the state of profound sleep takes place "in the arteries as well as in the Self"

Because this is mentioned in the scriptures (e.g., in *Chh* VI 8. 1 & 2, and again in VIII 6 3 in *Bri* IV 3 21 etc.) Sankara holds that the mention of arteries is only the popular uncritical view of the matter while in reality Brahman is the lasting abode of the individual in dreamless sleep. (*Vide* *Pras.* IV 6-11)

८। अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ।

८। अस्मात् अस्मात् एव सुषुप्त्यात् अतः एव जाग्रत् प्रबोधो जाग्रद्वत् अस्मात् अस्मात् भवति । "अतः एतत् अस्मात् ? (उह १।१।१६) इति अत्र प्रश्नस्य प्रतिबन्धनायै उपपत्तेरुक्तं विन्यसितः सुषुप्त्यवस्थेति । अतः एव जाग्रद्वत् इति दूषते (उह १।१।१६) ।

8. Consequently awakening (is due to) that (i.e. the Self)

As the Self is the place of deep sleep consequently awakening is also due the Self. Thus we see that in the *Brihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad in course of answer to the question "Whence did it come?" (II 1 16) it has been said that "as minute sparks rush out from fire so all *prāṇas* come forth from that Self" (II 1 20)

९। स एव तु कर्मागुच्छ्रुतियद्विधिभ्यः ।

९। किं स एव सुषुप्त्यं स एव प्रतिबुध्यते एतच्च वा, इति विन्यसितः । 'स' एव तु औच्यं पुनः उच्यते, न अन्यः, यतः कर्मणः अगुच्छ्रुतयः सन्त्येव विविधा च तत् परम्परा । पूर्वेषु अगुच्छ्रुतयः कर्मणः अपरिपुत्रं विषयं अगुच्छ्रुतं दृश्यते ।

अतीते अहनि “अहम् अदः अद्राचम्” इति पूर्वानुभूतस्य अनुस्मरणम् अन्यस्य उत्थाने न उपपद्यते । “सः अहम् अस्मि” इति च आत्मानुस्मरणम् एकस्य उत्थाने एव उपपद्यते । शब्देभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः च सुप्तस्य उत्थानम् अवगम्यते ( बृहदारण्यके ४।३।१६, छान्दोग्ये ६।१।०२, पाश० २ ) । तथा अन्योत्थान-पक्षे सुषुप्तमात्रं मुच्यते इति आपद्यते, अतः कर्म-विद्या-विषयः अनर्थकाः स्युः ।

9 (The awakened person) is the same (as the person that slept), as is known from works, from remembrance, from scriptural texts, and from precepts

Here we have to discuss whether the self that had been profoundly asleep and the self that has awakened from sleep are identical or are different. We reply that the same self that had been asleep arises from the sleep, and no other, as is evident from works, from memory, from scriptural texts, and from precepts. A person who did (i.e., began) some work on the previous day is observed to continue the remaining portion of the work the next day. And such remembrance of past perceptions as is conveyed by the words “I saw this on the preceding day” cannot take place if the person arising (from sleep) is a different one. Such consciousness of personal identity as “I am the same person as I was before” is possible only if the identical person arises (from sleep). The arising of the same person is known from scriptural texts also, (e.g., Bri IV 3 16, Chh VI 10 2 and VIII 3 2). Further, the hypothesis of a different person arising (from sleep) would lead to the inference that whoever falls asleep obtains final release, this would make precepts about work and knowledge useless.

# १० । मुग्धेऽर्द्धमप्यति परिगेयात् ।

१ । 'मुग्धे' मूर्खतां शब्देन 'अर्द्धमप्यति' अर्द्धेन सुषुप्तिरर्द्धेन च मर्त्येऽर्द्धे संप्रकृता भवति । 'परिगेयात्' एतं वा चरणा कृतं सप्त सुषुप्ति मर्त्येऽर्द्धे विनश्यति ।

10 *In the unconscious state there is a half and half contact for this is the only remaining (explanation of that state)*

In the unconscious state (i.e. in a swoon) the self is in a state of half union i.e. it is united half with the qualities of deep sleep and half with those of death. This being the remaining state i.e. a state which is different from the states of waking dreaming deep sleep and death

# ११ । न स्थानतोऽपि परम्योभयसिद्ध मध्येष हि ।

११ । किं ब्रह्मवाक्यं सुषुप्तिरर्द्धेऽर्द्धे शीघ्रं कृपाध्वममात् सन्ध्याति तस्य इत्यादीं मर्त्ये सुषुप्तिरर्द्धे निर्वर्त्यते । न सतः 'न' पदान्तः ४ दिव्यापुष्यद्वितीयान् 'अपि' 'परम्य' च मर्त्ये 'उभयसिद्धम्' उभयसिद्धम् सप्तसुषुप्तिरर्द्धम् उपपद्यते । 'मध्येष' हि सतः परब्रह्म प्रतिपादनपर्यन्तं सर्वेषु सुषुप्तिरर्द्धेषु अपान्त-ममत्वा विग्रहम् एव ब्रह्म कथयिष्यते ।

11 *Dual characteristics (i.e. being both saguna and nirguna) cannot belong to the Supreme Being—not even through (contact with) place Because everywhere (scripture describes the Supreme Being to be unconditioned)*



Let us now try to ascertain what, according to the scriptures, is the nature of that Brahman with which the self becomes united, through loss of limiting adjuncts, during deep sleep etc. Certainly, by itself, the Highest Brahman cannot have double characteristics. Nor can it possess double characteristics 'through contact with place' i.e. with limiting adjuncts like the earth &c. 'Because everywhere' in those scriptural passages whose subject matter is the Brahman, it is taught to be free from all qualifications

## १२। न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतवचनात् ।

१२। 'न भेदात्' सुतौ 'ब्रह्मणः' भेदकथनात् न तत् केवलं निर्गुणम्, 'इति चेत् न' । 'प्रत्येकम्' 'अतवचनात्' यत् 'प्रत्येकम्' एकैवां भेदकथनं प्रति 'अतवचनं' तद्विपरीतवचनम् अभेदं च श्रूयते । "यश्चायमस्या पृथिव्यां तेजोमयीऽमृतमयः पुरुषो यश्चायमप्यात्मशरीरस्तेजोमयीऽमृतमयः पुरुषोऽयमेव स योऽयमात्मा" ( बृह २।५।१ ) इत्यादि ।

12. If (it be objected that the above view is) *not tenable, because differentiation* (also is found to have been mentioned in the scripture about Brahman) *we say, No, because with each such (declaration of difference) there is a statement that Brahman is not so, i.e. not differentiated )*

An objection refuted If it be contended that Brahman cannot be wholly and solely unconditioned, because scripture declares different attributes of Brahman as well, we say, No. Because with reference to each such declaration of difference, there is also a statement that Brahman

is not differentiated e.g. in the passage, "He that is this radiant and immortal Person within this earth he that is this radiant and immortal Person incorporated in the body—he indeed is the same as this Self" (*Bri II 5 1*) etc.

### ११। अपि वैधमेके ।

११। 'अपि च एवं मे मनिसिद्धयैकम् अमेदममेव 'एके मास्मिन् सतामन्वि—'अनर्हेदेमायत्तं विदुः नागच्छि विदुः । एकी स एतुं वसति य इह वासैव पश्यति' (कठ १।१।११) इति ।

13 *There are some (teachers) again* (who teach the same that we say)

Again this very doctrine of ours viz., the acceptance of the doctrine of non-difference, and censure of that of difference, is taught by the members of one school, e.g. It (Brahman) is to be attained by the mind alone There is no plurality in it. He who thinks it to be many goes from death to death (*Kath II 1 11*.)

### १४। अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

१४। अपाद्याचार-रहितम् एव हि ब्रह्म चनपारमित्यर्थं न अपादिमत् । अपात् ।  
—तत्प्रधानत्वात् यतः विद्या-परात्मनि निपत्य-प्रज्ञात्मतत्त्व-प्रधानानि न चर्यात्तार-  
प्रधानानि ।

14 *Certainly (Brahman is) formless* (as we

conclude) *from the preponderance* (in the scriptures) of *such* (texts as teach this doctrine )

Brahman is certainly to be conceived as devoid of all form, shape etc , and not as possessing form etc Why so ? because Vedantic texts preponderately teach the doctrine of Brahman being devoid of the qualities of created things and not that of its being of a different nature ~

### १५ । प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् ।

१५ । 'प्रकाशवत् च' यथा प्रकाश सौर' चान्द्रस वा विद्यद्व्याप्य अवतिष्ठमान' अङ्गुल्याद्युपाधिसम्बन्धात् तेषु ऋजु-वक्रादिभाव प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तन्नावम् इव प्रतिपद्यते, एव ब्रह्म अपि पृथिव्याद्युपाधि-सम्बन्धात् तदाकारम् इव प्रतिपद्यते । 'अवैयर्थ्यात्' यत' एवम् एव आकारवद् ब्रह्मविषयाणाम् अपि वाक्यानाम् 'अवैयर्थ्यम्' सार्थक्यं भविष्यति ।

15 *And 'Brahman is' like light, for texts teaching his differentiations' are not meaningless*

The light of the sun or the moon, diffusing itself through space, comes into contact with human fingers or other limiting adjuncts, and as they become straight or curved, becomes itself straight or curved, as it were. Similarly Brahman also assumes the shape of the earth etc on coming into contact with the earth or other limiting adjuncts It is only on this view that the Vedic texts which treat of Brahman as having a form are saved from being meaningless.

### १६ । आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

१६ । 'आह च' श्रुति 'तन्मात्र' चैतन्यभाव निर्विशेष ब्रह्म, "स यथा सैश्वर्यधनी-

ज्ञानपीडायाः कृत्यो रसवत् एवैकं वा चरिष्यन्मात्रज्ञानपीडायाः कृत्यं मयातमल एव" ( इह शा. ११ ) इति ।

16 And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist wholly of that (i. e. intelligence)

And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelligence alone, and is without any qualifying characteristics.

Just as a lump of salt has neither any inside nor any outside, but is wholly and solely a mass of taste, similarly the Self has neither any inside nor outside, but is wholly and solely a mass of knowledge. (*Bri* IV 5 13)

१७ । दर्शयति चायं अपि अर्हति ।

१७ । दर्शयति च श्रुतिः परब्रह्म प्रतिपक्षेण एव ब्रह्म निमित्तमित्यम् । 'अथ अपि दर्शयति श्रुतिः अपि परप्रतिपक्षेण एव उपदिशति — 'तेनैव तत् तत् मनस्यामि बन्धु-  
मातावमनुते । अनादिमत् परं ब्रह्म न सगमासमुच्यते ॥ ( मयवहीतायाम् ११।११ )  
इति परमाख्या ।

17 This is shown by Sruti and also declared by Smṛiti

Scriptural texts thus expressly declare Brahman to be unconditioned, by denying all statements to the contrary. The Smṛitis too make the same declaration and they too deny the contrary view. Thus, I will now clearly declare that which is to be known (i. e. the sole object of knowledge) and knowing which one attains immortality. That beginningless Supreme Brahman is said to be neither *sat* (gross) nor *asat* (subtle) (*Gita* XIII 12). Similarly in other Smṛiti texts.

## १८ । अतएव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ।

१८ । यत एव च अयम् आत्मा चैतन्यस्वरूपः निर्विशेषः, वाङ्मनसातीतः, पर-  
 प्रतिपेक्षेन उपदेश्य, 'अत एव च' अस्य उपाधिनिमित्तात् अत्रारभार्यिकी विशिष्टवताम्  
 अभिमित्य जल-'सूर्यकादिवत्' इति उपमा उपादीयते मोक्षशास्त्रेषु,—“यथा ह्ययं  
 ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वानपो मित्रा बहुधैकोऽनुगच्छन् । उपाधिना क्रियते मेदरूपो देवः  
 क्षेप्येवमजीड्यमात्मा” इति ॥ “एक एव तु भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकधा  
 बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥” इति च एवमादिषु ।

18 *It is for this reason that similitudes, such as that of images of the sun (in water), and the like, (have been used to explain the nature of Brahman)*

Because this Self is intelligent in nature, unconditioned, transcending speech and the sensorium, and describable only by the negation of opposite qualities, therefore in order to convey the truth that all differentiations in Brahman are due to limiting adjuncts only, and are not real in themselves, the scriptures dealing with liberation have recourse to the similitude of water and the 'solar images' in it and the like, as in the passages, "Just as the one bright sun, when entering different waters, is rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts, so also this Deva, (the Divine Being), the unborn Self, is made multiform by his various forms of manifestation", and "The one Self of all beings, by abiding separately in individual beings, appears both as one and as many, like the moon in water," and in similar other passages.

१८ । अभ्युपगमकृपात् तु न तथात्वम् ।

१८ । पूर्वोपचर—अनुवत् अवस्थात् यत् अभूत् आत्मा पूर्ववत् न गच्छति, विवर्तयिष्यति न चापि अथात् सर्ववतात् सर्वानन्तात् उपन्युता विवर्तयिष्यति तथाच अत्रान्ते अतः इह न तथात्वम् न अत्राभ्युपगमत्वम् उपपद्यते ।

19 [An objection] (As no substance) like water can be apprehended the similarity spoken of does not exist

[An objection stated] ‘(As no substance) like water can be apprehended—As the Self not being a material thing cannot be made an object of perception like the sun nor can we apprehend any limiting adjuncts as different from the Self and occupying a different place from it, because the Self is in all, and is also identical with all, hence the comparison with water and solar images is unreasonable.

२० । उद्विज्जासमाज्जमन्तर्भावादुभय-सामञ्जस्यादेवम् ।

१ । तत्र उच्यते—उद्विज्जासमाज्जम् उद्विज्जात्तदी भोजनत्वम् एवं इत्यादि शार्ङ्गान्तरादी विवर्तितं साध्यम् न तु सर्वसाध्यं विवर्तितम् । अत्रयत् हि सूर्य प्रतिबिम्बं न-उद्विज्जा इति, अत्राज्जम् उच्यते, अत्रयत्ने यच्छति अत्रमिदं मियते इति एवं अत्रयत्नादुपविषति भवति न तु परमार्थे सर्वस्य तथात्वम् अस्ति । एवं परमार्थे, अविज्ञितम् एकव्यम् अपि ज्ञान ईशान्युपाधि परमार्थान् उद्विज्जासादीन् उपविषयान् मज्जेते इव । एवम् उभयी इत्यादि-शार्ङ्गान्तरादी ‘सामञ्जसात् अविधीय’ ।

20. [The objection refuted] (Brahman) being inside

(of the limiting adjuncts) it participates in their increase and decrease. This (participation) makes the two (cases) parallel.

To the above objection we reply thus: "Participation in increase and decrease" is the only point of similarity which we intend to assert between the example (the solar image) and its analogue (Brahman), we never mean to assert complete similarity between the two. The solar image in the water expands when the water swells, contracts when the water shrinks, trembles when the water is moved, becomes more than one when the water is divided, thus partaking of all the varying attributes of the water. But in reality the sun does not vary in this way. Similarly Brahman, which in reality is unmodified and unvarying, partakes, as it were, of increase and decrease, which are characteristics of its limiting adjuncts, viz., the bodies, within which it abides. The two, the example and its analogue, being thus parallel, the comparison holds good.

## २१ । दर्शनाच्च ।

२१ । दर्शयति च युति परस्य एव ब्रह्मणः देहादिषु च पाषाणेषु अनवरगुप्रवेशः, "पुरुषको हि पदः पुरुषको चतुषदः । पुरः स पची भूत्वा पुनः पुरुष आविश्यत्" इति च । ( बृह २।५।१८ ) इति । "अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य" ( का ६।१।३ ) इति च ।

21 And because scripture also declares this

Further, scripture distinctly declares that the highest Brahman enters into the bodies and other limiting adjuncts,

८४ He made bodies with two feet he made bodies with four feet. Having first become a bird, he entered the bodies as Purusha. (Bri II 5 18) and again 'Having entered into them in the form of this individual self &c. (Chh VI 3 3)

२२ । मज्जतैतावस्थ हि प्रतिषेधति ततो प्रवीति च भूय ।

।

११ । ब्रह्मसूत्रम् ( १।१।१ ) “इ वाच ब्रह्मकी कते मूर्तर्षीवभूतस्य भगवतायतस्य स्थितस्य यस्य सद्य इत्यस्य इति उपक्रमः पुनः पठ्यते ( ब्रह्म १।१।६ ) अथात आर्क्षी मेति मेति । न ह्येतन्मादिति मेत्यन्तत् परमसि” इति । अत्र उच्यते मज्जतैतावस्थ हि प्रतिषेधति” मज्जतम् उक्तं यत् एतावत् इत्यस्य प्रतिषेधः भूमीभूतस्य च ब्रह्मस्य यत् तत् एव” इत्यस्य प्रतिषेधति न तु ब्रह्मास्तित्वम् । ‘ततः प्रवीति च भूय’ इति एतत् नामप्रतिषेधवत् बोधयितव्यम् । अत्र नामप्रतिषेधस्य सत्यमिति प्राप्ता वै उक्तं तैत्तिरीयस्यम्” ( ब्रह्म १।१।६ ) इति हि प्रवीति ।

22. *Because the scriptural text (containing the expression Not so not so) denies the suchness (of Brahman) which forms the topic of discussion there, and also asserts something further*

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad (II 3 1) we have a passage which begins with the words ‘Of two kinds indeed are the forms of Brahman material, as well as immaterial, mortal as well as immortal static as well as dynamic, manifest as well as unmanifested’ and which afterwards (in II 3 6) reads thus,—“Further instruction about Brahman consists only of Not so not so. There is no other (instruction) higher than this viz Not so !”



About this passage the Sûtrakâra remarks, "Because it denies the such-ness which is the topic of discussion" He means to say that the negative statement 'Not so', in the above text is intended only to deny the reality of the forms of the Brahman, material as well as immaterial, which necessarily possess specification (such-ness), i. e., which are defined by limits, (this being the topic of discussion therein), and is not intended to deny the reality of Brahman itself. The words of the Sutra, "And also asserts something further" are to be understood about the very next sentence of the text, the subject of which is 'the name of Brahman,' and which runs thus, "Now, the name (of Brahman) is 'The True of the 'True'. The prânas are 'the True', and he, 'the True' of them" (*Bri* II 3 6).

२३। तदव्यक्तामाह हि ।

२३। तत् ब्रह्म अस्ति चेत्, कथं न गृह्यते ? 'तत् अव्यक्ताम्' अनिन्द्रियमाह सर्वदृश्यसाक्षित्वात् । 'आह हि' एव सूतिः,—“न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्ये देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा” ( मुण्डके ३।१।८ ) इत्याद्या ।

23 *Scripture expressly declares that Brahman is unmanifested*

If that Brahman really exists, why is it not apprehended ? Because it is unmanifested, i. e., because it is never itself an object of apprehension for the organs, being the witness of all objects of perception. This is declared by the scripture in the passage, "He cannot be perceived by the eye, nor by speech, nor by the other senses. It

cannot be obtained, by austerities and deeds. (*Mund* III 1 8) as well as in other passages

२४ । अपि च संराघने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

२४ । अपि च एवम् परमात्मानं संराघने उपासनायां प्रति ध्यानं प्रतिपत्त्या-  
नुमाने दीक्षितः पश्यति, इति 'प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां कृतिष्कृतिभ्याम्' अत्रोच्यते । तथा हि  
कृतिः—“अविहीतः प्रत्यगात्मानमेव । एतच्च परमत्वमिच्छन् ( कठ ३।१ ) इति,  
“यत्प्रसादिनं विप्रहस्यत्यतस्तु तं पश्यति निश्चयं आपमान” ( मु १।१।८ ) इति च  
एवमाद्याः । कृतिः अपि—“पुष्पमेवं भगवान् दीक्षी विगतकल्पः । कुर्वन् ब्रह्म  
संस्पर्शमयत्नं सुखमयतः ( मन् ६।१८ ) इत्याद्याः । [ भाष्यकारस्तु कल्पनायाम्  
उच्यति । ]

24 And (he is apprehended) in devotions (as we learn from) both *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*

Further, the fact that yogins in their devotions, i.e., when engaged in worship—in the practice of piety, meditation concentration &c.—see the Highest Self is known both from *Sruti* and *Smṛiti*. As we find in *Sruti*, Some wise men with eyes averted from objects, and wishing immortality see the Self that is directly seen. (*Kath* IV 1) and When one's heart is purified through pure knowledge he perceives that indivisible One by meditation (*Mund* III 1 8) and similar other passages. *Smṛiti* also has this, “Thus always fixing his mind (in God), the yogin freed from sin easily attains the supreme bliss of touching (i.e. directly realising) Brahman (*Gītā* VI 28) and other similar passages. (The *Bhāṣyakāra* quotes not this but a different passage from the *Smṛiti*).

२५ । प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च<sup>१</sup> कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ।

२५ । ननु संराध्य-संग्रहक-भावाद्यपगमात् परापरात्मनो अन्यत्वं स्यात् इति । न, इति उच्यते, 'प्रकाशादिवत् च अवैशेष्यम्' । यथा प्रकाशाकाश-सर्वित्प्रभृतयः अद्भुत-किरकोदक-प्रभृतिषु उपाधिभूतेषु सविशेषा इव अवभासन्ते, न च स्वाभाविकीन् अविशेषात्मकता जहति, एवम् उपाधिनिमित्त एव अयम् आत्मभेदः, स्वतः तु ऐकात्म्य एव । 'प्रकाश च' चिदात्मा अपि 'कर्मणि' ध्यानादिकर्मणि उपाधौ भिद्यते इव 'अभ्यासात्' यतः वेदान्तेषु अभ्यासेन असक्तत्वं लौकमाश्रयो, भेदः प्रतिपाद्यते ।

25 And, as in the case of light etc, there is non-difference (between the Universal and the individual) The Supreme Light, too, (appears to be multiform) in practice (This we know) from repeated declarations (in the scriptures)

It may be objected that by admitting the distinction between the object of devotion and the devotee, we assume that the Highest Self and the lower are different from each other To this we say, No, "as in the case of light etc, there is non-difference" Just as light, âkâsa, the sun, etc, though they appear to be multiform through the intervention of limiting adjuncts such as fingers (which make the light appear sometimes as curved, sometimes as straight), vessels (which divide the one omnipresent âkâsa into many parts), waters (which show many images of the one sun), yet do not really abandon their essentially non-differentiated character, similarly the difference of various selves is due to limiting adjuncts only, while essentially the Self is one only/ 'The Supreme Light' too, i.e., the Intelligent Self, (appears to be multiform) in practice, i.e.,

in devotional exercises like meditation which are its limiting adjuncts. "This we know from repeated declarations", i.e., because in Vedānta texts the identity of the individual and the Universal Self is inculcated over and over again

२६ । अतीतमस्तेन तथाहि निद्रम् ।

२६ । 'ततः समेदस्य आभाविद्यतात् मिदस्य च परिधातव्यतात् विद्यया परिधी विषयं जीव' अनन्तं स ह एवास्मत्तां गच्छति । 'तथा हि निद्रम् सुतिथमाच — "स यो ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" ( मु ३।१।८ ) । "ब्रह्मैव सत् ब्रह्मार्पणम्" ( इह ३।३।६ ) इत्यादि ।

26 Hence (the finite ultimately attains unity) with the Infinite For the indication in the scriptures is) in favour of such (attainment of unity)

Hence : e because the identity of the individual with the Universal Self is essential while the difference is only due to nescience, the individual after divesting itself of nescience through true knowledge attains unity with the Infinite. Such is the indication in the scriptures, e g in the passages, "Verily he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman in truth" (*Mund* III 2. 9) and Becoming Brahman itself he attains Brahman (*Br* IV 4 6)

२७ । उभयव्यपदेशात् त्वद्विकृष्टत्ववत् ।

२७ । उभयव्यपदेशात् सुती मिदमिदयोः उभयोः कथनात् ह अद्विकृष्टत्ववत्

जीव-ब्रह्म-विषयं तत्त्वं सवितुम् अर्हति । यथा अहिः, इति अमेदः, अहिं कुण्डलानि इति तु मेदः, एवम् इह अपि इति ।

27. *As both doctrines (viz., those of identity and difference) are taught in the scriptures, (the relation between the finite and the Infinite is to be thought of) as that between a snake and its coils*

“As both doctrines are taught” i. e., both identity and difference between Brahman and the individual self are mentioned in the scriptures, the relation between Brahman and the individual self must be “like the relation between a snake and its coils” Looked at as a snake, there is unity, while looked at as so many coils, there is multiplicity So also in the subject under discussion.

२८ । प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्वात् ।

२८ । अथवा प्रकाशाश्रयवत् एतत् प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । यथा प्रकाशः साविव तदाश्रयं च सविता न अत्यन्तभिन्नौ, उभयो अपि तेजस्वोविशेषात्, अथच मेदव्यपदेशभाजौ भवतः, एवम् इह अपि इति ।

28. *Or else, like that between light and its source, (both) being essentially fire*

Or else this (the relation) is to be thought of as that between light and its source Just as the solar light, and its source, viz., the sun, are not quite different, because both are essentially fire, and yet they are mentioned as different, so also in the subject under discussion

२८ । पूर्ववत् । ~

१८ । यदा वा पूर्णम् उपपत्तं प्रत्यक्षदिशम् च चक्षुःश्रवणम् इति तदा एव यत्तत्  
महिम्नं चक्षति ।

29 Or else as described before

Or else this, i. e., the relation between the two may be thought of as suggested previously — As in the case of light there is non-difference." (See Sūtra 25)

३० । प्रतिपेक्षाय ।

३० । एतत् एवः एव विदुः, यत्कालं परमात्मा चक्षुः श्रवणं चक्षति  
प्रतिपेक्षति यावत् — "तन्वीमोक्षि इति" ( इह शशाङ्क ) इति एवमादि ।

30 And on account of (explicit) denial (in the scriptures, of any other self)

The above conclusion follows also from the fact that any other intelligence besides the Highest Self has been explicitly denied in scripture e. g. in such passages as 'There is no other seer than he (Bri III 7 23)

३१ । परमात्मा-संयम-भेद-अपदेशेभ्यः ।

३१ । 'यत्' शब्दात् ब्रह्मण 'परम् चक्षुः तत्तम् जीवः ब्रह्म च इति महिम्नं  
चक्षति — इति पूर्ववत् । अत्र हेतुः — हेतुः अपदेशात् तन्मात्रस्य परमात्मा 'संयम  
अपदेशात्, भेद-अपदेशात् च' । हेतुः अपदेशात् वाच्यं — 'यत् यः चात्मा स हेतुः इति'  
( वा तदाह ) इति वाच्यमपि भिन्नस्य ब्रह्मण हेतुः सहीर्षयति । इह हेतुः अपदेशात्

आत्मनि प्रयुक्तः, इति लौकिकसेतु इव आत्मसेतो, अन्यस्य वस्तुन अस्तित्वं गमयति । “सेतु तौर्त्वा” इति ‘तरति’शब्दप्रयोगात् यथा लौकिक सेतु तौर्त्वा जाङ्गलम् असेतुं प्राप्नोति इति गम्यते, एवम् आत्मानम् सेतु तौर्त्वा अनात्मानम् असेतु प्राप्नोति इति गम्यते । चन्मानव्यपदेश च भवति, “तदेतत् ब्रह्म चतुष्पाददशको षोडशकलम्” इति । यत् च लोके चन्मितम् ‘एतावत् इदम्’ इति परिच्छिन्न कार्वाण्यादि तत् अन्यत् वस्तु अस्ति इति अस्ति, तथा ब्रह्मण अपि चन्मानात् तत् अन्येन वस्तुना भवितव्यम् इति गम्यते । तथा सत्त्वंव्यपदेश भवति,—“सता सीम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति” ( छा ६।८।१ ), “अथ पुरुष ( शरीर आत्मा ) प्राप्तेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्त” ( बृह ४।३।२१ ) इति च । मितानाञ्च मितेन सत्त्वं दृष्टं यथा नगराणां नगरेण । जीवानां च ब्रह्मणा सत्त्वं व्यपदिशति सुषुप्तौ । अत तत् परम् अन्यत् अमितम् अस्ति इति गम्यते । मेदव्यपदेश च एनम् अर्थं गमयति । तथाहि “अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यं पुरुषो दृश्यते” ( छा १।६।६ ) इति आदित्याधारम् ईश्वर व्यपदिश्य तत् मेदेन अद्व्याधारम् ईश्वरम् व्यपदिशति, “अथ य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते” ( छा १।७।५ ) इति । एवम् एतेभ्य सेवादिव्यपदेशेभ्य ब्रह्मण परम् अस्ति इति एवम् प्राप्तम् ।

31. (The Pûrvapaksha ) *Beyond that (i e , besides Brahman, there must be other existences), because (in the scriptures) Brahman is described (a) as an embankment, (b) as measurable, (c) as being connected, and (d) as distinguishable*

The Pûrvapaksha says that beyond Brahman other entities, such as finite selves and the world, too, must be admitted as possible The reason is, that the scriptures describe Brahman as an embankment, declare that it has measures and connections, and also distinguish it from other entities The statement about an embankment is the following passage, “Now, that which is the ‘Self is an embankment, a restraining boundary.” (Chh VIII 4 1).

This passage declares that Brahman designated here as the Self is an embankment. Here the word embankment being applied to the Self indicates, (just as a material embankment would indicate), the existence of something beyond that embankment (that is beyond the Self). Further the verb to pass has been used in this connection in the expression "having passed the embankment" (*Chh* VIII 4 2). One who passes a material embankment reaches something which is not the embankment itself, as for example a country. Similarly it is to be understood that after passing the embankment of the Self it is possible to reach something which is not the embankment in other words, which is not the Self. The statement about Brahman's measure is found here — "This Brahman therefore consists of four quarters (literally feet) eight cloven hoofs, and sixteen parts. Now in this world with regard to every object which is defined as to its quantity as being exactly so much e.g. a *kārshāpana* (a coin of the weight of 16 *māśās*) it is well known that other objects beyond it exist. Similarly it is to be understood that beyond Brahman which is limited there exist other objects which are not Brahman. The statements about connections are these — 'At that time, O dear disciple, he becomes united with the True (*Chh* VI 8. 1) and 'This person (the embodied self) being embraced by the Omniscient Self &c. (*Bṛ* IV 3 21). Now in this world connections are observed to exist only between limited objects, on the one hand, and something else that is also limited on the other e.g. between men and a town. Therefore as selves are men



tioned to have connection with Brahman during deep sleep, we have to conclude that beyond Brahman (which is thus limited by the connection) something else exists that is unlimited. The same sense is conveyed by the scriptural passages which teach that Brahman can be distinguished e g, the text "Now, this golden person that is seen within the sun" &c. (*Chh* I 6 6), first refers to a divinity who abides in the sun, and then goes on to mention one, distinguished from the same, who abides in the eye, by the words "Now, this Person that is seen within the eye" &c (*Chh* I 7 5). Thus, from the scriptural statements about embankment etc., we conclude that there exist things other than Brahman.

## ३२ । सोम(न्यात् तु ।

३२ । पूर्वपक्ष' मनुच्यते । 'तु'-शब्देन प्रदर्शिता प्राप्ति निराशङ्कि । न ब्रह्मण्य-  
अन्यत् किञ्चित् भवितुम् अर्हति, प्रमाणाभावात् । सेतुसामान्यात् एव सेतुशब्द आत्मनि  
प्रयुक्तः, इति स्मित्यते । जगतः तन्मय्यादागां च विधारकत्वं सेतुसामान्यम् आत्मनः । "सेतुं  
तीर्त्वा" इति अपि तरते अतिक्रमासम्भवात् प्राप्नोति इति अर्थः एव वर्तते । यथा  
"व्याकरणं तीर्थं." इति प्राप्तः इति उच्यते, न अतिक्रान्तः, तद्वत् ।

32 But (Brahman has been called an embankment etc., not because he is actually such, but only) *because there are points of similarity*

The Sūtrakāra answers the Pūrvapakshin. The word 'but' rejects the position just set forth. We hold that nothing other than Brahman can exist, for want of proof to

the contrary The word 'embankment' has been used in the scriptures with reference to the self because it has a certain resemblance to an embankment (and not because it is actually one) The self's resemblance to an embankment consists in supporting the world and all boundaries within it (just as an embankment keeps back the water and maintains the boundaries between fields) In the expression "having passed the embankment (quoted in the last sūtra) the verb "to pass has the sense of attaining, because going beyond is impossible. It is similar to saying he has passed the science of grammar" when we mean that he has attained or mastered it not that he has gone beyond it

३३ । बुद्धयर्थं पादवत् ।

३३ । यथा मन्त्र-वाक्यादौ चाम्नात्मन् परिदेवतश्च ब्रह्मपतीकयो चाचामयो चोक्तौ चामादयः सन्-सम्बन्धिनः पादा चाम्नात्ते चत्वारः च चाम्ना य चाकाश्च सम्बन्धिनः चाभ्यागत्य (वासीये ३।१८) तद्वत् ब्रह्मणः बुद्धयः उपलक्षणार्थं तस्य चाम्नात्मन्यपदीयः भवति न ब्रह्मवतिरिति वस्तुस्थित-प्रतिपत्त्यर्थः । नहि चविचारो यन्मनो ब्रह्मणि सन्ने पुंमि ब्रह्मा बुद्धिं व्यापयितुम् मन्दमध्यमीयन्-बुद्धिं तात् पुंसाम् ।

33 (The statement about the measure of Brahman) *is meant as an aid to apprehension* (in meditations etc.) *like* (the ascription to him of four) *feet*

In *Chhândogya* III. 18 the mind and the *śrīṣa* are mentioned as the personal and cosmic manifestations respectively of Brahman and as an aid to contemplation speech etc. (speech, breath, sight and hearing) are conceived as the four feet of the mind and fire etc., (fire, air, the sun

and the cardinal points) are conceived as the four feet of âkâsa. Similarly, the ascription of measure to Brahman is meant as an aid to apprehension, to meditation, and not as an argument for establishing other existences besides Brahman. The aid is necessary, because all men are not equally capable of fixing their minds on the infinite and changeless Brahman, the intelligence of some persons being of a low order, of others of a middling order, and of others of a high order.

### ३४ । स्थानविशेषात् प्रकाशादिवत् ।

३४ । 'प्रकाशादिवत्' यथा एकस्य प्रकाशस्य सौर्यस्य चान्द्रमसस्य वा उपाधिभेदात् एव भेदव्यपदेशः, न तु वस्तुभेदात्, यथा वा सूच्याकाशादिषु उपाध्यपेक्षया एव भेदकथनं न तु वस्तुविशेषात्, तद्वत् परमात्मनः अपि 'स्थानविशेषात्' उपाधिभेदात् एव सम्बन्धव्यपदेशः भेदव्यपदेशः च भवति, न तु परमार्थतः ।

34 (The statements about Brahman being connected and being distinguishable are) *due to particular places, as in the case of light etc*

"As in the case of light etc", i.e., just as one and the same light of the sun or of the moon is said to be different in different instances on account of the variety of the limiting adjuncts and not because of any variety in the light itself, and just as the âkâsa in the eye of the needle and the âkâsa in other places are said to be different from one another owing to differences in the limiting adjuncts and not to differences in âkâsa itself, similarly in the case of the Highest Self also, the ascription of connection

and distinction is due to the particular places i.e. to the limiting adjuncts only and not to any real differences.

४५ । उपपत्तेयः ।

४५ । उपपद्यते च अत ईदृशः एव सम्बन्धः न भव्यादृशः । यथा क्षमणीती मवति (वा हात्पात्रं) इति हि लक्ष्यस्य स्वयम् एतम् आत्मनः । लक्ष्यस्य च चनपादित्वात् न नरनगरादिना सम्बन्धः दृश्यते । उपपत्तिज्ञानं लक्ष्यं विरीभावात् तु क्षमणीती मवति इति उपपद्यते । तथा भिन्नं अपि न भव्यादृशः सम्बन्धः बहुतरं कृतिप्रसिद्धिचरणं विरीपात् ।

35 *And because* (only such connection between the soul and Brahman, and such distinction about Brahman, as have been described above) *can be inferred*

Further only such a connection between the individual and Brahman as has been explained above, and no other can be inferred from scriptural texts. This kind of connection *vis* one in essential nature is declared in the passage "He is gone to his Self" (*Chh* VI 8 1). The essential nature (of everything) is imperishable, therefore the above relation cannot be like that of man to the town they dwell in (which is not an unalterable relation). Hence we infer that the expression "He is gone to his Self" means that (before such going) the true nature (of the self) was obscured by the limiting adjunct *vis*., nescience. Similarly about "distinction" its ascription to Brahman can be explained only as has been done above, and in no other way i.e. all distinction with

regard to Brahman is due to nescience only ; it can never be real. Such a view would run counter to numerous scriptural texts which declare that there is only one Lord

### ३६ । तथान्यप्रतिषेधात् ।

३६ । तथा 'अन्यप्रतिषेधात्' अपि न ब्रह्मण पर ब्रह्मत्वरम् अस्ति, इति गम्यते । तथाहि "ब्रह्मेवेदं सर्वम्" ( सु २।२।११ ), "आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्" ( छा ७।२।५।२ ) इत्याद्याः ।

36 *And because other entities (besides Brahman) have been expressly denied (by the scriptures).*

Again, because other existences besides Brahman have been denied in the scriptures, we have to infer that nothing apart from Brahman exists e g, in the texts "Brahman, indeed, is all this" (*Mund.* II 2. 11), and "The Self, indeed, is all this" (*Chh.* VII. 25. 2), etc.

### ३७ । अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।

३७ । 'अनेन' सेत्वादिव्यपदेश-निराकरणेन, अन्य-प्रतिषेध-समाश्रयेण च 'आत्मनः' 'सर्वगतत्व' सिद्धं भवति । अन्यथा हि तत् न सिध्येत् । 'आयामशब्दादिभ्यः' यत् आयामशब्दादयः ब्रह्मव्याप्तिवचन-शब्दादयः 'आत्मनः' सर्वगतत्वम् अवबोधयन्ति । आयाम-शब्दादिदृष्टान्तः, "ज्यायान् दिवो व्याधानाकाशीत्" ( शतपथब्राह्मणे १०।६।३।२ ), "नित्यं सर्वगतं स्थानुरचलोऽयं सनातनः" ( भगवद्गीतायाम् २।२४ ) इत्यादि ।

37. *From this view (only can follow) the omnipresence of Brahman, as (taught) in scriptural texts about (Brahman's) extent.*

"From this view i.e. if we admit that the statements about embankment etc. are not literal and that other existences besides Brahman are denied in the scriptures) 'follows the omnipresence' of the Self. If we take the contrary view omnipresence cannot be proved. As taught in scriptural texts about Brahman's extent" i.e. because all texts which treat of the extent of Brahman proclaim that the Self is all pervading. Examples of texts about Brahman's extent are — He is greater than the heavens, greater than Akāśa (*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* \ 6 3 2) It is eternal all pervasive of a stable nature and everlasting" (*Gītā* II 24) etc.

३८। फलमत उपपत्ते ।

३८। यत् परमेशान् एव 'फलम्' कथयन् भविष्यम् अहति न तु कथयन् विनाशिकं कथय । उपपत्तं यत् स हि ईशवाक्यमवशिष्टत्वात् निर्दिष्टा कर्मा गृह्यं यद् ईशवाक्यमिति, इति उपपत्तौ न तु समावहयिकं कथयन् उपोत्तरति ।

38 *Fruits (of works also proceed) from him because (this is the only possible) conclusion*

'From him' i.e., from the Lord alone, can the fruits of human actions issue and not from the actions themselves, which pass away as soon as done. "This is the only possible conclusion, i.e., the only conclusion that follows from reason is that the Lord who knows all particulars about space and time, is alone capable of producing the results of actions in accordance with the merits of their agents and not the view that actions, which (being evanescent) are of the essence of nothingness, themselves produce the fruits.

३८ । अतत्वात् ।

३८ । "म वा ५५ महानत्र आत्मात्रादौ वस्तुनः" ( बृह ४।४।२४ ) इति एव जातीयकश्रुतिवचनात् च ईश्वरम् एव फलहेतुम् मन्यामहे ।

39 *And because this has been declared in the scriptures*

That fruits of actions proceed from the Lord alone, we assume also from such scriptural texts as the following -  
"This, the great unborn Self, is indeed the giver of food, the giver of wealth" (Bṛ IV 4 24).

४० । धर्म्मं जैमिनिरत एव ।

४० । आचार्ये 'जैमिनि' 'अत एव' हेतो श्रुते उपपत्ते च 'धर्म्म' फलदाता मन्यते । श्रुयते तावत् अयम् अर्थ 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इति एवमादिषु वाक्येषु । उपपत्ति च ईदृशो, किम् अपि अपूर्वम् अनुत्पाद्य विनश्यत् कर्म्म कालान्तरित फलं दातु न शक्नोति । अत कर्म्मण वा काचित् सूक्ष्मा उत्तरावस्था फलस्य वा पूर्वावस्था अपूर्व्यं नाम अस्ति, इति तर्क्यते । ईश्वर तु फलं ददाति, इति अनुपपन्नम्, यत अविचित्रस्य कारणस्य विचित्र कार्यं न उपपद्यते । फलदातरि ईश्वरे च वैषम्य-नैष्ठ्ये प्रसज्येते । कर्म्मगुष्ठानवैयर्थ्यं च उपपद्यते, तस्मात् धर्म्मात् एव फलम्, इति सिद्धम् ।

40 *From the same considerations Jaimini declares the religious merit* (of actions to be the cause of their fruits).

From the same considerations, viz, scriptural statement and reasoned conclusion, Achārya Jaimini holds the view that the religious merit of actions is the cause of

their fruits. Scriptural statements in support of his view are such as the following — He who is desirous of attaining heaven should perform sacrifices. The reasoning in support of his view is like this — An action cannot produce a result at a distance of time unless before passing away it gives rise to some *apūrvā* (literally an *unseen* result an intermediary between the action and the actual result both of which are *seen*). We therefore have to assume an intermediary named *apūrvā* which may be considered either as an after state of the action or as an antecedent state of the result. On the other hand it is inadmissible that the Lord should produce the fruits of actions. In the first place he the Cause being one and homogeneous cannot give rise to a variety of effects. In the second place the admission that the Lord is the giver of the fruits of actions would impute partiality and cruelty to him. In the third place actions would be rendered useless (if unable to produce fruits.) Hence the inference that the results of actions proceed from their religious merit (or demerit).

### ४१। पूर्वमु सादराय धो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ।

४१। साधाय सादराय च तु 'पूर्वम् पूर्वोक्तम् ईदृशम् एव धनहेतुं मन्तः। हेतुव्यपदेशात् यत् 'एव च द्वेव साधु च्छब्द आरयति तं यमेयी कीदृशं चिद्वैवर्त एव च द्वेवसाधु च्छब्द आरयति तं यमयो निगीवर्त' (श्रीप्री ३।८) इत्यादिषु सुनिपाप्तेषु ईदृश एव ईशु च्छब्दावर्कयी आरयित्वेन धनस्य च दातृत्वेन व्यपदिश्यते। विचिनकायां गुणपरागात् चपि कीदा ईदृश्य इत्यप्रत्ययपेक्षया न वक्तव्यम् ।



41. *Bādarāyaṇa*, however, (holds that the former *i e*, the Lord, is the cause of the fruits of actions,) *because the scriptures declare him to be the cause* (of actions themselves)

Achārya Bādarāyaṇa, however, considers the former, *i e*, the Lord, as explained above, to be the cause of the fruits of actions "Because the scriptures declare him to be the cause" *i e*, the scriptures represent the Lord to be the ultimate source of all human actions They declare that it is he who makes human agents perform deeds whether of religious merit or demerit, and he who dispenses the fruits of actions, in such passages as the following

"It is he who makes that individual do virtuous deeds whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds And it is he who makes that individual do vicious deeds whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds" (Kau III 8)

And, such objections as the impossibility of a variety of effects flowing from the Self which is one and homogeneous, *etc*, are groundless, because the Lord, in dispensing the fruits of actions, keeps an eye to the merits and demerits of individuals

## ‘साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये ततोय पादः—उपासनाभेद-भातुसंग्रहः

\* \*

### १। सर्ववेदा प्रत्ययं चीदनाद्यविशेषात् ।

१। इदानीं प्रतिवेदान्तं विद्यानामि मित्यन्ते, न वा, इति विचार्यते । सर्ववेदान्तं  
अन्यथानि विद्यानामि तन्निम्नं तन्निम्नं वेदान्तं तानि तानि एव भवितुमश्नुते । कुत ?  
चीदनाद्यविशेषात् यतः तेषां संक्षेप-रूप-चीदनाभ्येतु विषयेषु न विविक्तं भेदं अस्ति ।  
यथा पञ्चविन्मू अधिष्ठीते आद्यमिदं अपि पुरुषप्रथमं तादृशं एव चीदते सृजयात् इति  
एवं “यो ह वे ओष्ठस्य वेष्ठस्य वेद” ( ऋ ६।१।१ ) इति वागसमीधिनो जन्मीयानो च  
तादृशी एव चीदता ( शा ३।१।१ ) । प्रवीजन-संक्षेपं अपि अपिचिदं एव —“ओष्ठस्य  
वेष्ठस्य स्नानां मवति इति । रूपम् अपि समयनं तदेव विद्यानामं सत् सत ओष्ठवेष्ठानि  
गुणविशेषाभितं प्राचतश्चम् । यथा च द्रव्यदीवते यामस्य रूपम् एवं विशेष्यं रूपं विद्यानामम् ।  
तेन हि तत् कथ्यते । उभाभ्या अपि सा एव,—‘प्राचविद्या इति । तस्मात् सम्यक् । न  
प्रत्यक् विद्यानामम् । एवं पञ्चाधिविद्या वैश्वानरविद्या शान्तिधिविद्या इति एवमादिषु  
बीजधिविद्यम् ।

1 Those vidyās which are established by all the Vedānta texts are harmonious on account of the identity of injunction etc

We shall now deal with the question whether the various vidyās which are set forth in all the Vedānta texts

are different from one another, or are identical We affirm that while each one of the various cognitions is appropriately set forth in its particular Vedānta text, each is to be taken as established by *all* the Vedāntas Why so ? "On account of the identity of 'injunction' etc", *i e*, because there is no difference (amongst these various cognitions) in respect of 'connection', 'form', 'injunction' and 'name'. *e g*, in the Agnihotra, a single subject dealt with in several Vedic sūkhās, we find the identical human action enjoined everywhere by the words "He should offer oblations to the fire", and the injunction "He who knows the oldest and the best" is found identically in the text of the Vajasaneyins (*Bṛi* VI 1 1) as well as in the text of the Chhandogās (*Chh* V 1 1) In both cases, again, the connection (of the cognitions) with the objects to be attained by them is identically stated, *viz*, by the words "He becomes the first and best amongst his kith and kin" Further, both the cognitions have an identical 'form', *viz*., the true nature of the Prāna possessing the qualities of being the first and best Just as the 'form' of a sacrifice is determined by its particular divinity and materials, so is the 'form' of a cognition determined by the particular object to be known by it It is this which gives the cognition its distinctive form Both the cognitions have the same 'name', too, *viz*, 'Prāna-vidyā' From such considerations we affirm that each of these various cognitions is established by all the Vedāntas A similar course of reasoning applies to the Knowledge of the five fires, the Knowledge of Vaisvānara, the Knowledge ascribed to Sāndilya, etc

## २ । भेदावेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि ।

१ । आपत्तिग्रन्थम् — विद्यानां सर्ववशात् प्रत्यक्षं गुणभेदात् न उपपद्यते । तदा हि ब्रह्मसत्त्विका पञ्चाग्निविद्या प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मं चक्षुः पश्यन् अपि चाममन्ति “तन्माग्निरेवादिमवति ( इह ६।१।१४ ) इत्यादिना । अन्ति ॥ न तं न चाममन्ति, पञ्चमेत्या एव च उपसंहारिन्, “अथ ह य एताम् एवं पञ्चाग्नीम् वेद ( ब्रा ४।१ । १ ) इति । किं च न तस्य अपि देवा च कामि तेषां कथम् उभयेनाम् एका विद्या उपपद्यते ? इति चेत् न यत् एकाम् अपि विद्यायाम् उभजातीयकं गुणभेदं उपपद्यते ।

2. *If it be objected that (identity of cognitions is) not tenable on account of difference (in subordinate elements, we say) No Difference in subordinate matters may take place) even in one and the same vidyā*

It may be objected that as the different cognitions vary in respect of their *gunas* subordinate elements therefore it cannot be maintained that they are without distinction established by all the Vedānta texts. For example, the Vājāsaneyins, after propounding the knowledge of the five fires, mention an additional and sixth fire in this text of theirs — The fire of that (i. e., of cremation) is indeed fire (*Bri* VI 2. 14) But the Chhandogas do not mention it they on the other hand conclude with the clear mention of the number five as in the text But he who thus knows these five fires (*Chh* V 10 10) How in the face of this difference can it be maintained that both those who admit and those who do not admit that sixth fire have one and the same cognition ? If this objection be put forward we say No For such differences in *gunas* (subordinate elements) are quite admissible in one and the same *vidyā*

३। स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकागच्छ सववच्च तन्नियमः ।

३। यत् अपि उक्तम् आथर्वणिकानां विद्या प्रति शिरोव्रताद्यपेक्षणात् अन्यथा च तदनपेक्षणात् विद्याभेद इति, एतत् प्रत्यच्यते । स्वाध्यायस्य एष धर्मः, न विद्यायाः । कायम् इदम् अवगम्यते ? 'हि यत् 'तथात्वेन' स्वाध्यायवर्त्मत्वेन 'समाचारे' वेदव्रतोप-  
देशपरे ग्रन्थे आथर्वणिका 'इदम् अपि वेदव्रतत्वेन व्याख्यातम्' इति समाभनन्ति ।  
'अधिकागत् च,'—“नैतदचीर्णं प्रतोऽधीते” ( सु ३।२।११ ) इति च अधिकृतविषयात्.  
'एतत्'-शब्दात्, 'अध्ययन'-शब्दात् च, स्वीपनिषदध्ययनधर्म एव एष इति निर्धार्यते ।  
'सववच्च तन्नियमः' यथा च सवा हीमा नम सौम्यादयः शतौदनपर्यन्ता आथर्वणि-  
कानाम् एव नियम्यन्ते, तथा अयम् अपि धर्मः स्वाध्यायविशेषसम्बन्धात् तत्र एव नियम्यते ।  
तस्मात् अपि अनवद्य विद्यैकत्वम् ।

3 (The Sirovrata rite is a peculiarity) *only* of the study of the Vedas 'by the Ātharvanas, and not of their vidya itself), because in the Samāchāra it is declared as being of that nature This also follows from the general subject matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the Ātharvanas) is similar to that of the libations

It may be objected that the Sirovrata rite (the practice of carrying fire on the head) is associated with the school of Ātharvanas only and not with those of others so, here is a case of the *vidyā* being different in different texts Our reply to this objection is as follows the above practice constitutes a peculiarity not of the *vidyā* of the Ātharvanas, but only “of their method of studying the Vedā” How is this known ? “Because in the book called Samāchāra” in which Vedic observances are dealt with, the Ātharvanas

declare the above practice also as being of that nature *i.e.*, as constituting a peculiarity of their method of studying the Veda. This conclusion follows also from the general subject matter. This portion of the Sūtra refers to the text "One who does not perform the rite should not study this" (*lund III 2 11* in which (1) the word "this" refers to the subject matter dealt with in the previous mantra (*i.e.*, that the Brahmavidyā of the Ātharvans is to be imparted only to those who have practised the carrying of the fire on the head) and in which (2) the word study also occurs. From this we conclude that the practice is a feature only of the study of the Upanishads by the Ātharvans, (and not of their vidyā.) [The Sūtrakāra strengthens his position further by mentioning another act which is similarly confined to the Ātharvans only.] The restriction (of the above practice to the Ātharvans) is similar to that of the libations. This means that as the seven libations (from the sāura libation up to the sātaudana libation) are exclusively enjoined on the Ātharvans, similarly the above practice is limited to the study of their particular Veda only. The doctrine of the identity of cognitions therefore remains uncontroverted.

४ । दग्धयति च ।

४ । दग्धयति च ३५ चरि "देवैश्च सप्तवेदान्तसु देवैश्चत्वारिंशन् सप्त" विदा यन् पदमामनति" ( अ३ १।१।१५ ) इति ।

4 (Scripture) also says so

The Veda also declares the identity of *vidyas*, because the object of knowledge is taught in all the Vedāntas to be one, as in *Kath* I 2 15, which says, "The adorable One whom all the Vedas speak of "

#### ५ । उपसहारोऽर्थाभिदाद्विधिशेषवत् समाने च ।

५ । एव विज्ञानानां सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययत्वे स्थिते 'अर्थाभिदात् विद्यायां एक्यात् हेतोः अन्यवैदितानां विज्ञानगुणानाम् अन्यत्रापि 'समाने' विज्ञाने उपसहार' सिद्धं भवति, 'विधिशेषवत्' यथा विधिशेषाणाम् अग्निहोत्रादिविधिसंज्ञाणाम् उपसहार, एवम् इह अपि ।

5 From the identity of knowledge it follows that it is also proper to combine (the particular elements mentioned in several texts) when 'the cognition is) one and the same , as in the case of supplements to injunctions

Now, "from this identity of knowledge" it follows that it is "also proper to combine" the specific elements of a cognition mentioned in one particular text "with those of an equivalent cognition" mentioned elsewhere "As in the case of the supplements to injunctions" about Agnihotra and other sacrificial acts, (the subordinate injunctions given in various texts have to be combined into one whole), similarly here

#### ६ । अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

६ । 'शब्दात्' श्रुतिवाक्यात् 'अन्यथात्वं' विद्यानाम् अन्यैकत्वम् एव सिद्धम्, 'इति चेत्, न' । "त्वं न उक्ताय" ( बृह १।३।७ ) इति वाजसनेयिन उद्गीथस्य कर्तृत्वेन

प्राप्तम् आमगति, दम्भोदा उद्गीयत्वेन 'तम् उद्गीयम् उपाधावर्जितं ( ब्रा १।१।७ )  
इति तम् कथं विधकत्वे स्यात् इति चेत् न न दोषः । 'अविधीयान् नहि एतावता स्मरित  
विधकत्वम् अप्यवश्यं न अविद्यमानं अपि न तत्स्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् सम्यग्वापि ।

6. *If it be objected that the very Vedas make out a vidyā to be different (in different texts we say No because (in essentials it is identical (in both texts)*

If it be objected that from the very Vedas them selves a certain vidyā is known to be different in different texts we say No The details of the objection are these — In the "Udgītha vidyā" as given in (*Bri* I 3 7) the words Do thou sing out for us point out that according to the Vājasaneyins the prāna is the producer of the ūdgītha while (in the same vidyā as given in *Chh* I 2 7) the words "They meditated on it as the ūdgītha point out that according to the Chhandogas the prāna is the ūdgītha itself How then can the identity of vidyā be admitted in these cases? We say No The slight difference (in non essentials) pointed out above cannot disprove the identity of the vidyā in the two cases, since both are observed to agree in a very large number of essential points.

७। न या प्रकरणभेदात् परीक्षणीयस्यादिवत् ।

७। पूर्वपक्ष—'न वा' विशेषणम् यत्र व्याप्यम् विधामेव एव यत्र व्याप्यः ।  
कथात् ?—प्रकरणभेदात् उपक्रमभेदात् । 'परीक्षणीयस्यादिवत्' यथा आचार्यो  
'द्वेवेर्मी व्याधानाकाम्, पक्षपक्षः । स एव परीक्षणीयम् उद्गीय स एवीदृशम्  
( ब्रा १।१।१ २ ) इति परीक्षणीयस्यादिशुचिर्मिदम् उद्गीषीपासनम् अस्यादिवत्  
विश्वाम्यसुतादि ऽपविमिताः उद्गीषीपासनात् ( ब्रा १।१।६ ८ ) मिदम् ।



7. *On the contrary* (the Púrvapakshin may assert,) *there is no* (unity of *vidyās*), *on account of the difference in subject-matter, as in the case of "the Greater than the great "*

The Púrvapaksha We maintain, on the contrary, that not the unity but the diversity of *vidyās* is the reasonable conclusion. Why so? "On account of the difference of subject-matter", as shown by the methods of meditation enjoined. As in the case of "the Greater than the great " Eg, the meditation of the udgītha containing the attribute of "Greater than the great etc ", enjoined in the "Akāśa is indeed greater than all these, ākāśa is the great support, ākāśa is this udgītha, greater than the great, ākāśa is without end" (*Chh* I 9. 1 & 2) is different from the meditation of the udgītha containing the attributes of abiding in the eye and the sun, having a golden beard and so on (*Chh* I 6, 6 8 )

## ८ । संज्ञातश्चेत् तदुक्तमस्ति तदपि ।

८ । पूर्वपक्ष—अथ उच्येत 'संज्ञात' सञ्ज्ञैकत्वात् विद्वैकत्वम् अत्र न्याय्यम्, "उद्गीथविद्या" इति उभयत्र अपि एका संज्ञा इति, तत् अपि न उपपद्यते । 'तदुक्तम्' उक्तं हि एतत् "न वा प्रकरणभेदात् परोक्षरीत्यक्षादिवत्" इति । तत् एव च अत्र न्याय्यतरं । श्रुत्यचरणानुगतं हि तत् । सञ्ज्ञैकत्वं तु श्रुत्यचरणानुसृतम् । 'अस्ति तदपि' प्रसिद्ध-भेदेषु अपि तत् सञ्ज्ञैकत्वम् अस्ति, यथा प्रसिद्धभेदानाम् अग्निहीन-दर्शपूर्णभासादीनां काठकैकान्य-परिपठितानां काठकसञ्ज्ञैकत्वं दृश्यते ।

8 The Púrvapakshin continues *If it be stated that* (identity of *vidyās*) *follows from* (identity of) *names, (we*

say that *a reply* (to such statement) *has already been furnished* Moreover that characteristic (i. e. identity of names) is also found (in clearly different cases)

The Pūrvapakṣa continues. It may be asserted that from the nomenclature, i. e. from the identity of names follows the identity of *vidyās* the name in both cases being *udgīthavidyā*. But this does not follow. Sufficient reason against such an assertion has been adduced in the previous Sūtra *viz* that there is a difference in subject matter. That reason applies here with stronger force, because the subject matter is part of the revealed text while the identical name is not a part of the revealed text (being given by others for the sake of convenience only). Moreover "that characteristic (i. e., identity of names) is observed even in the case of admittedly different injunctions for instance, such admittedly different ceremonies as the Agni hotra, the Darśapūrnamasa, etc., are all comprised under the one name *kāthaka* merely because they are all recorded in the one book named *kāthaka*.

## ८। व्याप्तेऽयं समस्तमम् ।

८। सिद्धान्तपक्षः । अत्र मन्त्रोक्तं तु मन्त्रव्याप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थं परापरव्यापनं प्रयोजनम् ।  
‘व्याप्ते ओम्कारस्य समस्तं-सामान्यत्वात् । समस्तव्यापि अक्षरम् इह न प्रसज्यते, इति  
अतः तद्विषयस्यैव अक्षरम् विनिश्चितम् । अथ नाम तद्विषयवत्त्वं ओम्कार, मन्त्र इति ।  
अतएव व्याप्ते द्वितीयां अक्षरम् इति एतन्न तद्विषयम् इति एतत् विनिश्चितम् इति  
समस्तमम् एतत् निश्चितम् इत्यर्थः ।

Veda', the view (that the term udgītha is meant to specialise it) is appropriate

The Sūtrakāra's view The word 'and' in this Sūtra stands in the sense of 'but', and is meant to discard the opposite view presented in the two previous Sūtras "Because the omkāra extends over the whole Veda" This means that with a view to prevent the possibility that the omkāra under discussion may be taken to be that omkāra which pervades the whole of the Vedas, it is in this connection specified by the word udgītha So that only that omkāra which comes under the class (literally, forms a part) of udgītha may be apprehended Thus, on account of the extensive scope of the omkāra, its specialisation by the word udgītha is appropriate

## ૧૦ । સર્વભેદાદન્યત્રેમે ।

૧૦ । વાજસનેયિના ઇન્દોગાના ચ પ્રાચસવાદે ઐશ્વર્યાગુણાન્વિતસ્ય પ્રાચસ્ય ઉપાસ્યત્વમ્ ઉક્તમ્, વાગાદયે અપિ તત્ત્વ વસિષ્ઠાદિગુણાન્વિતા ઉક્તા । તે ચ ગુણા પ્રાર્થે પુનઃ પ્રત્યર્પિતા “યદ્વા અહ વસિષ્ઠોઽસ્મિ ત્વ તદ્વસિષ્ઠોઽસિ” ( રુદ્ર ૬।૧।૧૩ ) इत्यादिना । अन्येषाम् अपि तु शाखिना कौषीतकि-प्रभृतीनां प्राचसवादेषु “अथातो नि श्रेयसादानमेता ह वै देवता अहश्चेयसे विवदमाना” ( कौषी २।८ ) इति एवञ्जातीयकेषु प्राचस्य ऐश्वर्यम् उक्तं, न तु इमे वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणा उक्ता । अत्र संशयः, किम् एते वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणा कश्चित् उक्ता अन्यत्र अपि अक्षरेन् उत नाक्षरेन् इति । अत्र सिद्धान्तः, ‘इमे’ वसिष्ठत्वादयः गुणाः ‘अन्यत्र अपि’ अक्षरेन् । ‘सर्वभेदात्’ यतः सर्वत्र एव तत् एव एकं प्राणविज्ञानम् अभिन्नम् उक्तम् ।

10 Those (qualities which are attributed to the subject

of a vidyā in one Sākhā only are to be inserted) *in other texts also because in all texts the vidyās are non-different*

In the Colloquy of the Prānas as found in the two Vedic Sākhās, viz those of the Vajasaneyins and the Chhandogas, the direction is given that the Prānas are to be meditated on as possessed of the quality of being the best and speech and the other organs are stated to be possessed of various other qualities, such as being the richest etc. These latter qualities are ultimately however attributed to the Prānas also in such texts as If I am the richest, thou art the richest (*Bri* VI 1 14 etc. But in the Colloquy of the Prānas of certain other Sākhās e g that of the Kaushītakins, the quality of being the best is attributed to the Prānas in such passages as Next follows the recognition of the pre-eminence of the vital breath by the other powers. All the powers contending with one another in order to assert their own pre-eminence &c. (*Kau* II 9) but the latter set of qualities, viz being the richest etc., is not mentioned. Here a doubt arises whether these last qualities (being the richest etc.,) which are mentioned in certain texts only are to be inserted in the other texts or not. On this disputed point the view of the Sutrakāra is as follows "Those qualities (being the richest, etc.,) are to be inserted in the other texts also 'because everywhere the vidyās are non-different : e because the Prānavijnāna is recognised throughout in the Vedas as one and the same.

११ । आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ।

११ । प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणः आनन्दादयः सन्नां सुखे सुखस्य प्रतिपत्त्या, इति सुखस्य तत् एव ब्रह्म एव उच्यते ।

11 (For the same reason), *bliss and other qualities* have to be attributed to *Brahman* everywhere

Bliss and other qualities which are severally attributed to Brahman (in different places) are all of them to be understood in every place, because (following the same line of reasoning as in Sutra 10) in all the passages the subject matter is one only Brahman

१२ । प्रियशिरस्त्वा यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ।

१२ । 'प्रियशिरस्त्वायप्राप्ति' तैत्तिरीयके ( २।५ ) आस्ताताना प्रियशिरस्त्वादीना धर्माणा नान्ति अन्यत्र प्राप्ति । 'हि' यत प्रिय मौद प्रमोद आनन्द इति एते परस्पर-पेचया भोक्तृत्वगोचरा वा उपचितापचितरूपा उपलभ्यन्ते । 'उपचयापचयौ' च भेदे सति सम्भवत । निर्भेद तु ब्रह्म, न च एते प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्य ब्रह्मधर्मा, कोशधर्मा तु एते ।

12 (On the other hand) *such attributes as "having pleasure for its head", and so on, have no force* (with regard to other passages), *because increase and decrease are possible only where there is plurality*

Certain attributes mentioned in the *Taittiriya* (II 5, e g, "having pleasure for its head", and so on, have no force with regard to other passages treating of Brahman, because the successive terms pleasure, delight, greater delight, and bliss, are understood as having higher and lower degrees with respect to one another and also to the enjoyer who is different from all of them But higher and lower degrees are possible only where there is plurality,

while Brahman is beyond plurality. In fact the attributes of "having pleasure for its head" and so on belong not to Brahman but to the kosha sheath.

### १३ । इतरित्वसामान्यात् ।

१३ । 'इतरि तु आनन्दस्य चर्मा मज्जलस्य प्रतिपादनाय एव उच्यमाना अवसामान्यात् प्रतिपादयन् ब्रह्मण एकत्वात् सर्वत्र प्रतीक्षितम् ।

13 *Certain other attributes however (are valid for all passages treating of Brahman) because their significance is identical*

Other attributes (e.g. bliss etc.) are however mentioned in the scriptures for the express purpose of teaching the true nature of Brahman. And as their significance is everywhere the same (*viz.* that Brahman whose nature is sought to be taught is one) those attributes are to be viewed as valid for all passages treating of Brahman.

### १४ । आध्यानाय प्रयोजनमावात् ।

१४ । काठके पठ्यते—इन्द्रियं परा ज्ञेया चर्मास्य परं मन इति आरम्भं "पुरुषात् परं विदितं सा काठा सा परा गतिः" (उठ १।१।१ ११) इति । अत्र संसर्ग—विम् इमे सर्वे एव अर्वाद्य तत तत परत्वेन प्रतिपादयन्ते उत पुरुष एव एव सर्वेभ्यः परः प्रतिपादयति इति । अत्र शिक्षाना—पुरुष एव एव सर्वेभ्यः परः प्रतिपादयति इति युक्तं न प्रत्येकम् एषा परत्वं प्रतिपादनम् । कथात् १—प्रयोजनमावात् यत न इतरिषु परत्वेन प्रतिपादयेत् विदितं प्रयोजनं दृश्यते नृपते वा । आध्यानाय आनन्दपूजकाय सम्बन्धदर्शनाय एव इदं प्रमाणमासीति ।

14 (The passage *Kath* I. 3 10, 11 is meant to give instruction about the Person only) *for the purposes of meditation*, because there is no use (of information about the relative superiority of objects of sense etc)

There is a passage in the *Kathopanishad* (I 3 10 & 11) which begins thus The objects are superior to the senses, the sensorium is superior to the objects, the understanding superior to the sensorium", and which then passes on to declare that "there is nothing superior to the Person He is the end, the highest goal " Here a question may arise . Does this text mean to teach that the objects of sense etc , which are enumerated in it are each superior to the preceding ones ? Or does it mean to teach only that the Person is superior to all ? The conclusion of the Sūtrakāra is that it is reasonable to assume that the passage only means to teach that the Person is superior to all, and not to teach the superiority of each over the preceding ones Why so ? "Because there is no use", *i e*, no use is either observed or declared by scripture of a demonstration of the relative superiority of the members of the series The enumeration of the whole series of successive objects is merely "for the purposes of meditation" *i e*, to aid such pious meditation as may lead to perfect knowledge

### १५ । आत्मशब्दाच्च ।

१५ । इत्यत्र पुरुषप्रतिपत्तार्था एव शब्दम् इन्द्रियादिप्रवाहीति यत् "एष सर्वेषु भूतेषु गूढात्मा न प्रकाशते । दृश्यते त्वग्रया बुद्ध्या पृथग्या सूक्ष्मदर्शि" (काठ १।३।१२)

इति व्रतं वृत्तम् आत्मा इति वादः । अतएव इतरेषाम् अनात्मत्वम् विवक्षितम् इति मन्ते ।

15 And also because the word Self has been used (with reference to the Person)

The conclusion that the enumeration of the series of senses etc., is only for establishing the supremacy of the Person is further strengthened by the fact that in the passage This Self is hidden in all things it is not manifested But subtle seers see him by their keen and subtle intellects (*kath I 3 12*) the person under discussion is named the Self From this it also follows that the text intends to declare that the other objects enumerated therein are not the Self

१६ । आत्मव्योतिरित्यदुत्तरात् ।

१६ । एतरेषके व्रत — “आत्मा वा इमेव एवाय आसीत् नागान् विष्णुं मिषान् पशून् चामात्रान् मुच्यते इति । स इमांश्चामात्रान् पश्यन्त आत्मा मरीचिमिव आपः (एत १।१ १) इत्यादि । अत्र संसर्गः—किं पर एव आत्मा इह आत्मव्योतः अभिव्यक्तै व्रत आत्मा व्यपिन् इति । अत्र सवर्त — आत्मव्योतिरिति पर एव आत्मा इह आत्मव्योतः व्यप्यत । इतरण् यथा इतरेषु व्यपिन्वर्तुषु तज्ज्वाला एतज्ज्वालात्मन आकाशः सञ्चलः” (तैति १।१) इति एवमादिषु परम् आत्मनः सदृशं यथा वा इतरव्योतं लोकिवात्मनः समर्थायै व्रत आत्मा एव मुख्यः आत्मव्योतः सञ्चलः तया इह अपि मरिचुम् व्यपति । अत्र तु आत्मव्योतस्य आसीत् (इह १।१।१) इति एवम् आदी “पुरुषविष (१।१।१) इति एवम् आदि विमेषकत्वात् नृपते मरेत् तत्र विमेषकत आत्मनः सदृशम् । अत्र पुनः परमा मयकत्वात्पुरुषम् एव विमेषकम् अपि उतरम् उपपद्यते “स



उच्यते लोकान् तु सृजा इति" ( ऐत १।१ ) "स इमांस्त्रीकानसृजत" (१।२) इति एवम् आदि । तस्मात् तस्य एव ग्रन्थम् इति न्यायम् ।

16 (In the *Aitareya* passage I 1, 2 the word Self) *is meant for the Highest Self, as in other places , on account of the subsequent qualification*

In the *Aitareya* we read "Verily all this was in the beginning the Self only There was nothing that winked He thought, shall I create worlds ? He created these worlds,—Ambhas, Marichi, Mara and Ap" (I 1, 2) Here a question may arise, whether by the word Self is meant the Highest Self, or some other being ? We reply that "the Highest Self is to be understood" by the word Self here, "as in other places" As in other scriptural accounts of creation, such as "Verily from this Self came out ether" (*Taitti* II 1), the Highest Self has to be understood, and as even in cases of the application of the word Self to particular selves the Highest Self has to be primarily understood, similarly here But in other passages such as "In the beginning this was Self alone" (*Bri* I 4 1), where the Self is qualified by some other specialising attribute, e g , 'in the shape of a person', we have to understand that some particular self is meant In the passage under discussion, however, we meet with a "subsequent qualification" which fits in only with the interpretation of the word Self as the Highest Self, viz , "He thought, shall I create worlds ? He created these worlds". (*Ait* I 1) We therefore maintain that by the word Self here the Highest Self alone is to be understood

१०। अन्वयादिति चेत् स्यादयथाशयात् ।

१०। अन्वयात् इति चेत् बाधभावपदमनात् न परमात्मपदस्य इति पुनः यत् उक्तम् तत् परिहृतव्यम् इति । अत्र उच्यते स्यात् अत्रपारयात् भवेत् उपपन्न परमात्मनः इह पदस्यम् । कस्यात् ?—अत्रपारयात् । परमात्मपदस्य हि भाग्युपरे भावीकलावधारणम् आद्यस्य अत्र उच्यते अन्वया अनाद्यस्य तत् परिहृतव्यम् ।

17 *Should (the interpretation of Self as the Highest Self) be objected to for (the preservation of) the unity of meaning (in the whole passage we still declare) It is so on account of (a scriptural) assertion*

Should it be objected that in order to preserve the unity of meaning in the whole passage the word Self should not be taken to mean the Highest Self we say that such objection is inadmissible. It is so : c it is proper to take the passage as referring to the Highest Self. Why so ? On account of a scriptural assertion : c the scriptural assertion that before creation the Self was one and alone gives a consistent sense only if the word Self is interpreted to mean the Highest Self. Any other interpretation would fail to give such consistent sense.

१८। काव्याख्यानादपूर्व्यम् ।

१८। इत्येवम् बागमनेयिनः च प्राचसंवादि वादिभ्योर्दं प्राचस्य पदम् आवाप तस्य एव आपः वास इति आमगतिः । अतस्तस्मै इत्येवम् आमगतिः “तथावा पतदमिन्मनः पुरस्तादीपरिटायादि परिद्वयति ( वा ५।१।१ ) इति । बागमनेयिनः

च आचमन्ति “तद्विदास श्रोत्रिया” अश्लिष्यन् आचामन्त्यश्लिष्या चाचामन्त्येवम् एव तदचमनम् कुर्वन्ती मन्यन्ते” (बृह ६।१।१४) इति । अत्र आचमनम् अनग्रताचिन्तनं च प्राप्य प्रतीयते । तत् किम् उभयमपि विधीयते, उत आचमनम् एव, उत अनग्रताचिन्तनम् एव, इति विचार्यते । न आचमनस्य विधेयत्वम् उपपद्यते, ‘कार्याख्यानात्’ । प्राप्तम् एव हि इदं कार्यत्वेन आचमनं प्राप्यत्यर्थं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धम् अन्वाख्यायते । अवश्यम्विधेयत्वम् अनग्रतरश्मिन् वासकार्याख्यानात् अपा वास सङ्कल्पनम् एव ‘अपूर्वम्’ विधीयते, न आचमनं, पूर्ववत् हि तत् इति उपपादितम् ।

*As the mention (of the rinsing of the mouth) is merely that of an act (and not even of a new act) and as (the meditation of water as the dress of Prāna is) something new, (we hold that the latter is meant to be enjoined and not the former)*

Both the Chhandogas (V 2 2) and Vajasaneyins (VI 1 14) declare in the Colloquy of the Prānas that everything is the food of the Prāna, even up to dogs etc., and that water is the dress of the Prāna. In addition to the above the Chhandogas say, “Hence, when going to eat food, men surround it before and after with water” (*Chh* V 2 2). The Vājasaneyins say, “Srotriyas who know this rinse the mouth with water when going to eat, and also rinse the mouth with water after having eaten. They consider that by so doing they furnish the Prāna with dress (*Bṛ* VI 1 14). Now, these texts mention two separate things, *viz*, the rinsing of the mouth and the meditation of the Prāna as dressed. Hence the question arises whether here it is the intention of the scripture to enjoin both these things, or the rinsing of the mouth only, or the meditation of the Prāna as dressed only. The rinsing of the mouth cannot



the Vājasaneyins), *the same* (reasoning applies) *because of the identity* (of the object of meditation in both cases)

In the Agni-rahasya of the sākṣhā of the Vājasaneyins there is a vidyā named Sāndilya-vidyā. The particulars mentioned therein are these: “He should meditate on the Self as manomaya, *i e*, as consisting of mind, as having Prāna for its body, and as having light for its form”, (Satapatha Brāhmaṇa XC 6 3 2), etc. In the same sākṣhā, in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* Upanishad, we read, “That Person consisting of mind, whose essence is light, is within the heart, (minute) like a grain of rice or barley. He governs all, and is the Lord of all. He rules all this and whatsoever exists”, (VI 6 1). A question here arises: Have we here *one* vidyā, in which the particulars mentioned in the Agnirahasya and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* are to be combined? Or, have we here *two* vidyās between which there should be no combination of particulars? We reply: “The same reasoning applies even in one and the same sākṣhā”. We have seen above that texts of different sākṣhās do constitute one vidyā, in which different particulars of the different texts are combined. Similarly here the texts, though belonging to the same sākṣhā, constitute one vidyā only, “because of the identity of the object of meditation” *i e*, because we recognise the same Brahman, which consists of mind and which has other attributes, as the identical object of meditation in both. Now it is the object of meditation that constitutes the distinctive character of a vidyā. As long as that character remains unchanged, we cannot maintain that the vidyās are different. Hence, in the present instance, even in one

and the same śākhā the two passages constitute one vidyā, and their particulars have to be combined

## २० । सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ।

१ । पूर्वपक्षः । ऋदशस्मिन् “सत्यं ब्रह्म ( ३।१।१ ) इति उपस्थस्य तद्वत् यत् सत्यमसौ स आदित्यो य एव एतज्जिह्वयसी पुब्वी यथायं दक्षिणोऽङ्गः पुब्वः ( ३।३।१ ) इति तस्य एव सत्यस्य ब्रह्मस्य अपिर्देवतम् अथात् य आमतनविशेषम् उपदिश्य आहति जरीरत्वं य सम्बाध हे उपनिषदी उपदिशते तन्मोपनिषदस्मिन् विदेवत् तन्मोपनिषदस्मिन् यथाहम् ( ३।३।१ ४ ) । तत् संशयः — किम् अविभागेन एव तस्मिन् अपि उपनिषत्तौ उभयत्र अनुसन्धातव्ये सत् विभागेन एवाभिर्देवतम् एवाभ्यासम् इति । तत्र लक्ष्य एव उपलभ्यते — यथा शास्त्रिण्यविद्यायां विभागेन अपि ज्योतायां ऽभीपसङ्कारः सङ्गः । एवम् अत्रापि एवञ्जातीयकै विषयं भविष्युं च इति, एवविद्यायां सम्बन्धात् ।

20 The same thing is true in another case also because (both are) connected (with one and the same vidyā)

[The Pūrvapakṣa.] There is a passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (V 3 1) beginning with ‘The True is Brahman and passing on to ‘That which is the True that is also the Āditya, who is the Person that dwells in yonder orb and who is the Person in the right eye (V 5 2.) The passage thus declares two different abodes, viz., one with reference to the gods and another with reference to the human body of one and the same Brahman that is the True. The passage then goes on to establish that the sacred syllables (*brāh* etc.) constitute the body

of Brahman Finally, the passage teaches the two secret doctrines, "His secret name is 'ahar' with reference to the gods, his secret name is 'aham' with reference to the body", (V 5 3 & 4) A question here arises Are both the secret names to be conjointly applied to both the abodes? Or, is each to be separately applied, one to the deva-abode only, and the other to the bodily abode only? The opinion put forward by this Sūtra (the opinion of the Pûrvapaksha) is this In the Sândilya-vidyá, particulars, though found in two detached texts, had to be combined "The same thing is true in another case also" (i e, in the present case), "because both (the secret names) are connected with one and the same vidyá "

## २१ । न वा विशेषात् ।

२१ । सिद्धान्त । न एव उभयो उभयव प्राप्ति । कस्मात् ?—'विशेषात्' उपासन-स्थान-विशेषोपनिषत्वात्, इत्यर्थः । "य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुष" (बृह ५।५।२) इति हि अग्निदेविक-पुरुषं प्रकृत्य "तस्योपनिषद् अहम्" ( बृह ५।५।३ ) इति आवयति । "योऽयं दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुष" ( ५।५।४ ) इति च आध्यात्मिक पुरुषं प्रकृत्य "तस्योपनिषद् अहम्" ( बृह ५।५।४ ) इति । "तस्य" इति च "एतत्" सन्निहितालम्बनं सर्वनाम । तस्मात् आयतन-विशेष-व्यप्राययेण एव एते उपनिषदौ उपदिश्येते, कुत उभयोः उभयव प्राप्ति ?

21 But (we hold<sup>2</sup> that it is) not so, because there is a difference (of place)

[The Sutrakâra's view] The two secret names cannot both apply to both the persons Why so? Be-

cause the abodes in which the persons are to be meditated are mentioned as different By the words 'The Person that dwells in yonder orb the Person with the deva abode is referred to and about him it is said that His secret name is ahar while by the words "The Person in the right eye the Person with the bodily abode is referred to and about him it is said that His secret name is aham Now the pronoun 'his (tasya)' always has a reference to something proximate. The inference therefore is that the secret names are meant to belong to the distinctive abodes with which they are connected How then can both names be applicable to both ?

## २२ । दमयति च ।

११ । अपि च एवञ्जादीवकाणां पञ्चाचां अवस्थितिलिङ्गदर्शनं भवति तस्यैतस्य तद्वत् रूपं यदमुष्य रूपं भावमुष्य गीष्ठी तौ मैष्ठी यस्मान्न तस्मान् ( ब्रा १।७।३ ) इति । कश्चनश्च सिद्धत्वम् ? तदुच्यते — अस्यादित्यस्यागमेवमिन्द्रात् पद्मात् अग्नीश्वर्यात् अश्वत्थार्यात् पद्मत् इत्येतिदिमिन् आदित्यपुरुषपदवात् कपादीन् अश्वत्थार्यात् चपत् इति "तस्यैतस्य तद्वत् रूपम् इत्यादिना । तस्मात् अवस्थिते एव एते चपत् इति सिद्धम् ।

## 22. Scripture also indicates this

Further there is a clear indication in scripture that attributes of this class are to be understood as distinct *vis.*, in the passage "The form of this person is the same as the form of that other person the two singers (or two joints) of this person are the same as the two singers (or



two joints) of that other person, the name of this person is the same as the name of the other" (*Chh* I 7 5) How does this passage convey such an indication? We reply, because the passage admits by implication that the attributes of the two persons are differentiated by their abodes, *viz*, the eye and the sun, and are in consequence uncombinable, and then by a distinct act of mental transfer identifies the form etc of the person in the sun with those of the person in the eye by the words "the form of this person is the same" etc The conclusion therefore is that the two secret names are to be understood as distinct

### २३। सम्मृति-द्युव्याप्तिरपि चातः ।

२३। "ब्रह्मग्येष्टा वोय्या सम्मृतानि ब्रह्माग्ये व्येष्ट दिवसाततान्" इति एव रागायनौथाना खिलेषु वीर्यसम्मृति-दुग्निवेशप्रभृतय ब्रह्मण विभूतय पठ्यन्ते। तेषाम् एव च उपनिषदि शाण्डिल्यविद्याप्रभृतय ब्रह्मविद्या पठ्यन्ते। तासु ब्रह्मविद्यासु ता-ब्रह्मविभूतय उपसङ्गियेन न वा इति विचारणाया पठति, 'सम्मृति-द्युव्याप्ति'प्रभृतय-विभूतय शाण्डिल्यविद्या-प्रभृतिषु न उपसङ्गित्व्या । 'अत' एव 'च', आयतनविशेष-योगात्। तथाहि शाण्डिल्यविद्याया हृदयायतनत्वं ब्रह्मण, उक्तम्, "एष आत्मान-हृद्दये" (३।१।४।३) इति । तद्वत् एव दह्रविद्यायाम् अपि "दह्रं पुण्डरीकां वेश्म दह्रोऽ-भिन्नत्वाकाश" (का ३।१।१) इति । उपकोशलविद्यायां तु अक्षयायतनत्वं "य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो हृश्यते" (का ४।१।५।१) इति । एवं तत् तत् तत् तत् आध्यात्मिकम् आयतनम् एतासु विद्यासु प्रतीयते । आधिदैविकं तु एता. विभूतय सम्मृतिदुग्निवेश-प्रभृतय । तासां कुत एतासु प्राप्तिः ?

for a similar reason, (not to be inserted in the Brahma vidyās)

*Virya sambhṛiti* (holding together of powers) *dyu nivṛsa* (entering the sky) etc. are mentioned as varieties of energy (*vibhūti*) of Brahman in the following passage which occurs in the supplementary texts of the Rānāyanīyas — “The powers of whom Brahman is the greatest are held together In the beginning Brahman who is the greatest stretched out the sky Now we find that in the Upanishad of the same Rānāyanīyas the Sāndilyavidyā and other Brahma vidyās too are to be met with A question therefore arises whether the above energies of Brahman mentioned by the Rānāyanīyas should or should not be inserted in the Brahma vidyās. The view of the Sutrakāra is Holding together pervading the sky and other energies are not to be inserted in the Sāndilyavidyā etc. ‘And for the same reason : e., on account of their connection with different abodes. Thus, in the Sāndilya vidyā Brahman is said to abide in the heart ‘This Self is within the heart (*Chh* III 14 3) Similarly in the Dahara vidyā we find Within the body there is an abode shaped like a small lotus in it again there is a small ākāśa (*Chh* VIII) Again in the Upakośala vidyā Brahman is said to abide in the eye ‘The Person that is seen in the eye (*Chh* IV 15 1) Thus in these several vidyās several abodes of Brahman are described, and they are all bodily abodes. But the energies above mentioned viz holding together of powers, pervading the sky etc. are connected with the deva abodes of Brahman. In the face of such difference of abodes, how can the energies be inserted in the Brahmavidyās ?

## २४ । पुरुषविद्यायामिव चैतरेषाभनान्नानात् ।

२४ । अस्ति ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनाञ्च रहस्यब्राह्मणे पुरुषविद्या, तत्र पुरुषो यत्र कल्पित । तैत्तिरीयका अपि कश्चित् पुरुषयत्र कल्पयन्ति । तत्र सम्यक्, किन्तु ये इतरत्र उक्ता पुरुषयत्रस्य धर्म्या ते तैत्तिरीयकेषु उपसर्हर्त्तव्या किं वा न उपसर्हर्त्तव्या इति । न उपसर्हर्त्तव्या इति आह आचार्य । 'पुरुषविद्यायामिव' यथा एकेषा ग्राहिना ताण्डिना पैङ्गिनाञ्च पुरुषविद्यायाम् आभनानं न एवम् इतरेषा तैत्तिरीयाणाम् आभनानम् अस्ति ।

24 (There should be no combination of Purusha-vidyās) *because there are no such statements in the other books.*

There is a Purushavidyā in the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa, a fanciful identification of man with the Vedic sacrifice in the Tāndins as well as of the Paingins. And again there is another Purushavidyā in the books of the Taittirīyakas. Hence arises the question whether the particulars of the man-sacrifice mentioned in the former books should or should not be inserted in those of the Taittirīyakas? The Sūtrakāra says, They are not to be inserted. There should be no combination, because there are no statements in the latter sākhās (viz., the Taittirīyakas) corresponding to the Purusha-vidyā of the former sākhās, viz., those of Tāndins and Paingins.

## २५ । वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ।

२५ । अस्ति आद्यर्वणिकानाम् उपनिषदारम्भे मन्त्रसमान्नाय, "सर्वं प्रविध्य हृदयं प्रविध्य धमनीं प्रवृण्य शिरोऽभिप्रवृण्य विधा विप्रुक्तं" इत्यादि । स ताण्डिना "देव सवित प्रभुव यज्ञम्" इत्यादि । श्रौतार्थनिना "श्वेताश्वी हरितनीलोऽसि" इत्यादि ।

वाजसनेयिनां तु उपनिषदाश्चैव प्रवर्त्यन्ताम् पश्यति 'देवा इ वे सन्ते निषिदुः' इत्यादि ।  
 कौषीतकिनाम् अपि अपिटीमन्त्राश्च "ब्रह्म वा अपिटीमी ब्रह्मैव तदकर्ष्यन्ते वे ते  
 ब्रह्मोपवन्ति तेषु तत्त्वमाप्नुवन्ति य एतद्वदुपसंयन्ति इति । किम् इमे "सर्वं प्रविध्य"  
 इत्यादयः मन्त्राः प्रवर्त्यादीनि च कर्त्यापि विद्यासु उपसंक्रियेरन् किं वा न उपसंक्रियेरन्  
 इति नीमोक्षानुसृतिः । न येषाम् उपसंक्रान्तिः विद्यासु इति । अथाह ?—"वेधादायमिदात् ।  
 'इदं सर्वं प्रविध्य इति एवञ्जतीयकालान् हि मन्त्राणां ये अप्या उदयवेपादयः मित्रा-  
 चगमिसम्भवाः ते उपनिषदुदितानि विद्याभिः न तेषां ताभिः संगन्तु सामर्थ्यम् अस्ति ।

25 "*Piercing and other mantras of a similar type being different in subject matter (from the vidyās of the Upanishads, cannot be combined with the latter)*"

The commencement of an Upanishad of the Ātharvani  
 has consists of the following mantras — Pierce (the enemy)  
 wholly pierce his heart crush his veins crush his head  
 thrice crushed— etc. That of the Tāndins consists of  
 Deva Savitah generate the sacrifice That of the  
 Sātyāyanins 'Thou art the possessor of a white horse, and  
 art green as grass &c.' That of the Vājāsaneysins is a  
 Brāhmana passage about the Pravargya ceremony — 'The  
 gods sat down to a sattra &c. That of the Kaushītakins a  
 Brāhmana passage about the Agnishtoma, Brahman  
 is Agnishtoma, Brahman is that day through Brahman they  
 enter Brahman those who observe that day attain immor-  
 tality Now the point to settle is, whether these mantras  
 such as Pierce wholly etc. and the ceremonies such as  
 Pravargya etc. are to be combined with the Upanishad  
 vidyās or not. The answer is, they are not to be combined  
 with the vidyās. Why so? 'Because their subject  
 matter viz. piercing etc., is different This means that

the subject matters of such mantras as "Pierce the enemy's heart" etc are entirely different from, and have no connection with, the vidyas taught in the Upanishads, and consequently it is impossible to combine these mantras with the vidyās

२६। हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् कुशाच्छन्दः स्तुत्युप-  
गानवत् तदुक्तम् ।

२६। अस्ति ताण्डिना श्रुति, "अश्व इव रोमाणि विधूय पाप, चन्द्र इव राहो-  
मुखात् प्रमुच्य, घूत्वा शरीरमकृत कृतात्मा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्भवामि" ( छा ८।१३।१ )  
इति । तथा आथर्वणिकाणां, "तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निगूज्य परम साम्यमुपैति"  
( सु ३।१।३ ) इति । तथा शाखायनिन पठन्ति, "तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृद साधु-  
कृत्या विधत्त पापकृत्याम्" इति । तथैव कौषीतकिन, "तत् भुक्तवदुष्कृते विधूयते  
तस्य प्रिया ज्ञातय भुक्तवमुपयन्तप्रिया दुष्कृतम्" ( कौषी १।४ ) इति । तदिह क्वचित्  
भुक्तवदुष्कृतयोर्हान् श्रूयते क्वचित् तयोरेव विभागेन प्रियैरप्रियैश्चोपायन क्वचित्भूय हान-  
मुपायनञ्च, इति । तद्व यतोभयं श्रूयते तत्र न किञ्चित् वक्तव्यम् अस्ति । यवाभ्युपायन-  
मेव श्रूयते न हानम्, तत्रापि अर्थादेव हान सन्निपतति । यत्र तु हानदेव श्रूयते, न तु  
उपायन तत्र उपायन सन्निपतेत् वा न वा इति विचिकित्तमायाम् पठति,—'हानौ तु'  
एतस्या केवलायाम् अपि श्रूयमायायाम् उपायनं सन्निपतितुम् अर्हति इति पुरणीय ।  
'उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्' यत्र 'उपायन'शब्द 'हान'शब्दशेष 'हान'-शब्दापेक्षित इति  
समधिगत कौषीतकि-रहस्ये । तस्मात् अन्यत्रापि केवल-हानशब्द-श्रवण उपायनानुवृत्तिः ।  
'कुशाच्छन्दः स्तुत्युपगानवत्' इति उपसोपादानम् । तद्व यथा साहजिना "कुशा वान-  
स्यत्वा स्थ ता मा पात" इति अग्निन् निगमे कुशानाम् अविशेषेण वनस्पतियोनित्वश्रवणं,  
शाठ्यायनिना "औदुम्बरा कुशा" इति विशेषवचनात् औदुम्ब्र्य कुशा आश्रीयन्ते ।  
यथा च क्वचित् देवासुरच्छन्दसाम् अविशेषेण पौर्वापर्यप्रसङ्गे "देवच्छन्दासि पूर्वाणि"  
इति पैङ्गान्दानात् प्रतीयते । यथा च षोडशितोत्रे केपाञ्चित् कालविज्ञापनात् "समयाभ्यु-

पितृ ल्ये" इति चाप्युक्तं कालविशेषमतीति । यथा एव च अविनिमित्तं उपान  
 श्चित् समानगन्ति विनिमित्तं भ्रातृविग । यथा एतेषु कुशादिषु सुखकारणत विनिमित्तम्  
 एवं ज्ञानी अपि उपायगतायैव इत्ययम् । सुखम् कृतं हि विनिमित्तं सुखस्यैव यन्मुप  
 गच्छतः सर्वत्रैव विनश्येत् स्यात् न च अन्त्या मर्यादाः । तदुक्तम् तत् तन्नम्  
 पूर्वमेवाभावावर्जने इति शेषः ।

26 *And where the riddance (of the illuminated man from his good and evil deeds) is mentioned (in various texts the obtaining of those deeds by others has to be supplied) because the statement about obtaining (by others) is a necessary supplement (to the statement of his own riddance) as in the cases of the Kusas the Chhandas the Stuti and the Upagāna (The reason for this has already been stated (in the Purva Mimamsa)*

The following passage occurs in the text of the Tāndins — "I shake off sin as a horse shakes his hair I shake off the body as the moon gets released from the mouth of Rāhu. With soul satisfied I enter the uncreated Brahma loka (Chh VIII 13 1) This occurs in the text of the Ātharvanikas,—He (the wiseman) is freed from merit and demerit, becomes spotless and attains the highest equanimity (Mund III 1 3) The Sātyanyanins have this passage,— His sons inherit his property his friends the results of the good done by him his enemies the results of the evil done by him The Kaushitakinis have He gives up his merits and demerits. His dear kinsmen obtain his merits, and his enemies his demerits. (Kau I 4) Of these texts, then one class mentions that the man who has gained true knowledge attains entire freedom

from his merits and demerits. A second class mentions the obtaining of those by his friends and enemies respectively. A third class mentions *both* these facts. Now, we have nothing to say about the third class which mentions both. The second class which only mentions their obtaining by others, admits by implication that the person himself is freed from his merits and demerits, but does not mention the obtaining of these by others, leaves room for the doubt whether these merits and demerits shaken off by the person himself, are or are not transmitted to friends and enemies. This doubt the Sūtrakāra resolves thus "Where the riddance only" is mentioned, the obtaining by others should be added, "because the statement about obtaining (by others) is a necessary supplement to," *i.e.*, is necessary to complete the sense of, the statement about the person's own riddance, as is clear from the passage of the Kaushītakins above quoted. For this reason, in other texts also, wherever the riddance only is mentioned, the obtaining by others should also be supplied. Four analogous instances of supplementing one text by another are introduced into this Sūtra by the words "Like the Kusas, the Chhandas, the Stuti, and the Upagāna." These analogous instances are as follow (1) On the one hand, this mantra of the Bhallavins mentions Kusas as produced by trees in general without any specification, "You Kusas are the offspring of the trees, do you protect me!" On the other hand, this mantra of the Satyayavins mentions Kusas as produced by Udambara trees by a particularising statement, "You Kusas are the offspring of the Udambara tree" (2) On the one hand, in certain

texts the metres of the devas and asuras are mentioned with perfect indifference about their order of succession. On the other hand this mantra of the Paingins fixes a definite order of priority. The metres of the Devas come first." (3) On the one hand in certain texts the time of the stotra of the Shodasin ceremony is left unsettled. On the other hand a definite time is fixed for it in the following mantra of the Rikvedins. When the sun has half risen. (4) On the one hand in certain texts no definite mention is made of what classes of priests have or have not to join in the singing. On the other hand a mantra of the Bhallavins gives definite instruction in the matter. Now as in each of the above four instances (husas etc.) a general statement in one text is combined with a particular statement in another so in the present instance, "riddance has to be combined with obtaining by others." If the particularising statements from other texts were not thus applied and added to the general statements, the result would be universal *vikalpa* (uncertainty or scope for optional procedure) a thing which must always be avoided wherever possible. 'The reason for this has already been stated *viz.*, in the *Pūrva Mīmamsā*.

२०। साम्यराये तर्त्तव्याभावात् तया ह्यन्ये ।

२०। दीव्यामिन पद्या पर्व्वेऽर्ध्वं ब्रह्म अभिप्रमितश्च विदुषः अजनि सुततदुक् तदी विदीप्तं श्रीदीप्तविन (श्रीदी १।३ इत्यादिषु) आभनलि । तत् किं अजनि एव विनाशवचनं प्रविधायकं, उक्त आदी एव दीव्यामिन इति विचार्यायां ब्रवीति विदुषः



‘साम्पराये’ देहात् भवसर्पणे एव सुकृत-दुष्कृतहान भवति इति पूरणीयम् । ‘तर्त्तव्या-  
भावात्’ प्रातःस्थितायात्, यत तदवस्थायाम् विदुष न सुकृत-दुष्कृताभ्यां किञ्चित् प्राप्त्यम्  
शक्ति । ‘तथाहि अन्ये’ अन्ये शास्त्रिन, ताण्डिन शास्त्रायनिन च—तदवस्थायाम् एव  
सुकृत-दुष्कृतहानम् आभनन्ति, इति शेष ।

27 ‘The enlightened self) on departure (from the body gives up its merits and demerits) *there being nothing else to be reached* (by such a self through *karma*) Thus others too declare

The Kaushitakins declare (*Kau* I 3 and following sections) that the enlightened self, when proceeding along the path of the gods towards Brahman seated on a couch, obtains, somewhere on the way, release from his merits and demerits The question therefore arises Is the enlightened self’s release from his merits and demerits to be taken to happen when proceeding on the way, or immediately on departure from the body ? The Sutra says, Immediately on departure from the body “There being nothing else to be reached” by the enlightened self in that state (*viz*, of the dissolution of the body) by his good or evil deeds “Thus others, too, declare”, *e g*, the Tândins and Sâtyâyanins declare that the release from merit and demerit happens in that state (*i e*, immediately on the dissolution of the body)

## २८ । कन्दत उभयाविरोधात् ।

२८ । साम्पराये एव, न भवसर्पणे, सुकृत-दुष्कृत-हानम् भवति, यत देहपातात्  
प्राक् एव ‘कन्दत’ इच्छात प्रयत्नात् यमनियम-विद्याभ्यासात् सुकृत-दुष्कृत-हानि सम्भवति,  
न तु मध्यपथे यत्र कामचयहेतु न विद्यते । ‘उभयाविरोधात्’ यत एवम् एव काथ्य-  
कारण्योः, ताण्डि-शास्त्रायनिभ्यो च ‘अविरोध’ सङ्गति स्यात् ।



some cases it has the meaning of actual going, in some cases not "For otherwise", i e , if we apply "gati" to all cases without distinction, there would be a contradiction of scripture "Going" in the sense of "proceeding to another place" would evidently be contrary to reason in connection with this text, "He is freed from merit and demerit, becomes spotless and attains the highest equanimity" (*Mūṇḍ* III 1 3) How can a spotless self, which is non-moving, proceed to another place? And the goal to be reached by him is "the highest equanimity" which cannot certainly be attained by moving to another place

### ३० । उपपन्नस्तत्त्वार्थोपलब्धिलोकावत् ।

३० । अयम् उभयव्याभावः,—कचित् अर्थवती गतिः, कचित् न, इति 'उपपन्न' युक्तियुक्तः । 'तत्त्वार्थोपलब्धि' यतः तत्त्वार्थार्थं गते कारणभूतं अर्थं पर्यङ्क-विद्यादिषु सङ्गणेषु उपासनेषु उपलभ्यते । तत्र हि पर्यङ्कारोहणं पर्यङ्कस्थेन ब्रह्मण्यः सह सवदनं विशिष्टगन्वादिप्राप्तिः च, इति एवमादि बहु देशान्तरप्राप्तयस्तत्र फलं भूयते । तत्र अर्थवती गतिः । न तु आत्मैकत्वदर्शिना तादृशं किञ्चित् अपेक्षितव्यम् अस्ति । तत्र अनर्थिका गतिः । 'लोकावत्' च एष विभागो द्रष्टव्यः । यथा लोके ग्रामप्राप्तौ देशान्तरप्रापणं पन्था अपेक्ष्यते, न आरोग्यप्राप्तौ, एवम् इह अपि इति । भूयश्च एनं विभागं चतुर्थेऽध्याये नियुक्ततरम् उपपादयिष्यामः ।

30 *This twofold significance is reasonable, for it is observed (both in the case of life after death and) in ordinary life*

This two-fold significance of "gati" i e , having the sense of actual going in certain cases, and not so in others,

is reasonable. For the literal meaning of *gati* is seen in such *saguna* worships as the *parjanya vidyā* (*hans 1*). For there the texts mention various results such as mounting a couch holding a conversation with Brahman seated on a couch experiencing various odours etc., which are all attainable by going to various places. In such a context the word "going" has a sense. But no purpose of such a character is ever entertained by illuminated souls who have attained a vision of the unity of Self. For such souls the expression going has no meaning whatsoever. This distinction (between purposes which involve and which do not involve going) is to be seen in ordinary life also. A path along which places are reached becomes necessary when one has to go to a village but not when one has to attain freedom from disease. Similarly here. This distinction will be established with greater fullness in the fourth chapter.

३१ । अविद्यन् सर्वाणामविरोधं गच्छात्समानाभ्याम् ।

३१ । सर्वाणाम् एव न पाना विधानाम् 'अविद्यन्' अविरोध एव दिव्यानाम्ना स्मृतिं भविष्यन् अस्ति । 'अविरोध' न प्रवृत्तविरोधः अस्ति । समानाभ्याम् अस्ति अस्ति समानाभ्याम् । ( श्रौत १ ; वा ३८ ; गीता ८ ) ।

31 (Going along the path of the Devas) applies to all (*saguna vidyas* without restriction. There is agreement (in respect of subject matter) according to both *śruti* and *smṛiti*).

The path named *Devayana* applies equally without restriction, to all *saguna vidyas*. There is agreement in

respect of subject-matter, according to both sabda (revealed scripture) and inference that is the two-fold proof of sruti and smṛiti *Kaus I (Chh V 93 Gītā viii)*

३२ । यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ।

३२ । विदुष वर्त्तमान-देहपातानन्तर देहान्तरम् उपपद्यते, न वा, इति चिन्त्यते । 'आधिकारिकाणां यावत् अधिकारम् अवस्थिति' । व्यास-वसिष्ठ-भृगु-नारद-प्रभृतय परमेश्वरेण तेषु तेषु अधिकारेषु नियुक्ता सन्त्य कर्मसमाप्तिपर्यन्तं ससारे अवतिष्ठन्ते, तदवसाने अपवर्ज्यन्ते ।

32 *There is subsistence (of the body) for those who have certain offices (to perform), as long as those offices last*

The point under discussion here is whether for the illuminated soul a new body originates or does not originate after the destruction of the old body. The Sutra says, "There is subsistence of the body for those who have certain offices to perform as long as those offices last." Vyāsa, Vasishtha, Bhrigu, Nārada, and others, who have been entrusted by the Supreme Lord with their respective offices, have to remain in the body until the duties of their offices are fully discharged, and obtain release only when they are finished.

३३ । अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावास्तत्तमैपसदवत्  
तदुक्तम् ।

३३ । 'तु'-शब्द पूर्वपक्षव्यावर्तकः । 'अक्षरधियां' निर्विशेष-परब्रह्मवाचक-निषेध-



viz , an *adhvaryu* . The principle underlying such connection is that the offering of the *purodāsa* is the work of the *adhvaryu*, and subordinate matters (the mantras) are always governed by the principal matter (the procedure ordained for the offering of the *purodāsa*) . Similarly in the present case, the attributes of the *Akshara Brahman*, in whatever texts they occur or do not occur, are subordinate to the *Akshara Brahman* itself, and hence they must in all cases be connected with the *Akshara Brahman* . This principle has already been explained in the *Pūrva Mimāṃsa-Philosophy* .

### ३३ । इयदात्मननात् ।

३४ । मुण्डक-श्वेताश्वरोक्तं ( ३।१।१ , ४।६ ) “द्वौ सुपर्णा” इति मन्त्रे, एकस्य भोक्तृत्वम्, एकस्य च अभोक्तृत्व दृश्यते । कठोक्ते च “ऋतं पिवन्ती” ( १।३।१ ) एवमादौ मन्त्रे उभयोरपि भोक्तृत्वमेव दृश्यते । किमत्र विद्यैकत्वम्, उत विद्यानानात्वम् . इति वितर्कं ब्रवीति, विद्यैकत्वम् इति । कुत ? यत उभयो अपि एतयो मन्त्रयो ‘इयता’ इत्यनया द्वित्वपरिच्छेदेन अभिन्न वेद्य रूप परमात्मान ‘आत्मनन्ति’ कथयन्ति वेदान्ता । नास्ति वेद्यभेदः, तच्चात् विद्यैकत्वम् ।

34 (The texts “Dvā suparnā &c” and “Ritam pivantā &c , constitute the same vidya) because (in both cases) the (same) number is stated

In the mantra beginning with the words “Two birds of beautiful plumage” which occurs in Mund III 1 1 and Svet IV 6 , of the two, the individual self and the Supreme Self, one only has been stated to be an enjoyer, and the

other a non-enjoyer while, in the mantra beginning with the words "Two are enjoying the fruits which occurs in Kath 1 3 1 both are stated to be enjoyers. The doubt therefore arises whether we have two different vidyās here or one. The sūtra says both constitute one vidyā. Why so? Because in both cases the Vedānta mantras have as their common object of knowledge the Supreme Self as defined by the same number १/३ the number two. And as the object of knowledge is one the vidyā, too is one

३३ । अस्तस्य मूलपामवत् स्वात्मनः ।

३३ । "मत् प्राचादपरीचा इह य आत्मा सर्वान्तरात् ( उद् १।३।१ १।३।१ ) इति एवं वि' उच्यते कश्चित् प्रश्नो नृणां योऽयं वाजसनेयिनः समासगतिः । यत्र यथासात् विद्यानामात्मन् उत विद्यैकत्वं वा स्यात् इति वितर्कं प्रवृत्तिं समयमपि आत्मनः अविशिष्टब्रह्मणः 'अस्तस्य सर्वान्तरात्' इत्यर्थे प्रवृत्त्यतीत्येव । ततश्च विद्यैकत्वम् । न हि द्वौ आत्मानौ एकविन् ईदृशे सर्वान्तरीत्यवयवौ । मूलपामवत् इति तुल्यत्वं निदर्शयति । यथा "एवो द्विः सर्वमूर्तिषु नृणां सर्वभूतानां सर्वमूलानामपि ( अतः १।११ ) इति अविन् सन्ने समस्तषु मूलपामेषु एका एव सर्वान्तरात् आत्मायते, एवम् अन्तरीः अपि भक्तरीः इत्यपि ।

35 (Though the same passage occurs twice the vidyā in them is one) *because the undifferentiated Self is within all* (and hence cannot be two) *as* (clearly stated in the text about) *all beings*

The Vājasaneyins in their Brihadāranyaka Upanishad record one and the same passage twice in succession in the Questions of Ushasta and Kahola viz in III 4 1 and



III 5 1 The passage is this, "That Brahman which is directly perceived, and is not hidden, the Self who is within all" Here a doubt may arise as to whether there are two different vidyās on account of the repetition, or there is one vidyā only? The Sūtra says In both passages, in the questions and answers, "the undifferentiated Self" is represented as "within", i e, "within all things". Hence the unity of vidyā, because in one body there cannot be two selves each of which is within all things. The Sūtra refers to another text by the words "as in all beings" In the mantra "He is the one God, hidden in all beings, he is all-pervading, the Self within all beings" (Svet VI 11), the one Self within all is declared to be existing in all beings. Similarly in the two questions and answers under discussion

३६ । अन्यथा भेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत् ।

३६ । 'अन्यथा' आत्मानभेदेन विद्याभेदे अगङ्गीकारे, 'भेदानुपपत्ति' आत्मानभेदस्य अनुपपत्ति अयुक्तता भवेत्, 'इति चेत् न' । 'उपदेशान्तरवत्' यथा छान्दोग्योपनिषदि षष्ठाध्याये अष्टनाटिषु खण्डेषु "स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि ज्ञेयकोटी" इति नवकाले अपि उपदेशे विद्याभेद न भवति, एवम् ३६ अपि ।

36 If it be contended that otherwise separate scriptural statements become indefensible, we say, No ; as in the case of another instruction

If it be objected that unless we admit separate vidyās wherever there happen to be separate scriptural passages, the separate scriptural statements become indefensible,

we say No. As in the case of another instruction viz the passage "That is the Self thou art That O Sveta Letu" which occurs nine times in the eighth and subsequent sections of the sixth chapter of the Chhândogya Upani had As that instruction though repeated nine times does not put up one vidyâ into many : so also here

### ३०। अतिहारो विमिषस्ति क्षीतवत् ।

३०। "तदस्मिन् भूमी दीप्ती मादम्" ( ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण ११।३।६ ) इति ऐतरेय ब्राह्मणस्य पञ्चम ब्रह्मसूत्रम् । तदा आ च "सं वा दहमसि भवति पदं वा सवत्सि" । तत्र सवत्स- विमिष अतिहारो लभ्यते इति चेत्तदा सवत्स पदवत्स एव इति । अत्र चेति अतिहारो लभ्यते इति विमिष विमिषा एव लभ्यते इति । इति चेत् तदा लभ्यते इति लभ्यते इति लभ्यते इति । ३० वत्स इति चेत्तदा सवत्स लभ्यते इति लभ्यते इति लभ्यते इति ।

37 (In the double enunciations "I am thou" and "Thou art I" etc.) a reciprocal statement (is to be understood) because (the texts) clearly distinguish (the two meditations) as others

There is a text of the Aitareyins about the Person in the sun which says "What I am that is he. What he is that am I" (Aita 1r II 2 4 6) Similarly there is a text of the Jâbâlar which runs "I am thou O great divinity and thou art I" In such cases of double enunciation the doubt arises whether a two fold meditation is necessary or only a single one is sufficient. The Sâtra declares "Reciprocity is meant here i.e. both the above statements in which the individual self and the Lord

appear by turns as subject and predicate, are enjoined for the purposes of meditation, "because those uttering the texts here clearly distinguish them" by mentioning both distinctly "As others, *i e*, just as other attributes of the Lord, his all-pervasiveness, etc, are prescribed in scripture for meditation

३८ । सैव हि सत्यादयः ।

३८ । "स यो ह्येवमेव महद् यच्च प्रथमजं वेद सत्यं ब्रह्म" (बृह ५।४।१) इत्यादिना वाजसनेयके सत्यविद्या विधाय अगस्त्यस्मिन् आम्नायते "तद् यत् तत् सत्यमसौ स आदित्यो य एष एतस्मिन् सङ्खले पुरुषो यत्राय दक्षिणेऽक्षन् पुरुष" ( बृह ५।५।२ ) इत्यादि । अत्र 'सा एव' पूर्वोक्ता एव सत्यविद्या परव उपदिश्यते । 'हि' यत् पूर्वोक्ता "सत्यादयः" गुणा परव च अभिज्ञायन्ते ।

38 (The vidyā of the True treated of in a later passage is *the same as* (that in an earlier passage,) because "*the True &c* (are recognised as the same)

The text of the Vājasaneyins after imparting the knowledge of the True by the words "He who knows this great glorious First-born as the true Brahman" (*Bri* V 4 1), goes on to declare, "Now, that which is that True, the same is the Aditya, the same is the Person (that dwells in that orb, the same is the Person) in the right eye" (*Bri* V 5 2) Here we are to know that the same vidyā of the True that is taught in the earlier passage is taught again in the later passage Because the words "the True etc", which are treated of in the earlier passage, are recognised in the later passage as the same

## ३८ । कामादीतरस्य तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ।

३८ । “यस्य यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मरूपे ददर्श पुण्डरीके वैश्वं ददर्शास्मिन् अमराकाशः  
( वा ८।११ ) इति प्रकृत्य ब्रह्मणा चक्षीयते ”एष आत्मा पश्यतामा विजयी विद्यायु  
विजयीषी विजिह्वतीषीऽपिपाम मयकामः सत्यमहम्” ( वा ८।१० ) इत्यादि । तथा  
वाजसनेयिकः स वा एष महान्त आत्मा योऽयं विद्यामयः प्रागुक्तं य एषोऽस्मिन् दृश्य  
आकाशस्थिं पश्यते सत्यमहं ब्रह्म ( इह वा ८।११ ) इत्यादि । ‘कामादि’ सत्यकामादि  
इत्यर्थः । यत् एतत् ब्रह्माय उदयाद्यास्य मयकामात्मनि भूतजातम् उपलभ्यते तत्  
इतरं वाजसनेयिके “स वा एष महान्त आत्मा इति चतु मन्वभूतः । यत् च  
वाजसनेयिके वसिष्ठादि उपलभ्यते तत् अपि तत्र ब्रह्मायि ”एष आत्मा पश्यतामा  
इति चतु मन्वभूतः । ‘आयतनादिभ्यः’ यत्र उभयत्र समानं उदयायतनं समानं च  
वैश्वं दृश्यं, समानं च तस्य सैतुष्यं मोक्षावस्थं प्रयोजनम् इति एवमादि बहुतरं  
शान्त्यं दृश्यते ।

39 *Desires and other qualities* (of the Self mentioned in different passages have to be combined) *both there and here on account of* (numerous common characteristics such as) *abode etc*

In the *Chhândogya Upanishad* (VIII 1 1) we have the passage “There in that city of Brahman is an abode viz. the small lotus and in it again there is the small inner *ākāśa* followed later on by the passage “That is the Self free from sin free from decay free from death free from grief free from hunger and thirst his desires are true his imaginations are true (*Chh* VIII 7 1) &c. Again in the text of the *Vājasaneyins*, we find “He is that great unborn Self whose essence is knowledge He abides in that *ākāśa* within the heart in the midst of the *prāṇas*. He is

the ruler of all," (*Bṛ* IV. 4 22) "Desires etc" in the Sutra means "true desires etc" The attributes such as "having true desires", etc, which are predicated about the Ākāśa within the heart in the *Chhândogya* are to be combined "in the other passage" : *c*, in the passage "He that is the great unborn Self" etc, of the Vājasaneyins And again, attributes such as "the ruler of all" etc, mentioned by the Vajasaneyins are to be combined "there", : *c*, in the passage in the *Chhândogya* "That is the Self, free from sin" etc Why so? "On account of the abode etc", : *c*, because common to both there are a number of characteristics, such as, the heart being an 'abode', the Lord being the object of knowledge, and also the Lord being described as a bank which prevents the worlds from getting confused together by losing their identities, and so on

### ४० । आदरादलीपः ।

४० । पूर्वपक्षसूत्रम् एतत् । छान्दोग्ये वैश्वानरविद्या प्रकृत्य नृयते तद् यद् भक्त प्रथममागच्छेत् तद्धोमीयं स या प्रथमाहुति जुहुयात् ता जुहुयात् प्राणाय स्वाहा" ( छा ३।२।१ ) इति । तत्र पञ्चप्राणाहुतयो विहिता । तासु च परस्तादग्निहोत्रशब्द प्रयुक्त "य एतदेव विद्वानग्निहोत्र जुहोति" ( छा ३।२।४ ) इति,

“यथेह नृधिता बाला नातर पर्युपासते ।

एव सर्वान् भूतान् अग्निहोत्रमुपासते ॥” ( छा ३।२।४ )

इति च । तत्र इदं विचार्यते किं भोजनलीपं लीपः प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य उत अलीप इति । ‘अलीप’ तावत् प्राह । ‘आदरात्’ तथा हि वैश्वानरविद्यायाम् एव जावान्नाना श्रुति “पूर्वोऽतिथिभ्योऽग्नीयात् यथा वै स्वयमाहुत्वाऽग्निहोत्र परस्य जुहुयादेव तत्” इति अतिथि-भोजनस्य प्राथम्यं निन्दित्वा स्वामिभोजनं प्रथमं प्रापयन्ती प्राणाग्निहोत्रे आदरं करोति ।

40 (The *Pránágni*hotra enjoined on a householder while taking food) *is not to be omitted* (even when he happens not to take any food) *on account of the great importance* (attached to the *Pránágni*hotra in a *Jábála* passage)

The *Párvapaksha* In connection with the *Vaisvá naravidya* the *Chhándogya* has this passage, Therefore the food that has come first is to be considered as *homa*. The oblation which he (the consumer of the food) thus offers first, he should offer with the words *Pránáya Sváhá!* (*Chh* V 21 1) Afterwards the text enjoins five several oblations to the *pranas*. To these oblations later on the term *Agni*hotra is applied in these two passages — He who knowing this in this way offers the *Agni*hotra oblation (*Chh* V 24 2 and Just as hungry children on earth wait upon their mother similarly all beings wait upon the *Agni*hotra (*Chh* V 24 4) Here the doubt arises whether when no food is taken the *Pránágni*hotra is to be omitted or not. The *Párvapaksha* says, 'There should be no omission. Why so? On account of the importance attached to it. In connection with the same *Vaisvá naravidyá*, we have the following *Jábála* passage. He (i. e. the householder) should take his meal before the guests have theirs. Otherwise it would appear as if the householder without having first offered his own *Agni*hotra oblation was offering that of another. So much importance is attached by this passage to the *Pránágni*hotra that (contrary to custom) it objects to the guests having their meals first and enjoins that the householder should eat before them.

४१ । उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ।

४१ । सिद्धान्तम् । 'उपस्थिते' भोजने 'यत' तस्मात् एव भोजनद्रव्यात् प्रथमोपनिषत्तितात् प्राणायिको निर्वृत्तचित्तम् । 'तद्वचनात्' तथाहि "तद्वदभक्त प्रथमभागश्चेत् तद्वोमीयम्" ( छा ५।२।११ ) इति सिद्धवदभक्तोपनिषत्-परामर्शेन परार्थद्रव्यसाध्यता प्राणायुक्तोर्ना विदधाति ।

41 (The Pránágnihotra should be performed) *when the eating is actually taking place and with that* 'i e, with the victuals first presented), *because the text declares thus*

The Sutrakára's view is that the Pránágnihotra should be performed "when the eating is actually taking place", and "with that" 'i e, with the victuals first presented "Because the text declares thus," 'i e, because the passage "Therefore the food that has come first is to be considered as homa" (Chk V 21 1) refers to the presentation of victuals as something already accomplished, and consequently makes out the Pránágnihotra (not as an end in itself, but) as dependent on something (the taking of food) which has another object (the satisfaction of hunger)

४२ । तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्वद्वैदिकेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

४२ । सन्नि कर्मोक्त्यपात्रवाणि विज्ञानानि "ओमित्येतद्वद्वैदिकमुपासीत" ( छा १।१।१ ) इत्येवमादीनि । किं तानि नित्यानि एव स्युः कर्मसु उत अनित्यानि ? अत्र ब्रूल,—'तन्निर्धारणानियमः' इति । यानि एतानि उद्गीथादि-कर्मगुण-याथात्म्य-

निर्वाणानि न एतानि नियन्तु कथमु नियन्तेरन् । तदुक्तं तथा हि अनियतत्वम्  
एव एवञ्चातीवकालं दमयति स्तुतिः—“तेजामी कृती वेदेतदेव वेदं यय न वेद  
( का १।१।१ ) इति । इत्युभयतिर्यक्तं फलम् ( इत्युक्त्वा हि अनियतत्वम् फलम् ) अपि  
च एवञ्चातीवकालं कथमन्यथायस्य विद्यानस्य इत्युक्त्वा एव कथं च फलम् उपलभ्यत  
कथमन्यथायस्य इति तत्पुनरुक्तिः अतिशयविरुद्धं कथितं “यदेव विद्यायाः कुरीति शब्दा  
उपनिषदा तदेव कीर्तयन्तु भवति ( का १।१।१ ) इति ।

42. *Scriptural assertions do not make out (the vidyās) to be constant as seen (in scriptural texts) But they have different fruits —removal of hindrances*

Certain vidyās in the Upanishads are made to depend on minor sacrificial acts, e g the first vidyā of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad introduced by the words ‘The syllable Om is to be meditated upon as Udgîtha (I 1 1) Do these vidyās constitute a constant and essential element of the sacrifice, or are they separable and non essential ? On this point the Sūtra says, Scriptural assertions do not make them out to be constant : e the scriptural statements about the nature of such sacrificial functions as the udgîtha etc. are not to be permanently connected with the sacrifices. Because this is seen : e because scripture declares that such functions are not constant elements, e g in this passage which occurs in I 1 10 — ‘Therefore he who knows this and he who knows not both perform the sacrifice ‘They have different fruits,—the removal of hindrances : e the vidyās dependant on such minor functions have fruits of their own different from those of the sacrifice itself viz. removal of hindrances to the attainment of the object of the sacrifice : e a certain additional



success, as in the passage, "The sacrifice performed with knowledge, faith and the Upanishad is more powerful" (Chh I 1 10)

### ४३ । प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ।

४३ । वाजसनेयके "वदिष्याम्येवाहमिति वाग्दध्रे" ( बृह १।१।२१ ) इति अत्र अध्यात्म वागादीनां प्रायः श्रेष्ठ अवधारित अधिदैवम् अन्यादीनां वायुः । तथा छान्दोग्य "वायुर्विव स्वर्ग" ( छा ४।३।१ ) इति अत्र अधिदैवम् अन्यादीनां वायुः स्वर्ग अवधारित, "प्राणो वाव स्वर्ग" ( छा ४।३।३ ) इति अत्र अध्यात्म वागादीनां प्रायः । तत्र सप्रथ, किं पृथक् वा इमौ वायुप्राणौ उपगन्तव्यौ स्याताम् उत अपृथक् वा इति । अत्र सिद्धान्तः,—पृथक् एव वायुप्राणौ उपगन्तव्यौ इति । कस्मात् ? पृथगुपदेशात् । आत्मानार्थं ययम् अध्यात्माधिदैव-विभागोपदेशः, स असति आध्यानपृथक्त्वे अनर्थक एव स्यात् । प्रदानवत् यथा "इन्द्र य राज्ञे विपुर्गोडाशमेकादशकपालनिन्द्रावाऽधिगजावेन्द्राय स्वराज्ञे" ( तैत्ति २।३।६ ) इति अन्याम् विपुर्गोडाशिन्याम् इष्टौ इन्द्रामेदेऽपि राजादि-गुणमेदात् प्रदानपृथक्त्वम् भवति, एवम् अत्र अपि तत्त्वामेदेऽपि आद्येयाशपृथक्त्वात् आध्यानपृथक्त्वम् । 'तदुक्तम्' तत् उक्तम् जैमिनिना पूर्व्वमीमासायाम् ।

43 Vāyu and Prāna, are here to be considered different) as in the case of the offerings This has been shown (in the *Purvamīmāṃsā*).

In the passage of the Vājasaneyins which begins with the words "The Voice decided, I will speak" (Bṛ I 5 21) Prāna is specified as the best among the bodily organs, viz., Speech etc, and Vāyu is specified as the best among the Devas, viz., Agni etc Again, in the *Chhândogya* Upanishad, in the passage "Vāyu indeed is the engulfer" (IV. 3 1), Vāyu is specified as the engulfer of all Devas,



इति पृथक् अग्नीन् आमनन्ति । तेषु संशयः,—किम् एते मनस्विदादयः क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः  
तत्संशयभूता उत स्वतन्त्रा केवलविद्यात्मका इति ? स्वतन्त्रा इति सिद्धान्तः, 'लिङ्ग-  
भूयत्वात्' यतः भूयासि लिङ्गानि एषां विद्यात्मकत्वम् उपोद्बलयन्ति अभिन्नु-  
प्राप्त्यर्थं दृश्यन्ते—“तद्वत् किञ्चेमानि भूतानि मनसः सङ्कल्पयन्ति तेषामेव सा कृतिः”  
इति “तान् ह्येतानेव विदे सर्वदा सर्वथा भूतानि चित्तन्तपि स्वपते” इति च,  
एवञ्जातीयकानि । ‘तत् हि’ लिङ्गम् प्रकरणात् “बलीयः” । ‘तत् अपि’ उक्तं  
त्रैमिनिना पूर्वमीमांसायाम् ।

44 (The bright mental fires mentioned in the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins are mere vidyās, and separate from the sacrifices, *because there are numerous indications* (in scriptural passages that they are so) *That* (i. e., an indicatory passage) *has greater force* (than the general subject matter) *This too* (has been explained in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā)

A passage about the sensorium is found in the Agnirahasya of the Vājasaneyins in the Brāhmaṇa which begins with the words “This was not existent in the beginning” The passage runs thus, “It (the sensorium) saw 36,000 bright fires of its own, composed of manas built out of *manas*. Then the passage goes on to mention several (figurative) fires, different from the actually lighted fires. Now the question is, Are these fires built out of *manas* etc., to be considered as connected with the sacrificial act (*viz.*, actually building a fire-altar with bricks), and so supplementary to it ? Or, are they to be considered as separate from the sacrificial act, and constituting a mere vidyā ? The Sūtra says, they are separate, “Because there are numerous indications” in the texts of that Brāhmaṇa confirming the

character of these fires as mere vidyās e. g., Whatever thoughts these beings think in their minds—they go to form those same (mind built fires) and For one who knows this, all beings are always building up their fires (by their thoughts) even when he himself sleeps and similar other passages. And that i. e., an indicatory passage has greater force than the general subject matter This too has been explained in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā

४५ । पूर्वविकल्प प्रकारात् स्यात् क्रिया मानसवत् ।

४५ । पूर्ववत्पक्षमेतत् । न एतत् युक्तं भवत्वा एते अप्रय इति । पूर्वविकल्प प्रकारात् स्यात् पूर्वस्य क्रियामयस्य अप्रय प्रकारात् तद्विषय एव अप्रय विषयविमोक्षीयदीप्तः स्यात् न भवत्वा । क्रिया मानसवत् एते अप्रय भगवन्विता अपि प्रकारात् क्रियाविमित एव स्युः । यथा वादगोपसाम्य-यागे इधिया पात्रेण समुद्रस्य भीमस्य यदवादिश्रियावि मानसानि अपि क्रियाप्रकारात् क्रियानिमित्ताणि एव एवम् एते अप्रय अपि क्रियाश्रयाः ।

45 (The mental fire is) a particular form of the preceding fire because of the general subject matter (This fire, too is) an act like the mental (acts of certain Soma sacrifices)

The Pūrvapakṣa. It is not reasonable to say that these (mental) fires are unconnected with the sacrifice.

Because of the general subject matter which is an actual fire, we consider this too to be a particular form of the preceding one the instruction here being about a particular mode of the sacrificial fire itself and not unconnected with it. It is "an act, like the mental acts etc. i. e. these fires,

though built of thought, are, on account of the subject matter, to be taken as part of the sacrificial act. Just as in a particular Soma-sacrifice lasting 12 days, in which the earth is viewed as the cup and the sea as Soma, all the acts such as taking the cup etc., though performed in thought only, are considered to be parts of the sacrificial act, because the subject-matter is sacrifice, so also in the present case are the thought-fires to be considered as parts of the sacrificial act.

### ४६ । अतिदेशाच्च ।

४६ । पृथ्वपच । 'अतिदेशात्' 'च' उपाम् अग्निना क्रियाशेषत्वम् । पूर्व्वेण इष्टका-चिर्तेन क्रियानुप्रवेशिना अग्निना अतिदिग्गन्ती श्रुति एषा अपि क्रियानुप्रवेशं द्योतयति । सति हि सानान्ये अतिदेशं प्रवर्त्तते ।

46 (The same thing is proved) *further by the extension of injunctions*

(The Purvapaksha continued) That these fires too are part of the sacrificial act is proved further by the extension of scriptural injunctions to them. By extending the injunctions relating to the preceding brick-built fires, which are parts of sacrificial act, to these fires, scripture indicates that these too are parts of such acts. Extension of injunctions is possible only where there is similarity of characteristics.

### ४७ । विद्यैव तु निर्धारिणात् ।

४७ । सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् । 'तु'-शब्दः पचं व्यावर्त्तयति । विद्यात्मका एव एते

अतश्च। मगदिदाद्य 'अग्नयः' स्युः न किञ्च नममृतः, यतः स्रुतिः तथा एव निर्वाचयति —  
 "तै ईते विधाचिता एव" इति विद्या हैवेत एवविद्विता भवन्ति इति च ।

47 *But really (these fires constitute) a vidyā for there is scriptural assertion to that effect*

The Sūtrakāra's view The word but discards the Pūrvapakṣa. These mud built fires etc. are independent and of the character of vidyās, and are not parts of sacrificial acts, as scripture itself declares them to be such in these passages,— 'These are really built of vidyā and For one who knows these are really built of vidyā

४८ । दर्शनाच्च ।

४८ । दृश्यते च एषा स्वातन्त्र्ये निहा तत् पुरस्तात् दर्शितं 'सिद्धमूल्यात्' इति च ।

48. *And because (indicatory marks of that) are also seen (in the scriptures)*

Indicatory marks about the independence of these fires are also to be seen in the scriptures, as shown already in the 44th Sūtra by the words because there are numerous indications"

४९ । श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्याच्च न वाच ।

४९ । ननु, अथवा चान्ता माहो सिद्धम् अपि कश्चित् पर्वस्य अथाप्य न बीजम् इत्यर्थः, इति अपास तत् मग्न्यामन्त्रात् सिद्धमिति च ।

इति अतः उत्तर पठति, 'न वाच' न एव प्रकरणसामर्थ्यात् क्रियाशेषत्वम् अव्यवसायं स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षं वाधितव्यम् । 'श्रुत्यादिवलीयत्वात्' यत् श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यानि प्रकरणात् वलीयांसि ।

49 (The weakness of unaided indicatory marks) *does not constitute a refutation* (of our position), *because scriptural declaration etc have greater force*

The following objection may be urged When there is no other (i.e., corroborative) reason, a mere indicatory mark fails to prove anything, hence, that being rejected, the force of the subject matter ought to prevail, and the mental fires are thus proved to be parts of sacrificial acts To this we reply "The weakness of unaided indicatory marks does not constitute a refutation" of our position, i.e., it would be unreasonable to assume, on the strength of the general subject matter only, that the mental fires are parts of sacrificial acts, and to oppose the view that they are independent "Because scriptural declaration etc have greater force", i.e. because direct scriptural declaration and indirect scriptural indication have greater force than the general subject matter

५० । अनुबन्धादिव्यः प्रज्ञान्तर-पृथक्त्ववत् दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

५० । इत्यत्र प्रकरणम् उपपद्य स्वातन्त्र्यं मनसिदादीनां प्रतिपत्तव्यं, यत् क्रियावयवान् मन-आदि-व्यापारेषु अनुवध्नाति,—“ते मनसैवाधीयन्त मनसैवाधीयन्त मनसैव यद्वा अगृह्यन्त मनसाऽस्तुवन् मनसाऽशसन् यत् किञ्चित् यत्र कामं क्रियते यत् किञ्चित् यजिष्य कार्त्तम मनसैव तेषु तन्मनोमयेषु मनश्चित्सु मनोमयमक्रियते” इत्यादिना । एवम् अनुबन्धात् स्वातन्त्र्यं मनोमयादीनाम् । 'आदि'शब्दात् अतिदेशायपि यथासम्भव

आदिनाम् । बुद्ध्यानि च कार्यानि दक्षिणानि । एवम् अग्निर्वादिभ्यः कार्येभ्यः  
 भागवत् जलदिनादीनाम् । 'मन्त्राणां वृत्तकथनं कदा जालिन्विद्यावधनीनि मन्त्रा  
 नानि वाग मेव कल्पयन् कल्पयन्मात्रानि वृत्तक एव कथयन्' अत्र नर्तकस्य गतव्यति  
 मन्त्रे, एवम् इति । इहैव वागव्यवहारश्च दक्षिणाय कार्येति वागव्यवहारं तन्  
 दक्षिणाय वृत्तक- इह च । तस्य वृत्तकस्यानुवभात् वागव्यवहारं वागव्यवहारं कार्येति  
 कथयन् वृत्तकः । 'तद्वत्त्वं पूर्वभीमाकाशम् ।

50 (The mind built fires etc are independent of sacrificial acts for another reason too viz.) *because of the connection* (declared in some texts of actual sacrificial acts with mental activities) *and for other reasons as in the case of the separateness of certain other offerings*. This is seen (in another case) also and it has already been explained (in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā)

We have to assume the independence of the mind built fires etc. disregarding the general subject matter for another reason also viz. that there are texts which (instead of making the mental activities dependent on sacrificial acts actually do the reverse i. e.,) connect the very sacrificial functions with activities of the mind etc. thus — By the mind only are they (the fires etc.,) to be supported by the mind only are they to be built by the mind only are the sacrificial cups taken by the mind do (the udgātṛis) praise by the mind do the (hotṛis) recite. All that is done at the sacrifice all sacrificial acts whatsoever are done by the mind are done as consisting of the mind and are done on the fire altars made of mind and built with mind etc. On account of such connection and other reasons it follows that the mind built fires etc., are



independent Among the "other reasons" the extension of injunctions etc , too, should be included as far as possible , and we have already seen that direct scriptural declaration etc (Sūtra 49) are other reasons in our favour Thus, by virtue of the connection described above, and the other reasons adduced previously, the independence of the mind-built fires etc is firmly established "As in the case of the separateness of certain other cognitions" Certain other cognitions, e g the Sāṅdilyavidyā etc , though connected with their respective sacrificial acts, are yet separate from these sacrificial acts and from other cognitions, and are independent The same is the case here This (viz independence of the general subject matter) is seen in another case also The offering named Aveshti which occurs in the scripture under the subject-head Rājasūya, is seen to be raised above that heading The reason for such superiority is that the Aveshti is connected with all the three higher castes, while the Rājasūya can be performed by Kshatriyas only "This has already been explained" in the Purvāmīmāṃsā

५१। न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्न्युवत् न हि लोकापत्तिः ।

५१। यत् उक्तं "मानसवत्" इति तत् प्रत्यक्ष्यते । 'न सामान्यात् अपि' न मानसग्रह-सामान्यात् अपि मन्यिदादीना क्रियाशेषत्वं कल्प्यम् । 'उपलब्धे' यत् पूर्वोक्तेभ्यः श्रुत्यादिस्य हेतुभ्यः तेषां केवलपुरुषार्थित्वम् एव उपलभ्यते । न हि किञ्चित् कस्यचित् केनचित् सामान्यं न सम्भवति । न च तावता यथास्वं वैषम्यं निवर्त्तते । 'न्युवत् न हि लोकापत्तिः' यथा "सा वा एष एव सत्यं यं एष एतस्मिन् मण्डले पुरुषः" (शतपथब्राह्मण १०।५।१।३) इति, "अग्निर्वै सत्यः" (तैत्ति ५।१।१०।३) इति च

दन्वादिपुरुषो ममान् अपि मयम्-दीदं न च दन्वा अपि । यदा च “यसो  
वा मातामहो ममाहो” इति च वसिष्ठः (वा ३.३.१) इति न मन्वादि-  
ममान्वात्-ममन्वा इति-ममन्वा ।

51 *Not even from similarity* (can the mental fires be proved to be parts of the sacrifice. From scriptural observation (the opposite conclusion is reached) *Just as* (its things, each of which is compared to) *death* (do not become identical) *nor does a world* (compared to fire) *actually become* (fire)

This Sutra replies to the Pūrvapakṣa argument based on the similarity to the mental cup (Sūtra 45). Not even from their similarity to the mental cup can the mind built fires be conceived to be parts of the sacrificial act. From scriptural observation — i.e. from both direct scriptural declaration and indirect scriptural indication the mental fires are observed to fulfil certain purposes of men only (and not the purposes of any sacrificial action). Again it is impossible that a thing should not resemble any other thing in some respect or other — yet this does not prevent the thing from having such differences from all other things as constitute its individuality. As in the case of death the worlds do not become identical. In the two passages “The same is indeed Death who is the Person in that orb (Satapatha Brahmana V. 5.2.3) and Agni indeed is Death (Taittiriya Samhita V. 1.10.3) the word death is applied equally to Agni and to the Person in the sun but this does not prove that the two are absolutely identical. Again take the passage “That (heavenly) world is indeed Agni. O Gotama the sun is its fuel (Chh-

V 4 1). Here, from the similarity in having fuel etc., it cannot be proved that the world has actually become Agni. So also in the present case

५२ । परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विष्यं भूयस्त्वात्वनुबन्धः ।

५२ । 'परेण च' परस्तात् अपि, "अथं वाव लोका उपोऽग्निश्चित" इति एतस्मिन् अनन्तरे ब्राह्मणे, 'शब्दस्य' ब्राह्मणवाक्यस्य 'ताद्विष्यं' केवलविद्याविधित्वं प्रयोजनं न द्यते । 'भूयस्त्वात्वनुबन्धः' भूयास तु अन्यत्रयवा सम्पादयितव्या विद्यायाम्, इति, एतस्मात् च कारणात् अग्निना अनुबध्यते विद्या, न कर्माहत्वात् । तस्मात् मनस्विदादीनां केवल-विद्यात्मकत्वसिद्धिः ।

52 Subsequently also (in the same scriptural passage) the text is of that kind The connection (with sacrifice), however, is due to the multiplicity (of details)

"Subsequently also", i e, in the very next Brāhmaṇa beginning with the words "That world, indeed, is this fire that has been built", it is to be noticed that the drift of "the text is of that kind" i e the text enjoins a mere vidyā (and not a sacrificial act) "The connection, however, is due to the multiplicity" i e the reason why this vidyā (of the mind-built fires) is connected in the text with the sacrificial fire is that several elements of the actual fire have to be (by imagination) combined with the vidyā, and not that the vidyā itself is a part of the sacrificial act From all this it is proved that the mind-built fires etc., are of the nature of a vidyā only

५३ । एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ।

५३ । इह देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सद्भावः समर्थ्यते बन्धनोच्चाधिकार-सिद्धये ।

‘एवं साक्षात्प्राप्त्या’ दृष्टान् आत्मनः व्यतिरेकम् प्राप्नुः । ईदृशं च आचर्यते — ‘शरीरे  
मात्रम् यतः शरीरे सति एव अतश्चादि आत्मनश्च भवति च सति च न भवति । एवं  
मते परस्मिन् नृपे दृश्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः सत्त्वात् प्रतिपादयति ।

53 *Some (maintain the identity) of the self (with the body) because of its appearance when the body exists*

In the present section it will be proved that the self exists even without the body so that its liability to bondage and release may be established. Some viz the Lokāyatikas hold the non-difference of the self from the body. The reason they adduce is this — Because of its appearance when the body exists, i.e. because consciousness and other attributes of the self appear only when the body exists and disappear when the body ceases to exist. Against this position the next Sutra proves the existence of the Self apart from the body.

५४ । व्यतिरेकस्तद्वापामावित्वात् तूपलब्धिवत् ।

५४ । न तु एतत् सति यतः सत्तम् व्यतिरेकं दृष्टान् आत्मनः इति  
‘व्यतिरेक’ एव अस्य दृष्टान् भवितुम् अस्ति । ‘तद्वापामावित्वात्’ यतः तद्वापं शरीरे  
सति अपि अतश्चादि आत्मनश्च भवति च सति च न भवति । उपलब्धिवत् यथा  
एव भूतभीतिकविब्रजः, उपलब्धे सति तत्तम् च भुपगम्यते एवं तस्यां तद्वापं व्यतिरेक  
अपि आत्मनः नास्ति । उपलब्धिवत् एव च न आत्मा इति आत्मनः दृश्यतिरिक्तस्य  
मित्रस्य च उपलब्धे एव दृष्टान् ।

54 *Not so (there is) difference (between the self and the body) because (even) in the existence of that (the*

body) (there may be) *non existence* (of the self) , *as in the case of perception*

It is not correct to say that the self is identical with the body. On the other hand, "difference" between the two is the reasonable conclusion. "Because even in the existence of the body there may be non existence", *e g* in the state of death, even though the body exists, consciousness, memory and the other functions of self do not manifest themselves. "As in the case of perception," *i e* on the same grounds on which the *existence* of perception (of material objects and material products) is admitted, the *difference* of such perception from the material objects has also to be admitted. To us perception is of the very essence of the self, therefore the self's distinction from the body is evident, and so is its eternality because of the identity of perception (in spite of the variability of its objects)

५५ । अङ्गाववक्षास्तु न शाखास्तु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

५५ । सनाता प्रासङ्गिकी इयं कथा । सम्प्रति प्रकृताम् एव अनुवर्त्तमाने ।  
 "ओमित्येतच्चमुद्गीथमुपासीत" ( ऋ १।१।१ ), "लीलेषु ऋषिषु सामीपासीत"  
 ( का १।१।१ ) "उक्तथमुक्तयमिति वै प्रजा वदन्ति । तद्विदम्वोक्तमिदमेव पृथिवी"  
 ( ऐतरेय आरण्यक १।१।१।१ ) । "अथ वाव लीक एषोऽत्रिस्थित" ( शतपथब्राह्मण  
 १।१।४।१ ) इति एवमाद्या प्रत्यया 'अङ्गाववक्षा' उद्गीथादिकाम्नाङ्गेन सम्बद्धा  
 प्रतिवेद शाखासिद्धेषु विहिता । ते तत्-तत् शाखागतेषु एव उद्गीथादिषु भवेयुः अथवा  
 सर्वशाखागतेषु इति सश्रयः । अत्र सिद्धान्तः,— 'न' एते 'प्रतिवेदम्' स्वशाखास्तु एव  
 व्यवतिष्ठेरन्, अपि 'तु' सर्वशाखास्तु अनुवर्त्तेरन् ।

55 *But (the injunctions about vidyās, though) connected with (various) members (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to the particular śākhās of each Veda*

The topic incidentally taken up ended in the last Sutra. We now return to the proper matter under discussion. Notice these texts —“One should meditate on the syllable Om as the udgītha (*Chh* I 1 1) One should meditate on the five Sāmāns in the five world (*Chh* II 2 1) Uktha Uktha 1 1 c., Sāmān hymns) people often cry But the same is the Uktha, which is (also) the earth (*Aitareya Aranyaka* II 1 2 1) That world is indeed this fire which has been built (*Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* X 5 4 1) These scriptural injunctions are connected with various members of sacrificial acts such as the udgītha, etc. and are to be found in different śākhās of each Veda. Now a doubt arises, whether these injunctions about vidyās relate to the udgītha etc. as occurring in one particular śākhā or as occurring in all śākhās? The Sutra says, In each Veda these injunctions are not restricted to their particular śākhās only but apply to all the śākhās.

५३ । मन्त्रादिवक्षाविरोधः ।

३६ । 'वाचविरोधः यथा न एव एव विरोधः आम्हृत्य । मन्त्रादिवत् यथा मन्त्रावाक् कथवा । ज्ञाना च शास्त्रान्तरोत्पन्नानाम् अपि शास्त्रान्तरं उपसंगत इत्यने तदा च न अपि ।

56 *Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras etc*

“Or” (consider the subject in this way ) “No contradiction” need be feared “As in the case of mantras etc” We have seen that mantras, sacrificial acts, and their qualities taught in one sákhâ have to be taken over by other sákhás Similarly in the case of the vidyás

५७ । भूतः क्रतुवज्जगत्प्रत्ययः तथा हि दर्शयति ।

५७ । “प्राचीनशाल औपमन्यव” ( का ५।१।१ ) इति अस्याम् आख्यायिकाया व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च वैज्ञानरस्य उपासनं श्रूयते । अत्र संशयः,—किम् इह उभययः अपि उपासनं स्यात् व्यस्तस्य समस्तस्य च, उत समस्तस्य एव ? तत्र अभिधीयते, ‘भूतः’ पदाधीपचयात्वकस्य समस्तस्य वैज्ञानरीपासनस्य ‘ज्यायत्व’ प्राधान्यम् अस्मिन् वाक्ये विवक्षितं भवितुम् अर्हति । न अवयवोपासनानां प्रत्येकम् । ‘क्रतुवत्’ यथा क्रतुषु दर्श-पूर्णमास-प्रवृत्तिषु सामर्थ्येन साङ्गप्रधान-प्रयोग एव एकः विवक्ष्यते, न व्यस्तानाम् अपि प्रयोगः प्रयाजादीनां, न अपि एकदेशाङ्गयुक्तस्य प्रधानस्य, तद्वत् ।

57 (The texts declare) *the superiority* (of the aggregate) *as in the case of sacrifices For scripture shows this*

In the story beginning with “Práchinásála, the son of Upamanyu,” (*Chh V 1 1*) meditations on Vaisvânara both in parts and as a whole are enjoined. A question here arises, whether Vaisvânara should be meditated upon both in parts and as a whole, or as a whole only ? The Sûtra replies. The text seeks to declare “the superiority” of the “aggregate” *i e*, of the meditation on Vaisvânara as a whole constituted of several things, and not to enjoin each of the special meditations on the several parts of Vaisvanara. “As in the case of sacrifices” As in sacrifices, *e g.*, the Darsapûrnamásâ, the texts aim at enjoining

only a single thing viz., the entire sacrifice which consists of the main sacrificial action along with its parts but do not seek to enjoin in addition the performance of the several parts, such as the *prayajats* nor again do they seek to enjoin the performance of the chief action along with each single part so also here

### ५८ । नागा शब्दादिभेदात् ।

५८ । शब्दादिभेदोऽपि विद्या नागा भिन्ना भवितुम् अहति । शब्दान्भिदात् यतः शब्दादि भवति — 'वि' "उवासीत स जगु कुर्वति इति एवमादि । तथा शब्दादिभेदः ।

58 The vidyās may be various because textual words etc., differ amongst themselves

It is quite possible for the vidyās to be separate even when the object of cognition is one and the same. Because textual words etc. differ amongst themselves ; e the words of the Vedic texts often differ such as, 'He knows One should meditate One should form resolutions' etc There are also varieties of qualities

### ५९ । विदित्वोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ।

५९ । उपनिषदाणां 'विदित्व' वाक्यान्वयम् अनुष्ठानं भवितुम् अहति न समुच्चयः । विशिष्टफलत्वात् यतः साक्षात् फलम् उपान्यविषय-साक्षात्फलम् अविशिष्टम् अमितम् पश्येत् अ उपनिषदं साक्षात्फलं उपान्यविषयं द्वितीयम् अनर्थकम् । तथात् अविशिष्ट फलानां विद्यानाम् अन्वयसम् आदाय तत्पठः स्यात् यावत् उपान्यविषय-साक्षात्फलं तत्फलमिति इति ।



59' *Option* (amongst the various meditations enjoined, is allowed) , *because there is no distinction in the fruit*

Of the various meditations enjoined in the Vedic texts, it is meant that the seeker after Brahmanidyā may have option to choose one according to his liking and to perform it, and not that he is to perform them all cumulatively "Because there is no distinction in fruit" i.e., the fruit of all of them, without distinction is the direct vision of the object of meditation (the Lord) When the direct vision of the object of meditation has been attained through one meditation, a second one is unnecessary Hence, out of the different meditations which have one and the same fruit, the worshipper should select one, and stick to it, until by direct vision of the object of meditation he has attained success

६० । काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन् न वा पूर्वहेत्व-  
भावात् ।

६० । "स य एतमेव वायु दिशा वत्स वेद न पुनरोदं रोदिति" ( छा ३।१५।२ ) ।  
"स यो नास ब्रह्मेत्यपस्ते यावन्नास्मि, गतं तवास्तु कामचारी भवति" ( छा ७।१।५ ) इति  
एवमाद्या काम्या विद्या 'यथाकास' यथेच्छ समुच्चीयेरन् न वा, 'पूर्वहेत्वभावात्'  
पूर्वहेतो अविशिष्टफलत्वहेतो अभावात् ।

60 *But* (meditations) *aiming the fulfilment of some desire may or may not be cumulated, according to one's liking, because the reason stated in the preceding Sūtra is absent* (in their case)

He who thus knows Vāyu to be the young one of the quarters of the horn on his never to weep for his son (Chh III 13 2, He who meditates on Name as Brahman attains the power to reach at will all places to which Name reaches. (Chh VII 1 5)—and similar other texts constituting vidvā's whose aim is the fulfilment of worldly desires may or may not be cumulated by the worshipper at his will for the reason set forth in the preceding Sūtra, namely that the identity of fruits is absent in their case.

### ६१ । अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावे ।

६१ । अङ्गवर्तिमान् अङ्गवर्ति दावन् उतानि अन्ताः पुर्णवत्त्ववति । 'अङ्ग' उ अङ्गीकारिषु वि आदिताः प्रथमं ईश्वरवर्तिताः किं न समुचीयन् किं वा यथाकामं स्यात् इति मर्मयं यथाश्रयभावे इति अङ्ग पुञ्जवत् । यदा उवाच आ या. जीवात्मनः मन्त्रस्य प्रवर्ति, एवं प्रवर्तया अवि ।

61 (The cognitions connected) with members (of sacrificial acts are to be combined) as their sources

This and the three following sūtras represent the opinion of the Pārvaṇapaksha. Are those cognitions which rest on certain parts of sacrificial actions taught in the three Vedas to be combined or have we any option with regard to them ? To this question the reply of the Pārvaṇapaksha is, "As their sources," i. e. as the sources of those cognitions, viz. the stotras etc., are to be combined for the performance of the sacrifices, so are the cognitions, too to be combined.

## ६२ । शिष्टेऽपि ।

६२ । तथा 'शिष्टे' शासनात् विधानसाम्यात् विद्यानां यथाश्रयभाव उपपद्यते । यथा आश्रया स्तोत्रादयः त्रिषु वेदेषु शिष्यन्ते, एवम् आश्रिता अपि प्रत्यया । अज्ञाना तदाश्रयाणां च प्रत्ययानां न कश्चित् विशेष अस्ति, इत्यर्थः ।

62 Also because (the stotras etc, and the vidyās which have their source in them are equally) taught (in the Vedas)

Also because of the teaching, i e, equivalence of Vedic injunction, it is to be inferred that the vidyās are to be treated just like their sources Just as the sources, viz, the stotras etc, are taught in the three Vedas, so also are the cognitions that rest on them That is to say the members of the sacrificial act and the cognitions occurring therein are on exactly the same footing

## ६३ । समाहारात् ।

६३ । 'समाहारात्' अपि सर्ववेदीदित-विद्यासमुच्चय उपपद्यते । 'समाहार' निर्द्दोषकरणम् । उक्तं छान्दोग्ये, "होतृषदनाद्वैवाऽपि दुरुक्तीयम् अनुसमाहरति" । (१।५।५) । अस्यार्थः एक-साम-वेदीदितयोः प्रथमोक्तौथयो ऐक्यविज्ञान-माहात्म्यात् उद्गाता स्वकर्म्मणि उत्पन्नं चतुर्होतात् कर्म्मणः प्रतिसमादधाति । अत्र वेदान्तरोदितस्य प्रत्ययस्य वेदान्तरोदित पदार्थसम्बन्ध-सामान्यात् सर्ववेदीदित-प्रत्ययोपसंहारः सूचितः ।

63 The same conclusion follows from rectification.

The combination of the vidyās taught in all the Vedas follows also from the rectification of slips mentioned in this passage of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad "When he knows

the identity of the Pranava and the Udgîtha, he (i. e. the Udgâta) is able to rectify any error committed in his singing even from the seat of the Hotri (I 5 5) The passage means that such is the power of knowledge of the identity of the Pranava and the Udgîtha, that the Udgâta is able to set right any error he may have committed in his own functions by means of the functions pertaining to the Hotri. Now the relation between two *things* (the Pranava and the Udgîtha) mentioned in different Vedas is on the same footing as the relation between two *vidyâs* mentioned in different Vedas. This suggests the conclusion that the cognitions occurring in the different Vedas are also to be combined.

३४ । गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेः ।

३४ । अतः अथान्यत्र उदीवादेन सर्वोद्वादिना प्रदीपवचनेन सर्व सर्वश्रीः ।  
साधारणां श्रुत्यन्ते ततः आश्रयसद्वसावात् प्रत्ययसद्वसाव च उपपद्यते ।

64 *And because scripture declares that the subordinate elements of sacrifices are common to all performances*

Scriptural passages which direct the performance of sacrificial acts, and deal with all their members, declare that the Udgîtha and other subordinate elements of sacrifices are common to all performances. Hence as the sources go together we conclude that the vidyâs also go together.

३५ । न वा तत्प्रवृत्तमावाश्रुते ।

३५ । 'न वा इति पचन्त्यावयवम् । न यथाप्रवृत्तमाव आश्रितानाम् उपपत्तयः ।

भवितुम् 'अर्हति । कुत ?—'तत्सहभावाश्रुते' यत् विवेदविहितानाम् अक्षानां स्तोत्रादीनां सहभावश्च वक्तुं उपासनानां सहभावः न दृश्यते ।

65. (The meditations are *rather not* (to be combined, as scripture does not explicitly declare them going together)

The words "rather not" discard the Purvapaksha position. It is not reasonable to say that the treatment of the meditations is to be the same as that of their sources. Why so? "Because scripture does not declare it." Scripture indeed explicitly declares the going together of stotras and other members of sacrifices as enjoined in the three Vedas, but does *not* declare the going together of the meditations.

६६ ' दशनाच्च ।

६६ । दशंशति च श्रुतिः प्रत्ययानाम् असहभावः, "एवविद ह वै ब्रह्मा यज्ञं यजमानं सर्वाय ऋत्विजोभिरचति" ( ऋ ४।१७।१० ) इति । सर्वप्रत्ययोपसंहारे हि सर्वे सर्वविद इति, न विज्ञानवता ब्रह्मणा परिपाल्यत्वम् इतरथा सङ्कीर्तितम् । तस्मात् प्रयत्नात्मन् उपासनानां समुच्चयः विकल्पः वा इति ।

66 And because scripture shows (that the meditations do not go together)

Scripture also shows that the cognitions do not go together, e g, "A Brahma priest who knows this protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the priests" (*Chh* IV 17 10) If all the cognitions were combined, all the priests would know all of them, and the protection extended by a knowing Brahmá priest over others would not be mentioned. Hence the conclusion is that the meditations may be combined or omitted according to one's choice.

## ‘साधन-नाम-तृतीयाध्याये चतुर्थ पाद’—ज्ञानकभण्णो संवत्स

• •

१। पुरुषार्थोऽत आदादिति वादरायण ।

१। अय इदानीम् जीवनिवृत्तम् आत्मज्ञानं किम् अविचारितार्थं ज्ञानं एव  
अनुप्राप्नोति आधेयितुं ध्यतन् एव पुरुषार्थसाधनं भवति इति भीमसमान  
विद्वान् एव उपलभत पुरुषार्थं एतत् अद्यात् वेदादिब्रह्म आत्मज्ञानं तु  
तत्तन् पुरुषार्थं विधायति इति ‘वादायण’ नामक आचार्ये मन्वते । कुत ?  
‘अद्यात् एतत्’ ‘स यी ह वेदतत्परमं ब्रह्म वेदं ब्रह्मैव भवति ( मुण्ड ३।२।८ ) इति  
प्रवृत्तीयका स्मृतिः विद्यायाः वेदनायाः पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वं ग्राहयति ।

1 *The object of man's life is accomplished) through it (i.e knowledge of Self) Thus (declares) Bādarāyaṇa on the basis of scripture*

The question under discussion in the present section is whether the knowledge of Self taught in the Upanishads is merely an accessory to sacrifice entering into its performance through the instrumentality of a qualified performer or is it an independent means for accomplishing the highest end of man? The discussion begins with the statement of the Sūtrakāra's view Through it (i.e knowledge of Self) the highest end of man is accomplished Thus says the teacher Bādarāyaṇa. On what ground?—

“On the basis of scripture,” because the passage “Verily he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes Brahman in truth” (*Mund* III 2 9), and such other texts declare that knowledge alone is sufficient for the accomplishment of the highest end of man

## २ । शेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः ।

२ । पूर्वपक्ष (२-७) । कर्तृत्वेन आत्मन शेषत्वात् कर्मशेषत्वात्, कस्माद्भत्वात् तद्विज्ञानम् अपि विषयकारेण कर्मसम्बन्धि एव, इति अत तस्मिन् अवगतप्रयोजनं आत्मज्ञानं या फलश्रुतिः, सा अर्थवाद एव, ‘यथाऽन्येषु’ यथा अन्येषु द्रव्यसंस्कारकसमं “यस्य पर्याप्तं यो जुहर्भवति न स पापं श्लोके शृणोति” इति एवजातोयका फलश्रुतिः अर्थवादः, तद्वत् । ‘इति’ ‘जैमिनि’-नामक आचार्य्यं मन्यते ।

2 As (the Self is) a subordinate part (of the sacrificial action, Vedic statements about the fruits of the knowledge of the Self are *mere arthavādas*, as in other cases Thus Jaimini thinks

[The Pūrvapaksha 2-7] By virtue of its being the agent (in sacrifice) the self “participates in”, *i e* becomes a member of, the sacrificial action, hence the knowledge of the Self also, through the object of knowledge, is connected with such action, and consequently, as the purpose of such knowledge is already evident, the Vedic statements about the fruit of that knowledge are “merely arthavādas” *i e* minor statements about objects “As in other cases” This means that in other scriptural passages about materials, samskāras, and actions, the statements about fruits,

c g He whose sacrificial vessel is made of parnawood never hears any evil sloka and so on are mere arthavādas so also here "Thus Jaimini thinks

### ३ । आचारदर्शनात् ।

३ । अथ उद्दालकादीनां ब्रह्मविदां विद्यया सह आचारदर्शनात् आचारदर्शनं नानुष्ठानं नैव नानुष्ठानं पुनरुक्तमिति ।

3 And because scripture represents (Brahmavādins also as) performing sacrificial actions

In the scripture Janaka Uddālaka and others who know Brahman are represented as performing sacrificial actions along with the cultivation of the knowledge of the Self. Hence the conclusion is that the highest end of man cannot be fulfilled by mere knowledge.

### ४ । तच्छ्रुते ।

४ । "यत् एव विद्यया कर्तव्यं तद्व्या उपनिषदा तद्विद्यया शीर्षवत् भवति (वा १।१।१) इति च तच्छ्रुतिं विद्यायाः कथमवलम्बनात् न नैव नानुष्ठानं विद्यायाः प्रमाणमिति ।

4 And because scripture directly declares it

There is a passage viz. "When a man does something with knowledge, faith and Upanishad that becomes comparatively more powerful" (Chh 1 1 10) This passage directly declares that knowledge is a mere auxiliary to action. Hence knowledge alone cannot fulfil the highest end of man.



## ५। समन्वाग्भङ्गात् ।

५। “तं विद्याक्रमाणां समन्वाग्भङ्गे” ( ब्रह्म शास्त्र २ ) तं परलोकं व्रजन्तं विद्या-  
क्रमाणां समन्वाग्भङ्गे — इति विद्याक्रमाणां सादित्यदर्शनात् न स्वातन्त्र्या विद्याया ।

5 And because (a passage declares that knowledge and work) together follow (the departed spirit)

In Bri IV + 2 we have this passage “Him the person who departs this life), his knowledge and his work both follow” As knowledge and work thus go together, it follows that knowledge is not independent

## ६। तद्वती विधानात् ।

६। छान्दोग्यश्रुतौ (८।२५) तथा अन्यत्र च ‘तद्वत’ समस्त-वेदार्थविज्ञानवत् ।  
‘विधानात्’ कश्चिददेश-दर्शनात् न विज्ञानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण फलहेतुत्वम् ।

6 And because precepts (for the performance of sacrifices) are to be found in the scripture for one who possesses it

In (Chh VIII 15, and in other scriptural passages we find “precepts” for the performance of sacrificial actions given to “one who possesses it” i.e. a complete knowledge of the purport of the Vedas Hence, evidently, knowledge does not independently produce any fruit

## ७। नियमाच्च ।

७। “कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छत समा” ( ईशा २ ) इति एवञ्चा-  
तौयकात् ‘नियमात् च’ विद्याया कर्मशेषत्वम् ।

7 And *h* cause (*karma* has been definitely) *prescribed*

One should wish to live a hundred years here surely by performing duties (*Isopanishad* 2). From the fact that *karma* has been definitely prescribed here and in similar passages it is clear that *vidyā* is supplementary to *karma*.

८ । अधिकोपदेगात् तु वादराय ॥ स्वेवं दृष्टं नात् ।

८ । 'तु' मन्त्रात् एव विपरिवर्तितं । यत् उक्तं "अथवात् पुनराववात् इति तत् तत्र उपपद्यते । कस्मात् १—अधिकोपदेगात् यतः वेदान्तेषु अधिकस्य प्राप्तिनात् चामन्यं अर्थावतिष्ठं ब्रह्मण्यं उपदर्शय विद्यते । ततः "पुनराववात्" मन्त्रात् इति तत् वाद ॥ यद्यपि मतं तत् 'एवं' तथा एव अविवक्षितं तिष्ठति । तदर्थमनात् वेदान्त-अर्थविवक्षा ब्रह्मण्यं उपदर्शय मन्त्रात् ।

8 But as there is instruction (in the Vedānta) about the additional One (the Lord) *Bādarāyana's* view remains unaltered because scripture declares it

The word but sets aside the *Pārvaṇakṣa* view. The view set forth in *Sūtra* 2 which says that the fruits of *vidyā*s are mere *arthavadas* the self being a subordinate-part of the sacrifice cannot be maintained. Why so?

Because there is instruction in the Vedānta about an additional one over and above the embodied Self, i.e. because the Vedāntas teach not only about the self of individuals but also about the non-transmigrating *Īsvara*. Hence

*Bādarāyana's* view viz., that the object of man's life is accomplished through the knowledge of the Self (*Sūtra* 1)

“remains unaltered”, *i e*, uncontroverted “Because scripture declares it”, *i e*, because the Vedāntas teach about the Highest Lord, devoid of body

## ८ । तुल्यत्वं दर्शनम् ।

८ । यत् चक्रम् आचारदर्शनात् कर्मशेषत्व विद्याया, इति अत्र ब्रूम, ‘तुल्यम्’ आचारदर्शनम् अकर्मशेषत्वे अपि विद्याया । तथाहि श्रुतिः भवति, “एतच्च अ है तद्दिशाम आहुर्ऋषयः कावषेया किमर्था वयमध्येष्यामहे किमर्था वयं सस्यामहे । एतच्च अ वै तत् पूर्व विद्वांसोऽग्निहोत्रं न जुह्वामहे ।” “एतच्च वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणा पुनर्वेष्यायाश्च वित्तवेष्यायाश्च लोकावेष्यायाश्च व्युत्थायाश्च भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति” (बृह ३।५) इति एवञ्जातीयका ।

9 *Scripture represent (the same thing) equally* (in the contrary case)

In Sūtra 3 it was said that as scripture represents the performance of actions, therefore vidyā is supplementary to sacrifice. We say that scripture equally represents the performance of actions where vidyā is evidently not a supplement of the sacrifice. Compare scriptural passages like the following — “The *rishis* of the line of Kavasha, having attained this knowledge, said, “Why should we study the Vedas any longer ? Why should we perform sacrifices any more ? Indeed, when the ancient sages attained this knowledge, they ceased from performing the Agnihotra.” And, “The knowers of Brahman, when they have known this Self, rise above the desires for sons, wealth, and worlds, they then adopt the lives of mendicants” (Bṛ III 5)

## १० । असाध्यत्विकी ।

१० । “यत् एव विद्यया ऋणीति” इति एवा सुति न सामान्यिकी सम्प्रविद्या-  
विद्यया प्रकृतविद्याभिप्रायस्यात् । प्रकृता च तद्दीपविद्या ओमित्येतदप्यमुद्दीपमुपासीत”  
( वा १।१।१ ) इति च ।

10 (The word vidyā in the passage quoted is) *not used in a universal sense*

In Sūtra 4 the scriptural passage “When a man does something with knowledge etc.,” was quoted. But the word vidyā in that passage is not of universal application. It does not refer to *all* vidyā, as it is connected only with that vidyā which forms the subject matter there namely the Udgīthavidyā taught in the passage. The syllable Om is to be meditated upon as the udgītha. (Chh I 1 1)

## ११ । विभाग शतवत् ।

११ । यत् अपि उक्तं तं विद्यासम्पत्तौ समन्वयमिति इति एतत् तत्  
प्रसज्यते—विभागः अत्र द्रष्टव्यः । शतवत् यथा “शतमात्रा दीपताम्” इति उक्ते  
विमल दीपते, पञ्चाशत् एवमेव पञ्चाशत् अपरमेव, तद्वत् विद्या अत्र पुनरपि समन्वा भवे  
त्यत्र चतुर्मु इति ।

11 (There is the sense of) *distribution* (here) *as in the case of* (giving) *a hundred* (to two)

In Sūtra 5 it was said that “Knowledge and work both follow” the departed spirit. We say that there is the sense of distribution here, as in the case of a hundred.

When an order is given in such words as, "Give a 'hundred to these two," the hundred is distributed between the two, fifty being given to one, and fifty to the other. Similarly, the passage means that knowledge follows one person and works follow another.

### १२ । अध्ययनमात्रवतः ।

१२ । छान्दोग्ये "आचार्यकुलात् वेदमधीत्य" ( का ८।१।५।१ ) इति अथ अध्ययनमात्रस्य त्रयणात् अध्ययनमात्रवत एव कर्मविधि इति अर्थवत्त्वान्न ।

12 In the passage referred to the expression "for one who possesses the Veda" is to be taken in the sense of) "*for one who has merely read the Veda*"

In Sutra 6 the concluding passage of the *Chhândogya* Upanishad (VIII 15 1) is quoted. There, however, the text mentions 'the reading' of the Vedas only. Hence we conclude that the 'precept' given therein for the performance of sacrifices is meant for one who has merely read the Veda.

### १३ । नाविशेषात् ।

१३ । 'कुर्वन् एवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेत्' इति एवमादिषु नियमस्त्वेषु न विदुष इति विशेष अस्ति । अविशेषेण नियमविधातात् ।

13. (The mantra quoted) *does not go against us, because it is not specific*

The Mantra "One should wish to live here surely by



abandoned karma "of their own will," as we find in *Bṛ* IV 4 22 Hence also it follows that knowledge is not a mere supplement to action

### १६ । उपमदम् ।

१६ । अपि च विद्यामत्तयात् क्रिया-कारक-फलजनकस्य प्रसवस्य 'उपमदम्' विनाशम् आनन्ति "यत्र त्वय सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् तत् केन कं जिब्रेत्" (बृह २।४।१४ , ४।५।१५ ) इत्यादिना । तस्मात् अपि विद्याया स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

16 And (scripture also speaks of) the destruction (of the world and of all works by knowledge)

Further, scripture describes the "destruction" of the whole phenomenal world, of which actions, agents, and fruits of action are constituent elements, by the power of knowledge, in passages such as "But when for him everything has become the Self, how and whom can he then see, how and what can he then smell" ? (*Bṛ* II 4 14 IV 5 15,) etc This also proves that vidyā is independent of action

### १७ । जड्वरेतःसु च शब्दे हि ।

१७ । 'जड्वरेतःसु च' आश्रमेषु विद्या श्रूयते, न तु तत्र अग्निहोवादीनि वैदिकानि कर्माणि सन्ति । जड्वरेतस आश्रमा न श्रूयन्ते वेदे, इति चेत्, आह,—'हि' यत्र 'शब्दे' वेदे जड्वरेतस आश्रमा अवगम्यन्ते (छा २।१३।१ , ५।१०।१ , सु १।२।११ , बृह ४।४।१२ ) इत्येवमादौ । तस्मात् अपि विद्याया स्वातन्त्र्यम् ।

17 And (knowledge belongs) to those stages of life in

*which Brahmacharya is prescribed For (such stages are indicated) in scripture*

Further, *vidyā* is mentioned in connection with those stages of life in which Brahmacharya is the rule and in such stages of life Vedic works, such as Agnihotra etc., are not performed If it be objected that stages of life in which Brahmacharya is prescribed are not distinctly mentioned in the Vedas, we reply that such stages are sufficiently indicated in *Chh* II 23 1 *V* 10 1 *Mund* I 2 11 *Bri* IV 4 2' etc From this also follows the independence of knowledge

१८। परामर्शो जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि ।

१८। ऊहू रीतमां च म द' मभावाय "बरी धर्मभावा ( वा १११११ )  
इत्यादि यै इत्यादि उदाहरता ननु जमिनि प ममम् उदाहरमां एव जयते द्या  
नव वरीता विवायचमन १ जमन विवद १ 'च अपवदति हि अपि च मयवा  
सुति' च ममाम् अपवदति निवति — 'व' रदा वा एव दीवता वाग्निमुवाचपते ।"  
"आचार्य १ विव धनकाठव प्रमाणम् वा एवष्टेको ( तति ११११ ) परमाया ।

18 According to Jaimini there is mere mention (of the Brahmacharya stage of life in the scriptural passages) but there is an absence of injunction (in favour of such stages) On the contrary scripture forbids them

According to Jaimini the texts referred to by us as proving the existence of Brahmacharya stages of life (the first of which viz., *Chh* II 23 1 contains the words, There are three branches of the law') are "mere



mentions" of such stages because in them there is "an absence of injunction," i e, there are no words prescribing such stages of life "On the contrary, scripture forbids" such stages Direct scriptural statements are to be found which condemn the other (i e, the Brahmacharya) way of life e g, "He who lets the sacrificial fire be extinguished is a killer of the servants of the devas" "Having paid his honorarium to your preceptor (i e,, having returned home at the close of your studies, do not cut off the line of children (i e, do marry and bring up a family)" (*Taitti I 11*), etc

### ૧૯ । અનુષ્ઠેયં વાદરાયણઃ સામ્યશ્રુતેઃ ।

૧૯ । વાદરાયણ આશ્રમાન્તરસ્ય અનુષ્ઠેય મન્યતે । 'સામ્યશ્રુતે' યત ગાર્હસ્થ્યેન આશ્રમાન્તરસ્ય પરામર્શશ્રુતિ સમાના દૃશ્યતે, "વયો ધર્મસ્તન્વા" इत्याद्या । यथा इह श्रुत्यन्तर-विहित गार्हस्थ्यं पराश्रमम्, एवम् आश्रमान्तरम् अपि, इति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

19 (According to) *Bádarayana*, (the brahmacharya way of life, too), *is to be actually practised, because scripture places it on the same footing* (as the life of a householder)

According to *Bádaráyana*, the other stage of life, viz brahmacharya, is meant to be actually practised "Because scripture places it on the same footing" In that passage which begins with the words "There are three branches of the law", the brahmacharya way of life and the life of a householder are inculcated with equal force The reasonable conclusion is that as the life of a house-holder enjoined in other passages, is mentioned here, so is the other stage of life, brahmacharya.

२० । विधिवं धारयत् ।

[illegible]

20 An alternative interpretation is that the passage itself is meant to be *injunctory* as in the case of the carrying (of fire wood)

The passage under discussion is this — "There are three branches of the law. The first consists of sacrifices, study, and gifts. The second is the practice of austerities. The third consists of dwelling in the house of the preceptor and there living a life of celibacy to the end of one's days, continually mortifying the body. All of these lead to the world of the blessed. But he who is established in Brahman attains immortality" (*Chh* II 23 1). In the present *Sūtra* Bādarāyana says that an alternative interpretation of this passage is that it contains a direct injunction in favour of the other (celibate) way of life and not a mere mention of it. Now it may be said that the assumption

tion that brahmacharya is a matter for *injunction* here would go against the unity of the sense of the whole passage. Unity of sense demands here that the three branches of the law which have the worlds of the blessed for their result should be contrasted with establishment in Brahman which has immortality for its result. We admit that this is true. But yet in the present discussion we must set aside the consideration of the unity of sense of the passage, and give it our consideration only as containing an injunction (for celibacy). Why so? Because celibacy is mentioned in it for the only time, and no other text is met with enjoining it. This is similar to the case of the carrying of fire-wood. [In the Mahá-pitrí-yajna] the text says, "He should approach, carrying the fire-wood below (the sacrificial spoon containing the offering), for above he carries it for the gods." Now, in this passage, the unity of sense is preserved if we consider it as only mentioning the carrying of the fire wood below. But yet we have to take it as enjoining also the carrying of the fire-wood above, because this particular injunction is not to be met with elsewhere. This is explained in the Púrva-mímámsá, in the Chapter dealing with complements, in the Súra "But it is an injunction in the case of the carrying (of fire-wood), because it is not enjoined anywhere else." For a similar reason we hold that the present passage, which mentions the different stages of life, is also an injunctory passage.

२१ । स्मृतिभाष्यमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।

२१ । "स एष रसाना रसतप्तः परम. पराङ्गीर्षोऽमी यदुक्तीथः" ( छा १।१।३ )

इति एवमतीत्यथाः सुतय इति उद्गीथानि-मुन्यथा आसीदित् । उपासनाविषया  
 इति अग्निं संसृष्टे मुन्यथा इति पूर्ववत् ।, आसीं सुतीनां प्रवीजनम् अतिमात्रम्  
 एव । अथात् ?—उपासनात् उद्गीथादीनि अर्थाद्वाचि उपादाय तत्रेवात् । यथा  
 इत्येव इति चोक्तं उद्गीथदिग्दृष्टं कर्म सार्वादि आहवनीय इत्याद्या उद्गीथिमुन्यथा,  
 इति चित् । अपूर्वत्वात् आसीं सुतीनाम् अपूर्वत्वात्—आसीं विध्ययतायां हि  
 अपूर्वत्वात् विहितं भवति, मुन्ययतायां तु पातयत्यम् एव स्यात् ।

21 *If it be contended (that passages like Chh I 1 3 are) merely laudatory ones on account of the references (they contain to members of sacrifices) we say No Because (the instructions are) not met with elsewhere*

‘The udgītha described here is the quintessence of all essences, the highest having the highest abode, the eighth, (Chh I 1 3) Are passages like this merely meant for the glorification of the udgītha etc. or are they also meant to enjoin meditations? The Pūrvapaksha says that they are for glorification the only object of such passages being to praise the udgītha etc. ‘Why so? On account of the references, & c., because members of sacrificial actions, such as the udgītha etc., are referred to in them. Just as the texts ‘This earth is the sacrificial spoon’ ‘The sun is the tortoise,’ ‘The heavens are the Āhavanīya (fire) etc., are meant to glorify members of sacrificial actions, such as the spoon etc. so also here. To this the Sātrakarṇ replies,—‘This does not follow Because these instructions are not met with anywhere else. The fact that they are not met with elsewhere becomes significant only if they are taken to be injunctions for meditations but that fact becomes inexplicable if the passages are taken to be laudatory

## २२ । भावशब्दाच्च ।

२२ । “उद्गीथमुपासीत”, “सामीपासीत” “अहमुक्तमस्मीति विद्यात्” इत्यादयश्च विस्पष्टा विशिष्टाः श्रूयन्ते, ते च स्तुतिभावप्रयोजनताया व्याहृत्यैरन् । ‘भावशब्दात्’ ‘उपासीत’ इत्यादौ भावनासामान्यवाचि-शब्दश्चवशात् इति आचार्य्य कालीवरः ।

22 And also on account of scriptural expressions all of which have the identical sense of meditation

Further, scripture contains clearly injunctive expressions, e g, “One should meditate on the Udgitha”, “One should meditate on the Sāman”, “One should reflect, I am Uktha ” These would be devoid of meaning if the passages were merely laudatory Āchārya Kālīvara explains ‘bhavasabdtāt’ thus As we find expressions in scripture having the common meaning of ‘meditate’ (*upāsīta*)

## २३ । पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।

२३ । “अथ ह याज्ञवल्क्यस्य हे भार्य्ये वभूवतु मैत्रेयी च कात्यायनी च” (तृ ४।५ ) इति एवमादिषु वेदान्तपठितेषु व्याख्यानेषु संशय किम् इमानि ‘पारिप्लवार्था’ व्याख्यायिका-पाठात्मका-अश्वमेधयज्ञाङ्ग-प्रयोजनानि आहोस्वित् सन्निहित-विद्याप्रतिपत्त्यर्थानि ? ‘पारिप्लवार्था’ इमा व्याख्यानश्रुतय ‘इति चेत् न’ । ‘विशेषितत्वात्’ यतः पारिप्लवार्थानि व्याख्यानानि “पारिप्लवमाचचीत” इति प्रकृत्य विशिष्यन्ते ।

23 If it be said (that Upanishadic stories too, like other stories, are) for *pāriplava-recitations*, we say, No Because (*pāriplava*-stories are always) *specified as such*

Several stories are to be found in the Upanishads, e g ,

the one beginning with the words 'Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī' (*Bṛ* IV 5) Here a question arises, Are these stories meant to serve the purposes of the Pāriplava, (i. e. the recitation of tales during stated intervals during the Asvamedha sacrifice)? Or are they meant to introduce the vidyās that stand in proximity to them? If it be said that these scriptural tales are for the purposes of Pāriplava, we say "No. Because certain stories are specified for that purpose, i. e., stories meant to be read at the Pāriplava are specified in the scriptures by the introductory words. Here this pāriplava is to be recited

२४ । तथा चैकवाक्यतोपपन्नात् ।

२४ । 'तथा च' एववाक्यता उपपन्नात् । 'तथा च' असति च पारिवर्त्येण वाक्यानां तेषां सन्निहितानि विद्यानि एववाक्यता एकार्थता एव दृश्यते । उपपन्नात् प्रतीयन-प्रतिपत्ति-सौकर्यं प्रसूति-सम्बन्धश्चेन्नानु ।

24 *In the above circumstances (there is) unity of subject-matter (with the vidyās) because they are connected*

In such circumstances i. e., the stories not being for the purpose of pāriplava, there is unity of theme between the stories and the vidyās proximate to them. 'Because they (the stories) are connected with the vidyās by way of making them more palatable, and rendering their comprehension easier

૨૫ । અત એવ ચાગ્નીશ્વનાદ્યનપેચા ।

૨૫ । ‘અત એવ ચ’ વિદ્યાયા’ પુરુષાર્થહેતુભાત્ ( સૂ ૩।૪।૧ ) ‘અગ્નિ-ઇન્દ્રનાદિ-અનપેચા’ પુરુષાર્થસિદ્ધૌ અગ્નિ-ઇન્દ્રનાદીના તત્સાધ્ય-આત્મકર્મણામ્ ‘અનપેચા’ નિમિત્તતાભાવ ।

25 For these reasons, fire, fuel, etc , are unnecessary

“For these reasons” (adduced in support of the first Sūtra, viz , that man’s object of life is accomplished through knowledge), “fire, fuel, etc , are unnecessary,” i e , for the accomplishment of man’s object of life there is no necessity for fire, fuel etc , and the various sacrificial actions to be performed with them, as enjoined for the different āsramas

૨૬ । સર્વોપેચા ચ યજ્ઞાદિશ્રુતેરશ્વવત્ ।

૨૬ । યથાપિ ઉત્પન્ના વિદ્યા ફલસિદ્ધિં પ્રતિ ન આત્મકર્મ અપેચતે, તથાપિ વિદ્યોત્પત્તૌ ‘સર્વોપેચા’ સર્વોપામ્ આત્મકર્મણામ્ અપેચા નિમિત્તતા અસ્તિ । ‘યજ્ઞાદિશ્રુતે.’ યત “તસ્યેત વેદાનુવચનેન બ્રાહ્મણા વિવિદિધન્તિ યજ્ઞેન દાનેન તપસા-ઽનાશ્ચકેન” ( ઋહ ૪।૪।૨૨ ) કત્યાદિશ્રુતિ યજ્ઞાદીના વિદ્યાસાધનભાવ દર્શયતિ । ‘અશ્વવત્’ યથા યોગ્યતાવશેન અશ્વ ન લાઙ્ગલાકર્ષણે યુગ્યતે, રથચર્યાયા તુ યુગ્યતે, એવમ્ આત્મકર્મણિ વિદ્યાયા ફલસિદ્ધૌ ન અપેચ્યન્તે, ઉત્પત્તૌ તુ અપેચ્યન્તે ક્ષતિ ।

26 But (knowledge) stands in need of all (actions), because scripture mentions sacrifices etc as in the case of the horse

Though knowledge, once it is achieved, does not require, for the accomplishment of its fruit, the assistance of the sacrificial actions to be performed in the various

āśramas, yet for the rise of knowledge there is need of all —of actions of the various āśramas : e., the actions stand to knowledge as its means. Because scripture mentions sacrifices etc. i.e., because sacrifices etc. are described in the scriptures as ways to knowledge in such passages as Brāhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifices by gifts, by penance, by fasting (Br IV 4 22.) 'As in the case of the horse. The special aptitude of the horse is such that he is suited to draw not the plough but the chariot similarly the special utility of the āśrama actions is such that knowledge needs them not for its fruition but for its origination

२६। श्रमदुःसाध्युपेतं स्यात् तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तद्वत्तया  
तेषामवस्थागुहेयत्वात् ।

२७। यदि कश्चित् सञ्चेत,—“न यथादीनां विद्यासाधनमात्रं ज्ञाप्य, विधि  
अभावत् । तथापि श्रमदुःसाध्युपेतं स्यात् विद्यार्थे । ” तथादिर्बन्धनात्  
( उ ४।३।१२ ) इत्यादिषु तद्विधे विद्यासाधनत्वेन श्रमदुःसाध्यतां विधानात् तद्वत्तया  
“तदुपकारकत्वेन च तेषाम् अत्र ग्राह्यत्वात् तेषां विद्यासमागता सिद्धा ।

27 (If it be objected that sacrifices are not directly enjoined as means to knowledge, we reply) *Nevertheless* (the seeker after knowledge) *has to be possessed of calmness of mind subjugation of the senses etc .As these have been enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge it is obligatory to achieve them*

Here some one may object thus —The sacrifices etc. conceived by us to be the means to knowledge, cannot



reasonably be held to be such, because they are not directly enjoined as means to knowledge. We reply - "Nevertheless, the seeker after knowledge has to be possessed of calmness of mind, subjugation of the senses etc. And as these have been distinctly enjoined" as means to knowledge in the passage "Therefore he who knows this, having become calm", etc (*Bri* IV 4 23), and "as these are helpful" to the acquisition of knowledge, "it is obligatory to achieve them" They are therefore proved to be the means to knowledge.

## २८ । सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणाल्यये तद्दर्शनात् ।

२८ । छन्दोगाणां प्राणसंवादे "न ह एवविदि किञ्चनानन्नं भवति" (छा ५।१।२) इति । सर्वम् अस्य अदनीयम् एव भवति इत्यर्थः । न इदं सर्वस्य अन्नस्य अनुज्ञानं शमादिवत् विद्यायां विधीयते, परं तु 'प्राणाल्यये' परस्याम् आपदि 'सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च' सर्वस्य अन्नस्य अनुमतिश्च—सर्वम् अन्नम् अदनीयत्वेन अभ्यनुशयते । 'तद्दर्शनात्' तयाहि अति चान्नायणस्य ऋषेः कटायास्य अवस्थायास्य प्रवृत्तिं दर्शयति छान्दोग्ये (१।१०) ।

28 *Permission to take all kinds of food (given in Chh V 12 is meant only) for a state of danger to life, as shown in scripture*

The following passage is found in the Colloquy of the Prânas of the Chhandogas "To him who knows this there is nothing which is not eatable", (*Chh* V 12), which means that anything may be taken by him. Now this permission to partake of any food whatsoever is not to be understood as an injunction of an auxiliary to-

knowledge like calmness of mind etc. But only in a state of danger to life in case of the greatest difficulty are foods of all kinds permitted to be taken. Because scripture shows this viz. in the *Chhândogya* Upanishad (I 10) where it is related that the Rishi Châktrâyana, when in great straits proceeded to take unclean food.

### २८ । अवाधाय ।

१८ । आत्मनो बलवान् भक्षयिष्यन् । एवं च कति चान्ये पक्षे भक्षयिष्यन् भक्षयिष्यन् । (वा ७१६/१) इति एवमादि भक्षयिष्यन् विना आत्मन् बलवान् भक्षयिष्यन् ।

29 And because thus (only do scriptural injunctions) remain uncontradicted

This (interpretation of the permission to take every kind of food) follows also because there must be non contradiction of scriptural injunction. Only thus can the various scriptural injunctions which discriminate between lawful and unlawful food such as the passage "When the food is pure the whole nature is pure when the whole nature is pure memory is steady" (*Chh* VII 26 2) etc. remain uncontradicted

### ३० । अपि च कार्यते ।

३ । अपि च आपदि अवाधाय च अपि कार्यते विदुषः अपि विदुषः च अपि विदुषः, यथा,

जीवितायवमापक्षे दीक्षितमिति यतस्तत ।

विध्यते न तु पापिनः पश्यन्मित्राश्च ।

30. *The Smṛiti also says so.*

The *Smṛiti* also states that in times of peril all sorts of food may be taken, both by the enlightened and by the unenlightened, e. g. "He who, when in danger of life, eats food from anywhere and everywhere, is no more stained by sin than the lotus-leaf is affected by water "

३१ । शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ।

३१ । अनन्नस्य प्रतिषेधका 'शब्द' श्रुतिः 'च' अस्ति, 'अकामकारे' स्वेच्छानिवृत्ति-प्रयोजने । यथा, कठानां संहितायां श्रूयते,—“तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः सुरा न पिवेत्” इति । सोऽपि “न ह वा एवविदि” इत्यस्य अर्थवादत्वात् उपपन्नतरं भवति । ‘अतः’ एव-ज्ञातीयका अर्थवादा न विधेयः, इति ।

31. *Further, there is a scriptural text precluding option Hence* (the special permission given in sūtra 28 is not a general injunction)

“There is, further, a scriptural text” against the taking of unlawful food, “which precludes option,” i. e. which seeks to prevent action according to one’s liking in such matters, viz, the passage “Therefore a Brāhmana should not drink spirits,” found in the Samhitā of the Kathas. This text of general prohibition can be maintained with cogency only if we take the passage “To him who knows this” etc (of Sūtra 28) as an amplification, i. e. as a special provision for a particular case. “Hence” such permissions are mere amplifications, not injunctions.

३२ । विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकार्त्तापि ।

३२ । आश्रमकार्त्तं वागश्रमप्रतिज्ञां कुरुति इत्यादिना 'विहितत्वात्' अमुमुचो 'अपि' शक्यम् ।

32. *Being enjoined the works pertaining to the different Āśramas (are to be performed*

Being enjoined by texts such as "As long as he lives, he should perform the Agnihotra" the works pertaining to the different Āśramas are to be performed even by those who do not seek liberation.

३३ । सङ्कारित्वेन च ।

३३ । सङ्कारित्वेन कवेच 'त' एव शक्यम् विद्याश्रमसं विद्वत् ।

33 *And also because* works have been mentioned in the scriptures as) *co operating* (with the study of the Vedas)

Because works have been mentioned (in Br. IV 4.22.) *vide* Sātra 26) as co-operating with the study of the Vedas, they are proved to be the means of knowledge.

३४ । सर्वथापि त एवोभयसिद्धात् ।

३४ । सर्वथा अपि आश्रमकार्त्तस्य विद्यासङ्कारित्वस्य च 'त' एव 'अपि' शोभाय वक्ष्यी अमुमुचः । समसिद्धात् सुविशिष्टात् श्रुतिविष्टात् च ।

34 *In all cases the same* (duties are incumbent) *because directed bothwise*

“In all cases” i. e. whether viewed as duties pertaining to áśramas, or as auxiliaries to knowledge, “the same” that is the Agnihotra and such other (ceremonial) duties have to be performed, “because directed bothwise” i. e. enjoined both in the Śruti and in the Smṛiti

३५ । अनभिभवञ्च दर्शयति ।

३५ । ब्रह्मचर्यादि-साधनसम्पन्नस्य रागादिभिः क्लेशैः ‘अनभिभवम्’ अपराभवम् अविकल्पम् इति यावत् च दर्शयति श्रुतिः, “एष छात्रा न नश्यति यं ब्रह्मचर्येणागु-  
विन्दते” (छा ८।३।३) इत्यादिना । तस्मात् यज्ञादीनि आश्रमकर्माणि च विद्या-  
सहकारिणि च भवन्ति इति स्थितम् ।

35 *Scripture also declares* (that those who perform sacrifices, and consequently have to practise brahmacharya, etc.,) *are not overpowered* (by passions)

Scripture also declares that one who has become proficient in brahmacharya and similar sādhanas is not overpowered by such afflictions as the passions etc., e. g. in the passage, “The Self which he discerns through brahmacharya is never lost sight of” (*Chh VIII 5 3*) This establishes the conclusion that sacrifices etc. are not only duties incumbent on the áśramas, but also auxiliaries to knowledge

३६ । अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।

३६ । ‘अन्तरा च अपि तु’ अनाश्रमित्वेन अन्तराले वर्तमान अपि विद्यायाम् अधिष्ठितम् । कुत ? ‘तद्दृष्टे’ यत् रैका-वाचकवी-प्रकृतीनाम् एवम्भूतानाम् अपि ब्रह्मविष्य श्रुतौ दृश्यते । (छा ४।१-३, बृह ३।६, ८) ।

36. *But even a person standing outside (the āsramas is entitled to knowledge) because scripture declares this*

But even a person who not belonging to any āsrama, stands without as it were, is entitled to knowledge Why so? Because scripture declares this scripture describes that even persons like Raikva Vāchaknavi etc., attained the knowledge of Brahman (Chh IV 13 Brs III 68.)

३७। अपि च अर्ह्यते ।

३७। संवर्त-प्रवर्तीनां च नम्रार्थादिभ्योऽतु अगपेचित-आत्मसम्भवात् अपि अर्ह्यते इतिहासः ।

37 *Smritis also says so*

It is also narrated in (traditional) history that Samvarta and others, who by going naked etc. showed their disregard for the duties prescribed for the āsramas, nevertheless became great yogins.

३८। विशेषानुपपद्य ।

३८। निर्विषे जप-उपवास-दिवापचन-प्रवृत्तिभिः पथविम्व 'च' विधाया, अनुपपद्य उदयः सम्भवति ।

38. *And the acquisition (of knowledge is also possible for persons outside āsramas) through special acts*

And the acquisition of knowledge is also possible

for persons outside âsramas "through such special acts" of devotion as repeating prayers, fasting, the worship of deities etc

### ३८ । अतस्त्वितरज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च ।

३८ । 'अत तु' अन्तरालवर्तित्वात् तु 'इतरत्' आश्रमवर्तित्वम् 'न्याय' श्रेष्ठम् विद्यासाधनम् । 'लिङ्गात् च' स्मृतिलिङ्गात् स्मृतिलिङ्गात् च । स्मृतिलिङ्गम् "तेनैति ब्रह्मवित् पुण्यकृत् तैजसश्च" ( बृह ४।४।८ ) इति । "अनाश्रमी न तिष्ठेत् दिनमेकमपि द्विज । सवत्सरमनाश्रमी स्थित्वा कृच्छ्रमेकश्चरेत्" इति च स्मृतिलिङ्गम् ।

39 *But the other state (i. e., belonging to some âsrama) is better than this, on account of indications (in Sruti and Smriti)*

But the other state, i. e., belonging to an âsrama, is a better means to knowledge than this (remaining outside the âsramas), on account of indications in *Sruti* and *Smriti*. The *Sruti*-indication is this, "By that path goes one who has known Brahman, who has performed meritorious deeds (as prescribed for the âsrama), and who has attained splendour" (*Bri* IV 4 9) The *Smriti*-indication is, "A man of the twice-born classes should not remain for a single day outside the âsramas. If he does so for a year, he must undergo an expiation "

४० । तद्भूतस्य तु नातङ्गावो जैमिनेरपि नियमात् तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ।

४० । 'तद्भूतस्य तु' प्राप्त-ज- रेतोभावस्य तु 'न अतङ्गाव' न तत् प्रच्युतिः स्यात् ?

नियमावद्रूपाभावेऽपि, नियमात् अतद्रूपत्वं समावात् च । तथा हि चत्वनमात्मनम्  
 च चार्थकृषिः प्रसादयन् इति ( ब्रा १।१।११ ) “अरश्चम् इत्यादिति पदं तृती न  
 पुनरिष्टान्तिव्यपनिबद्ध इति नियमः । तथा च ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही भवेत्  
 ब्रह्मचर्योद्दिष्टं भवति इति च एवमादौलि आरीकृपायि वचांसि उपपन्नान्ते, न एव  
 प्रपन्नोक्तपायि इति अतद्रूपः । न च एवमाचारः, मिष्टा विद्यन्ते इति समाप्त  
 जैमिनेरपि इति ‘अपि’शब्देन कैमिनि वादपययन्ती चम सभ्रविपत्तिं याति,  
 प्रतिपत्ति-वार्त्ताय ।

40 *For one who has attained that (i e the brahma charya stage,) there is no becoming otherwise (i e descending to a lower stage) on account of restrictive regulations want (of instruction) of that nature and non-existence (of such custom This is the opinion) of Jaimini also*

For one who has once attained the stage of brahma charya, becoming otherwise, i e., a descent to a lower stage, is not proper. Why so? On account of (a) restrictive regulations, b) want of any instruction about such descent to a lower āsrama, and (c) absence of the sanction of good custom. The restrictive regulations are contained in such texts as mortifying the body in the house of the preceptor to the end of one's days (Chh II 23 1) and He should go to the forest in other words, he is not to return from there. This is the Upanishad. Again we find texts teaching the ascent to higher āsramas, such as, Having gone through the brahmacharya āsrama, one should be a house holder. One may however enter the wandering stage even from that of the householder. But we never meet with texts teaching the reverse order



Further, among the good customs prevailing, there are none such "This is the opinion of Jaimini also" The word "also" here affirms the agreement of Jaimini and Bādarāyana in this view, thus strengthening further the conclusion here set forth

### ४१ । न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात् तदयोगात् ।

४१ । यदि नैष्ठिक ब्रह्मचारी प्रमादात् अवकीर्त्येत, किं तस्य "ब्रह्मचारी अवकीर्णं नैर्ऋतं गर्हभक्ष्यमेत" इति एतत् प्रायश्चित्तं स्यात्, उत न ? 'न' इति उच्यते । 'अधिकारिकम् अपि' यत् अपि अधिकारलक्षणं निर्णीतं प्रायश्चित्तं तत् अपि न नैष्ठिकस्य भवितुम् अर्हति । 'पतनानुमानात् तत् तदयोगात्' यतः स्मृतौ नैष्ठिकस्य पतनकथनात् तस्य भावः प्रतिपद्यते, यथा

आरुढो नैष्ठिकः धर्मं यस्तु प्रच्यवते पुनः ।

प्रायश्चित्तं न पश्यामि येन युज्येत स आत्महा ॥

41 *The expiation (provided in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) in the Chapter on Adhikāra (for breaking the vow of chastity) cannot be (claimed by a brahmachārin for life), because it does not apply (to his case, which is a 'fall' according to Smṛiti).*

The question mooted in this Sūtra is this. There is an expiation prescribed (for breaking the vow of chastity) in this text, "A brahmachārin who has broken his vow shall sacrifice an ass to Nirriti" Now, if one who has adopted the vow of brahmacharya *for life* breaks that vow through heedlessness, is he also entitled to expiate himself by that sacrifice, or not ? The Sūtra says, No. Though an expiation has been prescribed in the Pūrva

Mīmāṃsa in the Chapter on Adhikāra, it is not meant for a brahmachārin for life. Why so? Because it does not apply to his case which Smṛiti views as a fall. The fall from chastity of a brahmachārin who had taken a life long vow has been dealt with in the Smṛiti in the following text which applies to the case under consideration — For one who has destroyed his soul by lapsing again from the duties of a Naishtika Brahmachārin which he once undertook I see no expiation that may make him clean again.

४२ । उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमग्नयत् तदुक्तम् ।

४१ । अतितु एके आचार्यः महिषम् द्रव्यवैद्युतिम् उपपूर्वम् उपपदं पूर्वम् यम् तत् पातकम् उपपातकं मन्वन्ते, न तु महापातकम् इत्यम् । यथा ते तस्य साधम् प्रत्यभिगमिष्यम् इच्छन्ति । अग्नयत् यथा ब्रह्मचारिणः भवमाध्यामिने नतन्मोघं पुनः संस्मरः च, एवम् इति । तदुक्तम् तत् उक्तं पूर्वमीमांसकानाम् अपि ।

42. On the other hand certain teachers (hold that such lapse is only) an *upā pātaka* (a minor sin and that expiation for it) exists as in the case of eating. This has been explained (in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa)

On the other hand certain teachers hold that a lapse from chastity of a brahmachārin for life is only an *upā pātaka*, (a minor sin) and not a *mahā pātaka*, (a deadly sin). Hence they claim that expiation for this sin exists. As in the case of eating just as, when there happens a breach of a brahmachārin's vow by the taking of honey or meat, there may be a purification again so also here. Thus has been explained in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā

### ४३ । वहिस्तूमयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।

४३ । यदि ऊर्ध्वरेतसा स्वाग्रमेव ग्रथवन महापातक, यदि वा उपपातकम्, 'उभयथा अपि' शिष्टे ते वहि कर्त्तव्या "आहूयतित विप्र मण्डलाच्च विनिश्चतम् । उद्वह ह्यभिदष्ट च स्पृष्टा चान्द्रायण चरेत्" इति 'स्मृते', शिष्टानाम् 'आचारात् च' । न हि यज्ञाध्ययनविवाहादीनि तै. सह आचरन्ति शिष्टा ।

43 *But in either case* (such transgressors must be kept) *outside* (the pale of good society), *because both smṛiti and good custom demand it*

Whether a lapse from the vow of chastity of brahmachārins for life be viewed as a mahāpātaka (a major sin) or as an upa-pātaka (a minor sin) in either case, such transgressors must be kept outside the pale of good society. For Smṛiti dictates, "If one touches a Brahmana who has fallen from his vow of brahmacharya, or a man who has been expelled from his order, or a hanged man, or a man whose body is being eaten by worms, he must undergo the Chundrīyana penance" And also "because of good usage", *i e*, because good men do not sacrifice with them, study with them or enter into matrimonial relations with them

### ४४ । स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ।

४४ । यज्ञार्हैषु उपासनेषु 'स्वामिन' यजमानस्य एव कर्त्तृत्वम् 'इति' 'आत्रेय' आचार्य मन्यते । 'फलश्रुते' यत "वर्षति ह्यग्निं वर्षयते एतदेव ९ विधान् दृष्टौ पञ्चविध सामाधान्तं" ( का २।३।२ ) इति उपासनाफल उपासनानां कर्त्तृणि एव त्रयते ।

44 (The meditations constituting the minor elements of the sacrifice are to be performed) *by the master of the sacrifice himself* Such is the opinion of Ātreya because of the scriptural statements about the fruit

The meditations which constitute the subordinate elements of sacrifices are to be performed by the master of the sacrifice (i.e. by the yajamāna) Such is the opinion of the teacher Ātreya because of the scriptural declaration about the fruit i.e. because the fruits of the meditations accrue to the person meditating as declared in the scripture in texts such as Rain falls for him and he too makes the rain fall for others who knowing thus meditates on the fivefold Sāman in the rain (Chh II 3 2)

४५ । आर्त्विष्यमित्यौकुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिकीयते ।

४५ । यमाहम् उपासतम् आशिष्यम् अग्निम्भि एव कथञ्चम् 'इति' दौहलोमि' आचार्यं सञ्चरे, हि यत तच्च माहाय कर्त्तव्यं अग्निं च यममानेन परिकीयते ।

45 According to Audulomi (they are to be performed) *by the priest* because he is paid for all this work

The teacher Audulomi however thinks that the meditations which are parts of the sacrifice are to be performed by the priest because the priest is paid by the yajamāna for the whole sacrifice including the subordinate parts.

## ४६ । श्रुतेऽथ ।

४६ । ‘श्रुते’ श्रुतिप्रमाणात् ‘च’ यजामात्रीपासनानां ऋत्विक्कर्मत्वसिद्धिः । यथा “यां वै काञ्चन यज्ञं ऋत्विज आग्निपमाशासत इति यजमानायैव तामाशासत इति होवाच” इति ( शतपथब्राह्मण १।३।१।२६ ), “तस्मादु ह्येवमुक्ताता वृथात् क ते काममागाथानि” ( छा १।७।८ ) ।

## 46 And also because scripture declares that

Scriptural statements also prove that the meditations which form parts of sacrifices are to be performed by the priests “Whatever blessings the priests pray for at the sacrifice, they pray in the interests of the yajamāna Thus declared he” (*Satapatha Brahmana* I 3 1 26) “An udgātri who knows thus may, therefore, say to the yajamana, ‘What desire of yours should I accomplish by my singing?’” (*Chh* 1 7 8)

## ४७ । सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् ।

४७ । ब्रह्मदारण्यके श्रूयते,—“तस्माद् ब्राह्मणं पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्यं बाल्येन तिष्ठति बाल्यञ्च पाण्डित्यञ्च निर्विद्याऽयं मुनिर्मौनञ्च मौनञ्च निर्विद्याऽयं ब्राह्मणः” (बृह ३।५।१) । अत्र संशयः,—मौनं विधीयते न वा इति ? सिद्धान्तः, ‘सहकार्यन्तरविधि’ अन्यत् एतत् विद्यासहकारि इति मौनस्य विधि एव अत्र अवगन्तव्यः । इदं च मौनं बाल्य-पाण्डित्यपेक्षया “तृतीयं” ज्ञानातिशयरूपं विधीयते । ‘तद्वत्’ विद्यावत् एव सत्यास्मिन् मौनं विधीयते । ननु, सति विद्यावत्त्वे प्राप्नोति एव तत्र विद्यातिशयः, किं मौनविधिना ? इति अत्र आहुः,—“पक्षेण” यस्मिन् पक्षे भेददर्शनप्रावल्यात् विद्यातिशयः न प्राप्नोति, तस्मिन् एव विधिः, इति । ‘विध्यादिवत्’ यथा “दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत” इति एवज्जातीयके विध्यादौ सहकारित्वेन अन्याधानादिकम् अज्ञातं पूर्व्वमौमासायां विधीयते, एवम् अविधिप्रधाने अपि अस्मिन् विद्यावाक्ये मौनविधिः इत्यर्थः ।

(Of the three states mentioned in ) (Bri III 5 1) the third (viz. muniship meditative silence) is enjoined as another co operating factor (towards knowledge) for (the sanyāsin) possessed of that (i e., knowledge) in case (he is not already perfect in knowledge) As in the case of injunctions etc

In this Sūtra the following text of the *Bṛhaddānyaka* will be discussed — Therefore a Brāhmaṇa, having renounced learning should desire to attain a child like state afterwards having renounced both childlikeness and learning he [becomes] a muni and then having renounced both the states of muniship and non muniship he [becomes] a Brāhmaṇa (III 5 1) At the outset (as there is no verb in the text to agree with the word muni) a doubt arises whether the state of a muni is enjoined here or not The view adopted by the Sutrakāra is as follows We are to understand that this text is an injunction for (the state of a muni as) another co-operating factor towards knowledge and the state of a muni mentioned in the text as the third after childlikeness and learning is here enjoined because its characteristic is pre eminence in knowledge For whom is the state of a muni enjoined? For the sannyāsin possessed of knowledge. Again if the sannyāsin is already possessed of knowledge pre-eminence in knowledge is already established in his case. Why then a further injunction for muniship? To this question the reply furnished in the Sūtra is In case i e In case pre eminence in knowledge should not have been established in the sannyāsin owing to the prevalence of the idea of difference (to which all

men are subject), the injunction is to be applied "As in the case of injunctions etc"—The *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* declares that in the text "He who desires heaven should offer two *Darsapūrnamasa* sacrifices", the subordinate functions, e.g., the establishment of the sacred fires, etc., are also to be understood as enjoined as auxiliaries. Similarly, though injunctions do not form the main subject in the present text pertaining to *vidyā*, yet the state of a muni is to be understood as enjoined in it as auxiliary to *vidyā*.

### ૪૮ । કૃત્સ્નભાવાત્ તુ ગૃહિણોપસંહારઃ ।

૪૮ । કયાત્ વાન્દોગ્યે ગૃહિણા ઉપસંહાર, "અમિષમાત્મ્ય કુટુંબ" (વા.૫.૧) इति अतः । अस्य उत्तरं पठति,—‘कृत्स्नभावात्’ इति । यदुलायासानि यदनि च यदन्नकणाणि यज्जाटीनि त प्रति कर्त्तव्यतया उपदिष्टानि । आश्रमादारकेभ्योऽपि च अमिषा इन्द्रियसंयमादीनि यथाशक्यं तस्य विद्यन्ते । इति अतः “कृत्स्नभावात्” सर्वोपसंगमवन्निनात्, “तु” ‘गृहिणा’ उपसंहार समापनं न विरुध्यत ।

48. *The termination 'of the Chhândogya Upanishad) with instruction about) the householder (is quite reasonable), because the householder is, (as it were, an epitome of) all the āśramas*

Why is it that the *Chhândogya Upanishad* (vi. 5. 1) winds up with instructions about the householder, as seen in the passage, "After having received his discharge from the preceptor, (and returned to) his own family," etc.? To this question the *Sūtra* replies—Most troublesome and manifold are the sacrifices etc., enjoined as duties on the householder in his own *āśrama*. In addition to these, duties of other

Āsramas, such as non violence and the control of the senses etc., are also incumbent on him as far as practicable. For this reason : & because he is, as it were an epitome of all the āsramas, the winding up of the *Chhandogya* with the household is not objectionable

४८ । मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेष्टात् ।

४८ । सुतो मौनम् इतरेषामपि आश्रमाणां उपदेष्टात् मुन्यन् विद्वन्  
अमुष्यन्त्यो प्रतिपत्ति ।

49 Is the other (āsramas) also are enjoined like the state of the muni (they are all to be gone through)

As the other Āsramas also are enjoined in scripture like that of the muni they are all to be equally practised whether by free selection from amongst them or by taking them all without exception

५० । अनायिषकुर्वन्मयात् ।

५० । 'तस्यान् ब्राह्मण पाणिन्यं निविद्य ब्राह्मण तिहासीन् अणार्य — ब्राह्मण  
आश्रमम् अनायिष्यन् ब्राह्मण्यदन आर्निष्यन्तिभि अवि १५५५ द्वादशान्वितम्  
मरेत् यदा ब्राह्मण अमीदेन्द्रियता न परितु आश्रमम् आविष्कृतुम् ईदृशे तदत् ।  
अनयात् यतः पर्व हि अस्माकम् अन्वयः सुकृतायता मयति ।

50 (The childlike state enjoined in *Bri* III 5 1 means that the seeker after Brahman) is not to make a display of himself for thus alone does that statement retain its consistency



The text "Therefore a Brāhmana, having renounced learning, should desire to attain a child-like state" (*Vide* Sutra 47) means that the knower of Brahman should desist from making a display of himself, i. e., he should not make an exhibition of his knowledge, learning, virtue, etc., and should divest himself of arrogance, pride etc., just as a child, whose sense functions are yet undeveloped, never strives to exhibit himself before others. Because only by this interpretation does the statement become consistent with the whole chapter.

### ५१ । ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुत-प्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ।

५१ । किम् इह एव जन्मनि विद्या सिध्यति उत कदाचित् असुत अपि ? इति भव आह,—विद्याजन्म 'ऐहिकम् अपि' भवति. 'अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे' अनुपस्थिते बाधके । यदा तु खलु प्रतिबन्धं क्रियते तदा असुत इति । 'तद्दर्शनात्' यतः श्रुतिः ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धं दर्शयति,

यवणाद्यापि बहुभि र्यो न लभ्य

मृष्यन्तीऽपि बहुवी यन्न विद्य ।

आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धा

आश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुशिट ॥" कठ १।२।७ )

गर्भस्य एव वामदेव प्रतिपेदे ब्रह्मभावम् ( पेट २।५ ) इति वदन्ती जन्मान्तर-  
मस्त्रिताव साधनात् अपि जन्मान्तरे विधीत्पत्तिं दर्शयति । तस्मात् ऐहिकम् आसुभिरु-  
वा विद्याजन्म प्रतिबन्ध-चयापेक्षया इति स्थितम् ।

51 (*The perfection of knowledge may occur*) *even in this world, if no obstacles present themselves* Because scripture declares it

Does knowledge attain perfection even in this world ? Or is that consummation sometimes postponed to the next world ? To this question we reply "The perfection of knowledge may occur even in this world if no obstacles present themselves. Where however there is some obstacle it occurs in the next world. Because scripture declares it, & scripture shows that there may be effective hindrances to knowledge & g. in the passage.

About whom many have not even the means of hearing whom many cannot know even after hearing of him — very rare is a speaker about him. An able man alone can find him. Very rare is a knower of him instructed by a wise teacher. (*Itih* 1 2 7). Again in *Aṣṭa* II, 5 it is related that Vāmadeva attained the state of Brahman even when he was lying in his mother's womb. Scripture therefore admits that it is possible for knowledge to spring up in a later birth through exertions made in a former birth. Therefore whether knowledge is to originate in this or in the next world depends on the removal of obstacles.

५२। एव सुखिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावष्टतेस्तदवस्थावष्टते ।

५२। 'एव' साधनतादयमेव उचितं आमुष्मिन् विद्याग्रन्थविशेषतः सुखिफलानियमः न खलु सुखिफलं सुखिस्यचर्चं ज्ञानफलं नियमः विधिः अस्ति । तदवस्थावष्टते यतः सर्ववैदान्तेषु तदवस्था सुखवस्था एव कदा अवधार्यते । ज्ञानेन हि सुखवस्था न च ज्ञानशीलैकाकाराद्यान अस्ति । तदवस्थावष्टते तदवस्थावष्टते इति पदाम्बासु चम्पावपरिसमाप्तिं चीतवति ।

*fruit (of knowledge) which is the final release, on account of the enunciations about that state, on account of the enunciations about that state*

Difference of sādhanas is seen to produce differing results, whereby knowledge is perfected in this world or in the next, but as regards that particular fruit of knowledge which we designate as 'the final release', there is no such rule "On account of the enunciations about that state", *vidē*, because in all Vedānta-texts that state, *viś*, the state of final release, is described to be of one kind only. The state of final release is nothing but the state of Brahman, and Brahman cannot have different forms.

The repetition of the last clause indicates the termination of the chapter.

## फलनोम चतुर्थाध्याये

### प्रथम पाद—मैत्रेयोपासनया जीवन्मुक्ति



#### १। आसत्तिरसक्तदुपदेशात्।

१। अथक्-मननादि-साधनानाम् बाधति पीनपुन्येन यथासं शरणम्-  
असक्तत्वं उपदेशात् यत् "श्रीवक्ष्यी मनस्यी निदिध्यासितम् ( ब्रह्म १।४।३  
३।१।६ ) एवमादीनाम् असक्तत्वं पीनपुन्येन उपदेश्य दर्शनपर्यन्तं साधनावधिं  
सूचयति।

1 (Spiritual exercises, such as *śravaṇa manana*, etc. require) *repetition because scripture repeatedly inculcates* (such exercises)

Repetition of spiritual exercises, (such as reading sacred books, meditation etc.) must be practised because scriptural instructions about them e g (The Self) is to be heard to be reflected upon to be meditated upon (*Bri II 4 5 IV 5 6*) etc. repeatedly inculcate the performance of such exercises until direct vision should be attained

#### २। शिक्षाच्च।

१। 'निष्ठम् अनुमापन्नं ज्ञेयं, तत् अपि प्रत्ययावधिं प्रत्याभवति। आदीनम्

( १।५।१, २ ) उद्गीथविज्ञानं प्रस्तुत्य “आदित्य उद्गीथ ” इति एतत् एकपुत्रतादीष्वपि अपोथ “रश्मीन् पथ्यावर्त्तायात्” इति रश्मिबहुत्वविज्ञान बहुपुत्रतायै विदधत् सिद्धवत् प्रत्ययावृत्तिं दर्शयति । तस्मात् तत्सामान्यात् सर्वप्रथयेषु आवृत्तिसिद्धिः ।

## 2 And also because there is an indication

[By an “indication” is meant a characteristic on which an inference may be based] Such an “indication” in one of the scriptural texts also points to repetition of meditations The *Chhandogya* Upanishad, when dealing with the Udgītha-vidyā, rejects one particular view, viz, that “the Udgītha is the sun” (*Chh* I 5 1), on the ground that the result of that meditation would be the possession of one son only, and by another text, viz, “Do thou resolve his rays” (*Chh* I 5 2), enjoins a meditation on the multitude of the sun’s rays, on the ground that the result of such meditation would be the possession of many sons From this it is evident that the repetition of meditations is a well-established doctrine But considered as a meditation, this one is on a par with all other meditations Hence it is reasonable to hold that the instruction about repetition should apply to all meditations

## ३ । आत्मेति लूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।

३ । ‘तु’ इति पूर्वपक्षनिरासार्थः । ‘आत्मा’ इति एव परमेश्वरः प्रतिपत्तव्यः । तथाहि परमेश्वर-प्रक्रियायाः जावाला आत्मत्वेन एव एतम् ‘उपगच्छन्ति’ जानन्ति, स्वीकृष्यन्ति,—“त्व वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवते, अह वै त्वमसि देवते” इति । तथा अन्ये अपि “अह ब्रह्मास्मि” ( ऋह १।४।१० ) एवमादयः आत्मलोपगमा द्रष्टव्याः ।

पात्रमिति च चात्मत्वेन एव ईश्वरं विद्वान्वाक्यानि उप त आत्मा सर्वानाम् । ( उह  
 ३।४।१ ) “एव त आत्मानोत्सृज्यत ( उह ३।४।३ ) तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि  
 ( वा ३।८।३ ) इति एवमात्मैति ।

3 (The sacred texts) *however both understand and inculcate* (the meditation of the Highest Lord) *as the Self*

The word “however” is directed towards a Pūrva paksha position [*viz* that the Highest Lord is not to be meditated upon as the Self of the devotee]—The Highest Lord is to be understood as the Self For the Jābālas, in their text about the Highest Lord doubtlessly understand him to be the Self in the passage “O Lord O Deity Thou indeed art I ! O Deity I indeed am Thou ! Similarly there are other texts, such as “I am Brahman (*Bṛs* I 4 40) etc. which clearly understand the Lord to be the Self Again certain other Vedānta texts distinctly inculcate the meditation of the Lord as the Self *e g* — ‘This (the Lord) is thy Self and is within all’ (*Bṛs* III 4 1) This (the Lord) is thy Self the indwelling ruler the immortal (*Bṛs* III 7 3) ‘That (the Lord) is the True that is the Self thou art that, (*Chh* VI 8 7) etc.

४ । न प्रतीके न हि स ।

४ । ‘प्रतीके मन-आत्मा-आदिपादौ ब्रह्मविचारं न आत्ममतिं प्रयोधात् ।  
 न हि स इव स’ उपनिषद् प्रतीकानि परिमितानि आत्मत्वेन न जानाति ।

4 Symbols (should not be thought of as the Self)

*because he (i. e., the devotee) does not apprehend them as the Self)*

Symbols, such as the sensorium, ether, the sun, etc. must not be meditated upon as the Self because he (the meditating person) does not apprehend symbols, which are by their nature limited, as the Self.

## ५ । ब्रह्मदृष्टिर्उत्कर्षात् ।

५ । “मनो ब्रह्मेत्यपासीतित्यध्यात्मम् । अथाधिदेवमाकाशो ब्रह्मेति” ( का३।१८।१ ) तथा “आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेश” ( का३।१८।१ ) “स यो नाम ब्रह्मेत्यपासी” ( का७।१।५ ) इति एवमादिषु प्रतीकोपासनेषु मन-आदिषु ‘ब्रह्मदृष्टि’ कर्षय्या, न ब्रह्मणि मन-आदि-दृष्टि । कुत ? ‘उत्कर्षात्’, यत एवम् उत्कर्षेण मन-आदय दृष्टा भवन्ति उत्कर्षदृष्टेः तेषु अध्यासात् ।

5 (In meditating upon symbols, the symbols themselves) *are to be contemplated as Brahman*, (and not *vice versa*), because thus there is an elevation (of the symbols)

The meditation of symbols has been enjoined in such texts as the following,—“One should meditate on the sensorium as Brahman this much about the body. One should meditate on the ākāśa as Brahman this much about the devas” (*Chh* III 18 1), “The sun is Brahman This is the doctrine,” (*Chh* III 19 1), “He who meditates on name as Brahman” (*Chh* VII 1 5) In these symbolic meditations it is the sensorium etc., that are “to be contemplated as Brahman,” and not Brahman that is to be contemplated as the sen-

sonum etc. Why so? Because thus there is an elevation i.e. because on being contemplated thus, the sensorium etc. are elevated in our view the contemplation of something higher than they (*viz* Brahman) being superimposed on them

### ६। आदित्यादिमतयस्याह उपपत्तेः ।

६। 'अहं' उद्गोपादि यस्याहं आदित्यादिमतय आदित्यादिबुद्धयः कृतव्या-  
न तु आदित्यादिबुद्धयः उद्गोपादि बुद्धयः । उपपत्तेः यत एवम् अपूर्णमग्निवशात्  
आदित्यादिमतिभिः सैव यमानेभ्य उद्गोपादिभ्यः कृतव्यसहि उपपद्यते । 'यदेव विद्यया  
करोति तद्वैवापनिषत्ता तदेव वीर्यवत्' भवति ( का १।१।१ ) इति च विद्याया  
वर्धनस्यैव हेतुता दशयति ।

6. On members (of the sacrifice) are to be super-  
imposed the conceptions of the sun etc., (and not *vice-  
versa*) so that there may be success

It is the members of the sacrifice, such as the udgītha  
etc. that are to be contemplated as the sun etc. and not  
the sun etc. that are to be contemplated as udgītha etc.  
Why so? In order that there may be success \* i.e.,  
because the work (i.e. sacrifice) attains success only

"Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action—such  
as the udgītha—undergo a certain ceremonial purification (*samskara*)  
by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The meditations  
therefore contribute, through the mediation of the constituent  
members, towards the *apūrva*, the supersensuous result of the entire  
sacrifice"—*Thibaut*.

This seems to be a translation from some annotator; it elucidates  
the commentary



when its members, such as udgītha etc , are purified by being viewed as the sun etc , through connection with the apūrva. The following passage also declares that knowledge (through contemplation) is a factor in the attainment of success in sacrifice, "Whatever work is done with knowledge, with faith, and with the Upanishad,—the same becomes more powerful", (*Chh* I I 10).

### ७ । आसीनः सम्भवात् ।

७ । 'आसीन' एव उपासीत, 'सम्भवात्' यतः समानप्रत्ययप्रवाहकारणम् उपासनम् आसीनस्य एव सम्भवति, न तु गच्छतः धावतः शयानस्य वा ।

7 (The devotee should perform his meditations) *in a sitting posture, for thus only is it possible*

One should meditate only "in a sitting posture , for thus only is it possible" Meditation consists in the continued flow of an identical current of thought This is only possible to a person who is sitting, not to one who is moving, or running, or lying down

### ८ । ध्यानाच्च ।

८ । 'ध्यानात्' च उपासनस्य ध्यानरूपत्वात् च तत आसीनस्य एव अनायासेन भवति ।

8 *And also because (meditation means) deep reflection*

Also, because meditation is of the nature of deep reflection, faculty for which is enjoyed only by a person seated

८। अचञ्चलत्वज्ञापेक्ष ।

८। अचञ्चलत्वं निपद्यते 'अ' अपेक्ष्य सख्यीकृत्य आनन्दप्रयोगं भवति ।  
निपद्यते च आसीनस्य एव सम्भवति, ततः च उपासनस्य आसीनत्वार्थम् ।

9 *And also because (meditation has) reference to absence of movement*

The use of the word meditation always implies absence of movement which is possible only to one sitting. For this reason also meditation should be practised sitting.

१०। स्मृतिश्च ।

१। श्रुतम् च उपासनाङ्गमेव आसनं कथयन्ति यथा भावटीका — "उची  
र्दमं प्रतिष्ठाप्य स्थिरमासनमात्मनः (६।११) इत्यादिना । अतः एव च धीनृणां  
गानादिब्रह्मणाम् आसनानाम् उपदेष्टम् ।

10 *Smritis texts also declare the same*

The *Smritis* also declare the sitting posture to be auxiliary to meditation e.g. the Bhagavadgita has this —

Having placed one's seat in a clean spot — a seat immovable etc. (VI 11) For the same reason instruction is given in the Yoga sūtras about various kinds of sitting postures.

११। धैर्यकायता तत्प्राप्तिमेवात् ।

११। 'यस्य दिशि दिशि कालि या सायकश्च एकाग्रता भवति 'तस्य एव  
उपासीत । 'अविर्ज्वलन्' अतः एतदु विपरीतं आर्यं निम्नमिदं गच्छति ।



6 3 1) declares the continuation of meditations up to death. *Sūriti* also has the following — O son of Kunti at the time of death whatever object one thinks of when leaving his body he with his mind pervaded by the thought of that object assumes the form of that object" (*Bhag* VIII 6) and "At the time of death with a steadied mind" (*Bhag* VIII 10). The scriptural passage "One should at the hour of death take refuge in this triad of meditations" (*Chh* III 17 6) also declares that there is a last duty (of meditation) at the time of death.

१३ । तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्व्याप्रयोरग्रेपविनाशो नश्यपदेयात् ।

१३ । 'तदधिगमे ब्रह्माधिगमे सति 'उत्तरपूर्व्याप्रया अग्रपविनाशो भवति.. भाविपापस्य अपिप.. पूर्वपापस्य विनाशो भवति इत्यर्थः । तदपदेयमात् तयाकि ब्रह्मविद्या प्रक्रियायां सम्प्राप्त्यन्तमवस्थस्य आनामितं दुरितस्य अनभिसम्पत्त्यं विदुष्य व्यपदिशति,— 'यथा पुनश्चपन्नाम आपा न प्रियन्ता परमेवन्विदि पापं कर्म न शिञ्जते ( ब्रा ३।१४।३ ) इति । तथा विनाशम् अपि पूर्वोपचितस्य दुरितस्य व्यपदिशति — त यथैवाज्ञानमयी प्रीतिं प्रदूदितैव ज्ञानस्योपपत्त्या नश्यपदेयात् ( ब्रा ३।१४।३ ) इति । अयम् अपर कर्मव्यवस्थाम् भवति —

मिच्छति उत्तरवर्तिनिदयान्ते भवत्संशया ।

चौदमे वास्य कर्मावि तच्छिन्ने इष्टे पश्यति ॥ ( १ मु १।८ )

13 When Brahman is attained non-contamination from and destruction of future and past evil deeds (take place) for thus scripture declares

"When Brahman is attained one becomes immune from the contamination of subsequent sins, and his past

sins also are destroyed "For thus scripture declares ' When treating of Brahma vidyā, scripture declares (in the following passage) that such future sins as would ordinarily cling to one, ceases to cling to him who knows Brahman, "As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows this (i e , Brahman)," (Chh . IV. 14 3) Scripture also declares the annihilation of the accumulated evil deeds of the past for one who knows Brahman in the passage, "As the pith of the Ishikā reed, when thrown into the fire, is burnt, similarly all his sins are burnt," (Chh V 24 3) Another scriptural statement about the annihilation of deeds is the following — "The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dissolved, and his (the wiseman's) deeds cease, when the Higher and Lower (Brahman) is seen " (Mund II 2 8)

### १४ । इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु ।

१४ । 'इतरस्य' पुण्यस्य कर्मण्य 'अपि' 'एवम्' अथवात् 'अश्लेष' विनाश च ज्ञानवत् भवत । 'पाते तु' विदुषः शरीरपाते तु मुक्ति भवति । 'तु-श्च' निश्चयार्थः ।

14 A similar non-adherence of the other (i e , good deeds) also (takes place) But (release comes immediately) at death.

"Of the other also," i e , in respect of good deeds also, a similar non-adherence takes place, (i e , non-contact with the future and annihilation of the past good deeds take place) in the case of one who has known



distinctly stated to be the limit of the delay for the attainment of release. If it were not so, i e, if all works (irrespective of the commencement or otherwise of effects) were to be destroyed through knowledge, there would remain no reason for the continuation of the present state of existence, and release would follow immediately on the attainment of knowledge. If such were the case, scripture would not have mentioned the waiting for the dissolution of the body.

१६ । अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्थयैव तद्दर्शनात् ।

१६ । 'तु'-शब्द आशङ्काम् अपनुदति । 'अग्निहोत्रादि' नित्य कर्म 'तत्कार्थाय एव' भवति, ज्ञानस्य यत् कार्थं तत् एव अस्य कार्थम् इत्यर्थः । तस्मात् तस्य विनाश न भवति । 'तद्दर्शनात्' यत् "तमेत वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन" (बृह ४।४।२२) इत्याद्या श्रुति यज्ञादीनां चित्तशुद्धिपूर्वकं ज्ञानफलं दर्शयति ।

16 *But the daily fire sacrifice etc, tend towards the same result, because scripture shows this*

The word 'but' dispels a doubt. Permanently obligatory duties like the Agnihotra etc "tend towards the same result", i e, whatever results knowledge produces, these also help to produce. Hence, these obligatory duties are not destroyed. "Because scripture shows this", i e, scripture shows that such sacrifices, by purifying the heart, foster the production of the fruits of knowledge, in such passages as "Bráhmaṇas seek to know him by study of the Vedas, by sacrifices, by gifts", (Br I V 4 22)

## १०। अतोऽन्याऽपि ह्येकेषामुभयो ।

१०। 'अतः' अपिहीमादि नित्यान् कर्मणः अस्या 'अपि हि' अस्ति साधुज्ञत्वात्, या फलम् अभिप्रायः कियते । तस्या एव विनिवोग उक्तः एवैव' सास्त्रिणां "सुष्ठु" साधुज्ञत्वामुपयति इति । तस्या एव च इदम् अप्यन्यं अद्यैव विनाश निरूपणम् — "इतरस्य अपि एवम् अस्ति" इति । एवसातोपकृत्य काश्चित् कर्मणः विधां प्रति अनुपकारकत्वे सन्नतिपति उभयो अपि भूमिनि वात्स्यायनयो आचार्ययोः ।

17 *There exists also (a class of good works) other than this According to some (these works have certain results There is (however) agreement of both (Jaimini and Bādarāyana about the futility of these works)*

"Other than this" viz the permanently obligatory duties such as the Agnihotra etc., "there is another class of good works viz those performed with an eye to some fruit According to some people who belong to a particular śākhā of the Vedas, the following is the application of such works,— His friends enter on his good works And the instruction about non adherence and destruction of effects — "A similar non adherence of the other &c. (given in Sūtra 14) applies to this class of works also There is however agreement of both the teachers, Jaimini and Bādarāyana, about the futility of such works actuated by selfish motives so far as the origination of true knowledge is concerned

## १८। यदेव विध्यतेति हि ।

१८। 'हि' इतः सुतो उक्तम् "यदेव विध्यते करोति तदधीपनिपदा तदेक वीर्यवर्धनं भवति (आ १।१।१) । ततः विधातृयुक्तस्य कर्मणः अपिहीमादि वीर्य-



वचनत्वाभिधानेन स्वकार्यं प्रति कश्चित् चातिशयं ब्रुवाणा विद्याहीनस्य तस्य एव तत्प्रयोजनं प्रति वीर्यवत्त्वं दर्शयति ।

18 *For the text "Whatever work is done with knowledge, etc , (confirms the same view).*

Scripture says, "Whatever work is done with knowledge with faith, and with upanishad,—the same becomes more powerful' (*Chh I 1 10*) In thus affirming that Agnihotra etc, when joined with vidyá, produce their own effects more powerfully and effectively, the text implies that even without vidyá such works have some power and some effectiveness in producing the same results

१८ । भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा सम्पद्यते ।

१८ । इतरे तु आरब्धकार्ये पुण्यपापे 'भोगेन' 'क्षपयित्वा' नाशयित्वा ज्ञानी ब्रह्म 'सम्पद्यते' प्राप्नोति ।

19 *But (the knower of Brahman,) having exhausted by experience the result of the other two evil deeds, becomes one with Brahman*

But "the other two", i e , good and evil deeds whose effects have commenced, the knower of Brahman "exhausts", i e , destroys, "by actual experience of their results", and thus he attains Brahman



organs of speech and the function of speech, is it meant that the organs and the function both merge in the sensorium ? Or the function only ? On this point the Sūtrakāra says The passage means that only the function of speech, (i e, the uttering of speech by the speech-organs,) is merged in the sensorium But how can we take "speech" in the sense of "the function of speech" ? This difficulty the Sūtrakāra explains thus "On account of observation," i e, the earlier cessation of the (dying person's) *function* of speech, even when his sensorium has not yet ceased to function, is a matter of observation But it is certainly not possible for any one to observe the merging of both the organs of speech and the function of speech in the sensorium "And on account of scriptural evidence," i e, because the word "speech" is also frequently used in the scriptures in the sense of the "function of speech "

## ૨ । અત એવ ચ સર્વોચ્ચનુ ।

૨ । "તત્પ્રાદુપશ્યન્તેજા પુનર્મવસિન્દ્રિયૈર્મનસિ સમ્પદ્યમાનૈ" ( પ્રશ્ન ૩૧૮ ) इति अव अवशिष्येय सर्वेषाम् इन्द्रियाणा मनसि सम्पत्ति श्रूयते । तव अपि 'अत एव' वाच. इव चक्षुरादीनाम् अपि स्रवणिके मनसि अवस्थिते इति लोपदर्शनात् तत्त्वप्रलय-असम्भवात् शब्द-उपपत्ते च इतिद्वारेण एव सर्वोचि इन्द्रियाणि मन 'अनु'-वर्तन्ते ।

2 For a similar reason, all (sense-organs follow) after the sensorium

The merging in the sensorium of *all* sense-organs without any distinction, is declared in the text, "So the person whose heat is spent out, betakes to another body

with his senses entered into his sensorium (*Pras* III 9)  
 About this the Sūtrakāra says 'For a similar reason  
 ; i. e., as was seen in the case of speech the eye and the  
 other sense organs also are observed to cease from func-  
 tioning when the sensorium is yet continuing to function  
 And (as was seen in the case of speech) the merging of  
 the organs themselves is an impossibility And as the  
 word speech ) was seen to admit of that interpretation  
 (namely function of speech) we therefore hold that all  
 the sense-organs follow after (i. e. merge themselves in)  
 the sensorium only in respect of their functions.

### ३ । तन्मन प्राण उत्तरात् ।

३ । 'तत् मनः प्राणं लीयते' इति तत्परादि च इति उत्तरात् प्रथमं सू-  
 त्रिकादत आह तत्परादिनात् अत्राश्रयति ।

3 *That sensorium merges itself in prāna on account of the next clause*

'That sensorium merges itself' i. e. by merging its  
 function 'in prāna on account of the next clause' of  
 the scriptural text quoted in the annotation of the first  
 Sūtra.

### ४ । सोऽप्यसौ तदुपगमादिभ्यः ।

४ । 'सुः प्रकृतः प्राणः' अथसि अविद्या-कर्म-पूर्वकं प्रमा उपविष्टि विद्यानात्मनि  
 जीवे विलीयते । तदुपगमादिभ्यः यतः तं जीवं प्रति प्राणानाम् उपगमनम् अनुगमनम्  
 अवस्थानं च भूयते । एवमेविसमाकाशमग्नकाशौ च सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमावन्ति  
 ( उच्यते ३।३।१८ ) इति उपगमन-श्रुतिः । 'अविद्याग मवति' ( उच्यते ३।३।१९ ) इति  
 अवस्थान-श्रुतिः ।

4 *That (prāna) enters the ruler (i e, the individual self), on account of the scriptural statements about going to the self, etc*

“The Prāna under discussion” merges itself in the “ruler”, i e in the intelligent soul, viz the individual self, which has for its limiting adjuncts nescience, karma, and previous knowlegde “On account of the scriptural statements etc” i e because there are scriptural texts about the prānas going to, following and abiding in, the individual self. A text about going to the self is this “Thus do all the prānas gather round the self at the time of death”, (Brī IV 3 38) A text about abiding in the self is this “He becomes endowed with intelligence”, (Brī IV 4 2). [i e, by abiding in the intelligent self he obtains intelligence therefrom ]

### ५ । भूतेष्वतः श्रुतेः ।

५ । स प्राणसंयुक्तः अथ च तेजसहचरितेषु ‘भूतेषु’ देहमीजभूतेषु सूक्ष्मेषु अवतिष्ठते इति अवगन्तव्यम् । “प्राणसेजसि” ( छा ६।८।६ ) इति अतः श्रुतेः । ननु च इयं अति प्राणस्य तेजसि स्थितिः दर्शयति, न प्राणसंयुक्तस्य अध्यक्षस्य । न एषः दोषः, यतः “सीदध्यक्षे” इति अन्तराले अध्यक्षः उपसंख्यातः ।

5 (The ruler, with the prāna, goes) to the elements, on account of the next scriptural clause

The ruler (individual self) joined by the prāna, then goes to abide in the elements with which there is also fire, i e in those subtle elements which constituted the seed of the body Scripture declares, (vide Sūtra 1), “His prāna

merges in fire (*Chh* VI 8. 6 It may be objected here that this text declares that the *prāna* only goes to fire but not the ruler and the *prāna* together To this we reply This objection is not valid because in the last *sūtra* *prāna* has been declared as entering the ruler and hence the ruler has a distinct position between *prāna* and the fire

### ६ । नैकस्मिन् दर्शयती हि ।

६ । कथं “तत्र मरुद्वरितेषु सुतेषु इति उच्यते वायता एकम् एव तत्र. त्रुते “वायनेजसि इति” अतः पाद — ‘न एकस्मिन् एव तत्रसि शरीरान्तर प्रेरण-  
क्यायां वायः प्रवतिष्ठति यतः शरीरम् अनेकात्मकम् । द्रवयत हि यतः त्रीति  
पञ्चमने नुतिष्यती वा एतम् अत्र द्रवयत । अति, — “प्रथिवीमथ आपोमयो वायुमथ  
५ आत्रमवस्तेजोमथ” ( ३८ ३।३।५ ) इत्याद्या । अति अपि —

अस्ती मात्रा विनामिथी दमाद्वाता नृ यां प्लुताः ।

तामि सार्वमिदं सर्वं मन्थयन्नुपुर्लब्धं ३ ( मनुः १।१० )

6 (The soul *does not* (go to one element only) *This is shown by both* (scripture and *smṛiti*)

It may be objected again that the next ‘His *prāna* merges in fire’ speaks of one element only viz. fire How do we then bring in (*vide Sutra 5*) the elements, with which there is also fire? We reply At the time of moving towards a new body the individual self cannot abide in the one element of fire only for the body is composed of several elements ‘This is shown by both This may mean either both the question and the answer in *Chh* V 3 or both scripture and *smṛiti* Such scrip

tural texts are, “(The self) consists of earth, water, air, ākāśa, fire’ (Bṛ IV. 4. 5), and the like. Such a smṛiti-  
passage is, “Those that are known as the minute perish-  
able particles of the five elements, from them is produced  
all this in due order” (Manu I 27)

### ७। समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादसृतत्वञ्चानुपीय ।

७। ‘समाना च’ एषा “वाङ्मनसि” इत्याद्या उत्क्रान्ति विद्वत्-अविदुषो ।  
‘आसृत्युपक्रमात्’ यतः यती मार्गद्वयकथनारम्भे ज्ञानिन अपि उत्क्रान्ति कथ्यते । ननु  
‘असृतत्वे’ विदुषा प्राप्तव्यं, न च तत् देशान्तरायत्तं, तत्र कुत भूतायत्तत्वं सृत्युपक्रम वा,  
इति । अत्र उच्यते, ‘असृतत्वं च अनुपीय’ इदं प्रतिज्ञातम् असृतत्वं ज्ञानी अविद्यादीन्  
क्लेशान् ‘अनुपीय’ (अन्-उप-उष्य, ‘उष्य’ दाहि ) अत्यन्तम् अदग्ध्वा एव प्राप्नोति ।  
आपेक्षिकं, न तु सुखम् इदम् असृतत्वम् इत्यर्थः ।

7 (The order of departure) is common (to both the  
knowing and the un-knowing) up to the starting point of  
the paths This is (relative) immortality in which  
(nescience etc) have not yet been burnt

The order of departure described by the text “The  
speech of the departing person merges in his sensorium,  
etc.,” is meant to be the common order of departure, both  
of one who knows and of one who does not know, “up to  
the starting point of the paths,” because scripture mentions  
the departure of the knower also when commencing the  
description of the two paths. It may be objected here that  
the knower is destined to attain immortality, and immor-  
tality cannot be reached by any change of place. How,  
then, can ‘abiding in the elements’ or ‘starting on a path’

apply to the knower ? To this we reply This is a sort of immortality in which nescience *etc* have not yet been burnt. The immortality affirmed here is of the kind obtained by the knowing soul without having burnt : *i e* thoroughly destroyed nescience and other miseries That is such immortality is only relative, and is not the highest immortality

८ । तदाऽऽपोते संसारव्यपदेशात् ।

८ । 'तत् तिष्ठ' आदि मृतपूज्य श्रीमादि क सायवमृतम् 'पा चपीति मीच पर्यन्तं परस्माद् द्विवाच्यं अतिष्ठते । संसारव्यपदेशात् यतः शुक्ति उत्क्रान्तस्य 'संसारं यत्रा व्यपश्रिति' कथयति यथा —

धीनिमन्त्रे प्रपञ्चस्य शरीरत्वाय हिदिन ।

आनुमन्त्रेऽनुसंधानि वपाकर्त्तव्यं यथासुतम् ॥ ( ऋठ ३१० )

अथवा सत्यं प्रायश्चमये एव तथापि प्रत्यक्षमथात् अथवा ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते । तत्र विविधाभ्यं च आगच्छन्ते स्मात् विद्यामालं च ।

8 *This (exists) until liberation because scripture declares the worldly state*

This : *i e* the subtle elements such as fire *etc.*, which sustained the sense organs, such as hearing *etc* continue to exist (without absorption) in the Highest Deity (vide Sutrā) until liberation. Because scripture declares the worldly state for the departed as in the passage Some enter into the womb for assuming a body others enter into immovable things (as trees and stones)—according to their respective knowledge and actions. (*Kath* II 2 7) Were it not so all would immediately at death lose their



distinctive limiting adjuncts, and attain absolute union with Brahman, and all the *sūtras*, giving injunctions or teaching *vidyās* for the attainment of Brahman) would be rendered meaningless.

### ८ । सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धिः ।

८ । सूक्ष्म-सहित निःशरीर 'प्रमाणतः' परिमाणतः सारूपतः 'च' 'सूक्ष्म' भवितुम् शक्नोति । 'तथा उपलब्धिः' यतः नाशनिमित्तमवस्थायात् द्रव्यान्तरे अप्रतिघातात् अदृश्यात् च तस्य सूक्ष्मत्वम् उपलभ्यते ।

9 (The *linga sarira*) is subtle in measure, also because it is observed to be thus

The *linga sarira*, (the form in which the soul passes out of the body), being composed of the subtle elements only, 'must be admitted to be subtle, both in essence and in measure' "Because it is observed to be thus" Scripture says that it passes out of the arteries, it never comes into impact with any material body and it is invisible. From these we conclude that it is subtle by nature

### १० । नोपसर्द्देनैतः ।

१० । 'अतः' एव लिङ्गशरीरस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात् एव सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य 'उपसर्द्देन' विनाशिन तत् 'न' विनश्यति ।

10 Hence the *linga-sarira* is) not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body)

"Hence", i.e., because the *linga-sarira* is subtle, it is not destroyed "by the destruction" of the gross body

११ । अस्त्यैव धीमवसेरप उष्मा ।

[illegible]

11 And the warmth (of the body) is the warmth of  
 12 (heat) (why) for this is proved (by experience)

The warmth which can be perceived in the living body by the sense of touch is the warmth of this language. For this is proved both by positive and negative evidence. The warmth is not perceived in the body when dead - it is perceived while there is life.

१२। प्रतिषेधात् इति चेन्न ग्राह्येयत् ।

[illegible]

12. Should it be said on the strength of a negative clause (in the scripture that the prāṇas do not leave the body of the knower of Brahman we say) No Because (the denial is in respect of the departure of the prāṇas) from the soul (and not from the body)

[A Pūrvapaksha view] “Now, as regards one who does not desire The man who has no desires, who has ceased to desire, who is satisfied in his desires, who desires the Self only, of him the prānas do not pass out, being Brahman, he goes to Brahman” (Bṛ IV 4 6) This negative statement is met with in the scripture in connection with the highest knowledge From this denial a doubt may arise, that in the case of one who knows the Highest Brahman, the prānas do not pass out of the body at all Our (the Pūrvapakshin’s) view is, that such a doubt would not be reasonable Why so ? Because the text denies the departure of the prānas, not from the body, but “from the embodied soul” How is this known ? Because the same text in another recension has the fifth case (“from him”) instead of the sixth case (“of him”, as above quoted)

### १३ । स्यष्टौ ह्येकेषाम् ।

१३ । सिद्धान्तसूत्रम् एतत् । न एतत् अस्ति यत् उक्तम् परब्रह्मविद् अपि देहात् अस्ति उत्क्रान्ति प्रतिषेधस्य देहि-अपादानत्वात् इति । ‘हि’ यत् देह-अपादाने एव उत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेध ‘एकेषाम्’ समान्नातृणां ‘स्यष्ट’ उपलभ्यते, यथा बृहदारण्यके आर्त्तभाग-प्रश्नोत्तरे, “याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यवाञ्च पुरुषो म्रियत उदङ्मात् प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो नेति नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽतैव समवलीयन्ते” ( ३।२।११ ) ।

13 (The above position is untenable), *because* (in the texts) *of some there is a distinct* (denial of the departure of the prānas from the body)

[The Sūtrakāra’s view] It is not reasonable to argue, (as has been done in the last Sūtra), that because the departure of the prānas from the *soul* of the knower of Brahman

as the starting point has been denied therefore their departure from the *body* as the starting point can be affirmed "Because in the texts of some Vedic sages the denial of the departure of the *prānas* from the body as the starting point is seen to be distinct E g in the questions and answers of Ārtaabhāga in the *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad* — Ārtaabhāga asked O Yājñavalkya when a person dies do the *prānas* pass out of him or do they not ? No replied Yājñavalkya they are gathered up in him (*Bṛi* III 2 11)

१४ । अर्थ्यते च ।

१४ । अर्थ्यते च महाभारते मत्स्यपुराण्यी चमात्र —

सर्वभूतानाममृतस्य सन्धगमूतानि पश्यत ।

देवा अपि मार्गे मुच्यन्त्यप्यस्य पदैषिण ॥

14 *Smṛiti also declares it*

The *Mahābhārata* also declares that the knower of Brahman has neither movement nor departure — He who has attained the state of the Self of all beings who has attained the perfect vision of all beings,—about the path of such a person the gods themselves are perplexed seeking to discover the place of one who has no place at all

१५ । तानि परि तथाध्याज ।

१५ । तानि प्राचगर्भीनितानि इन्द्रियाणि भूतानि च परि परमात्मनि प्रसीयन्ते ।

‘तथा हि याज बत मुनि तत् एव याज — एवमेवाऽस्य परिहृतिमा बोधयन्त्या, पुत्रप्राप्त्या इहर्षं प्राप्नोत्यत गच्छति’ (मंत्र ६।५) ।

15 *These (merge) in the Highest Brahman For (scripture) says so*

“These”, i e all the senses meant by the word ‘prāna’, and also the elements (of the knower of Brahman) “merge in the Highest Brahman” “For (scripture) says so”, as in the text “So these sixteen parts of this percipient being which are going towards the Person, are absorbed when the Person is reached”. (*Pras VI 5*)

१६ । अविभागे वचनात् ।

१६ । परब्रह्मणि विदुषः ‘अविभाग’ अविभागापत्तिं निरवशेषं लब्धं भवति । ‘वचनात्’ यतः कलाप्रलयम् उक्ता श्रुतिं वदति, “मित्येते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते स एषोऽकलीऽमृती भवति” ( प्रश्न ६।५ ) इति ।

16 (This merging in Brahman is) *absolute non-division* (from him) *Because scripture says so*

The merging of the knower in Brahman is of the nature of “absolute non-division from Brahman” there is no remainder left “Because scripture says so” After describing the merging of the parts the text goes on to say “Their name and form cease, and it is called the Person only He becomes partless (i e, indivisible) and immortal”. (*Pras VI 5*)

१७ । तदीकोऽयज्वलनं तत्पकाशितवागे विद्यामामर्त्या-  
न्तःशेषमत्यनुष्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतं शताधिकया ।

१७ । इदानीं सूक्ष्मपक्षम् दर्शयति । ‘तदीकोऽयज्वलनं’ तत् तस्य उत्क्रान्ति-  
भिच्छतं विज्ञानात्मनः शीघ्रं हृदयं, तस्य ज्वलनं भाविफलम्पुनश्च भवति यथात् उत्क्रान्ति

भरति, इत्येव । तत्पुरुषादितराः सन जन्मजन प्रथमिन् विद्यात् शरं चतुर्धम-  
 देन सा विद्यायाः उपाति इति कथा क्रिया । विद्यायामप्यात् विद्यायन  
 तत् क्रियति च अति योगात् च ददरविद्याविदितात् ( वा ८ ) मुनिमन्त्रागम  
 मति च देवमन्त्रात् च ( कठ १।१६ ; वा ८।१६ ) आर्द्रागुमहोत्त द-  
 वदना समुपमितन चतुर्धमोत्त तदावापय विद्या 'मन्त्राविद्या' एकाधिकमततमा  
 मुमुष्या नाया चतुर्धमति । ( कठ १।१६ वा ८।१६ ) ।

17 *First there is a lighting up of his abode (viz the heart) This light enables the soul to discover the door Thus strengthened by the knowledge guided by the memory of that final exit and supported by the grace of the Lord of the heart (the knower of Brahman passes out) through the 101st (artery)*

This Sūtra describes the method of the soul's passing out of the body. First there takes place a lighting up of his "i.e. of the intelligent self which wants to pass out) abode". This abode is the heart. The lighting up means the coming of a vision of the future. The sense is that the lighting up occurs first and after that the passing out. 'This illumination enables the soul to discover the door through which he must pass. The verb passes out is understood — Thus strengthened by the knowledge attained guided by the memory of that final exit that is through meditation of the soul's passage along the artery that penetrates the crown of the head as taught in the *Daharavidyā* (*Kath* VI 16 *Chh* VIII) supported by the grace of the Lord of the heart, i.e., favoured by Brahman who abides in the heart, and through meditation on whom the knower of Brahman has come to partake of

his nature, he passes out through the 101st artery," named Sushumnā (*Kath* III 3. 16, *Chh* VIII 6 6).

## १८ । रश्मिानुसारो ।

१८ । दहरविद्याया “अथ या एता हृदयस्य नाड्यः” ( का पा६।१ ) इति उपक्रम्य सप्रपञ्च नाडी-रश्मि-सम्बन्धम् उक्त्वा उक्तम्, “अथ यतैतदस्याच्छरीरादुत्क्रान्त्यथैतैरेव रश्मिभिर्ब्रह्माकामते” ( का पा६।५ ) इति । पुनश्च उक्तम्,—“तयोर्ब्रह्मायप्रवृत्तमेति” ( का पा६।६ ) इति । तथात् उपोसक्त यताधिकया नाड्या निष्क्रामन् ‘रश्मि-अनुसारी’ सन् निष्क्रामति इति अवगम्यते ।

18 (After passing out of the body, the soul) *follows the rays*

In the Dahara-vidyā referred to above, a passage begins with “Now these arteries of the heart” (*Chh* VIII 6 1), and after describing in detail the connection between the arteries and the rays, goes on to say, “When he passes out of this body, he passes upwards along those very rays” (*Chh* VIII 6 5) The passage also says, “Moving upwards by that (101st artery) he attains immortality,” (*Chh* VIII 6 6) From this it follows that the worshipper passes out of the body through the 101st artery, and then “follows the rays ”

## १९ । निशि नेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात् दर्शयति च ।

१९ । ‘निशि’ रात्रौ रश्मानुसारित्वे ‘न’ स्यात्, नाडीसम्बन्धविच्छेदात्, ‘इति चेत्’ आशङ्क्यत, तत् ‘न’ युक्तम्, ‘सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात्’ यतः, नाडीरश्मि-सम्बन्धः यावद्देह





tions, and, as the hour of death is uncertain, the knower of Brahman, even though he may die "during the southern progress of the sun" does obtain the fruit of knowledge

२१ । योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते आर्त्तं चैते ।

२१ । भगवद्गीतायाम्,

यत्र काले त्वनावृत्तिमावृत्तिश्चैव योगिन ।

प्रयाता यान्ति तत् कालं वक्ष्यामि भवतर्षभ ॥ ( ८।२३ )

इति प्राधान्येन उपक्रम्य अहरादिकालविशेष अनावृत्तये नियत । कथं रात्रौ दक्षिणायने वा प्रयात अनावृत्ति यायात् इति अत्र उच्यते, 'योगिन' प्रति च' अयम् अहरादिकाल-विनियोग, अनावृत्तये 'स्मर्यते' । 'आर्त्तं च एते' सांख्ययोगे, न श्रौते । अतः विषयभेदात् प्रमादविशेषात् च न अस्य आर्त्तस्य कालविनियोगस्य श्रौतेषु विज्ञानेषु अवतारः ।

21 (Certain directions are, however,) given in *Smṛiti* works exclusively for yogins, and both (Sāṃkhya and Yoga) have the status of *Smṛiti* (only, not of *Sruti*)

In the *Bhagavadgītā* we have the text, "O chief of the descendants of Bharata, I will now tell you of the times in which, when dead, yogins attain (respectively) to non-return (*i e*, the cessation of re-birth) and return (*i e*, re-birth) (VIII 23), and so on, which beginning in particular, fixes the day-time etc, as the special seasons when the soul should pass out of the body, in order never to return. A doubt may therefore arise here as to how one who dies at night, or during the southern progress of the sun, should attain the state of non-return? We

reply "These directions about death during day time etc with a view to non return are given in Smṛiti works exclusively for yogins And both Sāṃkhya and Yoga are Smṛitis only and not Śrutis Hence as this restrictive injunction about time has for its application a different class of persons (the yogins) and is also founded on a different authority (Smṛiti) it does not apply to knowledge based on the scriptures"

### ‘फलं नाम चतुर्थाध्याये छतोय’ पाद—देवयान पन्था

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#### १ । अग्निरादिना तत्प्रथिते ।

१ । अथ अग्नेः अग्निरादिना अग्निं प्राप्तिं प्रथमे भागपर्यन्तं यत्नं पञ्च तिलं पञ्चाक्षरीं वन्दति । तत्प्रथितं यत् एष भागः सम्पूर्णं विदुषाम् प्रथितः । तथाहि ३३५।१५३ पञ्चाग्निविद्या-प्रश्नः ६ ( ३३५ १ ) “यं चाग्नौ परश्चैव यद्वा मन्त्रमुपासते तैर्द्विषमभिसम्भवन्ति ( ३३५।१५ ) इति विद्यान्तरीक्षिणाम् अपि अग्निं प्राप्तिं प्राप्तिं प्राप्तिं ।

1 The first (stage on the Devayāna path) is Light, because that is well known

Every seeker after Brahman goes along the path (*viz.* the Devayāna) of which "the first stage is Light" "Because that is well-known," *i.e.*, this path is well-known to all who have known Brahman *E.g.* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Upanishad, in the section dealing with the Panchāgni-vidyā, we have the passage, "Those who in the forest worship with faith the True, go to Light" (VI 2 15), which says that even for those who pursue another vidyā the path begins with Light

## २ । वायुमब्दादविशेष-विशेषाभ्याम् ।

२ । देवयान-पथावलम्बो जीव 'अब्दात्' सवत्सरात् 'वायुम्' अभिसम्भवति । कथम् एतत् अवगम्यते ?—'अविशेष-विशेषाभ्याम्' अविशेष-उपदेशेन, यथा "स वायुलीकम्" ( कौषी १।३ ), तथा विशेष-उपदेशेन, यथा "यदा वै पुनरोऽस्माह्लोकात् प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचक्रस्य ख तेन स लक्ष्मणाक्रमते स आदित्यमागच्छति" ( ऋह ५।१०।१ ) इति । एतच्चात् आदित्यात् वायो, पूर्वत्वदर्शनात् विशिष्टात् अब्दादित्ययो अन्तराले वायु निवेशितव्यः ।

2 *The stage of Vayu is reached after that of the Year , (this is known) from non-specification and specification (contained in two texts)*

The individual self, moving along the Devayāna path, reaches "Vāyu after the Year" How is this known ? "From non-specification in one text, and specification in another" The non-specification text is "He comes to the world of Vāyu" (*Kau* 1 3) The specification-text is, "When the person passes away from this world he comes to Vāyu For him Vāyu leaves a space like the hole of a chariot-wheel Through this hole he ascends, and thus

reaches the sun (*Bṛi* V 10 1) Here Vāyu is specifically mentioned as coming before the sun therefore Vāyu must be given a place between the Year and the sun

३ । तद्धितोऽधि वरुण सम्बन्धात् ।

३ । आदित्यावन्दमर्ष चन्द्रमसी विद्यत ( का ३।१ ।१ ) इति चस्तद् सुतो तस्मिन् विद्युतः अधि उपरिष्टात् 'वरुण ईश्वरान् पर्यैकमे इति विद्यतः वरुणस्यो 'सम्बन्धात् विद्यावते । तथाहि ब्राह्मणे यदा हि विद्याया विद्यतसीत्याकाशयिवुर्निर्घोषा श्रीभुतो रेपु प्रणव्यन्त्यवाय प्रपतन्ति । 'विद्योतते जगन्मति वयिप्यति वा इति च वादो रे ( अ११।१ ) । अयां च अपिपति वरुण इति सुतिश्रुति प्रसिद्धिः ।

3 After Lightning (there is the world of) Varuna because 'the two are) connecte d

In the successive steps on the Devayāna path after the Lightning' mentioned in the text From the Sun to the Moon from the Moon to Lightning (*Chh* V 10 2) we are to understand that there is the world of Varuna because the two are connected The *Bṛāhmanas* say that when the broad lightnings dance in the mid spaces of the clouds to the accompaniment of loud thunder waters begin to fall The *Chhāndogya* Upanishad also says "There is lightning and thunder it will rain (*Chh* VII 11 1) And Varuna is reputed to be the lord of waters, both in *Sṛuti* and *Smṛiti*

४ । आतिवाहिकाभ्यासिद्धात् ।

४ । अक्षिरात्रिपु मार्गपर्येषु संशय विम् एतानि मार्गविज्ञानि उत भीमसूक्तम्— 'अथवा वेतार' वक्तव्याम् इति । अत्र उच्यते — आतिवाहिका वेतारः एव एते

મવિતુમ્ અર્હન્તિ । કુતઃ ? ‘તલ્લિજ્ઞાત્’, તથાહિ “ચન્દ્રમસી વિવ્યત તત્પુરુષોઽમાનવઃ  
સ એન બ્રહ્મ ગમયતિ” ( ક્ષા પ્રા ૧૦૧૨ ) ઇતિ સિદ્ધવત્ ગમયિત્વ દર્શયતિ ।

4 (Light etc) are conducting divinities, because there is such an indication (in the scriptures)

With regard to the stages on the Devayāna beginning with Light, a doubt may arise as to whether they are landmarks, or places of enjoyment, or conductors of the travellers The Sutra says, “They are conductors,” i.e., guides on the path Why so ? “Because there is such an indication in the scriptures,” viz., in the passage “From the Moon they go to the Lightning A person, not human, belonging to the worlds of Lightning, then leads them to Brahman” (Chh V 10 2) From this passage we take it as settled that Light etc, also are conducting divinities (like this ‘Person, not human’)

૫ । ઉમયવ્યામોહાત્ તત્સિદ્ધેઃ ।

૫ । યદિ અચેતના એવ અર્ચિરાદય અનેતાઃ તર્હિ માર્ગ-તદગત્યુપામ્ ઉમયેપામ્  
અપિ ‘વ્યામોહાત્’ અગત્વાત્ કર્ષયતિ ન સ્યાત્ । અતઃ અચેતન જીવ ચેતનાન્તરેથ  
નેય ઇતિ ન્યાયાત્ ‘તત્સિદ્ધે’ અર્ચિરાદિના નેતૃત્વસિદ્ધે ઉક્તાલિજ્ઞ ન્યાયોપેતમ્ ઇતિ  
સૂત્રાર્થઃ ।

5 And because (the indication) is also a logical necessity, both (the path and the travellers thereon) being devoid of consciousness

If it be contended that the Light etc, are non-intelligent (physical) objects, and consequently incapable of being guides, then, as both the path and the travellers thereon being devoid of ‘consciousness, the upward movement



यत' कार्यब्रह्मण एव गन्तव्यत्वम् उपपद्यते प्रदेगवत्त्वात्, न त परमिन् ब्रह्मणि, तस्य सर्वगतत्वात्, गन्तव्यत्वात् प्रत्यगात्मत्वात् च ।

7 *Bádari* (holds that the selves are thus led not to the Supreme Brahman but) *to the created* (Brahman) , *because to him only is "going" possible*

The path and its stages having been discussed, the goal is now the subject of discussion. About the scriptural text "He leads them to Brahman", the doubt arises, whether they are led to the created lower Brahman (Apara-Brahman) or to the highest, unqualified, chief Brahman. On this point the teacher Bádari holds that they are led by 'the person, not human' to the created, qualified, lower Brahman named Hiranyagarbha. On what ground? "Because to him only is 'going' possible." The created Brahman has a specific locality, and so can be the goal of a journey, but not the Supreme Brahman, who is present everywhere, and is the inner Self of the travelling individual selves.

८ । विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

८ । "ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु परा, परावती वसन्ति" (हृद ६।२।१५) इति श्रुत्यन्तरे 'विशेषितत्वात्' कार्यब्रह्मविषया एव गति इति अवगम्यते । न हि बहुवचनेन विशेष्य परमिन् ब्रह्मणि अवकाशते । कार्ये तु अवस्थानेदीपपक्षे सभावति बहुवचनम् । लोकश्रुति अपि विकारगोचरायाम् एव सन्निवेश-विशिष्टायाम् भोग-भूमौ आज्ञसी, गौथी तु अन्यत "ब्रह्मैव लोक एव सत्ताट्" (हृद ४।४।२३) इत्यादिषु । अधिकार्य-अधिकर्तव्य-निर्देश अपि परमिन् ब्रह्मणि न आज्ञस स्यात् ।

8 *Also because* (in another passage we find) *the qualified* (Brahman mentioned as the goal)

[Bīdarī's view continued ] Brahman the goal has been qualified further in the passage He leads them to Brahman In those worlds of Brahman they become great and live for ever Here evidently the created Brahman is meant for the Supreme Brahman can never be specified by the plural number ( worlds ) while the created Brahman can be so specified different conditions being possible to him The word loka (world) should be taken literally here for here it means a place of enjoyment entrance into which is possible and which belongs to the sphere of created things The word loka has been used metaphorically only in such passages as This is indeed Brahma loka O hims (Br. IV 4 3) etc., but not here Also the idea of abode and something abiding within it cannot be reasonably spoken of in connection with the Supreme Brahman

## ८ । मामीष्यात् तदपदेग ।

८ । एवं कार्यविरथं ब्रह्मण उपपदेत्, इति च त्र चाह — मामीष्यात् तदपदेग ॥ यत्र ब्रह्मण प ब्रह्म मामीष्यात् तदपदेग ॥ तद्विन् अपि ब्रह्मण उपपदेग ॥ तद्विन् अपि ब्रह्मण उपपदेग ॥ तद्विन् अपि ब्रह्मण उपपदेग ॥

9 (In the texts the created Brahman has) *that designation* ( Brahman / on account of proximity (to it) )

In reply to the question Why is the designation Brahman used with reference to the created Brahman ? the Sūtra says, On account of proximity" As the Apra brahman is in proximity to Para brahman the



use of the designation 'Brahman' to the former is not objectionable

## १० । कार्यात्यये तदव्यये सहः परमभिधानात् ।

१० । 'कार्य'ब्रह्मलीकास्य 'अत्यये' प्रलयकाले आगते 'तदव्यये सह' कार्य-  
ब्रह्मलीकात्यये हिरण्यगर्भेण सह तल्लीकावासिन 'अत पर' अपरस्मात् श्रेष्ठ विशुद्ध पदं  
परब्रह्मपदं प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति 'अभिधानात्' श्रुतिवचनात् अवगतव्यम् । भाष्ये न किञ्चित्  
श्रुतिवचनं उद्धृतम् । प्रश्नोपनिषदि तु उक्तम्,—“यथा पादोदरस्थश्च विनिर्मुच्यते एव  
ह वै स पाश्चात् विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलीका स एतस्माज्जोवचनात् परात्पर  
मुग्धश्च पुरुषनीचते” । ( ५।५ )

10 When the end of (the world of) created (Brahman) comes, (the selves go) with the ruler of that (world) to the Highest (This is stated) on the authority of scripture

When the end of the world of the created Brahman, the time for the total absorption, comes, the selves “dwelling in that world”, with Hiranagarbha, its ruler, proceed towards the Highest, *i e* towards the plane of the Supreme Brahman, which is higher than that world “This is stated on the authority of scripture” The Bhāshya does not give the scriptural authority Such a passage, however, is met with in the Prasnopanishad, “As a snake gets rid of its skin, so he gets rid of sine He is taken up by the Saman veises to the world of (the lower) Brahman From this concentration of life (*i e*, the Source of all life) he sees the Person, higher than the high and pervading all organisms (V 5)

## ११ । अतएव ।

११ । अतएव अतिप्रमाणात् ५ ५५१६६ । परम् इति सममुक्ति-  
शालक्यस्य स्यात्—

ह्यत्र च सप्त तं मन्त्रं सुश्रुतं प्रतिमुच्यते ।

परम्यान्ते ह्यतात्मानं प्रतिमन्त्रि परं परम् ॥

11 *And on the authority of Smṛiti also*

On the authority of Smṛiti also we know that suc-  
cessive liberation takes place from the lower to the  
higher Brahman. For example. When the dissolution  
of the world takes place with the end (i. e. absorption)  
of the high (Hiranyagarbha) they all—selves with their  
nature purified—enter the highest plane (i. e. the  
Supreme Brahman) with (the lower) Brahman.

## १२ । पर जैमिनिमुच्यत्वात् ।

१२ । जैमिनि आचार्यः “म एतान् ब्रह्म गमयति इति अत्र परम् उच्यते  
प्रापयति इति गमयते मुख्यत्वात् यत् परं ब्रह्म उच्यते ‘ब्रह्म गमयन् मुख्यम् आत्मनश्च  
गोचरम् ५५१६५ । मुख्यं गोचरी च मुख्ये संगमनस्य भवति ।

12. *Jaimini* (holds that the selves go) to the Su-  
preme (Brahman and not to Hiranyagarbha) that being  
the primary in name (of the name)

The teacher Jaimini holds that the text He lead  
them to Brahman should mean that they are led to the  
Highest Brahman that being the primary meaning  
of the name Brahman and Aparā Brahman its second-  
ary meaning. Between the primary and the secondary  
the primary is to be given the preference.

## १३ । दर्शनाच्च ।

१३ । “तयोर्द्विमायन्नमृतत्वमेति” ( काठ ६।१६ , छा ८।६।६ ) इति च गतिपूर्वकम् अमृतत्व दर्शयति । अमृतत्वञ्च परमिन् ब्रह्मणि उपपद्यते, न कार्ये, विनाशित्वात् कार्यस्य, “अथ यवान्यत् पश्यति तन्मर्तृम्” ( छा ७।१४।१ ) इति वचनात् ।

## 13 And because scripture declares thus

“The self goes up through it (the 101st-artery), and attains immortality” (Kath VI 16, Chh VIII 6 6) This text declares that by going along that path immortality is reached But immortality is possible only in the Supreme Brahman, and never in the created Brahman, who is himself mortal As scripture says, “Where one sees anything different, that is mortal” (Chh. VII 14 1)

## १४ । न कार्ये प्रतिपत्यभिसन्धिः ।

१४ । “प्रजापते सभा वेक्ष्य प्रपद्ये” ( छा ८।१४।१ ) इति सुसूची साधकस्य ‘प्रतिपत्ति-अभिसन्धि’ प्राप्ति-सङ्कल्प ‘न कार्ये’ न अपरब्रह्मणि भवितुम् अहति, यत् तत्र “आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निवहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म ( छा ८।१४।१ ) इत्यादिना कार्यविलक्षण परब्रह्म एव प्रकृतम् ।

## 14 And the intention of reaching (mentioned in certain texts) cannot be applied to the created Brahman

The “intention of reaching” expressed by the devotee who is about to pass away from this world, in the text “I come to the hall of Prajāpati, the house” (Chh VIII. 14. 1) cannot reasonably “apply to the created Brah-

man because the subject matter there has already been specified to be Para brahman who is distinct from the created Brahman by the immediately preceding words. He who is called Ākāśa is the revealer of all names and forms. That within which these (names and forms) exist is Brahman.

१५ । अप्रतीकात्म्यनाश्रयतीति वादराय ॥ उभयया-  
ऽदीपात् तत्कृतुय ।

११ । इदम् इत्यर्थो चिन्मते हि सत्त्वात् उभयया च विनिर्दिष्ट अमानव  
पुरुषः ब्रह्मज्ञाकम् प्रापयति उत कश्चित् एव । तत्र उच्यते — अप्रतीकात्म्यतया  
प्रतीकात्म्यतया च चिन्मते सत्त्वात् अन्त्यात् उपासकान् गच्छति इति वादराय ।  
चापार्थः सत्यतः । न तु “चनियमः सत्त्वात्मा” (३।१।११) इति चिन्मां सत्ये सत्त्वेऽप्याम्  
एव विदुषाम् ब्रह्मवति चिन्मा अयं तु प्रतीकात्मिका वर्धिरा । तत्र विरोधभङ्गाय  
वक्ष्यति — उभयया चिन्मात् न अयं विरोधः अस्ति, यतः “चनियमः सत्त्वात्  
प्रतीक-अतिरिक्तेषु उपासनेषु उपपद्यते । तत्कृतुय तत्कृतुः सत्यः च अस्य उभयया-  
मात्रस्य समवयवः द्वित्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । “यथास्तुतुष्टिज्ञाने पुरुषो भवति तथैव प्रेत्य भवति  
(आ ३।१।११) इति श्रुतिः । न तु प्रतीकेषु ब्रह्म-उपासकम् अस्ति प्रतीकप्रधानत्वात्  
उपासकम् ।

15 He (the Person not human) leads only those who do not meditate through symbols (to the world of Brahman). This is the opinion of Badarayana. Because there is no fault (of reasoning) in admitting this two fold view and (the two-fold view arises from) the meditation on that

A doubt here arises, viz., Does the Person not human

take men of all grades of meditation, without distinction, to the world of Brahman ? Or does he take some of them only ? The Sutrakīra says, 'He leads only those who do not meditate through symbols' - i. e., he leads to the world of Brahman all meditators except those who meditate on particular objects as symbolically representing Brahman. "This is the opinion of Badarayana. An objection may be raised here — The Sūtra '(Going along the Devayana path) *applies to all without restriction*' (III 3 3D) seems to teach that all meditators reach Brahman but in the present Sūtra meditators on symbols were excluded. Is there no inconsistency between the two views ? To repudiate the charge of inconsistency the Sūtra says "Because there is no fault of reasoning", there is no inconsistency, because the argument about non-restriction of going (contained in Sūtra III 3 3D) is meant to apply to all meditations including those through symbols. "And the meditation on that" - i. e., the argument from 'the meditation on that' seems to support the two-fold view. Scripture says, "According to what a person meditates on in this world, the same will he become when he passes away from here." (Chh. III 14 1). In the case of symbols, it cannot be said that the meditation is on Brahman, for in such meditations it is the symbol that preponderates.

१६ । विशेषञ्च दर्शयति ।

१६ । 'विशेष च फलविशेषं च दर्शयति श्रुतिः नानादिषु प्रतीकोपासनेषु पूर्व्वेष्वात् पूर्व्वेष्वात् उत्तरस्मिन् उत्तरस्मिन् उपासने । यथा, "यावन्नाम्नो गतः, तदास्तु यथाकाशचारि"

भक्ति ( वा ० १।१ ) वागव नाम्नी भूयो ( वा ० १।१ ) वागवाम् नतं तन्मात्रं  
 वागवाम्नामि भक्ति ( वा ० १।१ ) "मन्त्रवागव नाम्नी भूयो ( वा ० १।१ ) ।  
 ब्रह्मण्यस्य तु ब्रह्मण्यविमलताम् ब्रह्मं ब्रह्मवद्वत् ब्रह्मं तन्मात्रं न ततोऽप्यन्यथा  
 ब्रह्मं तन्मात्रमात्रं इति ।

16 And scripture declares that meditations on symbols give rise to different results

Scripture declares difference with reference to the meditations on various symbol such as Name etc. each succeeding meditation being given a different result from each preceding one. 1. He who meditates on the Name as Brahman his will shall possess untrained cope of action in all regions to which the Name reaches (Chh VII 1 5) Speech is greater than Name (Chh VII 1 1) He who meditates on Speech as Brahman his will shall possess untrained cop of action in all regions to which Speech reaches (Chh VII 2 2) Mind is greater than Speech (Chh VII 3 1) In a meditation on Brahman on the other hand as Brahman is undifferentiated there can be no difference of results. Hence those who meditate through symbols can never reach the same result as the others do

## ‘फल’-नाम चतुर्थाध्याये चतुर्थः पादः सुक्तात्मनः स्वरूपम्

०

### १ । सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् ।

१ । अथ ब्रह्मभावप्राप्तिं कथयति । शान्दीये श्रूयते, “एवमेवैष सम्प्रसादोऽ-  
आच्छरीरात् समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरूपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिप्यद्यते” (न।१।२।३) ।  
तत्र सश्रूय, किं देवलीकादि-उपनीगस्थानेषु इव आगन्तुकेन केनचित् विशेषेण अस्मि-  
निप्यद्यते आहोस्वित् आत्ममात्रेण ? तत्र उच्यते, ‘सम्पद्य’ ब्रह्मभाव प्राप्य जीवात्मन  
केवलेन आत्मभावेन आविर्भाव भवति, न आगन्तुकेन अपररूपेण । ‘स्वेन’-शब्दात्  
यत स्तुत्युक्तेन ‘स्वेन’-शब्देन आत्मरूपाविर्भाव एव उपपद्यते ।

1 *On reaching (Brahman, the soul) manifests itself (in its own form), on account of the word, ‘own’ (in the text)*

The state of attaining the nature of Brahman is henceforth to be the subject of discussion. The *Chhândogya* Upanishad says, “In the same way, the soul, in its state of unsullied serenity, rises out of this body, and possessed of the highest light, manifests itself in its own form” (VIII 12 3). Here a doubt arises. Does the soul manifest itself through some extraneous characteristic, as souls dwelling in the world of the gods and in such

other place of enjoyment do? Or does it manifest itself as a pure self? The Sūtra says On reaching *i.e.* on attaining the nature of Brahman the individual soul manifests itself in its own pure character and not through any incidental characteristic. On account of the word own in the text *i.e.* because from the phrase in its own form in the text above quoted the only possible inference is that the soul manifests it self in its own form.

२। सुष्ठु प्रतिधानाय ।

१। यः चरन्निवर्तयति इति उक्तं न वशात् पुनः यदत्र एव भाष्यम् ।  
 चरतिष्ठतः । अथ पुनः चरन्निवर्तयति मुक्तं यद्यपि इत्यनेन भवति इति ?— प्रतिज्ञानाम्  
 यतः सृतिः “एतं शब्दं निमृदयन्निवर्तयति” (वा. पा. १.१.१) इति आदेशात् चरन्निवर्तय  
 चरतिष्ठतिम् आशङ्क्यम् आशङ्क्यतन प्रतिज्ञाय “चरन्निवर्तयति” शब्दं गच्छेत् न निवर्तयति  
 मुक्तम् (वा. पा. १.१.१) इति च उपपन्नं अत्र दर्शयन्निवर्तयति न चरन्निवर्तयति  
 मुक्तम् (वा. पा. १.१.१) इति च उपपन्नमिति । तदा आशङ्क्यिका उपपत्तिरिति चेत्  
 “यः चरन्निवर्तयति” (वा. पा. १.१.१) इत्यादि मुक्त्यान्वितम् एव प्रतिज्ञायाम् ।

2 (The soul thus manifesting itself in its own nature) is released because scripture promises this

The soul described above as manifesting itself is released from bondage and exists henceforth in its pure selfhood. How is it known that the soul now obtains release? Because scripture promises thus. By the words Him I shall explain further to you (Chh VIII 11 3) the scripture promises to describe the self as unstained by the imperfections of the three states (of



waking, dreaming and sleeping) It then introduces the subject (of the released soul) by the words “On his being free from the body, pleasure and pain cannot touch him” (*Chh* VIII 12, 1) The passage concludes with the words (*vide* last Sūtra) “The soul manifests itself in its own form that is the Highest Person” (*Chh* VIII. 12 3) And also the opening words of the narrative (of Prajāpati, Indra and Virochana), *viz*, “The Self which is devoid of sin” (*Chh* VIII. 7. 1) make a promise of describing the released soul

### ૩ । આત્મા પ્રકારણાત્ ।

૩ । “પર જ્યોતિરપસમ્યદ્ય” ( છા ૮.૧૨.૩ ) અર્થ ‘જ્યોતિ’-શબ્દેન આત્મા એકં આવેદ્યતે, ન ભૌતિકં જ્યોતિ । ‘પ્રકારણાત્’ યત ‘જ્યોતિ’-શબ્દ પરમાત્મપ્રકારણે ઉક્તો ।

3 (The ‘highest light’ of which the soul is possessed) *is the Self, that being the subject-matter* (of the scriptural passage)

In the phrase “Possessed of the highest light” (*vide* Sūtra 1) of the scriptural text, the word ‘light’ means “the Self”, and not physical light, “that being the subject-matter” of the whole chapter from which the passage is taken

### ૪ । અવિભાગેન દૃષ્ટવાત્ ।

૪ । મુક્તા પરમાત્મના ‘અવિભાગેન’ એવ અવતિષ્ઠતે । ‘દૃષ્ટવાત્’ યતઃ “તત્ત્વમસિ” ( છા ૬.૮.૭ ), “અહં બ્રહ્માસમિ” ( રુદ્ર ૧.૪.૧૦ ), “યત્ર નાન્યત્ પશ્યતિ” ( છા ૭.૨.૪૧ ) ઇત્યાદય સ્ત્રોતય બ્રહ્મણા સહ મુક્તાત્મનં અવિભાગ દર્શયન્તિ ।

4 (The released soul abides) in a state of non division (from Brahman) because such is seen in scripture

The released soul abide in a state of non division from the Highest Self because such is seen in scripture" Scriptural text such as That art thou (Chh VI 8 7) I am Brahman (Bri I 4 10) Where he sees no other thing (Chh VII 24 1) etc. show that the released soul abides in a state of non division from Brahman

### ५। माध्वेण जैमिनिरूपय्यासादिभ्य ।

५। माध्वेण ब्रह्मत्वमिहाचक्षतप्राप्त्यादिना कवेन मुनिना निरूपयत इति जैमिनि आचार्ये मन्वते । अतः — उपनिषदां अथ यत उप आम्नेषतपाम इत्यादिना "सर्वकाम सर्वमउत्तर । इति ८०१" इति उपसु चकार शङ्खिवासीन एतत्तु चक्षयते ।

5 Jaimini holds (that the released soul manifests itself) in the same nature as that of Brahman on account of scriptural references etc

"The teacher Jaimini holds that the released soul manifests itself in those very qualities of freedom from sin etc. which belong to Brahman Why so? On account of scriptural references etc. : e because such an inference follows from the collocation of words beginning with 'This Self which is devoid of sin and ending in 'Whose desires are true whose volitions are true etc. (Chh VIII 7 1)

६ । चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

६ । 'चिति' चैतन्यम् एव तस्य आत्मन स्वरूपम्, अतः, 'तन्मात्रेण' चैतन्यमात्रेण सुक्तात्मा निप्यद्यते । 'तदात्मकत्वात्' यतः, आत्मा चैतन्यात्मकः, एव । सत्यकामत्वादयः तु वस्तुस्वरूपेण एव धर्मा उच्यन्ते, तथापि उपाधिसम्बन्धाधीनत्वात् तेषां न चैतन्यवत्-स्वरूपत्वसंभवः । 'इति औडुलोमिः' नाम आचार्यः, मन्यते ।

6 (The released soul manifests itself) as pure intelligence because its essence consists of that, thus says Audulomi

The nature of the self is pure intelligence Hence the released soul manifests itself as that alone (i e, as pure intelligence) "Because its essence consists of that" That is, because the self is of the essence of intelligence The other qualities, such as "having true desires" etc, are indeed mentioned in the text as attributes really inhering in Reality, but they are dependent on connection with limiting adjuncts, hence they cannot constitute its essential nature like intelligence,—so thinks the teacher named Audulomi

७ । एवमप्युपन्यासात् पूर्वभावादविरोधं वादरायणः ।

७ । एवम् अपि पारमार्थिक-चैतन्यमात्र-स्वरूप-अभ्युपगमे अपि 'उपन्यासात् पूर्वभावात्' व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्य अपि उपन्यासादित्य 'अवगतस्य सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादि-ब्राह्म-ऐश्वर्य-रूपस्य अप्रत्याख्यानात्, अविरोधः मन्यते आचार्यः वादरायणः ।

7 Even in that case, there is no inconsistency, says Bādarayana, because of the existence of the former qualities known from reference etc

Even in that case *i. e.* even if intelligence alone is taken to be the essential nature of the self yet because of the former qualities known from references etc. that is as the former attributes inferred from references etc. *e. g.* the lordly divine powers such as true volition etc. cannot be denied from a relative standpoint therefore there is no inconsistency — so thinks the teacher Bāda-  
rāyana.

८ । सङ्ख्यादेव तु तच्छ्रुति ।

८ । मुक्तात्मनः सङ्ख्यात् एव तस्य भावः भिजति न तु निमित्ताकारपेक्षया ।  
'तच्छ्रुतिः' यतः सङ्ख्यामिति एव शास्त्रविधायी श्रूयतः सदा — स यदि पित्रभीतकामो  
भवति सङ्ख्यामीनाम् पितरं भवतिष्ठति ( छा. पा. ११ ) इत्यादि ।

8 But (a released soul's wishes are fulfilled) by mere will *b* cause scripture says so

To a released soul the fulfilment of desires comes through his will only but not through the instrumentality of anything else. Because scripture says so. In the Vidyā of Brahman within the heart we read of such direct fulfilment of desire *e. g.* If he longs for the world of the fathers by his mere will do the fathers rise (*Chh. VIII 2 1*) and so on.

९ । अतएव चानन्याधिपति ।

९ । यतः एव च यस्याः सङ्ख्यात् एव 'य' मुक्तात्मा अनन्याधिपतिः भवति ।

9 And for this very reason (the released soul) has no other over lord

‘And for this reason’, i. e., because its wills are absolutely effective, the released soul has no other overlord

### १० । अभावं वादविराहं ह्येवम् ।

१० । ‘वादवि’ आचार्य्य मुक्तात्मनः शरीरेन्द्रियाणां च ‘अभावम्’ आह, “हि” यतः स्मृतिः, “मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् भवति ब्रह्मबोधि” ( छा ८।१।५ ) ‘एवम्’ मुक्तात्मनः शरीरेन्द्रियाणाम् अभावः कथयति । यदि मनसा शरीरेन्द्रियैः च विहरेत्, तदा “मनसा” इति विशेषणं न स्यात् ।

10 *Bādarī* (teaches) the absence (of a body and sense-organs in a released soul) because (scripture declares) thus

“The sage Bādarī teaches the absence” of a body and sense-organs in a released soul, “because scripture”, in the passage “In the world of Brahman he (the self) rejoices, seeing those desired objects with his mind” (*Chh* VIII 12 5), declares “thus”, i. e., the absence of the body and the organs in the case of a released soul. Had he rejoiced with his mind as well as with a body and its organs, the text would not have used the adverb “with his mind”

### ११ । भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पात्मननात् ।

११ । ‘जैमिनि’ आचार्य्य मुक्तस्थः मनीवत् शरीरेन्द्रियाणां च ‘भाव’ मन्यते । ‘विकल्प-आत्मननात्’ यतः “स एकधा भवति विधा भवति” ( छा ७।२।२ ) इत्यादिना अनेकधा भावविकल्पस्य आसन्नत्विः । न हि अनेकविधता विना शरीरभेदेन चाक्षसी स्यात् ।



scripture contains indications of both kinds, becomes sometimes a 'satva' and sometimes an 'ahīna' sacrifice, similarly here

१३ । तन्वभावे सम्यवदुपपद्यते ।

१३ । तनु-अभावे मुक्तात्मनः उपलब्धि 'सम्यवत्' स्वप्नावस्थावत् 'उपपद्यते' ।

13 When the released soul has no body, (perceptions) are possible (to him) as in the dreaming state

In the state of absence of body, perceptions may occur to the released soul as they occur to us in our dreaming state

१४ । भावे जाग्रद्वत् ।

१४ । तनो 'भावे' सत्तायाम् मुक्तात्मन उपलब्धि 'जाग्रद्वत्' भवति ।

14 When the released soul has a body, (perceptions occur to it) as in the waking state

When the released soul has a body, his perceptions are (as real) as they are to us in our waking state

१५ । प्रदीपवदविशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

१५ । 'प्रदीपवत् आवेश' यथा प्रदीप एकः अनेक-प्रदीपभावम् आपद्यते विकारशक्तियोगात्, एवम् एक अपि सन् मुक्तात्मा ऐश्वर्ययोगात् अनेकभावम् आपद्य सर्व्वाणि सङ्कल्पवृष्टानि शरीराणि आविशति । 'तथाहि दर्शयति' यत शास्त्रम् "स एकावा भवति विधा भवति, पञ्चधा समष्टा" (छां ७.२.६.१२.) इत्यादिना एकस्य अनेक-भावम् दर्शयति ।

15 *Entering (into several bodies) is similar to that of a lamp for scripture shows thus*

'The entering of the released soul into several bodies is similar to that of a lamp. Just as the one flame of a lamp through its power of self modification can convert itself into several flames similarly a released soul through its lordly power can multiply itself and enter all the various bodies created by its will. For scripture shows thus" : c., because scripture by such passages as He is one he becomes three five seven (*Chh* VII 26. 2) shows that one may become many

१६ । स्वाप्यय-सम्पत्तोरग्यतापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।

१६ । अयं पुनः मुख्य अनेकशरीरप्रवेशादि-सम्पत्तम् ईदृशं चक्षुष्यसम्पत्ते यावता "तत् त्वेन च विज्ञानीयात्" (उप १।३।१७ ३।३।१९) "न तु तद्वितीयमस्ति (उप ३।३।१९ इत्याद्या) इति एवमातीत्ययां श्रुतिः विश्वविज्ञानं वाचयति इति अतः तत्र पठति,—स्वाप्यय-सम्पत्तम् । सम्पत्तिं शब्दस्यम् । तयोः अन्तर्गतम् अवस्थाम् अपेक्ष्य एतत् विश्वविज्ञानमावश्यकम् उक्तम् । अयम् अवगम्यते ?—आविष्कृतं हि अतः तत् तत्र एव तदविकारवशात् आविष्कृतम् प्रकाशितम् एतेनैव श्रुत्या समुत्थाय तावन्वागुनिगम्यति न प्रेत्य संशयः (उप १।३।१९ ३।३।१९) एव वा अस्य सर्वमाख्येयम् (उप १।३।१७ ३।३।१९) "यत्र सुप्ति न कश्चन शब्दं आनयति न कश्चन स्वरं पश्यति (सायु ५) इत्यादि श्रुतिश्च ।

16. (The denial of specific cognitions found in certain texts) refers to either of the two states of deep sleep and union. This is manifest from the texts

An objection may be raised here. How can we



admit the possession of lordly powers, (e. g., that of entering several bodies etc.), by a released soul, in the face of such scriptural texts to the contrary, as “Then whereby can he know another?” (*Bri.* II 4. 14, IV 5 15), “Then there is no second” (*Bri* IV 3. 23) etc., which expressly declare that the soul (in that state) can have no specific cognitions? To this objection we reply This denial of specific cognitions refers in every case to either of the two states, *viz*, dreamless sleep, and union with Brahman How is this known? “This is manifest from the texts”, i. e., in the texts on the absence of cognitions, the two above states are manifest as being the very subject-matter of the texts. *E g* “Rising from out of these elements, he vanishes again in them When he has departed, there is no more consciousness” (*Bri.* II 4. 12, IV 5 13), “When to him all this has become the Self” (*Bri* II 4. 14, IV. 5. 15), “When falling asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams” (*Bri.* IV. 3. 19, *Mán* 5), etc

### ૧૭। જગદ્વ્યાપારવર્જી પ્રકરણાદસન્નિહિતત્વાચ્ચ ।

૧૭। ‘જગત્-વ્યાપાર-વર્જી’ જગત્-ઉત્પત્તિ-કાર્ય વર્જયિત્વા અન્યત્ અર્થિભાદિ-આત્મકમ્ ऐश्वर्यम् મુક્તાત્માનામ્ ભવિતુમ્ અર્હતિ । જગત્-સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-કાર્ય તુ નિત્યસિદ્ધસ્ય રૂપસ્વરસ્ય એવ । ‘પ્રકરણાત્’ યતઃ રૂપસ્વર-પ્રકરણે એવ સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-વ્યાપારઃ ઉક્તાઃ, ન તુ જીવપ્રકરણે । ‘અસન્નિહિતત્વાત્ ચ’ યતઃ ચ જીવઃ સૃષ્ટ્યાદિ-વ્યાપારે અસન્નિહિત વહુદૂરસ્થિતઃ, સદ્યઃ પશ્યાત્ તદુત્પત્તેઃ ।

17. With the exception of creative activity, (all

other lordly powers may be possessed by the released soul) *because of topic and absence of proximity*

'With the exception of cosmic affairs *viz.*, creation of the world etc., all other lordly powers *e. g.* the power of reducing one's self to an atomic size etc may belong to released souls. The creation of the world etc., belong to the eternally perfect Īsvara only. Because of topic", *i. e.*, because creation etc. are treated of in the scriptures under the topic of Īsvara, and not of Jīva. "And absence of proximity that is the individual self is not proximate to, *i. e.* very far from, the act of creation" etc. it having been born after creation

१८। प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेत्तादिकारिक भण्डस्योक्ते ।

१८। "चाद्रीति आराग्यम् ( तै १।६ ) इत्यादि 'प्रत्यक्ष उपदेशात् मुक्तानां निरङ्कुशम् ऐश्वर्ये सञ्चति इति चेत् आगच्छा स्यात् 'न सा युक्ता । आदिकारिक स प्रत्यक्षोपदेशे यत् सन्निवृत्त्यादियु निरीयावतमेव व्यवस्थितं य परमेश्वर, तत् आगता एव इयं आराग्यमिति उच्यते । ईश्वर्यप्राप्तात् मुक्तानाम् ऐश्वर्यम् न निरङ्कुशम् इति भावः ।

18. If (it be objected that) *from direct scriptural statements* (the power of the released soul is known to be absolute) *we say No because such power is said to belong to the Lord abiding in the solar regions*

If it be objected that from such direct scriptural statements" as He attains lordship" (*Tait I 6*) the lordly power of the released soul is known to be absolute *we say No* "Because such power is said to belong

to the Lord performing special functions and abiding in the solar regions", 1 e, because scripture expressly declares that the attainment of lordship by the released soul is dependent upon the Highest Lord, who for the discharge of certain specified offices abides in the solar regions Being dependent upon the Highest Lord, the lordly power of the released soul cannot evidently be absolute

## १८ । विकारावर्त्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह ।

१८ । न केवलं सवितमण्डलादि-अधिष्ठान सविकार पारमेष्ठ्यरूप, किन्तु 'विकारावर्त्ति च' विकारातीत निर्गुण च । 'तथाहि स्थितिम् आह' यत आन्नाय 'तथा' सगुण-निर्गुणरूपेण विवक्षा 'स्थितिम्' आह, "तावानस्य सहिमा ततो जायाश्च पुरुष । पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृत दिवि" ( छा ३।१।२।६ ऋक् १०।८०।३ ) इत्यादिना ।

19 (The Highest Lord) has also an unqualified non-derived form, for scripture declares his abiding thus

The Highest Lord not only has a qualified effected form, e g, the one by which he rules the solar regions, "but he has also a non-derived unqualified form" "For scripture declares his abiding thus", 1 e, in both the unqualified and qualified forms, as in the passage, "Such is its greatness Greater than it is the Person All beings constitute one-fourth of him the other three-fourths are all that is immortal in heaven" (Rik. X 90 3, Chh III 12 6) etc

२० । दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ।

१ । 'अदृश्य-चतुर्मासि सृति-क्षुती परतः सृतिर विज्ञातवन्ति' दशयत च ।

"न तत्र दृश्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारक ।

मेमा विद्युती भाति कुतोऽग्नयि ॥ ( कठ १।१।५ मृ १।१।१ ) इति श्रुति ।

'न तत्रावर्तते दृश्यो न श्रमाढी न पाशयः । ( गी १५।६ ) इति श्रुति ।

20 *And perception and inference (i. e. scripture and smṛiti) both show this*

Both scripture and smṛiti declare that the highest light is above all effected things & g the scriptural texts 'The sun does not shine there nor the moon the star, or these lightnings How hall this fire shine there?' (*Katha* II 2. 15 *Mund* II 2 10) And the Smṛiti text The sun lights not that [place], nor the moon nor fire (*Glid* \V 5)

२१ । मीगमात्रमाभ्यलिङ्गाच्च ।

११ । इत च न मुक्तानाम् ईश्वरे निरङ्कुशं यस्यात् भागमात्रम् एवाम् चकारि सिद्धेन ईश्वरेण समानम् इति श्रुति — "तमाह चापो न खलु मी । हि चसी चरं ते शीघ्रं ( कोपी १।६ ) इति । न यद्येतां देवतां सर्वानपि भूतान्यपि हिंसादि सर्वानपि 'भूतान्धनि' ( इह १।५।१ ) ते न च एतस्य देवताय मातुष्यं सन्धीकृतान्धनि ( इह १।५।१३ ) इत्यादि भेद व्यपदेशा निहिन्ध्य ।

21 *And scripture indicates that the equality (be tr on the Highest Lord and the released soul) consists only in enjoyment*

Another reason why the lordly power of the released

soul cannot be taken to be absolute is, that the equality between the eternally perfect Lord and the released soul consists, as declared in the scriptures, in enjoyment only In everything else differences are indicated, as in the texts "To him Brahman says This world of mine, consisting of water, is thine" (*Kaushī* I 6), "And as all beings honour that deity, so do all beings honour him who knows that" (*Bṛ* I 5 20), "By this observance he wins identity of nature and identity of abode with that deity" (*Bṛ* I 5 23)

२२ । अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ।

२२ । मुक्तानाम् ऐश्वर्यस्य अन्तवर्त्ते अपि न तेषाम् ब्रह्मलोकात् पुनरावृत्तिं प्रत्यागमनम् अस्ति, इति अनेन उपसहरति,—ब्रह्मलोकात् मुक्तानाम् अनावृत्ति एव सिद्धिः, "ब्रह्मलोकमभिसम्पद्यते न च पुनरावर्त्तन्ते" ( का ८।१५।१ ) इत्यादि-‘शब्दात्’ अतिवचनहेतोः । सूत्राभ्यासः शास्त्रसमाप्तिं दर्शयति ।

22 (Of the released souls) *there is no return, because scripture says so, there is no return, because scripture says so*

The Sūtrakāra concludes by saying that though 'the lordly power of the released souls is limited, yet there is no return for them from the world of Brahman Their non-return is proved by scriptural statements such as "He reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return." (*Chh* VIII 15 1) etc

The repetition of the words of this sūtra indicates the conclusion of the work

